

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Twenty-third Conference of the Parties (COP23)



COP23 | FIJI

UN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE

BONN 2017



**6 to 17 November 2017
Bonn, Germany**



United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
Twenty-third Conference
of the Parties (COP23)

6 to 17 November 2017
Bonn, Germany

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE AND DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Publication Director

Jean-Pierre NDOUTOUM, Director of IFDD

Technical Coordination

Arona SOUMARE, Programme Specialist, IFDD

Drafting team

Stéphane POUFFARY, ENERGIES 2050

(Drafting management)

Antoine ANTONINI, ENERGIES 2050

(Coordination)

Frédéric GAGNON-LEBRUN, IISD

Yanick TOUCHETTE, IISD

Alice BISIAUX, IISD

Kamel DJEMOUAI

Axel MICHAÉLOWA, Perspectives
Climate Change

Contributors

Mathias HONNEGER, Perspectives Climate
Group

Marjorie MENARD, Perspectives Climate Group

Aglaja ESPELAGE, Perspectives Climate Group

El Hadji Mbaye DIAGNE, Africa –

Energy- Environment

Marc FREITAS, Perspective Climat
et Développement Durable

Guillaume DE LABOULAYE, ENERGIES 2050

Stéphane QUEFELEC, ENERGIES 2050

Laurent DITTRICK, ENERGIES 2050

Yael POUFFARY, ENERGIES 2050

Graphics

Grégory BOVE, ENERGIES 2050

Review Committee (in alphabetical order)

Ndiaye CHEIKH SYLLA, Senegal

Jean-Pierre ELONG MBASSI, CGLU Africa

Sandra FREITAS, Togo

Mamadou HONADIA, Burkina Faso

Gervais Ludovic ITSOUA-MADZOUS,

COMIFAC

Mohamed KHALIL, Egypt

Kamayé MAAZOU, Niger

Seyni NAFO, Mali Climate Ambassador

Nivohary RAMAROSON, Madagascar

Komi TOMYEBE, Togo

Editorial Assistance

Issa BADO, Programme Attaché, IFDD

Christin CALIXTE, Programme Assistant, IFDD

IFDD Information and Documentation Department

Louis-Noël JAIL, Communication Officer,

Marilyne LAURENDEAU, Communication Assistant

This document has been prepared by ENERGIES 2050 on behalf of the *Institut de la Francophonie pour le Développement Durable* (IFDD – Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development). It does not necessarily represent the viewpoint of one or other of these organisations, nor that of the presidency of the COP23.

This document was updated on the basis of information available as at 3 October 2017.



in partnership with



ISBN: 978-2-89481-256-3

ISBN web version: 978-2-89481-257-0

This *Guide to negotiations* is the subject of a *Summary for policymakers*: You can consult the guide and the summary online on the IFDD website: <http://www.ifdd.francophonie.org/ressources/ressources-pub.php?id=13>

Layout

Perfection Design

Cover photos

- School being built at Damadé (Togo) - DEKA EWE (France) and NEJ (Togo) associations. All rights reserved. - "BIOCAMER Cameroon" project, nominated for the French-speaking Africa Climate Initiative Trophies 2017. All rights reserved. - Pixabay. - Groupe Sehom Inc. - Solar installation Sé, Benin. - IRD - IRA - Christian Lamontagne.

© Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD), 2017

56 rue Saint-Pierre, 3^e étage, Quebec City (Quebec) G1K 4A1, Canada

Telephone: 418 692-5727 – Fax: 418 692-5644

ifdd@francophonie.org – www.ifdd.francophonie.org

*This publication was printed on 100% post-consumer fibres
and chlorine-free paper, manufactured using biogas.*



A few words from the Director of the IFDD

Two years after COP21, which culminated in the historic signing of the Paris Agreement adopted by the countries in December 2015 and which entered into force on 4 November 2016, the 23rd session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (COP23) taking place in Bonn finds itself on the cusp of having to turn commitments into reality.

Admittedly, there is cause for celebration on the unprecedented speed of ratifications (170 Parties to date), the rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement and global determination to implement it quickly and fully, as shown in the Marrakech Proclamation for Climate Action and the unprecedented commitment by cities, investors, civil society organisations and businesses.

Recent extreme meteorological events this year (2017) have nevertheless reminded us yet again of the urgent need for action. The adverse effects of climate change are worsening, with severe droughts and unprecedented rainfall, storms and floods, especially in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, causing tremendous losses and damage estimated at several billion dollars.

Although progress has been made, since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, in Marrakech and Bonn during the inter-session negotiations held in May 2017 (46th session of permanent subsidiary bodies), the negotiators still have their work cut out to agree on all the details that will ensure an operational Paris Agreement. Concrete milestones must be marked out during COP23. Postponing certain critical decisions until the COP24 in December 2018 is not an option.

COP23 should therefore establish clearly bridges between progress made in Marrakech during COP22 and the next step in implementing the Paris Agreement.

Going beyond its technical nature this time, COP23 will only be successful if players are able to reach consensus on the modalities, procedures and guidelines that will assist all Parties in complying with their obligations under the Paris Agreement.

Everyone agrees on the irreversible nature of the Paris Agreement, but the time has come to give it the means for implementation. This message is in line with the declarations by ministers and heads of delegations attending the Meeting of the Committee of the Least Developed Countries in Addis Ababa and the pre-COP23 Meeting in Fiji in October 2017.

Without losing the central objective of substantially reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the momentum for the implementation of the Agreement must be maintained through a series of concrete climate actions that requires the involvement of all State and non-State stakeholders.

In this context, a key task in Bonn will be to prepare the Facilitative Dialogue scheduled to take place throughout 2018, culminating at COP24 in Warsaw, Poland. At the end of COP23, precise guidelines should be laid down to direct the global effort required to put the world on a pathway lower than a 1.5°C rise in temperature.

It is also important to take stock of progress made and process the renewal of nationally-determined contributions (NDC). As such, only increased cooperation between the developed and developing countries will provide the most vulnerable countries with the necessary financial, technological and capacity-building support to implement ambitious NDC capable of meeting the challenges.

The issues being debated are at the heart of concerns of the Francophonie. An effective global response to climate change is inextricably linked to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, as climate change creates new costs and exacerbates the existing development problems. By implementing the Paris Agreement, a substantial proportion of vulnerable communities in French-speaking and worldwide countries will emerge from poverty.

For this reason, readers, the *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie* (OIF), through its subsidiary body, the *Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable* (IFDD), will continue to support actions favouring a transition towards a low-carbon economy of its member countries as well as the active participation of French-speakers in the international climate change negotiations.

I hope that this new edition of the Guide to the Negotiations produced by IFDD will enlighten you on the issues of COP23. The purpose of this guide is to keep you advised of progress in the negotiations and on the key points to be discussed during COP23.

Its production has been made possible through the mobilisation of the French-speaking expertise and of our partners, especially Energies 2050, who we thank most warmly.

Negotiators and partners, I wish you excellent work and a successful outcome in Bonn, where the keyword will therefore be converting commitments into deeds.

Pleasant reading!

Jean-Pierre Ndoutoum

How to use this guide

The *Guide to the Negotiations* and the *Summary for policymakers* is enhanced year on year and goes beyond the climate change negotiating structure. This is even truer within the framework of current international climate actions, which, following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, formally aims to set up a multi-party and multi-sector, de-compartmentalised dynamic. Academics, public or private stakeholders, representatives of civil society organisations or international institutions, increasingly use the analytic and dynamic content of the issues outlined in the *Guide* and the *Summary* as a source of factual information, that is independent and up to date on negotiations.

Once again this year, the drafting team wanted to break new ground by promoting the accessibility of information to readers with varying degrees of knowledge about the negotiation process – whether they have in-depth knowledge or are knowledgeable about the topics or are first-time attendees. The goal is still that everyone can browse through the *Guide* and access all the information he needs, based on his priorities and the time he has available for this. With this in mind, efforts have been made to engage with a wider audience. Summary boxes support the detailed descriptions and analyses of the various questions addressed in the negotiations wherever possible so that the notion addressed can thus be grasped immediately. Illustrative and summary figures thus complete the picture, so the reader will have all the keys they need to understand the negotiations.

The 2017 edition of the *Guide* is once more benefiting from input from a group of authors comprising eminent members from different French-speaking countries who have been involved in the climate negotiations for many years. Known and recognised players, their early involvement in the negotiation chamber as well as in implementing policies and measures resulting from climate agreements brings this collective work as close as possible to the negotiation realities and to the major issues and challenges. A proofreading Committee comprised of individuals also known for their expertise was also set up for this edition to ensure that it would be of the highest quality. We are hopeful that the various contributions will make the work even more relevant and useful for the negotiators and actors implementing concrete projects resulting from the negotiations.

Part I puts the main negotiation issues under the Paris Agreement and its supporting Decision 1/CP.21 into perspective. This includes especially the implementation of commitments forming part of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), mechanisms, ambition, financing issues, adaptation and the role of non-State players. Each theme has its own analysis to bring out the main points of negotiations in progress and the challenges to achieve implementation of objectives and convert the ambitions of the international community into reality.

Part II proposes a general framework for the understanding of elements comprising the document in its entirety. As such, a brief history of international climate negotiations is outlined (Section II.A) since the adoption of the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) up to the 23rd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP23, November 2017, Bonn, Germany). Special emphasis is given to the main cycles that led to COP21 and the adoption of the Paris Agreement. A description of the structure of the Convention and the role and mandate of its main ad hoc working groups (Section II.B) rounds out this historical framework so that the reader can understand the negotiation architecture. Lastly, the main negotiating groups and their positions (Section II.C) are presented. This introduces the negotiation stakeholders and their views for the spokespersons.

Part III presents in detail the execution of objectives from Paris between COP22 and COP23 (Section II.A), focusing on the sessions of the permanent Subsidiary Bodies (Section II.A.1) and of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (Section II.A.2). This part also summarily deciphers the Paris Agreement, its main provisions and operational modalities emerging from Decision 1/CP.21 (Section II.B).

The authors have attempted to propose a global, analytical overview of the issues in each of these three parts. Numerous synthetic diagrams figure in the body of the document. These are designed to give the reader an overview and simplified perusal of the various topics addressed. The outlook within each section on the expectations of the COP23 is presented in terms of execution and operationalisation of major issues. Readers are referred to other sections of the *Guide* and to the source documents the length of the text so that they can broaden their understanding of a topic if they so wish.

Terminology sheets relating to the French and equivalent English vocabulary specific to the climate change negotiations and the abbreviations and acronyms currently used under the negotiations are also provided. Note that only the document listings are quoted when reference is made to documents resulting from negotiations. These listings, designed to make reading easier, can furthermore be used to find the documents referred to very easily on the Convention website¹. A table was added as an appendix to this document to make the listing easy to understand².

We hope that this *Guide* will meet readers' expectations. We ask them to share their assessment and suggestions with us by filling in the form at the end of the guide.

This *Guide to the negotiations* and its accompanying *Summary for policymakers* were updated on 3 October 2017.

Climate change is a universal issue where the effects are very real for an increasing proportion of the world population. More than ever there is an urgent need for action and the negotiations, even if they are still the remit of the UNFCCC States-signatory Parties, must not remain within the restricted enclave of specialists. This *Guide to the Negotiations* and its accompanying *Summary for policymakers* augment the firm commitment to give every reader the keys to understand and act.

1. <http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/items/3595.php>

2. See A.2.: List of the documents from the negotiations.

Contents

A few words from the Director of the IFDD	iii
How to use this guide	v
Introduction	1
International climate action confronted to the challenge of implementation	1
A Guide to understand, share and increase the opportunities to act	4
Part I. The issues and positions	5
Summary table of negotiation issues at COP23	5
I.1. Issues of permanent subsidiary bodies	7
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)	7
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)	28
I.2. Issues relating to the ad hoc working groups (AWG) and the Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Parties of the Paris Agreement (CMA)	32
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)	32
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)	50
I.3. The cooperation mechanisms of the Paris Agreement	51
Progress at COP22 in November 2016 in Marrakech	52
Progress during the subsidiary body sessions in Bonn in May 2017	64
I.4. Pursuing efforts towards 1.5 °C	76
I.5. National considerations related to the implementation of the NDCs	85
From INDCs to NDCs, a process at the core of the Paris Agreement	85
Realistic implementation of NDCs in each country	89
The continuation of the work on the NDCs and the main outcomes expected from the upcoming negotiation sessions	94
I.6. Ambition and sectoral approaches	97
Ambition	97
Sectoral approaches	102

I.7. Transfer of technologies.....	104
Context: the issue of technology in the climate negotiations.....	104
The issue of technology and the Paris Agreement.....	104
Continuation of work, situation since COP21 and on the run-up to COP23.....	105
I.8. Capacity building.....	108
Context: the issue of capacity-building in international climate action	108
Brief history of the capacity-building negotiations under the Convention.	110
Capacity-building in the context of the Paris Agreement	111
Continuation of negotiations, the situation since COP21 in the run-up to COP23.....	112
I.9. Financing questions.....	114
Climate Financing and the COP under the Fiji presidency.....	114
Long-term climate financing	115
The Standing Committee for Finance (SCF)	117
Green Climate Fund (GCF)	119
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	122
Sixth review of the financial mechanism of the Convention.....	123
Adaptation Fund	124
Points related to the implementation of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement.....	125
Other financial issues.....	126
Conclusion	127
I.10. Adaptation.....	127
Adaptation Committee.....	129
National communication on Adaptation	130
Nairobi Work Programme (NWP)	131
Adaptation Communications Registry.....	132
National Adaptation Plan (NAP).....	133
I.11. Role of non-State actors & evaluation of commitments.....	134
Non-State actors in international climate action, a role of growing recognition with several initiatives already under way	134
Recognition of the role of non-State actors within the Paris Agreement.....	138
The importance of mobilising non-State actors in international climate action in the post-Paris era	141
Continuing implementation, review between COP22 and COP23.....	142

I.12. Transparency	146
Progress of different working groups operating as part of the UNFCCC	147
a. Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)	147
b. Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)	150
Development of initiatives supporting transparency	152
a. The Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) ...	152
b. Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT)	154
Barriers to overcome	154
COP23 Standing Committee work programme	156
I.13. Facilitation dialogue	156
I.14. Ongoing Climate Initiatives	157
I.15. Equality of the sexes in the context of climate change negotiations	165
Context: “gender”, “gender equality” and climate	165
Recognising and taking into account issues relating to gender and gender equality in international negotiations	166
Work generating the results of COP21 and the inclusion of gender equality in the Paris Agreement	169
Further work on gender and equality between men and women following the Paris results	172
Part II. Understanding international climate negotiations:	
From the Paris Agreement to its implementation	177
II.A. The implementation of the Agreement...	
From Marrakech to Bonn	177
II.A.1. Sessions and outcomes of the permanent subsidiary organs between COP22 and COP23	180
II.A.2. Sessions and results of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement between COP22 and COP23	181
II.B. Concise summary of the Paris Agreement	182
Form and legal implications	182
Summary of the Paris Agreement	184
Article 2. Goal	189
Article 3. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)	190
Article 4. Mitigation	192
Article 5. Forests	193
Article 6. Cooperation mechanisms: market and “non-market” mechanisms	194

Article 7. Adaptation	198
Article 8. Loss and damage	198
Article 9. Financing	199
Article 10. Technology development and transfer	200
Article 11. Capacity building	201
Article 12. Public education, training, awareness and participation.....	202
Article 13. Transparency of measures and support.....	202
Article 14. Global stocktake.....	204
Article 15. Facilitation on the implementation and compliance	204
Articles 16-22. Institutional provisions and final clauses	205
Part III. Understanding international climate negotiations:	
General information	207
III.A. Brief history of international negotiations on climate change	207
Bali Action Plan (2007)	209
Copenhagen Accord (2009).....	211
Cancún Agreements (2010).....	212
Durban Platform (2011)	212
Doha Climate Gateway (2012).....	213
Warsaw Conference (2013)	214
Lima Call for Climate Action and the road to Paris (2014).....	214
The Paris Agreement, adoption of the first universal Climate agreement (2015).....	215
Marrakech...the “Action Conference”	216
III.B. Structure of the Convention and description of the role and mandate of its main bodies and ad hoc groups.....	217
III.B.1. Structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	218
III.B.2. Description of the role and mandate of the main decision-making bodies	221
III.B.3. Description of the role and mandate of the main ad hoc working groups	221
III.C. Presentation and positions of the various negotiation groups.....	223
III.C.1. Presentation of the main negotiating groups.....	223
III.C.2. Positions of the main negotiating groups	229
General conclusion	234
Appendices.....	251

A.1. Themed Sheets	237
Sheet 1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).....	237
Sheet 2. Kyoto Protocol.....	239
Sheet 3. List of Parties to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement and ratification status	241
A.2. List of the documents from the negotiations.....	242
A.3. Abbreviations and acronyms (French – English).....	243
A.4. Abbreviations and acronyms (English – French).....	246
A.5. Thematic glossary.....	249
A.6. Meeting agendas during COP23.....	255
Bibliography.....	264
ENERGIES 2050 presentation.....	283
IFDD presentation	285
OIF presentation	287
Guide to the Negotiations assessment form	288

List of Figures

Figure 1.	Statutes of the biennial updated report submissions	10
Figure 2.	Home page – NDC registry	15
Figure 3.	Search engine – NDC registry.....	15
Figure 4.	Individual home page – NDC registry	16
Figure 5.	The implementation of the Paris Agreement... Main arrangements “for consideration and adoption” during CMA1 – Summary.....	34
Figure 6.	Implementation of the Paris Agreement ... The agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences – Summary	35
Figure 7.	Ambition-related mechanisms – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences.....	36
Figure 8.	Cooperative approaches and pre-2020 Ambition – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences.....	37
Figure 9.	Adaptation and Loss and Damage – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences.....	38
Figure 10.	Financing – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences	39
Figure 11.	Technology – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences	40
Figure 12.	Capacity-building – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences.....	41
Figure 13.	Transparency and compliance – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences.....	42
Figure 14.	The issues of permanent subsidiary bodies related to the elements of the Paris Agreement and the accompanying decision.....	45
Figure 15.	Examples of differentiated consequences caused by a temperature increase of 2°C vs 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels	82

Figure 16. Evolution of the Convention’s goal and consideration of 1.5 °C	83
Figure 17. Projected rise in global temperature by 2100 based on 1990-2030 emissions pathways	84
Figure 18. The INDCs, an innovative and inclusive process for implementing the first universal climate agreement.....	87
Figure 19. Status of the ratification of the Paris Agreement and NDC submissions compared to the number of parties to the UNFCCC.....	94
Figure 20. Number of actors engaged in individual actions by sector (NAZCA)	135
Figure 21. Number of actors engaged in cooperative actions by sector (NAZCA)	136
Figure 22. Cities engaged in NAZCA	137
Figure 23. Signatories of the Covenant of Mayors.....	137
Figure 24. Progression of agreements on the transparency of support	151
Figure 25. The SDG, Goal 5: Gender equality	174
Figure 26. The structure of the Paris Agreement in a few words	185
Figure 27. The principles of the Paris Agreement in a few words.....	186
Figure 28. Conceptual diagram of the Global Stocktake	191
Figure 29. Process for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement and ratification status.....	206
Figure 30. International climate negotiations, main stages 1988-2015.....	209
Figure 31. Conceptual figure of the UNFCCC structure	218

Introduction

International climate action confronted to the challenge of implementation

Scientific analyses highlight gradual disruptions of the climate system and a global rise in temperatures over the last two centuries, at an increasing pace during recent decades³. These events are mainly caused by greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) associated with our consumption and production modes, with consequences that could quickly prove irreversible⁴. The 5th Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) restated in 2013 the anthropogenic (human) origin of this phenomenon, deeming “extremely likely⁵” (indicating more than 95% probability) the link between the rise in temperatures noted since 1950 and human activities.

Despite international negotiations, it is clear that progress in combating climate change has remained very modest compared with the numerous challenges raised. According to this same IPCC report, the increase in average temperatures could be between +2.6°C and +4.8°C by 2100. This increase would have major impacts, in particular changes to rainfall conditions, melting ice, rising sea levels (from 26 to 85 cm by the end of the century, depending on scenarios), the salinisation of soils, advancing desertification, ocean acidification or increasing extreme climatic events. These consequences would furthermore make already complex environmental, economic and social issues more pronounced, particularly in developing countries⁶.

The negotiation process put into place to face up to this global challenge is a pioneering experiment in the history of our societies. For the first time ever, the governments of almost all States are working jointly in the framework of a complex process which questions our economic development and social models replacing the environment, human development, inclusivity or solidarity among peoples as central concerns. This negotiation process has been conducted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since its adoption in 1992⁷. These negotiations are ambitious in scope. In fact, they simply mean protecting present and future generations from the multiple and devastating consequences of too significant and rapid increases in global planet temperatures.

The responsibility weighing on the shoulders of negotiators and policymakers is therefore huge. In a context where everyone defends their country's legitimate interests and focusses on their own national circumstances, delays in implementing ambitious actions, in line with the urgency and the scope of the issues, will have

3. IPCC, 2013.

4. IPCC, 2013.

5. IPCC, 2013.

6. Source: IPCC, quoted in ENERGIES 2050, 2016a.

7. Came into force on 21 March 1997. To find out more about the UNFCCC: see Annex A.1 – Sheet 1.

consequences for everyone. Although these consequences will be very unevenly spread, placing a burden particularly on the most vulnerable countries, which are, however, only slightly or not responsible for the current climate situation.

Within this context the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21, organised in Paris in 2015) to the UNFCCC was an historic step with the adoption of a new crucial international agreement to progress climate negotiations. The outcome of a process that started several years ago, the Paris Agreement copperfastens the hope for a global agreement of the States and a strengthening of the measures undertaken to combat climate change. This Agreement traces a roadmap towards international climate action for the years to come, and for the first time it brings together all the Parties to the UNFCCC. On this basis, it aims to significantly reduce their GHG emissions, but also addresses the implementation of measures required to increase the resilience of the human being and its environment to climate disturbances.

The Paris Agreement therefore takes into account the necessary mitigation efforts by the Parties, focusing on the objective to maintain warming “*significantly below*” the 2°C of pre-industrial levels from now until the end of the century, whilst at the same time encouraging the pursuit of efforts to stay within 1.5°C. The concerns of the developing countries have also been integrated and adaptation has also been recognised as an objective in its own right on the same level as mitigation. This is also true for loss and damage, capacity-building, technology transfer or again financing so that the Agreement can be implemented.

To achieve the objective of maintaining the average global temperature, but also to allow each Party State to enhance their own national realities, the commitments of the countries are presented in the form of Contributions decided on a national level (NDC) defined by the Party-States themselves. This “bottom up” process is the outcome of an unusual approach by the UNFCCC, whereby each Party is invited to formulate their own commitments and challenges in line with the Convention’s founding principles of equality, common but differentiated responsibilities and their respective capacities regarding national realities.

By adding these additional individual contributions arising from the NDCs implies collectively achieving the objectives set by the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, despite the process established by the Paris Agreement to renew and increase NDC commitments every five years, this momentum does, however, run the risk that the amount of national commitments is not enough to reach the target of 1.5°C/2°C. It should be recalled that, despite repeated warnings from the IPCC, which was already calling on developed countries in 2007 to collectively reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 25 to 40% by 2020 compared with levels in 1990⁸, global anthropogenic GHG emissions have not stopped rising⁹. We worryingly note that according to the United Nations figures, “*temperatures have continued to increase in 2016 [globally] establishing a new record of 1.1°C above pre-industrial levels*”¹⁰.

8. IPCC, 2007.

9. IPCC, 2014a, p. 6.

10. United Nations, 2017, p. 44.

Prior to COP22, a report produced by the secretariat of the Convention, taking into account the national contributions communicated by the Parties up to 4 April 2016, confirmed that the commitment of the States will not be sufficient to achieve a trajectory compatible with temperature increases below 2°C¹¹. Other studies carried out since then have confirmed the failure of the collective ambition to achieve the objective of maintaining temperatures¹². Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the challenges linked to its implementation cannot be underestimated, specifically the challenge of ensuring a continuous increase in the level of ambition. International cooperation provides initial leverage, such as the mobilisation of all stakeholders in the process.

As a positive sign for international climate change, the Paris Agreement, barely a year after its adoption in December 2015, came into force on 4 November 2016¹³, a few days after COP22 (Marrakech, November 2016). Propelled by this dynamic, COP22 was announced as the “Conference of action” and the launch of work in the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement which had officially come into force. A great deal of progress was expected, particularly regarding market mechanisms, the pre-2020 Agenda, capacity-building, the improvement in access to financing sources and technology transfer for the benefit of developing and less advanced countries, or again in the area of transparency and monitoring. Finally, the Parties ended two weeks of negotiations by adopting over 30 decisions, even though¹⁴, numerous points are still outstanding. At the end of COP22, the Parties agreed to end the discussions to allow for the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement with the view to making decisions at the latest at COP24, in 2018.

Discussions on all elements of the talks continued during the inter-session negotiations held in May 2017 in Bonn during the 46th session of the permanent subsidiary bodies (SBI46 and SBSTA46) and the third part of the first session of the Ad Hoc working group on the Paris Agreement (APA-3). Although since the adoption of the Paris Agreement progress has been made in Marrakech and Bonn, the negotiators still have a considerable amount of work to agree on all the details to ensure that the Paris Agreement will be operational from day one of its implementation. The contribution of COP23 will be central to the pursuit and finalisation of the work regarding the implementation of the elements to ensure the effective operationalisation of the Paris Agreement, given the short time left before COP24. A key element of the COP23 negotiations will be to prepare the facilitation Dialogue taking place in 2018 to take stock of the progress achieved and to instruct the renewal of the NDCs.

11. UNFCCC, 2016a.

12. See in particular UNEP, 2016; or, Climate Interactive, 2017.

13. The inherent conditions for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement (55 Parties – 55% of global emissions) were met on 5 October 2016 and the official ratification of 72 Parties accounting for 56.75% of global emissions occurred on the same date. It was planned that the Paris Agreement would come into effect 30 days after reaching these thresholds, i.e. 4 November 2016 under these conditions. See United Nations, 2016a.

14. Access all the decisions adopted during COP22 [online] http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567/php/view/decisions.php#

In addition to other crucial points, it will also mean pursuing the efforts for an ambitious action by the Party States, but also for an international climate action, that is de-compartmentalised and multi-actor to reduce the gap between the objectives of the Paris Agreement and achieving them. This requirement for multi-actor collaboration established at COP21 was re-confirmed in Marrakech with the adoption of the Marrakech Partnership for global climate action, which seeks to strength the global climate action Programme 2017-2020, adopted at COP20 in Lima. This is therefore a crucial challenge for the new Fijian presidency at COP23, particularly taking into account that current failure of the State Parties in achieving the objectives to limiting temperatures part of the Paris Agreement.

Across all the points being negotiated, it is indispensable that the “spirit of Paris” initiated since the adoption of the Agreement is preserved at the Bonn COP23 and beyond. The objective being that the ambitions of the international community become imbued more than ever, with trust and a long-term perspective, even though the Parties agreed in Marrakech to postpone certain final decisions until December 2018 at COP24.

A Guide to understand, share and increase the opportunities to act

The *Guide to the Negotiations* and its accompanying *Summary for policymakers* fall under the wider context of the support provided by the *Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable*, a subsidiary body of the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF), to French-speaking countries in the international climate change negotiations.

Although this *Guide* is intended especially for the negotiators from OIF member countries, it has year on year become a reference document translated into several languages. We hope that it will be a useful tool for all delegates and that it will make an effective contribution to facilitating the search for a consensus for ambitious progress realistically in line with the challenges.

Aimed at helping negotiators to understand better the challenges of the COP23, this *Guide* the major issues being debated (Part I). Part II proposes a concise summary of the Paris Agreement and the challenges related to achieving the objectives from it, focusing upon the work carried out by the permanent subsidiary bodies and the special Paris Agreement Ad Hoc working group. The major issues at stake are then presented in Part III Lastly, Part III gives a brief history of the negotiations and presents the UNFCCC structure and the main negotiation groups and their positions.

Part I.

The issues and positions

Summary table of negotiation issues at COP23¹⁵

Section of the Guide	Issues in the negotiations	Session agenda items					
		COP 6-17 Nov.	CMP 6-15 Nov.	CMA 6-17 Nov.	SBI 6-15 Nov.	SBSTA 5-15 Nov.	APA
I.1	Issues of permanent subsidiary bodies						
I.1.1	Facilitative sharing of views facilitation in the framework of the international consultation and analysis process				2 (d)		
I.1.2	Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry referred to in Article 4, para. 2, and Article 7, para. 12				6, 7		
I.1.4	Paris Committee on Capacity-building				16 (b)		
I.1.5	Modes of functioning, work programme, and functions anticipated under the Paris Agreement for the forum on impact of measures of response implemented (joint agenda with OSCST)				17 (b)	9 (b)	
I.1.6	Questions relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement					11	
I.2	Issues relating to						
I.2.3	Project issues:						
	Mitigation						3
	Adaptation						4
	Transparency						5

15. Indicative selections based on the issues dealt with in this Guide and corresponding to the agenda items of the Bonn sessions (November 2017).

To find out more: consult the detailed agendas for the Bonn sessions in the annex (A7).

Section of the Guide	Issues in the negotiations	Session agenda items					
		COP 6-17 Nov.	CMP 6-15 Nov.	CMA 6-17 Nov.	SBI 6-15 Nov.	SBSTA 5-15 Nov.	APA
	Global stocktake						6
	Implementation of and compliance with the Paris Agreement provisions.						7
	Other issues related to the implementation of the Paris Agreement:						8
I.2.4	Issues of the CMA1-2						
I.3	The mechanisms of the Paris Agreement						
	Article 6, paragraph 2 ("concerted approaches")					11 (a)	
	Article 6, paragraph 4 ("mechanism for sustainable development")					11 (b)	
	Article 6, paragraph 8 ("non-market based approaches")					11 (c)	
	Clean development mechanism		4		8 (a)		
I.5	National considerations related to the implementation of the NDCs				5		3, 4
I.7	Transfer of technologies	8	8		14	6	
I.8	Capacity building	13	10		16		
I.9	Financing questions	10			15		
	Green Climate Fund.	10 (c)					
	Permanent finance committee	10 (b)			15 (a)		
	Third review of the Adaptation Fund		7 (b)		15 (b)		
I.10	Adaptation	6, 14 (a), 15	7		11, 12	3, 4	4
I.12	Transparency						3 (b), 5
I.15	Equality of the sexes in the context of climate change negotiations	16			20		

I.1. Issues of permanent subsidiary bodies

Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)

I.1.1 Exchange of views focusing on the facilitation in the framework of the international consultation and analysis process

A very first exchange of views focusing on facilitation in the framework of the international consultation and analysis process took place during the 44th session of the SBSTA (SBSTA44) in Bonn in May 2016¹⁶. This process, established during the COP17 in Durban in 2011, aims mainly to enhance the transparency of mitigation measures implemented by the countries not included in Annex I¹⁷ to the Convention. Starting from a participative, Party-driven approach, the efforts highlighted by the developing countries are firstly communicated via a biennial updated report (BUR) and then analysed by a team of technical experts (TTE) under modalities which are neither intrusive nor punitive and which respect national sovereignty¹⁸.

During the first exchange of views, in May 2016, thirteen developing countries had submitted their BUR to the process¹⁹. Most countries taking part in the exchange of views underlined, during individual presentations, the need for international financial support in their own national processes, mainly in respect of improving their national measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) system²⁰. This type of capacity-building need, mainly in terms of the MRV of national GHG emissions was also reflected during subsequent exchanges of views²¹. Workshops relating to these exchanges of views also took place under the COP23 and SB 46 at Bonn in May 2017. In the first instance, seven other countries submitted their BUR to the inter-Party discussions, namely Andorra, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Lebanon, Mexico and Paraguay. In the second instance, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mauritania, Montenegro, Morocco, Republic of Moldavia, Thailand and Uruguay participated in the process. A new workshop relating to exchanges of views is scheduled for 10 November 2017 during COP23.

Following the technical analysis process by the TTE in conjunction with each of the Parties in question, each Party received written questions from all their counterparts from the Convention based on a succinct report submitted by the TTE and each party to the SBI²². These issues were then reviewed during a meeting

16. SBI, 2016.

17. Decision 2/CP.17, Annex III.

18. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 63.

19. SBSTA, 2016, namely South Africa, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Ghana, Namibia, Peru, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Tunisia and Vietnam.

20. UNFCCC, 2016b.

21. To consult the reports of individual reports from each Party: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php

22. See the *Summary and technical reports*: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php

coordinated by the SBSTA during its sessions. These have until now related to the aspects below, among other things²³:

- (i) institutional arrangements in place to prepare the BUR;
- (ii) the design of national MRV systems;
- (iii) the national greenhouse gas (GHG) emission inventory improvement plans and, in association;
- (iv) their needs for capacity-building to implement the 2006 International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidelines; and
- (v) the ex-post review of the implementation of mitigation action;
- (vi) the capacity-building requirements to improve transparency under a second BUR²⁴;
- (vii) the role played by the Clean Development Mechanism to achieve the GHG emission reduction targets of a Party²⁵ or relating to accounting of emission reductions achieved thanks to market mechanisms²⁶;
- (viii) the MRV system used to measure the emissions from the land use and land use changes sector along with lessons learned from the assessment process of repercussions from mitigation measures in this sector²⁷.

The exchanges of view then allow the Parties to respond directly to these questions raised in writing or orally during workshops. This question and answer process gave the Parties a better understanding of the noted difficulties and shortcomings confronting these thirteen developing countries and was also a chance for them to learn more about the experience lived and acquired, the lessons learned from compiling the BUR and the optimum practices used²⁸.

It seems therefore that the process has demonstrated its relevance for two issues in particular. Firstly, holding a first exchange of views gave the developed countries a better understanding and knowledge of the needs of their developing counterparts on the implementation of measures to limit their GHG emissions and their financing needs to achieve this. The process was then an opportunity, for developing countries yet to submit their BUR or where the TTE technical analysis with Party feedback was in progress, to find out more about the potential challenges and to benefit from the experience acquired by their counterparts. As at 25 September 2017, 37 BUR had been submitted by the Parties, of which 35 were the subject of a succinct report. The Parties had not yet exchanged views on the succinct reports from Armenia, Serbia, Ecuador, Georgia and Jamaica²⁹. There were no succinct reports attached to the BUR of China and Mongolia.

23. See the *Record of facilitative sharing of views*: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php

24. FCCC/WEB/FSVR.1/IND/2017.

25. FCCC/WEB/FSVR.1/IND/2017.

26. FCCC/WEB/FSVR.1/CRI/2017.

27. FCCC/WEB/FSVR.1/COL/2017.

28. UNFCCC, 2016b.

29. See the *International consultation and analysis – Outcome*: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php

Biennial Updated Reports (BUR) and the international consultation and analysis process

The Cancún Decision (2010) requires the Parties not included in Annex I to submit their national communications every four years, and their GHG inventories every two years, through their biennial updated reports (BUR)¹. The national communications are not however examined specifically, as is the case for the Parties included in Annex I. During the COP17 in Durban in 2011, the Parties agreed that the first BUR from developing countries should undergo such an examination from December 2014 onwards. The least developed countries (LDC) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have to decide collectively whether they wish to submit their report, of their own volition, to this type of review². As of 3 October 2017, 37 of the non-Annex I Parties had submitted a first BUR and eight Parties had submitted a second³.

The BUR consists of (i) an update of national greenhouse gas inventories, mainly a national inventory report; (ii) information on action taken; (iii) noted needs; (iv) needs and aid received in terms of financial, technological and capacity-building resources⁴.

The BUR are submitted as separate updated reports or as a summary by certain parties of national communications during the year where the national communication is submitted by the Party.

Once the BUR have been submitted by the Parties, a Technical Team of Experts (TTE) starts a technical examination. The TTE must submit to the Party in question a summary report within three months of it starting its work⁵.

The Party then has another three months to review the report and formulate its comments on its contents. A final period of three months can be used by the TTE and the Party in question to draft, together, a final version of the summary report. This is then submitted to the SBI for publication on the website of the Convention⁶. The other Parties may use this summary report as a basis for formulating their questions prior to a workshop specific to the exchange of views intended to facilitate the international consultation and analysis process arranged by the SBI at regular intervals⁷.

1. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 60.

2. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 41.

3. See *Submitted Biennial Updated Reports (BURs) from Non-Annex I Parties*: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/rapportage_on_climate_change/items/8722.php



4. Decision 2/CP.17, Annex IV.

5. Decision 20/CP.19.

6. See *International consultation and analysis—Outcome*: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php

7. Decision 2/CP.17, Annex IV.

Figure 1. Statutes of the biennial updated report submissions³⁰



1.1.2 Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement and Article 7, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement

To implement the Paris Agreement, the Parties agreed during the COP21 that all would be required to “undertake and communicate ambitious efforts”³¹ with respect to six issues, namely:

- (i) reduction of their collective GHG emissions³²;
- (ii) the building up of their capacities to mitigate climate change³³;

30. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – Figures updated on 1 September 2017.

31. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 3.

32. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4.

33. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7.

- (iii) climate financing³⁴;
- (iv) technology development and transfer³⁵;
- (v) enhancing the capacities of developing countries³⁶; and
- (vi) transparency of action and support³⁷.

It is planned that the efforts be communicated to the Convention Secretariat as NDC, which inserts them for the moment in provisional public registry³⁸. Under the Agreement, the Parties have agreed on the relevance of this registry particularly regarding two points:

- efforts to reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions³⁹; and
- communication of needs in terms of implementation, support, adaptation projects and measures⁴⁰.

However, in the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the Parties requested the SBI to develop modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public mitigation registry⁴¹, while refraining from giving any instructions to the subsidiary bodies or to the Secretariat regarding the potential development of a public registry recording countries' adaptation efforts. An item on the SB 44 agenda therefore provided for addressing with the Parties the registry dealing with mitigation efforts, but this quickly became a stumbling block as soon as it was time to adopt the agenda for the session⁴². The disagreement seems to primarily arise from the fact that Parties do not agree about how to interpret the Paris Agreement and, at the same time, to establish such a registry⁴³. In particular, certain concerns were raised during the first day of the SB 44 session over the lack of an explicit mention of adaptation in the agenda item addressing the NDC registry⁴⁴.

Thus in Bonn, in May 2016, the developing countries, led by the G77+China, made known to the SBI Chairman that they disagreed with the formulation of the provisional agenda item dealing with the registry⁴⁵, maintaining that it would be more appropriate to deal with a NDC registry as a whole, without specifying other fields of intervention like mitigation and adaptation. Some observers believe that one reason for broadening the type of information to be communicated to the public registry, rather than preferring a more restricted interpretation of the Agreement⁴⁶,

34. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9.

35. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10.

36. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 11.

37. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 13.

38. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 30.

39. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 12.

40. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7, paras. 10 and 12.

41. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 29.

42. TWN, 2016a, p. 1.

43. TWN, 2016a.

44. IISD, 2016a, p. 2.

45. TWN, 2016a, p. 1.

46. More especially paragraphs 29 and 30 of Decision 1/CP.21.

would be to prevent setting up a public registry focusing on mitigation⁴⁷. These observers think that, for the developing countries, it would be more appropriate rather to request the Parties to communicate to the public, and therefore transparent, registry the relevant information on the six central components of the Agreement and NDC⁴⁸ mentioned previously. Such an approach would be more representative of the exhaustive nature expected from the NDC for use by the countries in “*undertaking and communicating ambitious efforts*”⁴⁹.

However, the Umbrella Group and EU countries would rather see a strict interpretation of the consensus emanating from Paris⁵⁰, which is restricted to addressing a public registry compiling mitigation elements contained in the NDC. These same groups of countries prefer the same approach to the Paris Agreement⁵¹, which urges the Parties to submit adaptation communications rather than requesting them to do so, as is the case for mitigation. Where appropriate, these countries were thus not in a position to support the amendment proposed by the G77+China to item 5 on the provisional agenda, resulting in the adoption of an initial agenda for the SB 44 session which initially ignored any talks at all about a public registry⁵², until the Parties could agree, during informal discussions, on the most suitable way of addressing this topic.

Ultimately, item 5 of the agenda was amended and adopted as follows: “*Establishment of the modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement*”, whereas a new item 6 on the agenda was also adopted: “*Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement*”⁵³.

Still during SB 44, Egypt suggested, when adopting this new agenda, that both the adaptation and the mitigation measures should be compiled in one and the same registry⁵⁴. Whilst the SBI split these two agenda items into two separate informal groups⁵⁵, the Africa Group instead expressed its wish for them to be addressed at the same time by the same co-mediators, with a view for just one NDC registry be set up when the Agreement entered into force, rather than two⁵⁶. When talks were closed on this topic, the Umbrella Group and EU countries reiterated their view that tying these two public registries together under the agreement

47. TWN, 2016a, p. 1.

48. TWN, 2016a, p. 1.

49. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 3.

50. Paragraph 29 of Decision 1/CP.21: TWN, 2016a, p. 3.

51. Mainly Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 12, of the Convention.

52. IISD, 2016a, p. 2.

53. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.2.

54. IISD, 2016d, p. 2.

55. IISD, 2016d, p. 3.

56. IISD, 2016e, p. 1.

would overstep the scope of the decision taken in Paris⁵⁷, referring especially to the delicate balance between mitigation and adaptation on which the Parties managed to agree during the COP21.

Talks surrounding the creation of one or two registries continued in Marrakech and Bonn in 2017, with continuing tension. Among other things, two draft conclusions were submitted initially to the Parties in Marrakech under informal consultations on setting up two public registries; one under Article 4 of the Agreement on mitigation and a second under Article 7 on adaptation. In the case of a registry for mitigation efforts, two groups of developing countries quickly showed their unwillingness to debate this, calling instead on continued exchanges of viewpoints between the Parties until the termination of the work of the APA on NDC⁵⁸. Finally, a draft conclusion submitted by the SBI merely noted the exchange of views in the talks and to agree to continue these discussions in Bonn⁵⁹. In particular, the discussions stalled over stating that talks held under agenda item 5 should relate to the NDC provided for under Article 4 as its description suggests or that reference should be made rather to “NDC provided for under Article 3” as proposed by a group of developing countries in Marrakech⁶⁰.

As part of the creation of a registry relating to adaptation efforts by Parties, two groups of developing countries, during informal consultations in Marrakech, expressed their preference for talks about this registry to be grouped with those about a registry under Article 4. Several developed countries opposed this proposal⁶¹. Here again, some participants expressed their preference to postpone talks on this issue until certain aspects had been clarified within the framework of the work carried out by the APA, including “*additional guidelines for communications on adaptation*”⁶². Furthermore, the Parties addressed the option of requesting that the Secretariat assess the costs associated with developing two registries, a stumbling block between the Parties during the informal talks in Marrakech. In addition to continuing these discussions in Bonn at SB46, the Parties adopted a draft conclusion recognising the existing or potential links between items 5 and 6 of the SBI agenda.⁶³ At the close of the talks on item 6 of the agenda in Marrakech, Saudi Arabia highlighted the fact that certain Parties wanted to see these two items combined.⁶⁴

Again when the Parties met in Bonn within the framework of SB46, the talks on the creation of one or two public registries were conducted as informal discussions⁶⁵. Nevertheless the Parties focused more on the function of the public

57. TWN, 2016a, p. 3 See also IISD, 2016e, p. 2.

58. IISD, 2016g, p. 4.

59. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.35.

60. IISD, 2016h, p. 1.

61. IISD, 2016g, p. 4.

62. IISD, 2016g, p. 4.

63. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.36, FCCC/SBI/2017/L.6 and FCCC/ SBI/2017/L.8.

64. IISD, 2016i, p. 27.

65. IISD, 2017a.

registry, notably in relation to the form of the provisional and current registry⁶⁶ (see box below). A fact of interest is that a group of developing countries suggested that the Parties adopt “*a paragraph on eliminating the duplication of work undertaken under APA agenda item 3*” covering mitigation measures, a suggestion which proved a stumbling block for one group of developing countries.⁶⁷ The discussions regarding the public registries continued at SB47 and the Parties were invited to submit their comments regarding items 5 and 6 of the SBI agenda by September 21, 2017, notably in relation to the potential links between the work on these two items of the agenda⁶⁸.

Secretariat's interim public registry

Until the modalities and procedures for the operation of a public mitigation registry and a public adaptation registry have been adopted by the Parties, they have mandated the Secretariat to set up an interim registry¹. The NDC from 160 Parties have been published in it as at 3 October 2017.

All the Parties have their own logins to the registry where they can upload documents, including their NDC, which they can subsequently manage themselves². The portal is configured so that a set of documents can be grouped to form one and the same NDC³. The Secretariat checks the authenticity of all the documents to ensure Parties' security and makes them available to the public thirty minutes after the necessary checks have been completed⁴. When Parties update their documents, earlier versions may be stored at the Parties' discretion⁵.

The public can access the information added to the public registry by going to the website home page. Here the documentation communicated by all Parties can be accessed via their individual pages⁶ (see Figure 4 below). The home page offers web surfers an immediate search facility with options to browse using key words or Parties⁷ (see Figure 3 below). A description of each Party's most recent version of its NDC is found on its home page along with a list of all documents submitted to date⁸ (see Figure 2 below). The documents appear in chronological order of submission – the date is displayed – and are classified by whether it involves the NDC from the country, a translation or an additional document, among other things⁹.

At the SB46 held in Bonn in May 2017, the Parties took note of certain specific aspects of the current provisional registry submitted by the Secretariat, which elements they took into account when developing the public registry under article 4 of the Paris Agreement. These elements are¹⁰: (i) only allowing national coordinators of the Parties to register the NDC in the public registry; (ii) ensuring the security of the accounts and the accessibility to the contents of the registry; (iii) maintaining the NDC already communicated by the Parties; (iv) providing a user guide for Parties; and (v) ensuring continuous support in operating the public registry.

Lastly, the Parties were invited to submit to the SBI “*experience and lessons learned in using the interim registry [...] and which could prove useful in developing the*

The rest of the text page 15

66. IISD, 2017b, p. 1.

67. IISD, 2017c, p. 2.

68. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.6, para.5 (c).

registry”, their views on the registry functions, *structure and design elements of the public registry*” and “*ways of enhancing the security, accessibility and user-friendliness of the public registry*”¹¹.

1. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 30. Consult the registry [online] <http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx>
2. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 10.
3. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 11.
4. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 11.
5. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 12.
6. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 13.
7. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 14.
8. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 15.
9. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 16.
10. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.6
11. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.6, para. 5.

Figure 2. Home page – NDC registry



B		
	BAHAMAS FIRST NDC	COUNTRY PAGE
	BARBADOS FIRST NDC	COUNTRY PAGE
	BELIZE FIRST NDC	COUNTRY PAGE
C		
F		

Figure 3. Search engine – NDC registry





Figure 4. Individual home page – NDC registry



1.1.3 Scope and modalities for the periodic evaluation of the Technology Mechanism for the implementation of the Paris Agreement (joint agenda with the SBSTA)

The development and transfer of technologies assume special importance within the UNFCCC as they turn numerous mitigation and adaptation measures into reality⁶⁹. Several decisions encourage the development and transfer of technologies, headed by those that created the Technological Mechanism (Cancún, 2010)⁷⁰. The aim of this mechanism is to facilitate the reinforcement of technological development and transfer to support the climate change mitigation and adaptation policies.

In recognition of the relevance of the work that the Technology Mechanism has carried out thus far, the Parties made it a body that will serve the Paris Agreement⁷¹. In this respect, in May 2016 the SBI adopted draft conclusions aimed at developing the scope and modalities for the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism in relation to supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement⁷², as the Parties had tasked it with doing so during COP21⁷³. In strengthening the Technology Mechanism, the Parties would like the TEC and CTCN to carry out further work, in particular to develop and enhance endogenous capacities and technologies, on the one hand, and to undertake technology research, development and demonstration, on the other⁷⁴.

69. Article 4.1.(c), 4.5 and 9 of the UNFCCC, in particular.

70. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 117.

71. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 3.

72. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.5.

73. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 70.

74. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 66.

The purpose of this periodic assessment includes looking at the effectiveness and of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism and its adequacy⁷⁵. On the whole, this periodic assessment must take into account matters relating to technology development and transfer. The assessment must also consider the conclusions emanating from the first independent review of the CTCN⁷⁶. The assessment of the Mechanism should also take account of the development of modalities of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Agreement, work on the transparency of the action and support referred to in Article 13 and the preparation of the technology framework (see box below). It is intended that the scope and modalities of this periodic assessment are adopted during the COP25 in 2019.

To achieve this, the Parties made their views known on the scope and modalities for the periodic assessment of the Mechanisms prior to the SB 46 session in May 2017. The SBI compiled these submissions into a summary compilation which was presented to the Parties at SB 46⁷⁷ which noted them⁷⁸ (see box below). The SBI also requested the Secretariat to continue its work in this respect, by establishing “a technical document on the experience, lessons learned and best practices obtained by reviewing various provisions of the Convention and of the Kyoto Protocol that are relevant for the periodic assessment, including a list of reviews performed”⁷⁹. The Parties have not yet managed to agree on whether the COP or the CMA should be the body to carry out this assessment⁸⁰. The SBI should continue with the talks on the scope and assessment of the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism at SB 48, in April-May 2018⁸¹.

**Summary compilation by the Secretariat
of Parties’ observations on the scope and modalities
of the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism¹**

In its summary compilation of 25 April 2017, the SBI reported on the observations of 98 Parties communicated in eight submissions from Parties listed below:

- Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay;
- Canada, Australia, Japan and Norway;
- LDC;
- IALAC;
- Indonesia;

The rest of the text page 18

75. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 69.

76. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.5, para. 3.

77. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2.

78. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.4, para. 2.

79. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.4, para. 3.

80. IISD, 2017d, p. 13.

81. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.4, para. 4.

- European Union;
- Republic of Korea;
- South Africa.

Effectiveness of the Technology Mechanism

A certain number of Parties² have underlined that the periodic assessment should take account of the measure whereby the two Technology Mechanism bodies, i.e. the TEC and CTCN, comply with their mandates.

Regarding the periodic assessment by the TEC, the measures below have been singled out by some Parties as potential issues for the assessment, especially in terms of their relevance and number and the quality of the process³:

- the recommendations of the TEC to the COP;
- its activities, including topical discussions and workshops;
- its reports and other documents.

As regards the CTCN, several Parties have emphasised the periodic assessment of the effectiveness of three essential services to be provided by the CTCN in implementing the Paris Agreement. In particular, certain tasks that should be submitted to the review were listed by some of the Parties, namely to⁴:

- answer questions from developing countries⁵;
- promote collaboration and access to information⁶;
- improve networks, partnerships and capacity building⁷;
- networking⁸;
- an institutional provision⁹;
- designated national authorities¹⁰.

Certain Parties¹¹ have also mentioned technological needs assessments (TNA) as elements that should be included in the periodic assessment of the Mechanism. In this respect, a group of Parties have listed the following items as being relevant to the periodic assessment¹²:

- the number of countries and geographical areas that carry out TNA;
- the number of TNA performed;
- the number of published documents relating to TNA;
- the level of satisfaction of the countries that had carried out TNA; and
- the number of projects implemented arising from a technological action plan.

Appropriate nature of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism

Regarding the appropriate nature of the support, several Parties¹³ noted that the periodic assessment should assess the financial support made available by the Technology Mechanism bodies to determine whether it is appropriate so that bodies can fulfil their mandates in implementing the Paris Agreement. Regarding the TNA, the European Union noted that the periodic assessment should take account of the support to the TNA working groups, events and studies¹⁴. On the subject of the CTCN, a few Parties stated that the assessment should depend on the amount, the predictability and the appropriate nature of the financial resources received by the CTCN¹⁵.

Modalities of the periodic assessment

In this respect, certain Parties have noted the importance of avoiding overlapping efforts and of keeping costs as low as possible¹⁶. One group of Parties has also underlined that the instruments used for the periodic assessment should be simple and that complex indicators should be avoided¹⁷. Lastly, the Parties have raised the general questions below as potential issues to be addressed to define clearly the modalities of the periodic assessment¹⁸:

- Who will be responsible for the periodic assessment?¹⁹
- How will the assessment be carried out?²⁰
- Which the sources of information will be relevant to the assessment?²¹
- When will the assessment be carried out?²²
- How will be assessment results be presented?²³

1. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2

2. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2, para. 11 on LDC, 2017, Republic of Korea, 2017 and EU, 2017

3. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2, para. 12 on Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017

4. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2, para. 12

5. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017

6. LDC, 2017 and Republic of Korea 2017

7. IALAC, 2017, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017, LDC, 2017 and Republic of Korea, 2017

8. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017 and LDC 2017

9. LDC, 2017

10. LDC, 2017

11. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017 and LDC 2017

12. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2, para. 15 on Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017

13. South Africa, 2017d, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017, Indonesia, 2017, LDC, 2017, Republic of Korea, 2017 and EU 2017

14. EU, 2017

15. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017

16. Australia, Canada, Japan and Norway, 2017

17. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017

18. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2, paras. 21-29

19. South Africa, 2017d and Republic of Korea, 2017

20. South Africa, 2017d and Republic of Korea and EU, 2017

21. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017, Australia, Canada, Japan and Norway, 2017, LDC, 2017, Republic of Korea, 2017 and EU, 2017

22. Republic of Korea, 2017 and EU, 2017

23. Republic of Korea, 2017 and EU, 2017

1.1.4 The Paris Committee on capacity-building: mandate, composition and first meeting

In Paris, the Parties created the *Paris Committee on Capacity-building*⁸². In this respect, the Parties launched a five-year workplan overseen by the Committee for the 2016-2020 period. This work plan aims to “*increase synergies through cooperation and avoid duplication among existing bodies established under the Convention that implement capacity-building activities of capacity*.”⁸³ This work may also take into account the bodies which are dedicated to capacity-building within and outside the Convention. The parties also requested the SBI to organise annual in-session meetings of the Committee⁸⁴.

The objective of the Committee through its initial work plan will also be to assemble a broad range of information relevant to the Parties’ capacity-building, including:

- (i) “capacity gaps and needs”⁸⁵;
- (ii) the “good practices, challenges, experiences and lessons learned from work on capacity-building by bodies established under the Convention”⁸⁶; and
- (iii) “the opportunities to strengthen capacity at the national, regional and subnational level”⁸⁷.

The workplan that will be supervised by the Committee also envisages promoting “*the development and dissemination of tools and methodologies for the implementation of capacity-building*”⁸⁸, as well as “*exploring how developing country Parties can take ownership of building and maintaining capacity over time and space*”⁸⁹. This effort should allow the Committee to “*provide directives to the secretariat to maintain an updated window on line [of the Convention] dedicated to capacity reinforcement*”⁹⁰. This acquisition and sharing of knowledge should also allow the Committee to “*foster world global, regional, national and subnational cooperation*” in terms of capacity-building⁹¹, in addition to “*fostering dialogue, coordination, collaboration and coherence among relevant processes and initiatives under the Convention*”⁹².

The Committee should also be called upon to carry out work “*in the context of the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework*”⁹³, which is aimed at assisting developing countries to implement the

82. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 71-81.

83. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 73(a).

84. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 75.

85. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73(b).

86. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (e).

87. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (g).

88. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (c).

89. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (f).

90. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (i).

91. Decision 1/CP. 21, para. 73(d).

92. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 73(h).

93. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 76.

provisions of the Convention and the processes emanating from the Kyoto Protocol⁹⁴. This review was concluded during COP22 in Marrakech, when the Parties adopted its conclusions⁹⁵ (see also Section I.8). In this context, the Parties adopted the mandate and composition of the Committee during COP22 so that it could start its work⁹⁶.

Mandate and composition of the Paris Committee on capacity-building

In Marrakech, the Parties adopted a mandate for the Paris Committee, whereby it is composed of twelve members distributed according to the procedures listed below¹:

- (i) Two members from each of the five United Nations regional groups;
- (ii) One member from the least developed countries;
- (iii) One member from the Small Island Developing States.

These members are nominated by their respective groups or constituencies to serve two-year terms. They are only eligible to serve two consecutive terms². Furthermore, *“six representatives of the bodies created under the application of the Convention and the functional bodies of the finance Mechanism will be invited to participate in all the Committee meetings based on the Committee’s annual theme”*³. Lastly, from the twelve nominated members, the Committee itself elects two co-chairs annually to serve for a term of one year⁴.

The Committee meets annually as organised by the SBI during its in-session meetings⁵. Every year, the work of the Committee relates to *“an annual focus area or theme related to enhanced technical exchange on capacity-building, with the purpose of maintaining up-to-date knowledge on the successes and challenges in building capacity effectively in a particular area”*⁶. In this respect, the Committee drafts an annual technical progress report. These reports must be submitted to SBI during sessions that coincide with the COPsessions so that SBI can communicate them to the Parties⁷.

In accordance with its mandate, the Committee met for the first time during SBI46 in Bonn in May 2017 and elected its first co-chairs. Representatives from the Climate Technology Centre and Network, the Consultative Group of Experts and the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism were invited to attend the meeting and make brief presentations at the opening of the session.

At its first meeting, the Committee focused on three points from the 2016-2020 capacity-building workplan, i.e.⁸:

- to implement, to the extent possible, pillar I of its work;

The rest of the text page 22

94. Articles 4.5 et 5 of the UNFCCC; and Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol.

95. Decision 16/CP.22, para. 12.

96. Decision 2/CP.22.

- to adopt its rolling work plan for 2017-2019 and to include in it the technical reports submitted to the parties at COP23; and
- to recommend to the Parties to invite other institutions to support the implementation of its work plan.

Following its initial meeting, the Committee finalised its sliding workplan for 2017-2019 which the Committee then made available on the UNFCCC web portal⁹⁷. The plan underpins some fifty deliverables that the Committee plans to produce over the next three years to fulfil the mandates assigned to it by decision since COP21.

1. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 2
2. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 5
3. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 3
4. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 8
5. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 11
6. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 12
7. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 17
8. FCCC/2017/1/10, para. 16
9. Available online: http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/scf_8_background_paper_fifth_review_of_the_financial_mechanism.pdf.

Field or annual theme of the Paris Committee for 2017

At its first meeting, the Committee spent a full day on addressing the following annual theme: *capacity-building activities in the implementation of the nationally determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement*⁹⁷. At the end of this day, the Committee agreed to move forwards with a number of points during the forthcoming year, including⁹⁸:

- (i) perform an assessment of capacity-building needs as identified in relevant sources (such as nationally determined contributions, biennial updated reports, national communications, reports of the Durban Forum);
- (ii) perform an assessment of the work conducted by other constituted bodies of relevance to this subject matter with a view to identifying gaps, solutions and synergies;
- (iii) to appoint Committee representatives who could act as liaisons between the other bodies in order to share synergies;
- (iv) strengthen the capacity-building portal as appropriate.

The Committee also invited the Parties, the constituent bodies and any other stakeholder interesting in so doing to submit information that is relevant to the work of this annual theme. During this same meeting, the Committee agreed to

⁹⁷. PCCB/2017/1/10, para. 21.

⁹⁸. PCCB/2017/1/10, para. 22.

continue its work on the same theme in 2018, i.e. on the topic of “*capacity-building activities for the implementation of nationally determined contributions in the context of the Paris Agreement*”⁹⁹. To achieve this, the Committee members also decided to invite representatives of the following bodies to take part in its 2018 meeting¹⁰⁰:

- Global Environment Facility;
- Green Climate Fund;
- Adaptation Committee;
- Least Developed Countries Expert Group;
- Permanent finance committee;
- Technology Executive Committee.

1.1.5 Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures (joint agenda with SBSTA)

The Paris Agreement, in the spirit of the Convention, recognises the importance of “*taking into consideration in the implementation of this Agreement the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country Parties*”¹⁰¹, whilst the Paris Agreement aims to “*hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels*”¹⁰². When then Convention was adopted, the Parties recognised the effect that achieving its objective could have on countries whose economies were highly dependent on revenues derived from the extraction, refining and export of hydrocarbons such as oil¹⁰³. Since Bali, the integration of this issue on the agenda of climate negotiations has resulted above all in a demand supported partly by Gulf countries which want it to be considered in the same way as adaptation and mitigation¹⁰⁴.

This impact of response measures crystallises a strong opposition between developed countries and developing countries. The latter desire that concrete measures be taken by the first to limit the negative impacts of their measures linked to climate change and that this element of the agenda lead to strong decisions. In addition, they plead for supplementary support from developed countries to counter the destructive consequences of their measures¹⁰⁵. This element of the agenda has evolved during the last years towards the creation in 2011 of a Forum operated jointly by SBI and the SBSTA¹⁰⁶.

99. PCCB/2017/1/10, para. 26.

100. PCCB/2017/1/10, para. 27.

101. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 15.

102. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 2, para. 1(a).

103. Convention, Art. 4, para. 8(h).

104. FCCC/SB/2012/MISC.2 for example.

105. FCCC/SB/2012/MISC.2 for example.

106. Decision 8/CP.17, para. 3.

In light of this, the Parties decided, at the COP21, to maintain and improve the forum on the impact of response measures implemented whose work will be centred on “*the provision of concrete examples, case studies and practices in order to enhance the capacity of Parties, in particular developing country Parties, to deal with the impact of the implementation of response measures*”¹⁰⁷. The improved work programme of the Forum, which will continue to meet twice a year¹⁰⁸ under the joint guidance of SBI and SBSTA, works in two areas¹⁰⁹:

- a. Economic diversification and transformation;
- b. A just transition of the workforce, and the creation of decent work and quality jobs.

The subsidiary bodies are requested to advance the improved forum’s work by forming special technical expert groups¹¹⁰ and by the “*assessment and analysis of impacts, including the use and development of economic modelling*”¹¹¹. The plan is for the subsidiary bodies to review the work of the improved forum every three years from COP24 onwards¹¹². This revision should also deal with operating modalities of the forum.

In this respect, the Parties instructed the Secretariat of the Convention, in Paris, to prepare in the framework of the 44th session of subsidiary bodies a technical document that facilitates, for developing countries, “*the assessment of various impacts that can result from the response measures implemented*”, on one hand, and that identify also the options of economic diversification that can, at least in part, neutralise these impacts¹¹³.

The Secretariat has thus prepared two technical documents that could help guide the work of the improved forum and offer more precise data to the Parties regarding the impact of response measures during the talks on the matter under COP22. A first technical document evaluates firstly the impact of response measures, in particular by using several economic modelling tools¹¹⁴.

The document identifies seven categories of response measures in particular¹¹⁵ which could have “*impact on economic growth, income distribution, employment, the environment, public health and food security*”¹¹⁶:

- carbon tax;
- subsidies favourable to low-carbon technology, granted simultaneously with removal of subsidies to technologies with stronger GHG intensity;

107. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 2.

108. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 3.

109. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 5.

110. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 4.

111. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 6.

112. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 7.

113. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 9.

114. FCCC/TP/2016/4.

115. FCCC/TP/2016/4, para. 36.

116. FCCC/TP/2016/4, para. 37.

- policies on energy reform and green investments;
- ceiling systems and trading of GHG emission credits and the compensation credits at the international level;
- commercial measures such as customs duties and border adjustments for carbon;
- implementation of standards and labelling; and
- technology cooperation”.

A second technical document deals with the concept of economic diversification in the context of response measures¹¹⁷. The document identifies four economic sectors where the impact of response measures could be felt more significantly and that could benefit from economic diversification¹¹⁸:

- (i) conventional fossil fuels (coal, gas and oil);
- (ii) energy-using products that are also exposed to foreign competition (aluminium, iron and steel, cement, chemical products and pulp and paper sectors);
- (iii) tourism; and
- (iv) agriculture.

It appears, however, for the moment, to be more complex to identify solutions available to developing countries that wish to diversify their economy¹¹⁹.

During discussions in the contact group on response measures that took place in Bonn in May 2016, the G77+China identified numerous fields that could enhance cooperation in terms of acquisition of knowledge on the impact of response measures and tools available in order that this impact be minimised particular for developing countries, i.e.¹²⁰:

- (i) technical cooperation,
- (ii) cooperation in terms of modelling and evaluation considering priorities of developing countries,
- (iii) partnerships with research organisations, and
- (iv) cooperation for equitable transition”.

The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), for its part, stressed in the past a “focus oriented towards action “for the forum¹²¹, a proposal that received the support of numerous Parties in Bonn, in May 2016, whilst the importance of concrete results, accompanied “by clear schedules for identified actions” was raised by these Parties¹²². South Africa for its part wished to orientate the talks in terms

117. FCCC/TP/2016/3.

118. FCCC/TP/2016/3, para. 114.

119. FCCC/TP/2016/3, paras. 129-155.

120. IISD, 2016b, page 2.

121. FCCC/SB/2016/L.2/Rev.1, Annex I.

122. IISD, 2016c, page 2.

of identification of vulnerabilities faced by developing countries¹²³. These two last elements were dealt with in part by the technical documents prepared by the Secretariat, as mentioned above.

The European Union specially stressed the sharing of knowledge so that the different actors be called upon to contribute pragmatically and globally to the discussion on the impact of response measures. Such an interactive framework where exchanges of views and knowledge are encouraged could introduce favourable conditions for the identification of themes that could lead to meetings of a special group of technical experts¹²⁴.

During a first meeting of the forum in Bonn in May 2016, the subsidiary bodies also prepared the work programme of the forum until November 2018. To this end, a *“workshop on views and experiences on economic diversification and transformation and on a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs”* was held on 7-14 November during COP22¹²⁵. Five sessions were held at the workshop discussing the following issues¹²⁶:

- (i) the status of the knowledge acquisition on sustainable economic and social transition within the scope of implementation of mitigation measures;
- (ii) integration of economic diversification within the national strategies: discussions on experiences and apprenticeships;
- (iii) management of the social repercussions caused by sustainable development;
- (iv) fair transition for the active population and the creation of decent and quality jobs; and
- (v) next steps.

In addition, in Marrakech, the Parties agreed to set up an ad hoc group of technical experts (GET) to *“elaborate on the technical work on the areas of the work programme in the context of sustainable development and that it would spend two days on considering the two areas of the work programme”*¹²⁷. These experts met as planned in Bonn during SB 46¹²⁸. Participants addressed more than ten issues on diversification and transformation of the economy, nearly ten issues specific to a fair transition for the active population and the creation of decent and quality jobs were also discussed with a further ten or so additional issues relating to both themes at the same time¹²⁹.

123. IISD, 2016c, page 2.

124. IISD, 2016c, page 2.

125. FCCC/SB/2016/INF.2.

126. FCCC/SB/2016/INF.2.

127. FCCC/SB/2016/L.6.

128. SBSTA and SBI, 2017.

129. See the short summary of the workshop online: http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/response_measures/application/pdf/summary_teg.pdf

As for how to include the forum in the impact of response measures to the Paris Agreement, the SBI and SBSTA invited the Parties to submit their views “*on concrete elements of the modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures*” by 30 September 2017 at the latest¹³⁰. The Parties were also invited to base their observations, amongst other things, on the discussions held to date on this issue as well as on the concept note prepared jointly by the permanent subsidiary bodies and the secretariat¹³¹. This offers the Parties some pathways as well as taking into account past submissions communicated by the Parties on this topic (see box below).

Work programme to be envisaged under the Paris Agreement for the forum: possible stumbling block in Marrakech?

A work programme with a broad rather than targeted range could also create a stumbling block regarding implementation for the period covering current works up to November 2018, whilst certain Parties in Bonn in May 2016 opposed the forum covering too much material and statements simultaneously¹.

In this respect, the United States, Saudi Arabia, AOSIS, the G77/China and the EU propose that the work programme be limited for the time being to the two areas determined in Paris². Russia, on the other hand, presented a submission that simply reiterated that the fundamental requirement of the forum was to ensure compliance with paragraph 15 of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, i.e. to ensure that the Parties, under implementation of the Agreement, take account of the concerns of Parties most affected by the response measures, mainly the developing countries.³

Whilst concentrating the forum efforts around these two areas, AOSIS suggests moreover that the work programme take place in two stages: (i) evaluation and analysis of current and possible effects on developing nations, in particular the SIDS and LDC, of response measures implemented by developed nations in particular unilateral measures, and (ii) specific activities to be carried out in the work programme⁴.

The G77+China for its part suggested adding exchange of views and experience on (i) support and capacity-building and (ii) measures that can mitigate damaging effects of response measures in workshops that could take place under the auspices of the forum⁵.

For its part, the Africa Group prioritises an expanded work programme covering five issues⁶: (i) sustainable development with a view to determining the damaging effects of response measures for sustainable development in Africa and mitigate them; (ii) examination of the impact of response measures implemented, to improve mobilisation and transparency in order to reach common answers;

The rest of the text page 28

130. FCCC/SB/2017/L.3, para. 2.

131. Available online: http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/response_measures/application/pdf/rm_reflection_paper.pdf

(iii) enhanced capacity-building; (iv) development of guidelines on the subject of reporting and consideration of response measures; and (v) economic modelling. Ghana suggested a broader work programme similar to that of the Africa Group.

1. IISD, 2016e, p. 2
2. Saudi Arabia and United States, 2016, AOSIS, 2016b and EU, 2016b
3. Russian Federation, 2016
4. AOSIS, 2016, pp. 2-3
5. G77+China, 2016
6. Africa Group, 2016
7. Ghana, on behalf of the Africa Group, 2017

Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)

1.1.6 Questions relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

Decision 1/CP.21 recommends that the CMA adopts directives, rules, modalities and procedures, as well as a framework for new mechanisms drawn up as per Article 6 of the Paris Agreement¹³².

The parameters that contribute to the GHG mitigation mechanism and that promote sustainable development are:

- Voluntary participation authorized by each Party involved;
- Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change (GHG emissions reduction);
- Specific scope of activities;
- Reductions in emissions that are additional to reductions that would have already been made anyway;
- Verification and certification of emission reductions resulting from mitigation activities by designated operational entities;
- Experience gained with and lessons learned from existing mechanisms and approaches adopted under the Convention.

The type of system to implement to enforce Article 4 is still a major question for the Parties. The new mechanism could be a continuation of the previous approach, through which credits were issued for projects and programmes. In Paris, Brazil made a proposal to consider a mechanism whose scale is similar to that of the CDM, an “improved CDM” or a “CDM+”¹³³. Conversely, during the preliminary discussions for a New Market Mechanism (NMM), the European Union (EU) and the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) proposed a mechanism encouraging action at the scale of entire sectors¹³⁴.

132. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 6, paras. 1, 4 and 9.

133. CEPS, 2016.

134. SBSTA, 2014.

Accounting

The existing accounting system under the UNFCCC is differentiated for developed parties and developing parties. By virtue of the Convention, industrialised countries must submit GHG inventory updates each year, whereas developing countries may include these inventories in their biennial updated reports that they must submit every two years—except for LDCs and SIDS, which may submit their reports at their discretion—or include them in their national communications, which are submitted every four years.

The Paris Agreement sets a framework for strengthening the transparency of the action and of the support provided to implement these actions. However, it has some flexibility that incorporates the various national capacities. In this framework, each party must submit a national GHG inventory. The SBSTA is tasked with drawing up and formulating opinions on how to apply the provision of the strength of the accounting for cooperative approaches, for adoption at the first CMA session. According to paragraphs 89, 92b and 94a of Decision 1/CP.21, given the flexibility offered as part of the strengthened transparency framework, the developing countries must make efforts to be aligned with this to the extent possible, even if they do not necessarily strictly follow these directives, especially in the first years of their application. The Paris Agreement does not specify how compliance of the accounting of a country will be ascertained, but the new transparency system will probably look into this (see also section I.B.13 with Article 13 of the Agreement).

As for the accounting system, the CMA may play an active role in making transfers more transparent, via a central registry similar to the existing CDM registry, for example¹³⁵. If the system is more decentralised, the directive could ask parties to keep their own registry with double-entry accounting and count based on the transparency rules suggested in Article 13, to ensure that the monitoring is sufficient to avoid double counting. All of Article 6 requires that the activities of Parties also promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity. As such, the directives, rules and procedures to be drawn up should also provide for modalities that ensure and assess these results based on development objectives.

NDCs and markets

The role of the market-based instruments in the NDCs needs to be clarified, in terms of the accounting—especially concerning the possibility of combining climate funding and market-based mechanisms to implement political instruments as well as mitigation projects.

Mitigation “results”

Until the decisions shed more light on some questions, it will be useful to define the scope of what can be considered as a “mitigation result” that can be transferred between countries. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Certified Emission Reductions (CER) from CDM projects are an accounting unit for transferring obligations as

135. CEPS, 2016.

well as for defining the scope of the international transfers that are accepted. In other words, only the transfers involving CERs are accepted in the presentation of national GHG accounts. The Parties will also need to examine if other forms of cooperation could be considered, as per paragraph 2 of Article 6. For example, the Joint Crediting Mechanism, a Japanese initiative that has some similarities with the CDM, or the bilateral link between the two exchange systems. The transfer concept implies that one or several countries that do not have an absolute target for all of their economies may trade mitigation units. This poses problems for the objective of avoiding double counting.

The institutional aspect

The Parties must decide on the institutional governance modalities for the new mechanism. The CDM is managed by an Executive Board composed of ten representatives, including one member from each of the five UN regional groups, two members from the parties referred to in Annex I, two members from Non-Annex I parties, and one representative from the SIDS. Similarly, JI has a supervisory committee to monitor project verification. The new mechanism from Article 6.4 could directly include one of these institutions. The CDM and JI already have procedures for developing projects that are ultimately credited. The Parties may decide to transfer part of this set of rules to the new mechanism, or they may decide to adopt new procedures.

Developing new rules

The Kyoto Protocol established the CDM in 1997. However, it took four years to set the CDM, in the Marrakech Accords in 2001. It is possible and advisable to not take as much time to draw up the rules of Article 4, in light of all the experience with the CDM and JI. However, as the governments have diverging views on the role of market-based mechanisms, it will be difficult to quickly draw conclusions on these fundamental issues. The difficulty in reaching a consensus on market-based mechanisms has been reflected in the slow progress in their negotiation since 2011, in the UNFCCC framework, working towards a Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) and the NMMs. However, the fact that several countries have attached importance to international markets in their NDCs suggests that there may be a strong impetus to find a viable system quickly.

The sustainable development component of Article 6

With its adoption of the 17 sustainable development goals in 2015, the international community has a robust base for using the concept of sustainable development, in the context of Article 6 of the Agreement, for example. Although the voluntary market produced some experience with the co-benefits of mitigation activities in terms of the activity programmes and projects, the CDM does not have strict rules for analysing the positive impacts of sustainable development and the prevention of negative impacts. It preserves the prerogative of the host countries to design and implement review procedures according to their own sustainable development priorities.

The Parties will therefore have to decide (i) whether the participants in the Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) and cooperative approaches (CA) should analyse in advance the positive and negative effects of proposed activities, (ii) if they should following an internationally-defined assessment procedure and (iii) whether strict monitoring of sustainable development results from SDM and CA activities will be required.

As the Paris Agreement aims to mitigate GHG emissions, it incorporates part of the sustainable development goals. SDM rules could thus require that the implemented results of the Agreement be monitored by MRV approaches that have yet to be determined. The Parties must decide whether an upstream assessment and results follow-up in terms of sustainable development will be mandatory or voluntary, and whether the rules will be set up in a centralised manner, or if the Parties will be free to set up their own approaches to integrate sustainable development.

Finalising the CDM reform and the NMM and FVA negotiations

The future of the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol is also uncertain, particularly regarding the integration of elements of the CDM and JI in this new mechanism. The Paris Agreement does not mention the CDM or JI. However, it does note that the new mechanism must build on the experience of the existing mechanisms. Likewise, it is difficult to know if the units produced by the Kyoto mechanisms will be eligible after 2020. If they are eligible, it is not easy to ascertain whether they should be converted into some type of alternative credit, to comply with the framework of the new mechanism.

The negotiators may also decide to transfer the methodologies of CDM projects to apply them in the new mechanism, to not incorporate some of these existing approaches, or to develop more of them (for example, by developing methodologies for sector-level activities). The negotiators may also envisage other methods used outside of the UNFCCC.

At the same time, it will be important to continue and potentially complete the CDM reform, so that lessons from this process can be used to develop the SDM, and to start a coordinated and transparent transition from the CDM to the SDM. As such, it is also important for the Parties to set the terms of the eligibility of the CDM portfolio for the SDM. They may be various levels of eligibility, to restrict the supply, and also to ensure CDM project developers that it will be possible to continue high-quality projects. It will be interesting to see if, and under what conditions, an activity transition from the CDM / JI toward the SDM will be authorised. Continuing CDM activities might only be possible if these activities fulfil criteria that ensure environmental integrity¹³⁶.

These criteria could be: additionality, benefits for the host country and contribution to global mitigation of global emissions. The last two criteria may require adapting baselines to make them more conservative. This approach could make it easier to make the new mechanism operational more quickly, and could send a

136. Voigt, 2016.

positive signal to the private sector, even though it might not settle the fundamental question of the origin of the request. Regarding all the rules inherited from the CDM and JI, assigning a mandate to the Executive Board to review all of the existing rules in order to identify the elements that may be used, and those that must be modified in the Paris Agreement, would offer an opportunity to respond to these questions.

At the same time, it is important to make progress on simplifying the methodologies (such as the standardised baselines), and to share these results so that they can be applied to the SDM.

The Parties met in Marrakech and Bonn to continue discussions about Article 6 under the Paris Agreement. The decisions adopted for all sub-items mainly involved noting exchanges of views between Parties and invited them to continue with their talks. In Bonn, the Parties also considered three informal notes prepared by the SBSTA that reported on outlines included in the written observations submitted by the Parties prior to SB 46 along with exchanges during a round table held during SB 46. In all three cases, the Parties were invited to submit new observations, in connection with the talks held in Marrakech and Bonn, by 2 October 2017 at the latest. Each of these three notes contains more than sixty or so issues raised by the Parties during these talks. They can be consulted online using the links below:

- (i) Cooperative approaches: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_10a_informal_note_final.pdf;
- (ii) Mechanism created under Article 6: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_10b_informal_note_final.pdf;
- (iii) Market-based approaches: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_10c_informal_note_final.pdf.

Lastly, note that certain Parties did not wish observers to be allowed to participate in the round tables and negotiations taking place under Article 6. Should this practice continue, it could prevent the talks benefiting from valuable contributions from miscellaneous stakeholders with actual practical and technical experience in this matters.

I.2. Issues relating to the ad hoc working groups (AWG) and the Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Parties of the Paris Agreement (CMA)

Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)

By adopting the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) also decided to run a major work programme accompanying it, via Decision 1/CP.21. The UNFCCC decided to establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)¹³⁷.

¹³⁷. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 7, p. 3.

Currently, in the post-Paris context, this new process is the most important climate change negotiation round in the various bodies that have been mandated to prepare the entry into force of the Paris Agreement and making it operational. As such, this process determines the future of the fight against the effects and consequences of climate change, especially for the most vulnerable countries, including the LDCs and SIDS.

For the first time, the Parties reached an agreement on the obligation of achieving “together” the goal of holding the global temperature increase “*well below*” 2°C by 2100, or even 1.5°C, thereby sharing the same vision for mitigation and a global adaptation goal to be determined. Furthermore, these Parties agree to work together and to make support, transfer, and various other forms of cooperation available, be it financial, technical, technological or building capacities. This cooperation aims to respond more effectively to climate change, via mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, deforestation, land degradation, etc. in a transparent, evolving and sustainable framework.

The mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)

- Prepare the entry into force of the Paris Agreement;
- Prepare and convene the first Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA);
- Prepare draft decisions that the CMA should adopt at its first session.


The APA shall mainly be guided by the work programme elements that Decision I/CP.21 mandates. It must develop further the provisions of the Paris Agreement and prepare the implementation of its components, especially in terms of:

- (i) the objective;
- (ii) mitigation;
- (iii) nationally-determined contributions;
- (iv) adaptation;
- (v) loss and damage;
- (vi) financing;
- (vii) technologies;
- (viii) capacity building;
- (ix) transparency;
- (x) Global Stocktake;
- (xi) Preparation of the entry into force of the Paris Agreement.

This work must be conducted in the negotiation sessions of the APA, as well as in the two other subsidiary bodies (SBI and SBSTA) of the UNFCCC. Several bodies constituted under the Convention have also been mandated to help to implement the work programme preparing for the implementation and operationalisation of the Paris Agreement. This involves the Adaptation Committee, the


Least Developed Countries Expert Group, the Standing Committee on Finance, the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility, the Technology Executive Committee, the Paris Committee on Capacity Building, and the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.

Figure 5. The implementation of the Paris Agreement...
Main arrangements “for consideration and adoption”
during CMA1 – Summary¹³⁸



138. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

Figure 6. Implementation of the Paris Agreement ... The agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences – Summary¹³⁹



139. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – See also the UNFCCC Progress tracker (latest version available on 20 June 2017) [online] http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/pa_progress_tracker_200617.pdf

Figure 7. Ambition-related mechanisms – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences¹⁴⁰



AMBITION-RELATED MECHANISMS

MANDATES		
MAIN ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION AT THE CMA 1		
<p>AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE PARIS AGREEMENT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formulate guidelines on the features and information to be provided in the future NDC - Formulate guidelines for NDC accounting - Define the implementation modalities for the global stocktake - Define the data sources for the global stocktake 	<p>SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE AND SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR IMPLEMENTATION</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formulate recommendations on the operating modalities, work programme and functions of the forum on the impact of response measures implemented to remedy the adverse effects of climate change by virtue of the Agreement 	<p>SUBSIDIARY BODY ON IMPLEMENTATION</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Define the modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public NDC registry

CHRONOLOGY			
MAIN STEPS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS AGREEMENT			
<p>FEBRUARY-MAY 2016</p> <p>Secretariat of the UNFCCC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Updating the synthesis report on the aggregate effect of INDC (published in May 2016) - Creation of the NDC interim public registry 	<p>2016 - COP22</p> <p>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identify how the IPCC assessments can fuel the work of the global stocktake 	<p>2018 - COP24</p> <p>Competence of the Conference of the Parties</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Start a facilitation dialogue to assess collective efforts and progress made towards the long-term objective of the Paris Agreement <p>IPCC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide an assessment report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C 	<p>2019 - COP25</p> <p>Responsibility of the Parties</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reformulate or update the NDC - Communicate long-term strategies for developing low GHG emissions

140. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

Figure 8. Cooperative approaches and pre-2020 Ambition – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences¹⁴¹



COOPERATIVE APPROACHES

MANDATES

MAIN ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION AT THE CMA 1

SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE

- Formulate indications to ensure that double counting is avoided for the emission sources and the absorptions by carbon sinks
- Formulate a decision on the work programme under non-market approaches for sustainable development
- Define the rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism intended to contribute to the mitigation of GHG emissions and to support sustainable development

PRE-2020 AMBITION

CHRONOLOGY

MAIN STEPS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS AGREEMENT

2016 - COP22

Competence of the Conference of the Parties

- Facilitate the dialogue to assess progress in enhancing pre-2020 action

2017 - COP23

Competence of the Conference of the Parties

- Perform the technical mitigation and adaptation review processes

141. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

Figure 9. Adaptation and Loss and Damage – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences¹⁴²



142. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

Figure 10. Financing – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences¹⁴³



FINANCING

MANDATES

MAIN ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION AT THE CMA 1

COMPETENCE OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

- Information to be provided in public finances
- Defining the modalities for accounting of public finances

CHRONOLOGY

MAIN STEPS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS AGREEMENT

2016 - COP22

Competence of the Conference of the Parties

- Start work on identifying information to be provided on the public finances planned, mobilised and provided

2018 - COP24

Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

- Develop the modalities on public finance accounting for consideration at COP 24

143. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

Figure 11. Technology – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences¹⁴⁴



TECHNOLOGY

MANDATES

MAIN ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION AT THE CMA 1

SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE

- Define a new technology framework

CHRONOLOGY

MAIN STEPS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS AGREEMENT

FEBRUARY-MAY 2016

Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

- Start work on defining a new technology framework

Responsibility of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation

- Start the assessment of the effectiveness and relevance of the support provided by the Technology Mechanism

2018 - COP24

Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement

- Develop recommendations on transparency of action and support for consideration at COP 24

The issues and positions

144. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

Figure 12. Capacity-building – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences¹⁴⁵



CAPACITY-BUILDING

MANDATES

MAIN ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION AT THE CMA 1

COMPETENCE OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

- Reach a Decision on how to improve the institutional provisions for capacity-building

CHRONOLOGY

MAIN STEPS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS AGREEMENT


2016 - COP22	2019 - COP25
<p>Competence of the Conference of the Parties</p> <p>- Adopt the mandate of the Paris Committee on capacity-building</p>	<p>Competence of the Conference of the Parties</p> <p>- Review the progress, need for prolongation, effectiveness and improvement of the Paris Committee on capacity-building</p>

145. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

Figure 13. Transparency and compliance – Main arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences¹⁴⁶



TRANSPARENCY AND COMPLIANCE



The APA activities, similar to those of the other bodies and groups constituted and mandated by Decision 1/CP.21 should be completed, considering and based on the existing procedures and modalities, by improving, strengthening and/or developing new elements as needed for new measures.

For example, countries could continue to consider the issues of transparency within the existing system, via international consultation and analysis for developing countries, and assessment and review for developed countries, based on two parallel reporting systems—biennial updated reports for the former and biennial reports for the latter.

146. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

In Marrakech, the Parties requested the APA and the other permanent subsidiary bodies and bodies created by virtue of the Convention to report on their progress in implementing the Paris Agreement, at the latest at COP24 in 2018¹⁴⁷. The plan is also for the COP23 to review progress made by the APA in terms of executing its work programme¹⁴⁸.

1.2.1 Conduct of the first APA session

The first APA session was held on 6-16 May 2016 in Bonn (Germany), during SB 44. It was a step of crucial importance for the success of the current negotiation process. Although the session got off to a rough start, it was able to note significant progress finally on the following fundamental points:

- Adoption of the APA agenda;
- Adoption of the APA work organisation mode;
- Election of the APA Bureau;
- Agreement on some lines of work of the subsidiary bodies that are important for the coherence of the work programme.

In fact, prior to and after the APA session in May 2016, countries and country groups had expressed reservations regarding the concept note¹⁴⁹ jointly presented by the COP21 Chairmanship (France) and by the future COP22 Chairmanship (Morocco), especially regarding the proposals for priority items that need to be added to the draft APA. These Parties consider that the initially suggested agenda was focused on mitigation, and that an acceptable agenda should equitably reflect all the elements of the Paris Agreement.

As mentioned earlier, other bodies constituted under the Convention were mandated just like the APA, and the two other standing subsidiary bodies of the Convention were mandated to run the work programme to prepare the entry into force and implement the Paris Agreement. Some of these bodies are not directly under the authority of the Convention Secretariat, such as the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund, which are mandated to develop provisions related to financial issues, and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) for technological aspects¹⁵⁰.

Thus, for some Parties, the APA agenda should be designed so that negotiators can feel confident that all the elements of the Paris Agreement will be treated in a balanced and equitable manner, all treated with the same importance. This would still be the case even if some elements of the work programme established by Decision 1/CP.21 were on the agendas of the two other standing subsidiary bodies of the Convention or of other mandated committees and groups.

147. Decision 1/CMA.1, para. 8.

148. Decision 1/CMA.1, para. 10.

149. UNFCCC, 2016f.

150. UNFCCC, 2016f, Annex II, pp. 6-11.

Many countries and country groups also asked for explanations and clarifications on the content of certain items in the initial provisional agenda, such as the description of the elements of the Nationally Determined Contributions (the “characteristics” of NDCs), the modalities for organising and running the global stocktake and questions relating to transparency and compliance.


After APA1 work began on 17 May 2016 in Bonn, and following the speeches of countries, country groups and alliances, the expected difficulties in adopting the agenda took centre stage for APA1. The APA Co-Chairs (Saudi Arabia and New Zealand) had to spend two days on consultations to reach a consensus on the APA agenda. Minor amendments¹⁵¹ were made to the initial draft agenda, which essentially consisted of the addition of the following two items:

1. Item 4: New communication guidelines for adaptation, which are included in the Nationally Determined Contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement.
2. Item 8(c): Reports on the progress made by subsidiary bodies and bodies constituted in the mandate received in virtue of the Paris Agreement and Section III of Decision 1/CP.21, to promote and facilitate the coordination and coherence of the execution of the work plan, and if necessary, to take measures that may be in the form of recommendations.

In addition to showing the APA agenda items, Diagram 14 below also shows the work of the subsidiary bodies that are mandated to implement the work programme.

151. United Nations, 2016b.

Figure 14. The issues of permanent subsidiary bodies related to the elements of the Paris Agreement and the accompanying decision¹⁵²



1.2.2 Organising the APA1 negotiation work

One of the main issues for this first session was to agree on how to organise the work of this new body. Despite the keen interest for and the momentum arising from the adoption of the APA agenda, and the availability of all countries to start

152. © Guide to negotiations of COP23-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2017– to the UNFCCC [online] http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/8892.php

negotiating quickly, the opening statements, following the adoption of the agenda, revealed that most developing countries, and some developed countries, would like the negotiations to take place with a minimum number of formal and informal groups. This implied accommodating mainly the small delegations and avoiding that similar or connected topics (for example, financing, technology, transparency, etc.) would be discussed in parallel in different groups, given that the negotiators, who generally specialise in topics, could not be present at more than one meeting at a time.

The Parties agreed with the proposal of the APA1 Co-Chairs to continue their work in a single contact group¹⁵³ that should consider the six essential items of the agenda, to handle the issue of funds, review progress, determine the path to take and review the draft conclusions.

1.2.3 Issues of the APA in Bonn

The first session of the APA met again in Marrakech, during COP22, to continue its work (APA1-2). However, progress was slower than expected on the issues addressed by the APA at the second half of its first session. In this respect, the formal APA work had been cut short at the beginning of the second week of talks under the COP22 before continuing as informal consultations until the end of the conference.¹⁵⁴

With apparent signs of policy stumbling blocks on several of the agenda items of the APA for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, the Parties agreed in Marrakech to set 2018 and the COP24 as the deadline date to adopt the modalities that would allow the Agreement to be implemented.¹⁵⁵ In this respect, certain observers qualified the COP23 as the “transition COP”¹⁵⁶, during which the Parties would no doubt be called on to adopt draft decisions to execute the APA agenda items during COP24. Nevertheless, for some Parties, mainly the least developed countries, it would be more relevant for the APA to submit decisions relating to its substantive agenda items (items 3 to 8) to adoption as and when ready rather than submitting a “package” of decisions to the CMA during COP24¹⁵⁷. This would avoid especially having to compromise on certain decisions so that they can be adopted as a block.

At the Marrakech session, the APA mainly noted the majority of informal notes drafted under informal consultations about its agenda items 3 to 8, which reflect in detail viewpoints issued by the Parties during these consultations¹⁵⁸. No

153. IISD, 2016a.

154. IISD, 2016i, p.41.

155. IISD, 2016i, p.41.

156. IISD, 2017d, p.24.

157. IISD, 2016i, p.41.

158. Each informal note can be accessed at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/items/9974.php

draft decision was drawn up at APA1-2 and, as discussed below, the talks continued at APA1-3 in Bonn in May 2017, mainly emphasising the technical aspects of the agenda items whilst at the same time postponing some more policy-type questions to a later date¹⁵⁹.

In this respect, the APA presented the Parties with a full reflection note describing the progress of work for every APA1 agenda item following the first two parts of its first session¹⁶⁰. Referring to item 8 of the APA agenda, which touches on various issues regarding the implementation of the Agreement, the Parties agreed that the APA was directly responsible for a least one “orphan” issue, namely the inclusion of the Adaptation Fund under the Paris Agreement¹⁶¹ (see part I.10 regarding the issues on adaptation).

To facilitate progress on the work on this point at the APA1-4, the Parties requested that the secretariat draft a report and publish its contents on the UNFCCC website at the latest by 15 September 2017, covering all the decisions taken on the Adaptation Fund and which addressed its governance, institutions provisions, its guarantees and its operational rules. In addition, it was also possible to advise the Parties, during APA1-3, about legal issues relating to the inclusion of the Adaptation Fund under the Paris Agreement, as for the moment this falls under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties acting as the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) and serves to implement the Kyoto Protocol¹⁶². Thus, it seems that in order for the Adaptation Fund to serve the Paris Agreement, it would be necessary that the CMP and the CMA both adopt complementary decisions on this, which would allow, to some extent, a transfer of the Funds from one instrument to the other.

The Parties were also asked to submit their viewpoints on items 3 to 7 of the agenda prior to APA1-3¹⁶³. These communications should have enabled to frame the talks taking place at the round tables of APA1-3, in Bonn, in May 2017. Nevertheless, certain observers have underlined the challenges facing delegates attending the APA1-3 in Bonn, despite little concrete progress being made in this respect in Marrakech¹⁶⁴, apart from the call for communication in an attempt to hold workshops and round tables in May 2017¹⁶⁵. Mainly, the work of the APA in Marrakech stalled overall in relation to the balance to be attributed to all the elements for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, by avoiding prioritising some aspects such as mitigation¹⁶⁶.

159. IISD, 2017d, p.22.

160. APA.2017.1.InformalNote [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/apa/eng/1infnot.pdf>

161. APA.2017.1.InformalNote, para. 41-44.

162. IISD, 2017d, p.7.

163. FCCC/APA/2016/L.4.

164. IISD, 2016i, p.43.

165. IISD, 2016i, p.42.

166. IISD, 2016i, p.43.

For example, during the talks on mitigation, a group of developing countries clearly emphasised that it was essential to address “the full scope of the NDC” including the “resources required to implement them, namely financing, technologies and the support for capacity-building”¹⁶⁷. If this was not possible, this group of countries did not wish to continue with the talks. Disagreement still exists between the Parties in terms of implementing the differentiation of the responsibilities between developed and developing countries for various elements of the Paris Agreement, stumbling blocks which had remained during APA1-3¹⁶⁸.

To help progress in the talks at the APA1-4, new informal notes were prepared for each item and sub-item of the APA1-3 agenda¹⁶⁹. With regard to mitigation of the NDC (item 3), the Parties were invited to submit their viewpoints to the APA regarding the content of the informal notes referring to each sub-item by 15 September 2017, so that a new informal note could be prepared at the latest by October 15 in preparation of a round table to be held on 6 November 2017. This would however be closed to observers, which would also be the case for all the round tables planned for the time being within the framework of the AP 1-4 talks (see also section I.5 for further information on the implementation of the NDC).

Regarding the communications on adaptation (item 4), the Parties were invited to submit their viewpoints regarding the “elements” and “a basic summary” proposed in the informal note of APA1-3¹⁷⁰. These communications should be submitted until 15 September 2015 so that the UNFCCC Secretariat can prepare a technical document on the type of information relating to adaptation in the NDC by 1 October 2017 at the latest. An informal note should also be drafted by 15 October 2017 at the latest to prepare for the round table discussions scheduled for 4 November 2017, prior to the COP23 (see also Section I.10 for more information about adaptation).

On the subject of the framework for transparency of measures and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (item 5), the Parties have been invited to submit their views in relation to “titles” and “sub-titles” found in the APA1-3 informal note¹⁷¹. In this case, the communications should be submitted up to 30 September 2017, to prepare for discussions at two round tables scheduled for 4 and 5 November 2017, prior to the COP23. The round table of 4 November will focus on the transparency of the support, with the round table of 5 November focusing on the transparency of the action¹⁷² (see also section I.12 for further information on the topic of transparency).

167. IISD, 2016i, p.43.

168. IISD, 2017d, p.22-23.

169. FCCC/APA/2017/L.2. Each informal note can be viewed at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/items/10277.php

170. UNFCCC, 2017e.

171. UNFCCC, 2017f.

172. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.2, para. 13.

Regarding the Global Stocktake referred to in Article 14 (item 6), the Parties were unable to agree to accept the contents of the informal note submitted at APA1-3 which noted in particular the divergences and convergences of the viewpoints of the Parties on this matter¹⁷³. They were unable to find common ground for agreement both on the observations to be included in the Global Stocktake, particularly regarding equity between the Parties, and on accepting a technical document reporting on the lessons learnt in 2013-2015¹⁷⁴. The Parties were therefore asked to submit their viewpoints once again on the Global Stocktake in preparation for APA1-4 in relation to potential topics to be included as sources of information and to develop the modalities of the Global Stocktake. A round table is planned for November 5, 2017. Nevertheless, no informal document is planned in preparation for this round table considering the stumbling blocks at the previous APA sessions.

Regarding the modalities and procedures to ensure the proper function of the committee responsible for implementing and promoting compliance of the provisions of Article 15, paragraph 2 of the Agreement (item 7), talks in both Marrakech and in Bonn made little progress, particularly in relation to the notion of the differentiation between the Parties regarding their obligations under the Paris Agreement. For example, the developing countries reiterated the need to take into account their national capacities and circumstances¹⁷⁵. Many of them have also suggested that the mechanism for compliance with provisions and means of implementation be interlinked¹⁷⁶. To move forward with the work at the APA1-4, the Parties were invited to submit their viewpoints by 15 September 2017. A round table is planned for this purpose on the first day of COP23, i.e. on 6 November 2017. The Parties have been invited, within the framework of the reports, to answer the following three questions¹⁷⁷:

1. How can links be created between the Committee and other provisions of the Agreement whilst at the same time ensuring, on the one hand, the efficacy of the Committee and on the other hand that the independence of these other provisions is preserved?
2. What type of activities suggested by the Committee would fully facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement and their compliance? How could this be achieved?
3. How could the modalities of the Committee's function under Article 15 take into account the national capacities and circumstances of the Parties?

At the APA1-4, the challenges will be significant in order to make progress on the work in adopting the decisions required to implement the Paris Agreement at the COP24, one year later. In Bonn, in November 2017, the Parties would no

173. IISD, 2017d, p.6.

174. IISD, 2017d, p.6.

175. IISD, 2017d, p.6.

176. IISD, 2017d, p.6.

177. UNFCCC, 2017g, Annex, p.9.

doubt wish to set down the foundations for the options, elements and clear provisions of items 3 to 8 of the APA agenda, although certain specific policy aspects of the APA, or related element treated in parallel by other UNFCCC bodies could stall on these. Nevertheless, the same co-chairs of the previous year will oversee the work of the APA1-4 in the hope of achieving significant progress during this “transition COP”¹⁷⁸. The precise work programme submitted to the Parties by these co-chairs will no doubt be propitious to such advancement of works, whilst five round tables are planned, the views of the Parties have been sought before the APA1-4 on the main agenda items and informal notes should be drafted for most of them before the Parties meet in November 2014.

Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)

1.2.4 Issues of CMA1-2 in Bonn

Under the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on 4 November 2016¹⁷⁹, just a few days before the COP22 (Marrakech, 6-17 November 2016), the first session of the Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA1) was held at the same time. Given this entry into force of the Paris Agreement, it was decided to extend the duration of the first session of the CMA to December 2018 to improve the chances of agreeing on the issues that should have been decided at the first CMA session.

One of the key issues of the first CMA session held at the same time as COP22 was the rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement, extolled by the Parties, combined with the need laid down by Decision 1/CP.21 to adopt numerous decisions to implement the Agreement at CMA1. The Parties thus found themselves faced with a sizeable challenge: firstly, whether or not to adopt a decision at CMA1 and secondly, what type of decision to adopt¹⁸⁰. So, in Marrakech, the Parties debated various elements that could be included in the decisions of the CMA, including a meeting calendar of the CMA1, and tackling the so-called “orphan” issues previously addressed¹⁸¹.

On the subject of the CMA1 timetable, the talks stalled mainly between developing and developed countries. The LDC mainly wished that the CMA1 meet again in 2017 at the same time as COP23, under the CMA1-2¹⁸². They argued that some of the elements to implement the Paris Agreement would be already included in the draft decisions submitted either by the APA or by the permanent subsidiary bodies. If not, the developing countries argued that these drafts should be rapidly adopted and there was the risk of pushing this out until 2018. Finally,

178. IISD, 2017d, p.24.

179. UN, 2016a.

180. IISD, 2016i, p.4.

181. See Decision 1/CP.22, title V.

182. IISD, 2016i, p.4

one group of developing countries suggested that the Parties meet anyway in 2017 within the framework of the CMA1-2 to take stock of the progress achieved in the last year. Although other Parties opposed this idea, this appears to have prevailed, with the CMA1-2 taking place at the same time as the COP23¹⁸³.

On the other hand, the developed countries as well as some developing countries were more in favour of postponing the next part of the CMA1 until 2018¹⁸⁴. These countries particularly highlighted that the Marrakech Agreements which enabled the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol needed three years of negotiations and that these are effectively a “set” of rules, namely decisions taken across a group of elements in a consistent manner. They also highlighted the risk for the Parties meeting again in 2017 without any decision ready to be adopted, and that given the limited time prior to COP24, the negotiators should be focussing more on progressing with the work within the permanent subsidiary bodies and in the APA, without being distracted by another CMA meeting¹⁸⁵.

Thus, the Parties will meet in Bonn, during the COP23, mainly “*to review progress on the implementation of the work programme under the Paris Agreement*”, whereas the COP will be tasked with reporting on progress made in this respect by the various bodies in question at the latest at the CMA1-3 in December 2018¹⁸⁶. The agenda adopted by the CMA1-2 can be consulted in annex 6 of this guide¹⁸⁷. A high-level meeting of the Parties is planned within the framework of the CMA1-2.

I.3. The cooperation mechanisms of the Paris Agreement

The negotiations on the mechanisms of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement are characterised by strong interdependence between the technical and political requirements, particularly regarding transparency¹⁸⁸, nationally determined contribution (NDC) accounting¹⁸⁹, and the Global Stocktake¹⁹⁰.

Regarding the objective to ensure “*environmental integrity*”, many questions remain outstanding, particularly regarding the definition of additionality for mitigation related to political instruments or for entire sectors. For the accounting, the main issue is to avoid double counting, particularly under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6. More specifically, the issue is how to ensure robust accounting for internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) in the NDC context, although the targets/parameters are very different.

183. Decision 1/CMA.1, para. 10

184. IISD, 2016i, p.4

185. IISD, 2016i, p.4

186. Decision 1/CMA.1, para. 5

187. A.6. Meeting Agenda during COP23 – Agendas

188. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 13

189. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 13

190. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 14

Other major issues question which elements of the Kyoto regulation mechanisms (clean development mechanism – CDM and joint implementation – JI) will be directly used under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. For the new mechanisms, paragraph 37 of Decision 1/CP.21 recommends using the experiences and lessons learned from the CDM – regarding norms, methodologies, governance model and transparency, for example¹⁹¹. In this respect, several legitimate questions have been brought up:

- Are the CDM reference and monitoring scenario to be directly used as per the conditions stipulated in Article 6 paragraph 4?
- What happens to the certified emission reductions (CERs) granted under the CDM that have not been cancelled or removed under the Kyoto Protocol?
- Can future CERs serve as internationally transferred mitigation outcomes under the regime of Article 6?
- Can the activities registered under the CDM be directly transferred to the mechanism stipulated in Article 6 paragraph 4?

Another question regards defining international regulations to avoid diluting the global mitigation ambition for cooperative approaches (CA)¹⁹². At the same time, another question that is just as sensitive aims to determine whether emission credit issues will be taxed only for Article 6 paragraph 4, or also for Article 6 paragraph 2. Lastly, the definition of the contribution to global mitigation efforts¹⁹³ under Article 6 paragraph 4 remains pending. As for the non-market based approaches referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6, the orientation of the mechanism also remains completely open.

The ultimate objective of the negotiations¹⁹⁴ is to adopt the directives based on the modalities referred to paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Agreement¹⁹⁵, and the rules, modalities and procedures that are applicable to the mechanism established by paragraph 4 of Article 6 of the Agreement¹⁹⁶.

Progress at COP22 in November 2016 in Marrakech

The premature entry into force of the Paris Agreement just a few days before the start of COP22 in Marrakech¹⁹⁷ caused some confusion. Less than 30 days before the start of the Conference, the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA1) was added to the

191. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(f)

192. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 2

193. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 4(d); which aims to “*deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions*”.

194. In accordance with paras. 36, 37 and 38 of Decision 1/CP.21

195. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 36

196. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 37-38.

197. UN, 2016a.

programme. It seems that the atmosphere of COP22 – which was also “influenced” by the election of a candidate to the United States presidency who made the dismantlement of the Paris Agreement one of his campaign promises – affected the negotiations, including the negotiations on the cooperation instruments established under Article 6.

Although informal consultations aimed to advance negotiations on Article 6, the results were meagre¹⁹⁸. The questions of the co-facilitators of the European Union and the Maldives for this contact group included:

- Regarding the cooperative approaches referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6:
 - What are the options for ensuring environmental integrity?
 - What are the options for ensuring sustainable development?
 - How does the related adjustment work?
 - Regarding paragraph 2 of Article 6, what subject will the guidance address: Will the guidance target the subject of the entire life cycle of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, or just part of the cycle (for example, the procedure of issuing units, transferring, and removal)?
 - How should the link between paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6 and the provisions of Articles 4 and 13, which regard accounting, be managed?
- Regarding non-market based approaches referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6:
 - Is the governance relevant for non-market based approaches?
 - Do non-market based approaches require an international collaboration component?
 - Is quantification useful for non-market based approaches?

Lastly, the conclusions in Marrakech regarding all of Article 6 consisted of the invitation for the Parties to communicate their views, before 17 March 2017¹⁹⁹, especially regarding the aspects to consider (including their implementation), the directives for the cooperative approaches, the links between paragraphs 2 and 4, the rules, modalities and procedures concerning Article 6 para. 4, as well as the sustainable development aspects to consider in the work programme relating to the framework for non-marked based approaches (para. 101). The decision made in Marrakech also included a request for the Secretariat to plan a round table that brings together the Parties based on the views they have communicated, at the same time as the 46th meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), and thus continue to examine these questions²⁰⁰. The main differences are presented in the following sections.

198. IISD, 2016i.

199. UNFCCC, 2016g, paras. 105, 114 and 123.

200. UNFCCC, 2016g, paras. 86, 94 and 102.

Discussions specifically on Article 6, paragraph 2 (“cooperative approaches”)

During informal consultations, the Parties discussed the framework issues proposed by the co-facilitators²⁰¹. Several Parties suggested that the issue of the corresponding adjustment²⁰² was too technical for the discussion at the 45th SBSTA meeting²⁰³. Regarding the directions of the units that may be transferred, some participants suggested leaving the question of the scope of Article 6, paragraph 2 open. Others called for centralised governance and the use of appropriate institutions as part of the CMA²⁰⁴. Regarding the link between paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6, one Party suggested that the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes could be exchanged under Article 6, para. 2 by letting the mechanism drawn up in virtue of Article 6, para. 4 produce the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes²⁰⁵.

Discussions specifically on Article 6, paragraph 4 (“sustainable development mechanism”)

During informal consultations, the Parties tried to clarify these questions by expressing their opinions concerning Article 6, paragraph 4 in particular. One question that captured much attention was the impact on the centralised mechanism, which may be inadequate, in a new regime where all Parties have NDCs, in contrast with the “universe” (the regime) of the Kyoto Protocol²⁰⁶. The Parties also discussed additionality, governance, and how to achieve “global mitigation”, the procedure required to draw up project and activity rules, as well as the need to use the experience of existing mechanisms²⁰⁷.

Regarding additionality, one Party suggested that this will be indicated by the fact that all new projects that are not planned as part of the NDC of a country but that have still been implemented would not have happened without Article 6, para. 4. Other Parties highlighted that additionality is closely linked to environmental integrity²⁰⁸.

The Parties expressed their strong support for centralised government and for building upon the knowledge and experiences resulting from the Kyoto Protocol (especially from the CDM)²⁰⁹. The interconnections with the other provisions of Article 6 have been identified, particularly concerning the need to avoid double counting units. Regarding the implementation of rules aiming to include new activities, one Party advocated giving priority to project-based rules²¹⁰.

201. IISD, 2016i.

202. See Decision 1/CP.21, para. 36.

203. IISD, 2016i.

204. IISD, 2016i.

205. IISD, 2016i.

206. IISD, 2016i.

207. IISD, 2016i.

208. IISD, 2016i.

209. IISD, 2016i.

210. IISD, 2016i.

In Marrakech, the end result for paragraph 4 of Article 6 resulted in the invitation for the Parties to communicate their views on the subject prior to 17 March 2017²¹¹. Regarding Article 6 para. 4, in particular, this invitation aimed to have the Parties state the elements relating to rules, modalities and procedures of the mechanism to be considered (including their implementation). There was also emphasis on the issue of the links between paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article 6. These questions were to be discussed afterwards in a round-table discussion at the same time as the 46th SBSTA meeting²¹².

Discussions specifically on Article 6, paragraph 8 (“non-market based approaches”)

During the work programme discussions on non-market based mechanisms, the Parties answered various questions, particularly regarding the relevance of governance, quantification, accounting and international cooperation within the context of non-market based mechanisms²¹³.

A few countries noted the importance of governance concerning the identification of contributions to NDCs. From a general point of view, it would seem that the majority of the Parties considered that the quantification was useful²¹⁴. Some Parties also suggested that the established notification practices as well as the existing greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories should be used to complete the quantification. Furthermore, one Party also indicated that accounting should not be mandatory, that the procedures and directives could be drawn up for voluntary use. Several Parties noted the possibility of forging synergies between paragraphs 2 and 6 of Article 6. Lastly, one group warned that great care must be taken to avoid double counting due to potential overlaps²¹⁵.

Regarding the question of whether non-market based mechanisms should necessarily constitute international collaboration, the Parties did not find a clear vision: some Parties indicated domains in which international cooperation could support and strengthen national action²¹⁶.

Regarding institutional arrangements, one group suggested workshops to strengthen international cooperation, and other Parties suggested the creation of a mechanism devoted to sharing information on non-market based mechanisms. To improve the clarity of the subject and identify potential synergies, it was also suggested to classify and map non-market based approaches²¹⁷.

211. UNFCCC, 2016g.

212. UNFCCC, 2016g; para. 94.

213. IISD, 2016i.

214. IISD, 2016i.

215. IISD, 2016i.

216. IISD, 2016i.

217. IISD, 2016i.

In Marrakech, the outcome for Article 6, paragraph 8 was to invite the Parties to communicate their views on non-market based approaches as well as their submissions concerning paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6²¹⁸. Concerning non-market based approaches, the invitation targeted the elements to consider, particularly regarding sustainable development (as referred to in paragraph 9 of Article 6) and the links between paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6. It was also decided that a specific round table including the subject of paragraph 8 of Article 6 would be organised at the SBSTA46²¹⁹.

The reform of the CDM, which was a “hostage” of the lack of progress on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

In the generally difficult context of the negotiations related to the market mechanisms, the process of reforming the modalities and procedures of the CDM did not result in a formal and concrete finalisation. At the same time, the major task of implementing a recourse procedure was delayed until 2019. This new deadline plans (or counts on the fact that) that by this date, the regulations related to Article 6 will be implemented.

During the discussions held in November 2016, the Parties differed over several questions²²⁰. The contact group decided to delete a large part of the draft text and send a “clean” version of the draft decision to the CMP for examination²²¹. The Parties differed over questions regarding the reference scenarios and the methods for monitoring and registering CER issuance, regional and subregional distribution, and resources for the CDM work. Likewise, voluntary cancellation of CERs, their use in international aviation, references to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the duration of credit periods were challenged. The climax was the question of the relevance of the CDM within Article 6. Finally, the Parties reached a consensus to delete the references to the Paris Agreement. Several Parties made it a point to highlight that the lack of demand for CERs and the unpromising status of the Doha Amendment were subjects of high concern that could pose a problem²²².

In its annual decision on the directives relative to the CDM²²³, the CMP encourages the Executive Committee (EC) to continue its work to simplify the CDM, particularly via the process of registering and issuance, and via the methods. The CMP requests the EC to assess the overall cost of the designated operational entities and report to CMP13. The directives also contain sections on the methods for the baseline and monitoring scenarios. The monitoring methodologies are now meant to make it possible to choose between the values that are kept by default or an approach using direct measurements. The system of subsidised loans of the UNFCCC

218. UNFCCC, 2016g.

219. UNFCCC, 2016g; para. 123.

220. IISD, 2016i.

221. IISD, 2016i.

222. IISD, 2016i.

223. FCCC/KP/CMP/2016/L.4.

for the CDM project developers has been withdrawn, and the EC continues to examine the connection with international climate financing. Compared with the previous years, the annual guidance for the CDM is extraordinarily general.

Regarding the resources of the Adaptation Fund reserved at the end of COP22 (despite the opposition of developed countries²²⁴), Fund representatives highlighted the need to reform the CDM in order to improve the predictability and sustainability of the resources of the Fund²²⁵.

Submissions of the Parties on Article 6 prior to the meetings of May 2017

The submissions of the Parties in September 2016 and March 2017 show the different views and positions on various points of the negotiations. In the below paragraphs, the positions are organised into common themes in order to identify similarities and differences among the positions.

Fundamental principles of the mechanisms

According to the European Union (EU), the fundamental principles referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6 should guide the implementation of paragraphs 2, 4 and 8 of the same Article²²⁶. The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) requests that the principle of environmental integrity be the same for paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6²²⁷. As for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), it asks that the incentives from Article 6 be aligned with the principles and objectives of the Paris Agreement²²⁸. The Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) asks that the units referred to in paragraph 4 of Article 6 be guided by the provisions of paragraph 2 of the same Article²²⁹. Ecuador demands that all the mechanisms be submitted to the non-commercial mechanism platform in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6²³⁰.

Accounting and environmental integrity

The EU would like the emissions that are verified and certified in accordance with the provisions provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 6 to become internationally transferred mitigation outcomes once they are transferred to another country to be used in the NDCs²³¹. The EIG considers that the design of all the instruments of Article 6 should incorporate the provisions regarding NDC accounting²³², which is closely linked to internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, and by virtue

224. Sethi, 2016.

225. IISD, 2016i.

226. Republic of Malta, 2017.

227. Switzerland, 2017.

228. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.

229. Republic of Mali, 2017a, b.

230. Obergassel *et al.*, 2017.

231. Republic of Malta, 2017.

232. In accordance with the provisions of Art. 4 para. 13 of the Paris Agreement.

of Article 13 on transparency²³³. Canada also insisted on the principle of avoiding double counting and of adding that the principle aiming to ensure environmental integrity not be compromised²³⁴. As for the AGN, it suggests supporting the CDM project and evaluation cycle process, including verification by third parties²³⁵. The AGN asks that the MRV system not be overloaded²³⁶, that enough space be given to the surveillance body. The AGN also notes that there must be a reporting system at the international level²³⁷. AOSIS notes that the reports should include information on consulting Stakeholders, and notes the importance of technical reviews by third parties, especially for inventories, suggested baselines and suggested credit thresholds²³⁸. AOSIS also requests that the accreditation standards of the designated operational entities (DOEs) be set up.

Different roles of the instruments of paragraphs 2, 4 and 8 of Article 6

The Arab Group countries consider that the dynamic carries risks that could negatively impact sustainable development (as mentioned above)²³⁹. In this respect, paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 are an opportunity to integrate targeted tools that would address these risks and that would lead to the holistic implementation of cooperative approaches. The mechanisms from paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 are particularly qualified for this role, as they focus on promoting sustainable development and on a distinctive cooperative approach²⁴⁰. As such, the development of mechanisms from paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 should be consolidated and complement the mechanisms from paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6²⁴¹.

Ambition and contribution to global mitigation

The AG highlights that the mechanisms should contribute to improving mitigation and adaptation²⁴². The AG describes the need to define how the mechanisms can increase the ambition. AOSIS requests a redefinition of market-based mechanisms to generate net global emissions reductions, beyond compensation, and also beyond the concept of the advantage that the host Party may obtain from conservative baselines²⁴³. The Arab Group countries specify that cooperation mechanisms must preserve national prerogatives in defining NDCs and concerning sustainable development²⁴⁴. As such, the Arab Group countries suggest that cooperation mechanisms

233. Switzerland, 2017.

234. Canada, 2017.

235. Republic of Mali, 2017b.

236. Measuring, Reporting and Verification.

237. Republic of Mali, 2017b.

238. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.

239. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.

240. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.

241. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.

242. Republic of Mali 2017b.

243. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.

244. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.

may offer flexibility. At the same time, this Group observes that mechanisms offer an opportunity to increase the adaptation ambition. Furthermore, it observes that paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6 offer the option of boosting the mitigation ambition. Lastly, the Arab Group countries state that all countries may participate in the mechanisms²⁴⁵. The EIG asks that the mitigation outcomes obtained in virtue of paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6 lead to emissions reductions beyond the efforts that the host country may make, and lead to verifiable, permanent and real reductions²⁴⁶.

Lessons learned from the experience and questions concerning the CDM transition to Article 6

The AG and the Arab Group countries consider that Article 6 para. 4 must be based on the CDM outcomes²⁴⁷. They also note that it will be important to not lose ongoing mitigation activities in the field and to not risk losing their upscaling potential simply due to a regime change. The EIG highlights the importance of not discouraging current emissions reduction efforts implemented via CDM programmes or projects²⁴⁸. It suggests that a discussion is required to determine whether – and in what circumstances – CDM projects could be included in Article 6. It thus suggests an option in which CDM projects may be registered again under the mechanisms provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 6. In contradiction, the EU considers that the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms should not be maintained at the end of the second commitment period²⁴⁹; as such, any discussion regarding the transition arrangements should only be held within the context of the definition of the rules relating to paragraph 4 of Article 6. As for Brazil, it suggests that the objectives of the new Paris mechanism reflect the CDM logic by widening its scope²⁵⁰. In order to conduct a successful and productive transition, Brazil foresees the need for a smooth transition by using the existing CDM methodologies as well as the CDM accreditation system²⁵¹. This would make it possible to continue ongoing CDM projects and programmes, and also to make existing CDM CERs eligible under Article 6, para. 4.

Sustainable development

Regarding sustainable development, the AG considers that the sustainable development tool that the Secretariat developed for the CDM may be used on a voluntary basis²⁵². The Arab Group considers that non-market based mechanisms constitute an opportunity to integrate a series of instruments that could address the risk of a

245. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.

246. Switzerland, 2017.

247. Republic of Mali, 2017b; and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.

248. Switzerland, 2017.

249. Republic of Malta, 2017.

250. Brazil, 2017b.

251. Brazil, 2017b.

252. Republic of Mali 2017b.

negative impact on sustainable development from the dynamic of the instruments related to paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6²⁵³.

At the same time, instruments relating to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 are considered as opportunities to conduct cooperative approaches in a more holistic manner. As such, the development of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 should be consolidated and complement paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6.

The Arab Group countries foresee the gradual achievement of sustainable development by implementing the mechanisms that encourage a transition toward a sustainable economy, and the Group suggests introducing economic and social safeguards²⁵⁴. The Arab Group considers that sustainable development criteria must be defined and monitored at the national level²⁵⁵. Brazil also notes that the promotion, examination and monitoring of sustainable development is a national prerogative, and that it is not appropriate for the UNFCCC to offer an international definition of sustainable development or to suggest how the Parties should promote sustainable development at the national level²⁵⁶.

The EIG states that activities related to paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6 should, at least, be compatible with the sustainable development goals (SDGs) defined under the 2030 Agenda, and also with the sustainable development objectives and strategies of the Parties, and with human rights²⁵⁷. The EIG suggests that the host Party confirm compliance with the SDGs and human rights, whilst noting the need for an international tool aiming to describe this compliance in sharing information and evaluating activities. AOSIS requests that the publication of sustainable development criteria be made mandatory, and notes that at the same time, host Parties should have the flexibility required to make decisions regarding relevant norms²⁵⁸.

Specific aspects of cooperative approaches

The Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) suggests that national governments be able to authorise interactions and links between national, regional and subnational systems before transferring mitigation outcomes to the international level²⁵⁹. AOSIS notes that the directives should address the quality of the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, and identify the need for a centralised control mechanism at the same time²⁶⁰. It also suggests that internationally transferred mitigation outcomes should constitute additional emissions reductions and that these transfers should be limited to NDCs that have a quantified economy-wide reduction target. The AG requests that internationally

253. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.

254. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.

255. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.

256. Brazil, 2017b.

257. Switzerland, 2017.

258. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.

259. Guatemala, 2017.

260. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.

transferred mitigation outcomes be expressed in quantitative terms and that they result in adjusting the NDCs that require a degree of coherence (that could be reached by following the IPCC guidelines)²⁶¹. The AG emphasises the importance of transparency regarding the scenarios and the need to report on internationally transferred mitigation outcomes at the time of the exchange, and also the need to have a centralised registry supervised by the UNFCCC secretariat²⁶². It suggests that the Parties show the methodologies used and the introduction of safeguards that guarantee environmental integrity and sustainable development. The Group also postulates that internationally transferred mitigation outcomes should comply with the rules in virtue of Article 13 on the framework for strengthened transparency of measures and support. Lastly, it suggests that internationally transferred mitigation outcomes should not be globally fungible, and that solely Article 6 para. 4 should be able to lead to fungible and negotiable units.

Brazil suggests that paragraph 2 of Article 6 allows Parties that go beyond their mitigation commitment registered in their NDCs to exchange this surplus²⁶³. It notes that the guidance should include accounting rules and the requirements for international transfers. Brazil notes that the exchange regimes for national, subnational or regional rights should be indicated in the communications of the Parties²⁶⁴. Furthermore, Brazil proposes an international transaction mechanism that could transmit units to different registries. It also suggests that each unit transmitted should have a unique serial number to identify and monitor it²⁶⁵.

Canada proposes that Article 6 para. 2 makes it possible to use bottom-up approaches and experiment with this approach using a variety of methods, including transferring innovative mitigation actions. This guidance should be able to facilitate the participation of several market players, including subnational governments and other non-Party stakeholders. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations asks that the results of the REDD+ mechanism be fully eligible under Article 6 para. 2. According to the EU, the Parties must establish an accounting balance by making the adjustments relevant to the accounting balance of each Party concerning the emissions and removals covered by the NDCs²⁶⁶. The reports should also provide initial information on how Article 6 was implemented at the national level.

Venezuela considers that internationally transferred mitigation outcomes must not be reimbursable, and should be automatically cancelled if they are not used after a specific period (not exceeding five years)²⁶⁷. Venezuela considers that internationally transferred mitigation outcomes should not be transferable more than once.

261. Republic of Mali, 2017b.

262. Republic of Mali, 2017a.

263. Brazil, 2017a.

264. Brazil, 2017a.

265. Brazil, 2017a.

266. Republic of Malta, 2017.

267. Venezuela, 2017.

Specific aspects of the mechanism established in virtue of Article 6 para. 4

Role of the mechanism established in virtue of Article 6 para. 4

Brazil proposes that the mechanisms help to demonstrate that NDCs have been made, and to introduce additional tools to implement mitigation actions by non-Party stakeholders (public and private entities) by cancelling the units²⁶⁸. ASOIS proposes that the instruments related to paragraph 4 of Article 6 add value by helping countries to reach their NDCs at a lower cost and by facilitating the commitment of private entities in emissions reductions²⁶⁹. Furthermore, the group considers that there is an inherent value in this, beyond compensation. It proposes to start with project-based activities and policy activities to include sectoral approaches afterwards, as they require more experience and stricter standards. AILAC and the EU suggest that the mechanism be used to mobilise a range of including project-based, policy, sectoral and other initiatives that could receive credits for emissions reductions achieved²⁷⁰. The EU notes that the mechanisms should catalyse action for a low-emissions future, create incentives to broaden, quantify and incorporate NDCs, and avoid perverse incentives.

Degree of centralisation and role of the supervising body of Article 6 para. 4

The AG suggests equal treatment of the provisions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6, and adds that all the mechanisms provided for in Article 6 should be placed under the auspices of the same supervising body²⁷¹. Brazil suggests that the supervising body of Article 6 para. 4 designated the CMA should follow the CDM EC in nearly all aspects²⁷². AILAC proposes that the supervising body have the ability to allow other international mechanisms to generate mitigation outcomes after certification²⁷³. AOSIS notes that the surveillance body should be managed by the CMA, and that the national focal points should play a certain role in the activities acceptance process²⁷⁴. South Africa²⁷⁵ identifies a need for centralised governance, including for the mechanism of Article 6, para.2 according to rules drawn up by the CMA.

268. Brazil, 2017b.

269. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.

270. Guatemala, 2017; and Republic of Malta, 2017.

271. Republic of Mali, 2017a.

272. Brazil, 2017b.

273. Guatemala, 2017.

274. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.

275. South Africa, 2017a.

Concrete approach to establish in virtue of Article 6 para. 4

The EIG considers that the supervisory body should develop tools and standards relating to additionality, baselines, and permanence²⁷⁶. Furthermore, the EIG proposes to define the procedures aiming to ensure that all the activities fulfil these criteria. The EU proposes a gradual approach for implementing rules, and initially only drawing up general rules, leaving more specific provisions for the supervisory body to develop under the authority and control of the CMA²⁷⁷. Regarding national arrangements, South Africa proposes that they draw from lessons learned from the CDM, and adopt similar governance bodies²⁷⁸. The group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) proposes a large-scale reproduction of the CDM rules and of JI for Article 6 paragraph 4, and using a hybrid approach: applying similar rules to the CDM or the JI, depending on the whether project activity that a Party has undertaken, is conducted within or outside of the sectors identified in its NDC²⁷⁹.

Specific aspects of the mechanism established in virtue of Article 6 para. 8

New Zealand²⁸⁰ observes that the function of Article 6 para. 8 is to recognise that there are other ways to implement the NDCs that are not market-based.

The AG suggests that Article 6 para. 8 should strengthen the links and synergies between existing mechanisms without duplication²⁸¹. Non-market based mechanisms should provide funding for NDCs and include any action or activity that does not depend on international negotiation. The AG considers that the work programme should clarify the function and provide a definition of the typologies of activities included (for example, appropriate national mitigation measures not credited, buy back rates, removal of fossil fuel subsidies and carbon taxes). It will be important to establish a process to identify links and synergies with other mechanisms and find an approach to avoid duplication in the areas of finance and technology.

AOSIS considers that the decision on the work programme may concern the modalities, the targeted thematic areas, a schedule to examine the targeted areas, a process to identify other thematic activity areas, results and recommendations²⁸². The work programme could be based on the results of the technical examination process on mitigation and the technical examination process on adaptation. AOSIS also offers thematic areas for the work programme: reforming fossil fuel subsidies, deploying renewable energy technologies, and eliminating inefficient and polluting technologies²⁸³.

276. Switzerland, 2017.

277. Republic of Malta, 2017.

278. South Africa, 2017, b.

279. Ethiopia, 2017b.

280. New Zealand, 2017.

281. Republic of Mali, 2017c.

282. Republic of Maldives, 2017b.

283. Republic of Maldives, 2017b.

The EIG suggests that non-market based approaches could arise from sharing best practices and information on various subjects relevant to mitigation and adaptation²⁸⁴. Furthermore, it proposes to address specific measures that directly or indirectly contribute to GHG emissions mitigation or to adapt to climate change. Relevant initiatives should also emphasise a more balanced involvement of the public and private sectors. Lastly, the EIG states that the programme should examine specific areas of cooperation such as: encouraging the use of international sustainability standards, eliminating ineffective fossil fuel subsidies, and encouraging measures aimed at reducing climate-related risks²⁸⁵.

Lastly, the EU considers that Article 6 para. 8 as one of the most transversal points of the Paris Agreement, with potential links with mitigation, adaptation, financing, technology transfer and capacity building²⁸⁶. As such, the decisions to take within the framework of its work programme must carefully avoid duplication between Article 6 para. 8 and other provisions of the Paris Agreement.

South Africa²⁸⁷ considers that Article 6 para. 8 is a mechanism that cannot be regulated in virtue of the convention as long as it remains a domestic imperative²⁸⁸. Requirements for declaring could be needed for climate financing.

Progress during the subsidiary body sessions in Bonn in May 2017

During its 46th meeting, the SBSTA, in accordance with Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 36, pursued its work on drawing up the guidance referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The round table between the Parties on the guidance referred to in Article 6 was held on 8 and 9 May 2017, followed by a “traditional” contact group from 10 May.

The round table aimed to address funding issues in a more open setting than in the “usual” negotiation meetings. Participation in the round table was limited to one representative per Party. The following observations on the round table are from the author, who participated in the round table discussions in person. Unfortunately, the Parties obstructed the publication of the discussion outcomes. The lack of trust amongst Parties could also be seen in the fact that Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Papua New Guinea and Dominica asked that solely the Parties have access to the contact group.

The co-facilitators proposed a rough schedule that planned to identify questions considered as “high priority” during the 46th session, to develop a draft project at the 47th session, and to finally negotiate the text at the 48th session.

284. Switzerland, 2017.

285. Switzerland, 2017.

286. Republic of Malta, 2017.

287. South Africa, 2017c.

288. South Africa, 2017a.

Emphasising the implications of using an international cooperation mechanism for the NDCs, regarding the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of Article 6, the Parties noted that the scope of the NDCs in terms of sectors, gas and their time horizon would affect emissions reduction accounting. Several Parties noted the necessity to take NDCs forward, toward economy-wide targets, and the importance of avoiding perverse incentives that could limit the ambition.

It was observed that it would be important to synchronise the activity notification intervals under the mechanisms with the planned deadlines for the NDCs, and to make a distinction between conditional and unconditional targets.

An important point of the discussion concerned the interaction of the NDCs, determining additionality, as well as defining the baseline (or reference point). Several Parties called for a new definition of additionality to replace the definition used in the Kyoto Protocol. One proposal was to evaluate activities using the baselines to evaluate increased ambition.

As for leveraging past experience in the design of the mechanism, especially experiences resulting from the Kyoto Protocol, Parties suggested strengthening the role of the designated national authorities. Regarding the transition of rules and units between existing mechanisms to new instruments, the Parties discussed the eligibility of existing projects and the conditions in which the certified emissions reductions would be valid.

Following the negotiations, the co-facilitators prepared an informal information note containing an informal list of elements brought up by the Parties. The elements of these lists are enumerated below. They show that the approach used still aims to collect elements, and does not endeavour to define clear options from which the policymakers may choose. It is also clear that new elements may still be added to the lists because each subcomponent includes an open element.

Informal list in Article 6 para. 2²⁸⁹

A. Overarching issues, principles, considerations, context, criteria

1. Voluntary cooperation
2. Context of the Paris Agreement
3. Context of Article 2
4. Unitary nature of Article 6 and the Paris Agreement
5. Environmental integrity
6. Sustainable development
7. Preserving national prerogatives
8. Manageable sustainable development transition

289. SBSTA, 2017a.

9. Avoiding negative social and economic impacts of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes
10. Avoiding negative ecological impacts
11. Incentivizes for higher ambition
12. Incentives for progression
13. Incentives for domestic mitigation
14. Bottom-up approach
15. Accounting integrity, avoiding double counting
16. Mitigation co-benefits of adaptation
17. Mitigation co-benefits of economic diversification
18. Not erode the environmental integrity of NDCs, implementation of NDCs
19. Centralized oversight
20. Equal treatment of Article 6.2 and Article 6.4
21. Distinctive nature of Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8
22. Benefits and opportunities of sustainable developments
23. Transparency
24. Avoidance of undue burden
25. Top-down approach
26. ...

B. Definitions

1. ...

C. Scope and applicability of guidance for Article 6.2

1. ...

D. Governance

1. Objective and scope of governance
2. Form of oversight
3. Transparency in governance
4. Demonstration of conformity with guidance
5. Review process for guidance
6. Avoidance of duplication of institutional arrangements
7. ...

E. Participation

1. Authorization by Parties
2. Eligibility
3. Participation requirements
4. Inclusivity
5. ...

F. Internationally transferred mitigation outcomes in Article 6.2

1. Scope and definition of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes
2. Measurement, reporting and verification
3. Standards – real, additional, permanent
4. Issuance
5. ...

G. Robust accounting

1. Impact of scope, types, time period, conditionality of NDC, vintage of mitigation outcomes
2. Emissions balance, NDC permitted emissions, accounting balance
3. Avoiding double counting, double usage
4. Avoiding double counting with other processes
5. Corresponding adjustment, additions and subtractions
6. Inventories
7. ITMOs issued before 2020
8. ...

H. Ensuring environmental integrity

1. Guidance on the establishment of baselines
2. Standards
3. ...

I. Promoting sustainable development

1. ...

J. Transparency

1. Initial NDC accounting starting point, information required for commencement, information on NDC to allow accounting, calculation report of NDCs permitted emissions
2. Format and frequency of reporting
3. Tracking of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, compilation and accounting reports
4. Reporting on environmental integrity
5. Reporting on sustainable development
6. National level information
7. Publicly accessible information
8. Final accounting of NDC, information for completion of NDC contribution period, report upon expiration of additional period for tracking progress
9. ...

K. Infrastructure

1. National registries

2. Multilateral, centralized registry
3. International transaction log
4. Compilation and accounting database
5. ...

L. Limits and safeguards

1. Supplementarity
2. Limits and controls on internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, trading, tradable units
3. Human rights
4. No conflict with other environmental aspects
5. Other Preamble rights
6. Addressing negative social and economic impacts
7. System for addressing hot air
8. ...

M. Interlinkages

1. Relationship between Article 6.2, Article 6.4, Article 6.8
2. Links to Article 4.7 mitigation co-benefits
3. Links to Article 4.13 accounting guidance, TACCC principles (Transparency, Accuracy, Completeness, Comparability, Consistency)
4. Links to Article 4.15 impacts of response measures
5. Article 10 technology
6. Links to Article 13.7(a) GHG inventories
7. Links to Article 13.7 (b) information to track progress
8. Links to Article 13.11 multilateral consideration
9. Links to Article 13.12 technical expert review
10. Links to Article 13.13 modalities, rules and procedures
11. Links to Article 14 global stocktake
12. Links to Article 15 mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance
13. ...

N. Share of proceeds

1. For adaptation, the Adaptation Fund
2. ...

O. Overall mitigation in global emissions

1. ...

P. Transitional issues

1. ITMOs issued before 2020
2. ...

Q. Other

1. ...

For Article 6 para. 4, the list is even longer²⁹⁰:

A. Overarching issues, principles, considerations, context, criteria

1. Context of the Paris Agreement
2. Context of Article 2
3. Voluntary cooperation
4. Unitary nature of Article 6 and the Paris Agreement
5. Environmental integrity
6. Sustainable development
7. Preserving national prerogatives
8. Incentives for higher ambition
9. Incentives for progression
10. Incentives for domestic mitigation
11. Transparency
12. Overall mitigation in global emissions
13. Bottom-up approach
14. Party-driven process
15. Accounting integrity
16. Carbon market credibility, development, strengthening
17. Distinctive nature of Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8
18. Equal treatment of Article 6.2 and Article 6.4
19. Real, measurable, long-term benefits, additionality
20. Top-down, centralized and multilateral nature
21. Share of proceeds
22. Lessons learned from existing mechanisms
23. Article 6.4(c)
24. Not erode the environmental integrity of NDCs, implementation of NDCs
25. ...

B. Definitions

1. Activities
2. Article 6.4 units, credits
3. ...

C. Scope and applicability of rules, modalities and procedures for Article 6.4

1. Mitigation inside, outside NDC

290.SBSTA, 2017b.

D. Governance

1. Roles of the CMA
2. Roles, composition and procedures for the supervisory body
3. Roles of participating Parties and institutional arrangements
4. Role of the secretariat
5. Accreditation and roles of designated operational entities
6. Operational cost
7. Appeals process
8. Certification of non-UNFCCC mechanisms
9. Review process for rules, modalities and procedures
10. ...

E. Participation

1. Participation by Parties
2. Participation by public and private entities
3. Inclusivity and incentivizing the participation
4. ...

F. Scope of activities

1. Types of eligible activities, sectors, methodologies
2. Projects
3. Programmes of activities
4. Sectoral approaches
5. Inclusivity
6. ...

G. Aspects of activity

1. National control, priority and prerogatives
2. Approval by Parties
3. Development of methodologies
4. Quantification of mitigation, emission reductions and avoidance
5. Permanence
6. Determining baselines, conservativeness
7. Determining additionality
8. Measures to ensure environmental integrity
9. Sustainable development
10. Stakeholder consultation
11. Grievance process
12. Resolving disputable issues
13. Mitigation co-benefits of adaptation and economic diversification
14. ...

H. Activity cycle

1. Activity design
2. Validation
3. Registration
4. Monitoring and reporting
5. Verification
6. Certification
7. Issuance
8. Cancellation
9. ...

I. Share of proceeds

1. For administrative expenses
2. For adaptation, the Adaptation Fund
3. ...

J. Overall mitigation in global emissions

1. Responsibility
2. Timing
3. Methodological approaches, best-available-technology benchmarks, conservative baselines, cancellation, Article 6.4(c)
4. Accounting modalities
5. ...

K. Limits and safeguards

1. Supplimentarity
2. Limits to transfer, acquisition
3. No infringement of human rights, other preamble rights, no conflict with other environmental aspects
4. Avoiding negative incentives, speculative policies, interferences
5. Addressing negative social and economic impacts
6. Addressing negative ecological impacts
7. Avoidance of fraudulent trading
8. ...

L. Infrastructure

1. International transaction log
2. Article 6.4 registry
3. Other registries
4. Infrastructure cost
5. ...

M. Transparency

1. Public availability of data
2. ...

N. Accounting

1. Impact of scope, types, time period, conditionality of NDC
2. Article 6.4 registry transactions (forwarding, transfer, acquisition) to Parties and non-Parties
3. Use of Article 6.4 credits or units for achieving NDC
4. Common accounting system
5. Applicability of Article 6.2 accounting, applicability of corresponding adjustment
6. Avoidance of double counting, avoidance of double use (Article 6.5)
7. Accounting integrity
8. Article 6.4(c)
9. ...

O. Interlinkages

1. Relationship between Article 6.4 and Article 6.2
2. Relationship between Article 6.4 and Article 6.8
3. Links to Article 2, 3
4. Links to Article 4.7 mitigation co-benefits
5. Links to Article 4.13 accounting guidance, TACCC principles
6. Links to Article 4.15 impacts of response measures
7. Links to Article 13.7(a) GHG inventories
8. Links to Article 13.7(b) information to track progress
9. Links to Article 14 global stocktake
10. Links to Article 15 mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance
11. Links to Article 19 subsidiary bodies and other institutional arrangements
12. ...

P. Transitional issues

1. Transition of rules, methodologies, infrastructure, accreditation
2. Transition of activities, issuance
3. Transition of credits, units
4. Fungibility
5. Impact of new rules
6. ...

Q. Other issues

1. Capacity building
2. ...

For Article 6 para. 8, the list is diverse due to various views on this mechanism²⁹¹:

A. Overarching issues, principles, considerations, context, criteria

1. Voluntary cooperation
2. Context defined by Article 6.1
3. Context of Article 2
4. Unitary nature of Article 6 and the Paris Agreement
5. Environmental integrity
6. Sustainable development
7. Poverty eradication
8. Preserving national prerogatives
9. Bottom-up approach
10. Manageable sustainable development transition
11. Addressing negative social and economic impacts of response measures
12. Flexible, in the context of implementation of NDCs
13. Adaptation activities with mitigation co-benefits and/or economic diversification
14. Promote higher ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions
15. No infringement of rights
16. Distinctive nature of Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8
17. No commoditization of emissions or environmental functions
18. Enhancement of linkages and synergies between existing mechanisms without duplication
19. Avoiding duplication of work with existing arrangements under the UNFCCC
20. ...

B. NMAs under the framework

1. Non-tradeable, no transfer of mitigation outcomes, no commoditization
2. Applicability of any or all of Article 6.8 (a), (b), (c)
3. International (bilateral, regional or multilateral) cooperation between Parties, including North-North, North-South and South-South cooperation, to implement NDCs
4. More than one mitigation measure (including GHG reductions and avoidance of GHG emissions) adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building in each NMA
5. No duplication of work under the UNFCCC and other fora
6. ...

291.SBSTA, 2017c.

C. Governance of the framework

1. Institutional arrangements for the framework
2. Avoiding duplication in institutional arrangements
3. ...

D. Functions of the framework

1. To be available to Parties to the Paris Agreement
2. Ensuring inclusivity of access to the framework
3. Enhancing access to greater number of Parties
4. Enhancing public and private sector participation
5. Promoting mitigation and adaptation ambition
6. Establishing process for identifying gaps in, and developing instruments to enhance linkages and synergies across, existing UNFCCC instruments and institutions.
7. Ensuring no international transfer of mitigation outcomes from NMAs and ensuring no double counting
8. Enabling opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements
9. Identification of best practices and case studies
10. Identifying roles of public and private sectors
11. Involving representatives from the private sector and international organizations with expertise in different areas of NMAs
12. Developing guidance
13. Providing recognition of NMAs
14. Tracking of NMAs
15. Managing timeframe for work programme
16. Monitoring, reporting and accounting for transparency of emissions reductions resulting from NMA against NDC
17. MRV that is appropriate to the NMA
18. Avoiding double counting
19. Assessment, evaluation and follow-up process, link to global stocktake, ensuring effectiveness of NMAs
20. Voluntary reporting of NMAs under existing arrangements of the UNFCCC
21. Addressing social and economic impact of operationalization of Article 6.2 and Article 6.4
22. ...

E. Work programme activities

1. Identification of NMAs, fossil fuel subsidy reform, deployment of renewable energy technologies, elimination of inefficient and polluting technologies

2. Identifying existing linkages, synergies, coordination and implementation already occurring between identified NMAs and positive experiences
3. Development of guidance, conceptual basis, instruments and institutional arrangements
4. Development of guidance on the development and implementation of the framework
5. Identifying opportunities for enhancement of existing linkages, creation of synergies, coordination and implementation of NMAs
6. Enhancing linkages and create synergies, including recommendations
7. Facilitating implementation and coordination of NMAs
8. Establishment of institutional arrangements for facilitating the implementation, monitoring, evaluation and follow-up of the framework
9. Establishment of a task force to develop and lead the work programme, including preparing draft decisions on the work programme
10. Developing a needs-based registry and matchmaking facility
11. Development of a UNFCCC web platform to register NMAs
12. Developing possible linkages with the existing UNFCCC platforms
13. Establishment of an information-sharing process for the development and implementation of NMAs at the national/regional/international levels
14. Sharing by doing and sharing best practices and information
15. Profiling of national experience, research on lessons learned from other processes
16. Identification of international, regional and private sector initiatives and making recommendations to other initiatives
17. Exploring synergistic policy approaches to leverage and generate mitigation and adaptation co-benefits
18. Coordinating with the Technical Expert Process
19. Assessing impact of NMA on international trade
20. Evaluating options for using revenues gained from the application of NMA
21. Developing process for identifying initial and additional thematic areas of focus
22. Launching dialogue amongst Parties and non-Party stakeholders
23. Assessing the result of previous steps and drawing conclusions
24. ...

F. Modalities of work programme

1. Discussion on the function of the framework
2. Written submissions, workshops and workshop reports, technical papers, synthesis reports, case studies, recommendations, milestones and targets
3. ...

G. Transparency

1. ...

H. Interlinkages

1. Links to Article 6.2 and Article 6.4
2. Links to Article 2 objectives
3. Links to Article 3 communication of NDCs
4. Links to Article 4.7 mitigation co-benefits
5. Links to Article 4.8 information necessary for NDC clarity
6. Links to Article 4.13 account for NDC
7. Links to Article 4.15 response measures
8. Links to Article 4.16, 4.18 regional economic integration organizations
9. Links to Article 7 adaptation
10. Links to Article 9 finance
11. Links to Article 10 technology transfer
12. Links to Article 10.5
13. Links to Article 11 capacity building
14. Links to Article 12 adaptation
15. Links to Article 13 transparency
16. Links to Article 14 global stocktake Global stocktake
17. Links to Article 15 compliance
18. ...

I. Other

1. ...

The concrete result of the 46th session of the SBSTA was to invite the Parties to, prior to 2 October 2017, present their viewpoints on the content of the guidance concerning Article 4 para. 2 in particular²⁹², including the “structure”, “areas” and “issues” to consider on the rules, modalities and procedures of Article 6 par. 4²⁹³ with the same keywords, as well as questions concerning the non-market mechanism work programme²⁹⁴. Again, the SBSTA asked the secretariat to organise a round table for the Parties based on the presentation of the Parties – jointly with SBSTA47 in Bonn in November 2017.

I.4. Pursuing efforts towards 1.5 °C

By implementing the Paris Agreement, the Parties aim to strengthen the global response to the climate change threat by “*holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels*”²⁹⁵.

292. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.15.

293. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.16.

294. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.17.

295. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2.

In this respect, at the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) in 2010, the Cancun Agreements recognised that a significant decrease in greenhouse gases (GHGs) is required to limit to global average temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels²⁹⁶. Within the framework of these Agreements, the Parties agreed to periodically review the global long-term target they set for themselves to limit the global temperature rise²⁹⁷, as it could be necessary to strengthen this 1.5 °C target based on the accumulation of scientific knowledge²⁹⁸ (see Figure 16 below) and also effective efforts that are and/or will be qualitatively and quantitatively implemented by all countries. The first review of the long-term global target took place between 2013 and 15²⁹⁹, and should incorporate “*various matters presented by the science, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5°C*”³⁰⁰.

The work of this first review, led by two permanent subsidiary bodies, was completed at COP21 in Paris in 2015. The expert dialogue report that supported the review states that the 2 °C limit should be considered as a “defence line”³⁰¹. It adds that the “guardrail” concept is inadequate. The concept considers that a “guardrail” of 2 °C of warming is safe. The report recommends considering 2 °C as the upper end of the range of an increase in the global average temperature compared to pre-industrial levels. This is a line of defence that must be protected, keeping in mind that less warming is advisable. The report also states that the scientific literature is less substantial when it comes to the effect of a global temperature rise limited to 1.5 °C compared to a rise of 2 °C³⁰². Since then, this shortcoming has been partially compensated for by some more recent scientific articles (see Figure 15 below).

Thus the review of the long-term 2013-2015 global target allowed the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, as part of its work to draw up the Paris Agreement, to incorporate the scientific inventory on a global average temperature rise that would be limited to 1.5°C or 2°C above pre-industrial levels from the Cancun Agreements.

Afterwards, in Paris, several developing countries emphasised that it is important for them to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, rather than 2 °C, as their populations are dealing with various repercussions of the warming that has already happened. Thus the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America³⁰³, Alliance of Small Island States³⁰⁴, Coalition for

296. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 4.

297. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 138.

298. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 4.

299. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1.

300. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 139.

301. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, Message 5.

302. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, Message 10.

303. BAPOA, 2015.

304. AOSIS, 2015.

Rainforest Nations³⁰⁵, Africa Group³⁰⁶ and Least Developed Countries Group³⁰⁷ all made reaching 1.5°C one of their main targets for Paris. The Africa Group and AILAC have also suggested that an increase of over 1.5 °C should involve developed countries offering more funding to developing countries, which would probably be confronted with the most harmful effects of global warming³⁰⁸.

For the first time, the Paris Agreement set a target of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. In Paris, the Parties also recognised that the 2030 emissions pathway from Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted by the Parties should be decreased by 28% to reach the 2°C target by 2100, and more scientific data is required to establish a least-cost pathway to reach the goal of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels³⁰⁹.

However, limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels is a major challenge. This is partly because most of the scientific work to date has examined the options to limit the increase to 2 °C. This is also partly because there is barely a decade left before we cross the threshold of an average global temperature rise of 1.5 °C, compared to pre-industrial levels³¹⁰. In its most recent synthesis report published in 2014, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) highlights that there is currently little work analysing emissions trajectories that limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. However, the IPCC has identified three action areas that could limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C:

- (i) immediate mitigation action;
- (ii) rapid implementation of all emissions mitigation technologies currently available; and
- (iii) development that encourages low-carbon energy demand³¹¹.

To fill these knowledge gaps, at COP21, the Parties invited the IPCC to “provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways”.³¹² The IPCC accepted this invitation at its 43rd meeting³¹³. Nevertheless, the IPCC may face various challenges in compiling this special report which is henceforth slated

305. Coalition for Rainforest Nations, 2015.

306. Africa Group, 2015.

307. Group of Least Developed Countries, 2014 .

308. Africa Group, 2013 and IISD, 2015b, p. 5 for AILAC, Mexico and the Dominican Republic.

309. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 17.

310. Reuters, according to data from the UK Met Office’s Hadley Centre, 2016, [online] <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-impacts-conference/climate-change-could-cross-key-threshold-in-a-decade-scientists-idUSKCN11S1FE>

311. IPCC, 2014a.

312. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 21.

313. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 20.

for September 2018, examined in the below box. There is no doubt that this is a major challenge, with the current commitments of the Parties leading to an average temperature increase that could reach approximately 2.8°C³¹⁴ to 3.3°C³¹⁵ at the end of the century, according to two independent analyses (see Figure 17 below).

In October 2016, the IPCC adopted a decision aiming for the adoption of its special report on a 1.5 °C rise (see the box on this subject below). It will thus be published early enough to be incorporated in the negotiations that will take place under the Facilitative Dialogue (see Section I.13).

However, the discussions on the 2018 Facilitation Dialogue may hit a stumbling block, as an independent analysis published in November 2016 suggests that reaching the 1.5 °C target would imply that developed countries would reduce their GHG emission by 45% by 2030, compared to their 2005 emissions baseline. This means that the efforts currently proposed in the NDCs of some of these countries would be intensified³¹⁶.

For example, the analysis suggests that the European Union should increase its effort in its NDC by 22% for the 2025-2030 period, reducing its GHG emissions by 62% in 2030 compared to the 1990 baseline, in contrast to the 40% reduction that is currently planned. As for the United States, the effort recorded in its NDC is based on its 2005 emissions. The analysis suggests that limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5 °C would require the ambition of the United States to be almost 2.5 times higher, with an emissions reduction of 60% by 2030, instead of 26%. As for all the other developed countries, their cumulative effort for 2030 implies an increase of their collective GHG emissions by 2% compared to the 2005 baseline. The analysis also suggests that reaching 1.5 °C would require them to actually reduce their emissions by 60%, over this same period. Still according to this same scenario, China would need to cap its GHG emissions in 2025 rather than in 2030. The rest of the developing countries would be asked to cap their emissions in 2027. Lastly, it is obvious that the industrialised countries should pursue and achieve mitigation objectives over and beyond 100% in the 2050 to 2100 period³¹⁷.

314. Analysis of the Climate Action Tracker dated 1 November 2016. This includes both the NDCs of Parties that have ratified the Agreement and the INDCs of the Parties that have not ratified it yet [online] http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefing_papers/CAT_temperature_update_November_2016.pdf

315. Analysis of Climate Interactive at 5 April 2017. This includes both the NDCs of Parties that have ratified the Agreement and the INDCs of the Parties that have not ratified it yet [online] <https://www.climateinteractive.org/programs/scoreboard/>; and to access the data [online] <https://www.climateinteractive.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Climate-Scoreboard-Output-5April2017-to-share.xlsx>

316. Climate Interactive, 2016.

317. Robiou du Pont, Y., *et al.*, 2017.

In addition to this independent analysis, there is also the most recent analysis of the “*Emissions Gap Report*” published in 2016 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which also stated that most of the current scenarios forecast a 50% chance of limiting the temperature rise to 1.5°C by 2100, highlighting that the increase would most likely surpass this threshold in any case, and then fall back to 1.5°C if sufficient efforts are made. UNEP notes that there is currently too little data to evaluate pathways, with an over 2/3rds chance of limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 °C over pre-industrial levels. To reach this, it seems that global GHG emissions would need to drop by 13% by 2030 compared to the 1990 threshold—knowing that these emissions actually increased by 36% between 1990 and 2014³¹⁸.

**Special IPCC report on the impacts
of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels
and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways**

Consequences of global warming of over 1.5 °C

For several developing countries, it is essential to improve scientific knowledge of the consequences of a global temperature rise of 1.5°C. Their populations are already suffering major impacts from the global warming that is already happening. These repercussions are mainly weather or hydrologic events that are either intense, or take time to be felt, such as sea level rise, the loss in biodiversity, the salinisation of seas, the disappearance of glaciers, and longer droughts. These events are already becoming more frequent. The global temperature rose by approximately 0.6 °C between 1986 and 2005 compared to the pre-industrial era¹. In the past, the IPCC has highlighted that there are already anthropogenic disturbances to the climate².

These consequences already entail a high economic and social cost, mainly for developing countries. One analysis considers that in 2016 alone, natural disasters caused nearly USD 100 billion in damages, in addition to affecting the lives of nearly 411 million individuals³. The IPCC has thus set a major and important challenge—to better understand how the climate system could respond to a temperature rise that is more subtle than the 2 °C increase compared to the pre-industrial baseline. The idea is to provide concrete scientific tools to States at the next Facilitative Dialogue on reaching the objective enshrined in the Paris Agreement, if the Parties would like to execute the most ambitious part—limiting the increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. Some observers consider that this mandate of the Parties to the IPCC demonstrates the will to finally define what society considers as a dangerous interference to the climate system. These observers also add that the 1.5 °C limit represents the least risk that is socially acceptable⁴.

The rest of the text page 81

318. UNEP, 2016.

Related global GHG emissions pathways

The special report will surely enable a portrayal of the expanding academic debate concerning the feasibility of fast mitigation pathways⁵. A number of relevant populations indicated that there are significant stakes involved in the political and technical measures required for their implementation⁶, including the need to deploy new technologies which for the most part have not been tested yet, and could thus lead to quantified impacts of several GtCO₂ per year (for example, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage)⁷. A large proportion of these technologies remain untested and could cause potential significant socio-economic conflicts. The 1.5 and 2°C scenarios forecast the elimination of GHG directly from the atmosphere and their storage at a scale of several GtCO₂ per year. A review of the academic literature reveals a general outline, whereby it will be necessary to pursue mitigation objectives over and beyond 100% (negative net emission levels) to achieve the 1.5°C target⁸.

Major points of the special report⁹

During its 44th session in Bangkok in 2016, the IPCC agreed to target September 2018 as the date on which its special report could be adopted. Furthermore, the Group agreed to draw up a report that may be up to 225 pages long, with a table of contents that should address the following subjects:

- Chapter 1: Framing and context;
- Chapter 2: Mitigation pathways compatible with the 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development;
- Chapter 3: Impacts of 1.5°C global warming on natural and human systems;
- Chapter 4: Strengthening and implementing the global response to the threat of climate change;
- Chapter 5: Sustainable development, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities;
- Through the report: integrated case studies/regional and cross-cutting themes;
- FAQs.

1. IPCC, 2014a

2. See IPCC, 2007; IPCC, 2012; IPCC, 2014b

3. CRED, 2016

4. Nature Climate Change, 2016a

5. Peters, 2016


6. Anderson and Peters, 2016

7. Boysen, Lucht and Gerten, 2017

8. Robiou du Pont *et al.*, 2017


9. IPCC, 2016, Decision IPCC/XLIV-4

Figure 15. Examples of differentiated consequences caused by a temperature increase of 2°C vs 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels³¹⁹




319. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017, according to Schleussner *et al.*, 2016.

Figure 16. Evolution of the Convention's goal and consideration of 1.5 °C³²⁰



320. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

Figure 17. Projected rise in global temperature by 2100 based on 1990-2030 emissions pathways³²¹



I.5. National considerations related to the implementation of the NDCs

From INDCs to NDCs, a process at the core of the Paris Agreement

Intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs)

As part of the international negotiation process on climate change by virtue of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol was the first international climate agreement that was legally binding. It was adopted on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005³²². The industrialised countries committed to quantitative reduction targets for their GHG emissions for the 2008-2012 period, compared to a 1990 baseline³²³, whilst the developing countries did not have quantitative targets³²⁴, in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities³²⁵.

At the end of the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP18 in 2012 in Doha), the Parties to the UNFCCC began the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol³²⁶. As of now, this only covers approximately 15% of global GHG emissions for the 2013-2020 period³²⁷. Despite significant progress resulting from the Kyoto Protocol, especially concerning the methodology and related mechanisms, this second stage is considered as a failure, particularly due to the fact that few States have renewed their commitments³²⁸, and due to a globally limited commitment³²⁹. Another point that must be brought up is that the second commitment period continues to differentiate the targets, and imposes reduction commitments solely on developed countries and economies in transition. These various points have revealed the limits of an instrument such as the Kyoto Protocol in combating global climate change effectively, in light of the portion of emissions covered. To this end, the Parties to the UNFCCC re-examined how they approach the fight against climate change, incorporating the need to bring together the States in a new global climate agreement.

322. UNFCCC, *Kyoto Protocol* [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php

323. The Parties referred to in Annex I (developed countries) that have ratified the protocol were to reduce their emissions of six GHGs by 5% compared to a 1990 baseline during the 2008-2012 period, as per Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Kyoto Protocol.

324. National Assembly of the French Republic, 2016, p. 3.

325. United Nations, 1992a, *UNFCCC*, Article 3 para. 1, p. 5.

326. This second period is initiated by the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol [online] http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kp_doha_amendment_english.pdf

327. National Assembly of the French Republic, 2016, p. 4.

328. As of 3 October 2017, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was ratified by 83 countries [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php

329. Indeed, a very small number of countries have fulfilled their commitments, and some countries have even questioned their commitments in the process as a whole. For example, Canada withdrew in 2011, and the United States never ratified the Protocol.

The top-down approach showed its limits with the Kyoto Protocol, making way for a bottom-up approach. The aim was also ensure that all States Parties to the UNFCCC (developing and developed countries) are involved in a collective process based on the incorporation of all national mitigation contributions. The addition of the commitments made by the by Party State should collectively enable the joint restriction of the average temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This resulted in the invitation for the Parties to draw up “*Intended* Nationally Determined Contributions” (INDC).

The dynamic of drawing up INDCs was a key vector at COP21 and in drawing up the Paris Agreement, by enabling all players to participate in a proactive dynamic that considers the reality of each player. From an official point of view, mitigation is the initial entry point for the INDCs. However, the developing countries emphasised what is realistic in terms of adaptation, in addition to their potential contributions to the global GHG reduction effort. For example, some of them have structured their INDCs so that they begin by introducing adaptation stakes and the objectives of low-carbon development, with mitigation co-benefits. In their INDCs, developing countries were also able to bring out their needs in terms of financing, and in terms of North-South and South-South capacity and technology transfer, as part of the so-called “conditional” targets³³⁰, which go beyond their “unconditional targets”³³¹. This innovative approach was decisive in obtaining the Paris Agreement, the first universal climate agreement, which applies “*to all Parties*”.

The contributions of the States were reported to the UNFCCC Secretariat all throughout 2015, prior to COP21. When the Paris Agreement was adopted, nearly all the Parties to the Convention had submitted their INDCs, all of which were compiled in the INDC registry³³² that the Secretariat set up.


330. Conditional on external support (financial, technological, etc.).

331. Not conditional on external support.

332. Accessible at the address: <http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx>

As of 3 October 2017, the gateway had received 165 submissions.

Figure 18. The INDCs, an innovative and inclusive process for implementing the first universal climate agreement³³³



333. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

Nationally determined contributions (NDCs)

Once the INDCs – declarations of intent (“*intended*” contributions) – are submitted, they are to become concrete action plans and implemented. The Agreement provides that the INDCs will be replaced by nationally *determined* contributions (see section II.B.) when the Parties submit their Paris Agreement ratification instruments.

In line with the submission of the instruments of ratification, the number of NDCs increases at the same time³³⁴. These NDCs are recorded in an interim public registry under the UNFCCC Secretariat as per Article 4, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement³³⁵. The modalities and procedures for the operation and use of this public NDC registry are still being negotiated, as the States Parties have not reached a consensus regarding this yet (see section I.1.2.).

With the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, these NDCs become concrete action plans that must be transposed into national measures.

Entry into force of the Paris Agreement: The NDCs become effective

In the process of implementing the Paris Agreement, the ratification of China and the United States³³⁶, the two main global emitters, on 3 September 2016 was an important step. It was also fundamental for the European Union to ratify the Agreement, to ensure that the two thresholds in Article 21 of the Paris Agreement would be reached³³⁷. As of 4 October 2016, the European Parliament approved the ratification of the Paris Agreement by the EU, following its adoption by the council of European ministers on 30 September. As of this date, seven Member States (Hungary³³⁸, France³³⁹, Austria³⁴⁰, Slovakia³⁴¹ and Germany³⁴², Malta³⁴³

The rest of the text page 89

334. As per paragraph 22 of Decision 1/CP.21, which “*invites Parties to communicate their first nationally determined contribution no later than when the Party submits its respective instrument of ratification, accession, or approval of the Paris Agreement. If a Party has communicated an intended nationally determined contribution prior to joining the Agreement, that Party shall be considered to have satisfied this provision unless that Party decides otherwise*”.

335. UNFCCC, *NDCs Registry* (interim) [online] <http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx>

336. United Nations Treaties Depository, Status of the Paris Agreement [online] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en

337. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 21, para. 1 – “*This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 per cent of the total global GHG emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession*”.

338. Climatechangenews, 2016a.

339. Climatechangenews, 2016b.

340. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/09/c_135499491.htm

341. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/slovakia-becomes-fourth-eu-country-to-ratify-the-paris-climate-agreement/>

342. <http://phys.org/news/2016-09-german-lawmakers-ratify-paris-climate.html>

343. <http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/L-Union-europeenne-ratifie-l>

and Portugal³⁴⁴) had already completed all the national formalities for ratification. These countries, as well as the European Union, submitted their instruments to the depositary, the United Nations Secretary-General, on 5 October, with 3 other countries (Bolivia, Canada and Nepal).

On the same date, the two thresholds (55-55%) required for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement were met, with the ratification of 72 Parties, representing 56.75% of global emissions. Less than one year after its adoption, the Paris Agreement thus entered into force a few days before COP22 in Marrakech (November 2016)³⁴⁵. For all of the States that have already sent their INDCs, these INDCs become NDCs that must be transposed into national measure to ensure their effectiveness.

Realistic implementation of NDCs in each country

The NDCs are one of the cornerstones of the Paris Agreement, as contributions of each Party to reach the targets set by the Agreement. The capacities of countries are considered and re-asserted in the Agreement, reflecting equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and different national contexts³⁴⁶. At the national level, converting NDCs into concrete measure will indeed require a significant effort from States and from all national stakeholders based on their different national realities. To reach the targets made together in virtue of the Paris Agreement, the process related to the NDCs will also be subject to the smooth functioning of operations at the international level (during the upcoming negotiation rounds, and also at the level of international institutions), to fine tune the modalities of execution and monitoring, and to find resources to support successful implementation.

An ambition to build together, incorporating different national realities

NDCs are the result of an inclusive and participatory process that is unprecedented in the history of the UNFCCC. The INDCs reflect a shared understanding of as well as a shared ambition of the fight against climatic disruptions and the sustainable development of our societies. As such, the national ambitions related to the implementation of the NDCs not only reflect the objectives of the States based on their actual situations, but are also a unique and new global opportunity to reconsider our modes of development, to foster more solidarity and become more resilient and sustainable. As such, the participation of all States in the Paris Agreements must also involve their cooperation, which is just as important, to reach the objectives.

344. <http://www.lorientlejour.com/Article/1010246/portugal-le-parlement-ratifie-laccord-de-paris-sur-le-climat.html>

345. In compliance with Article 21 of the Paris Agreement in virtue of which the Agreement enters into force 30 days after the double threshold is reached (55-55%).

346. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2.

As the Paris Agreement states, industrialised countries must thus take the lead “by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets”³⁴⁷. For developing countries, climate ambition must be incorporated into development goals, which may include adaptation measures with mitigation co-benefits³⁴⁸. They are, however, also encouraged to “enhance their mitigation efforts”³⁴⁹, for low-carbon development. In order to allow them to take more ambitious measures, “in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11” of the Paris Agreement, (financial and technical) support will be provided to them³⁵⁰.

Overall, the NDCs of developed countries mainly include mitigation, whereas those of developing countries are more targeted towards adaptation, loss and damage, capacity building and sustainable development, in addition to mitigation. Support for funding and technology transfer is mainly in the conditional targets of developing countries. Overall, in their NDCs, developing countries have highlighted adaptation (according to the UNFCCC figures based on the review of 161 INDCs³⁵¹ prior to COP22, 137 Parties included adaptation targets in them³⁵²), financing, and capacity building. However, developed countries have not highlighted this. This is despite the fact that implementation will require close collaboration amongst States, because whether the targets are conditional or unconditional, developing country targets may not be upheld without appropriate technical and financial support.

Funding remains an essential corollary

Faced with the funding needs of DCs, since Copenhagen in 2009, the developed have committed to mobilising USD 100 billion annually between 2013 and 2020, and then from 2020³⁵³. This amount is henceforth a lower threshold, and by 2025, a new target will need to be set, “taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries”, “in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Agreement”³⁵⁴.

Article 9 of the Paris Agreement thus states that “developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.”³⁵⁵. It also states that the latter must report quantitative and qualitative

347. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 4.

348. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 7.

349. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 4.

350. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 5.

351. As of 3 October 2017, 165 INDCs were submitted [online] <http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx>

352. UNFCCC, 2016a.

353. European Parliament, 2014, p. 2.

354. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 54.

355. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 1.

information on funding allocated to developing countries every two years³⁵⁶. Article 9 also specifies that “*such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts*”³⁵⁷. Going beyond just the developed countries, “*other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily*”³⁵⁸.

In practice, beyond the descriptive detail of the commitments, the ambition to mobilise USD 100 billion annually is only mentioned in the introduction of the official documents, and is not an integral part of the text of the Agreement. Although this is not binding and there are no official instruments, financing perspectives are firming up. Nevertheless, as of yet, little progress has been made toward mobilising USD 100 billion annually by 2020, despite the perspectives to make the Green Climate Fund gradually operational. A detailed definition still must be drawn up of the objectives and instruments relating to it, as well as the funding modalities in general, for several aspects of the implementation of the objectives of the NDCs.

Following COP22 for example, it was decided that the Adaptation Fund would be used to implement the Paris Agreement³⁵⁹. The contribution of COP23 to continuing work on making these objectives a reality, and their implementation must reflect significant progress, by encouraging and resulting in ever-increasing cooperation amongst States.

Monitoring the implementation of objectives and raising the NDC ambition

As at 3 October 2017, 165 INDC had been submitted to the UNFCCC³⁶⁰, covering 193 Parties (the European Union submitted one single INDC for all its Members). These contributions represent 98% of the Parties to the UNFCCC³⁶¹ and a total of over 95%³⁶² of global GHG emissions.

356. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 5.

357. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 3.

358. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 2.

359. For further information, see *Countries Affirm in Closing Hours of COP22: The Adaptation Fund Should Serve the Paris Agreement* [online] <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/countries-affirm-closing-hours-cop22-adaptation-fund-serve-paris-agreement/>

360. See the gateway *INDCs as communicated by Parties* [online] <http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx>

361. Which, as of 3 October 2017, has 197 Parties [online] http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php

362. These estimations are based on the review of 163 INDCs – *L'ONU met à jour son rapport de synthèse des plans climat nationaux, 189 pays inclus, 95.7% des émissions mondiales* [online] <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/fr/actualite/C3%A9s/mise-a-jour-du-rapport-de-synthese-des-plans-climat-nationaux/>

However, the current pledges, even if they were fully met, would not be sufficient to keep the temperature increase “*well below 2°C*” (even 1.5°C) by the end of the century, which is the target set in the Paris Agreement. Paragraph 19 of Decision 1/CP.21 asked the Secretariat to prepare an assessment report on the contribution of INDCs to combating climate change³⁶³. According to this document, with the title “*Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of intended nationally determined contributions*”³⁶⁴, average global GHG emissions are expected to be 8.7 GtCO₂e and 15.2 GtCO₂e in 2025 and 2030, respectively, above a scenario that is compatible with the 2°C pathway.

Other more recent studies³⁶⁵, have not overturned this observation³⁶⁶. This is particularly the case of an independent study that Nature Climate Change published at the end of July 2017³⁶⁷. In this study, the researchers specify that there is only a 5% chance of reaching the 2 °C target by the end of the century (and a 1% of reaching the 1.5 °C target), with warming that would actually be between 2° C and 4.9 °C, with a median temperature of 3.2 °C. The increase in the ambition relating to NDCs is thus an essential corollary for reaching not only long-term targets, but medium- and short-term targets as well, especially to reach a peak of GHG emissions “*as soon as possible*” within half a century³⁶⁸.

In this framework, the monitoring process that the Paris Agreement implemented will be an effective instrument for inviting Parties to increase the ambition. Indeed, to reach the Paris Agreement targets, each Party must report and renew its NDCs every 5 years³⁶⁹. The Parties may modify their NDCs at any given time, as long as the level of ambition is increased³⁷⁰. In addition to all this reflection, the implementation of the NDCs must absolutely be clear and transparent.³⁷¹ This is at the core of the current process. As such, the strengthened mechanism for transparency and monitoring established by the Paris Agreement is central. The methodological criteria for Measuring, Reporting and Verification are all important and must be fully part of the implementation of the NDCs. They will be essential for monitoring and demonstrating the progress made via the process of increasing the ambition to reach the targets.

363. This report, which was released in 2016, takes into account all of the INDC submitted by 4 April 2016.

364. UNFCCC, 2016a

365. See, in particular, Climate Interactive, 2017.

366. This is due in particular to the fact that the main emitters already submitted their contributions when the Secretariat report was published.

367. Nature Climate Change, 2017.

368. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 1.

369. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 9.

370. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 11.

371. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 8.

Monitoring the implementation of targets linked to NDCs

A set of interconnected Articles in the Paris Agreement implements a binding legal architecture to reach the level of ambition in the mitigation targets linked to the NDCs. This includes the goals of holding the increase in the global average temperature in the long term³⁷², the relevant mitigation goals³⁷³, while putting pressure on Parties to gradually increase their mitigation goals, in order to collectively reach the level of ambition of the Paris Agreement. This dynamic should be strengthened by a renewal of the NDCs in five-year cycles that are increasingly ambitious, and informed by scientific assessments.³⁷⁴

The Paris Agreement thus creates two cycles:

The first cycle commits the Parties to present their NDCs when they accede³⁷⁵ to the Paris Agreement, if they have not already done this via their INDCs, or when they decided to modify them³⁷⁶. Each future contribution should constitute progress compared to the previous contribution, and also reflect common but differentiated responsibilities and the respective capacities of each country, in light of the various national contexts. Parties whose INDCs have a 10-year schedule are asked to report or update these contributions.

The second cycle consists of a Facilitative Dialogue in 2018³⁷⁷, followed by a first Global Stocktake of collective efforts that will be conducted in 2023.³⁷⁸ This will then take place every five years. All the Parties must present a report using a shared transparency framework, and support shall be provided to developing countries to enable them to fulfil their commitments to draw up reports.

To achieve the targets, the IPCC is invited to “provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways”³⁷⁹. This report will also inform the Facilitative Dialogue of the same year.

Also note that whilst the vast majority of States Parties have sent an INDC, only 166 Parties ratified the Paris Agreement³⁸⁰, and 160 NDCs are recorded in the interim registry³⁸¹.

372. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2, para. 1.

373. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 1.

374. Nature Climate Change, 2016b, p. 830.

375. Ratification or equivalent process.

376. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.

377. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20.


378. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 14, para. 2.

379. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 21.

380. http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php (dernière consultation le 3 octobre 2017)

381. <http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx> (last consulted on 3 October 2017)

Figure 19. Status of the ratification of the Paris Agreement and NDC submissions compared to the number of parties to the UNFCCC³⁸²



Although the combined effects of INDCs/NDCs is still insufficient (as indicated above), although there are currently less NDCs (and thus less commitments that become effective), the ambition challenge is as crucial as ever. The ambition deficit must endorse more actions and must invite a rapid transposition of targets recorded in the NDCs into national measures. It is true that the level of ambition is currently not enough. However the process of converting NDCs into concrete action plans is still crucial.

In other words, the challenges of ambition, implementation and monitoring of targets are still core issues, and should not be underestimated. Alongside these challenges for the States Parties in the implementation in the field, several crucial points are still outstanding or are being discussed in negotiations. In this sense, COP23 will be an important step to fine tune the work on several aspects of the NDCs.

The continuation of the work on the NDCs and the main outcomes expected from the upcoming negotiation sessions

After COP21, COP22 (held from 7 to 18 November 2016 in Marrakech in Morocco) made it possible to continue the work to make the Paris Agreement possible, with the Parties adopting over thirty decisions³⁸³. Among other discussion

382. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – Figures updated on 1 September 2017.
383. Access all the decisions adopted during COP22 [online] http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567/php/view/decisions.php#

points, various aspects of the NDCs were discussed, in accordance with the elements in Decision 1/CP.21 and the Paris Agreement, particularly via the work of Subsidiary Bodies, the CMA and APA. The discussions on some of these points continued in May 2017 at the 46th session of the permanent Subsidiary Bodies (SB 46 – from 8 to 18 May 2017, in Bonn, Germany), and during the continuation of work under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA).

To ensure monitoring of the work programme and the achievements of the elements relevant to Decision 1/CP.21³⁸⁴, the Secretariat regularly publishes a document on the progress made³⁸⁵. This tool is a progress tracker that aims to³⁸⁶:

- (i) Provide updated information on the implementation of the elements in Decision 1/CP.21; and
- (ii) Provide information on the next relevant steps.

Furthermore, the Secretariat acknowledged that this document was useful in May 2017, during the intersession of the Bonn negotiation. The Secretariat was thus invited to continue to update and regularly publish the aforementioned document³⁸⁷.

Amongst the issues covered, this progress tracker gives information on the progress on NDC work. Below are the main upcoming deadlines (including the progress that COP22 made possible, during the negotiation intersession in Bonn in May 2017 and the important points for COP23):

- Planning a Facilitative Dialogue in 2018 to take stock of progress made³⁸⁸ and guide the renewal of NDCs³⁸⁹.

This is the mandate of the COP. To this end, the presidents of COP22 and COP23 commenced consultations during SB 46, in accordance with Decision 1/CP.22. These consultations will continue at COP23 and will be recorded in the publication of a joint report³⁹⁰.

- Draw up additional directives on the characteristics of NDCs for review and for adoption by the CMA³⁹¹.

This is the mandate of the APA and the CMA. These directives are slated to be drawn up in 2018 (at the latest)³⁹². Following the first CMA session in Marrakech at COP22, negotiations continued on this point at APA1-3 (held at the same time as SB 46, from 8 to 18 May 2017 in Bonn, Germany)³⁹³. Based on concept

384. http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/cop/application/pdf/overview_1cp21_tasks_.pdf

385. UNFCCC, 2017a.

386. UNFCCC, 2016c.

387. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.10, para. 13.

388. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 1.

389. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 8.

390. UNFCCC, 2017a, pp. 1-2.

391. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 26.

392. UNFCCC, 2017a, p. 2.

393. For further details on the results of these negotiations, see APA, 2017c, para. 11.

notes from the sessions held at APA1-3³⁹⁴, the negotiations will continue during COP23 under the auspices of APA1-4. The Parties are invited to send in their views until 17 September 2017.

- Establish a common timetable for NDCs for the CMA to review and adopt³⁹⁵.

This is the mandate of the SBI and the CMA. This common timetable is slated to be drawn up in 2018 (at the latest)³⁹⁶. In accordance with the decision that the CMA adopted at COP22, this point should be examined at the 47th session of the SBI (SBI47) at COP23³⁹⁷.

- As stated previously, the Parties may modify their NDC at any given time, provided that the ambition is raised, in accordance with the directives adopted by the CMA³⁹⁸.

This mandate of the Parties (to revise their NDCs) and of the CMA (to adopt the directives) runs until 2018³⁹⁹. This point was discussed at APA1-3, and the negotiations will continue at APA1-4 at COP23.

- Based on the NDCs submitted by the Parties (with information to make the contributions clearer, transparent, and easy to understand), the Secretariat will prepare a summary report in 2020⁴⁰⁰.
- Draw up broader directives for information that makes the NDCs clearer, transparent, and easy to understand, for the CMA to adopt⁴⁰¹.

This is the mandate of the APA (for the directives to draw up) and the CMA (for their adoption). These directives are slated to be drawn up in 2018 (at the latest)⁴⁰². The negotiations on this point continued at APA1-3, and will continue at APA1-4 at COP23. A report will be published to highlight the reflections from the APA1-3 sessions. The Parties were invited to submit their views until 15 September 2017. Following this, a paper aiming to summarise points of convergence and divergence, as well as the various options to examine, will be published on 15 October 2017. A specific workshop on this point will be organised by the Secretariat and the APA for COP23 on 6 November 2017⁴⁰³. This point is a key issue for the upcoming negotiations, as it will play a major role in determining the information that the Parties must provide in their future communications on the NDCs.

394. APA, 2017a.

395. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 10.

396. UNFCCC, 2017a, p. 2.

397. FCCC/PA/CMA/2016/3, para. 3.

398. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 11.

399. UNFCCC, 2017a, p. 2.

400. The first revision of the NDCs on this common timetable should be this year.

401. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 28.

402. UNFCCC, 2017a, p. 2.

403. UNFCCC, 2017a, p. 3.

- Draw up directives for the NDC accounting of the Parties, “*drawing from approaches established under the Convention and its related legal instruments*” for the CMA to adopt⁴⁰⁴.

This is the mandate of the APA (for the directives to draw up) and the CMA (for their adoption). These directives are slated to be drawn up in 2018 (at the latest)⁴⁰⁵. These directives for NDC accounting are subject to the same schedule (see below) as for the directives on NDC information. The next negotiations will take place on 6 November at COP23.

Another important point also concerns communications directives on adaptation as a component of the NDCs (with the Secretariat and the APA planning a workshop on this at COP23, on 4 November 2017)⁴⁰⁶.

In brief, the COP23 schedule will be full, and the negotiations should be able to fine tune the work on the NDCs in several ways. Furthermore, COP23 will be a crucial step towards 2018. 2018 is a major step, especially in the framework of the Facilitative Dialogue, particularly as at COP22, the Parties decided to set 2018 as the deadline for adopting the rules on the making the Paris Agreement operational.

I.6. Ambition and sectoral approaches

Ambition

Ambition mechanisms in the Paris Agreement

The need to take effective measures to limit global warming and confront its adverse effects is urgent, which is why several players concerned about climate change consider that the Paris Agreement is not ambitious enough, although it constitutes major and unprecedented progress in international climate negotiations. A major reason for this firm belief is that there are no binding provisions formally recorded in the Agreement, such as quantified commitments on emissions reductions, carbon pricing provisions, or abandoning fossil fuels and substituting them with renewable energy.

However, it must be remembered that the objective that guided the process of drawing up the Paris Agreement was to draw up a consensual text that may strike the right balance between ambition, the participation of everyone, solidarity and equity, and which prepares for the future (long-term targets), all while presenting solutions for the present (short- and medium-term targets). It is true that the Paris Agreement—adopted during COP21—and Decision 1/CP.21 which accompanies are lacking in terms of the legitimate expectations of several stakeholders—

⁴⁰⁴. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 31.

⁴⁰⁵. UNFCCC, 2017, p. 3.

⁴⁰⁶. UNFCCC, 2017, p. 5-6.

especially those who are the most vulnerable to climate change impacts—established certain sustainable mechanisms, provisions and instruments. If they are effectively implemented, in the long term, they will make it possible to limit the temperature rise and confront present and future impacts of climate change.

The main ambition mechanisms of the Paris Agreement include:

- The Paris Agreement provides a sustainable framework that guides the global effort for decades to come. The target of limiting the temperature rise to well below 2 °C by the end of the century, and to strive to limit it to 1.5 °C, is asserted. This ambition is concretely conveyed by establishing a global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions pathway: reach peak emissions “*as soon as possible*”, and emissions neutrality in the second half of the century⁴⁰⁷ (see Section I.4 as well);
- All Parties will submit or update a national contribution (called a “Nationally Determined Contribution – NDC”) every five years, which must be ever-more ambitious than the previous NDC, with the option of revising it at any given time, with the obligation of setting the ambition higher (see Section III.5 as well);
- The target of mobilizing 100 billion American dollars (USD) per year by 2020 was maintained through 2025, and strengthened in this decision⁴⁰⁸. This objective is henceforth a lower threshold with a more ambitious financial target that should be reached in 2025 to help developing countries strengthen the application of their mitigation and adaptation policies, strategies, rules, action plans and measures to combat climate change to contribute to accomplishing the purpose of the Agreement (see Section III.9 as well);
- The Parties are invited, by 2020, to communicate to the Convention Secretariat their mid-century long-term low GHG emission development strategies⁴⁰⁹;
- The Agreement authorises voluntary cooperation for the timely implementation of their NDCs to raise the ambition of their mitigation and adaptation actions and promote sustainable development and environmental integrity⁴¹⁰ (see Section I.3 as well);
- A monitoring system for the implementation and “enhanced” support was implemented, constituted by the Transparency Framework⁴, and applicable to all, with flexibility for developing countries. It should be gradually developed, incorporating the achievements of the current measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) system (see Section I.12 as well). It will make it possible to ensure the transparency of mitigation and adaptation efforts, and the financial of all the Parties;

407. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 1.

408. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 53.

409. Decision 1/CP.21: para. 35.

410. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6 para. 1.

- A Facilitative Dialogue that can take stock of the collective efforts made by the Parties to reach the long-term target will be planned in 2018⁴¹¹ and will make it possible to guide the revise the NDCs upwards (see Section I.13 as well);
- A Global Stocktake will be made every five years from 2023 the assess the collective progress in terms of the long-term targets of the agreement, and to decide on which actions to take to remain aligned with these targets. The Parties will thus submit new NDCs, based on the results of the collective stocktake;
- For the first time, the Convention formally acknowledges the role of non-State actors (local governments, private sector, NGO, etc.)⁴¹² to take climate action that must be incorporated in the Global Stocktake (see Section I.11 as well);
- The importance of incentives for emissions reduction actions was recognised, especially via tools such as national policies and carbon pricing (see Section I.3 as well).

The ambition of the Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 must also be assessed by the fact that the documents include important provisions that include:

- The obligation to strengthen support for international cooperation for mitigation, adaptation, capacity building, and technology transfers;
- The creation of a new technology framework⁴¹³, while recognising the need to accelerate innovation;
- Strengthening carbon sinks, particularly forests⁴¹⁴, through REDD+ actions and approaches that combine mitigation and adaptation;
- A global adaptation goal⁴¹⁵ (see Section I.10 as well), and the need to balance the funding between mitigation and adaptation is asserted;
- Formal recognition of the issue of loss and damage⁴¹⁶, with an appropriate cooperation framework;
- The public nature of the actions that the Parties implement via their NDCs⁴¹⁷, as well as the actions of non-State actors⁴¹⁸ and the “reputation” effect of this transparent publicity, which should have a significant impact on the chances of reaching the targets of the Agreement. This should be strengthened by the public nature of the results of these joint actions, particularly via the Global Stocktake;

411. Decision 1/CP.21: para. 20.

412. Decision 1/CP.21, Chapter V, Non-Party Stakeholders.

413. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 4.

414. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 5.

415. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7.

416. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 8.

417. Particularly via the public NDC Registry [online] <http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx>

418. Particularly via the NAZCA platform [online] <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/>

- A series of provisions and measures for enhanced action for mitigation, adaptation, technology and funding for enhanced action prior to 2020⁴¹⁹.

Continuation of work, situation since COP21 and in the run-up to COP23

Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement at the end of COP21, it took less than a year for it to enter into force on 4 November 2016, a few days before COP22 (in Marrakech in November 2016). In light of the early and particularly quick entry into force of the Paris Agreement, several observers external to the process expected COP22 to accelerate the process of drawing up modalities, procedures and directives, as well as the provisions and mechanisms for making it operationally effective. One of the important outcomes of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) held on the sidelines of COP22 is the conclusion to set 2018 as the deadline for making the Agreement operational and to incorporate important issues that have not been explicitly included in the agendas of subsidiary bodies.

At the end of COP22, the Parties also welcomed the very clear work programme through December 2018 established in the APA conclusions for each point, which includes calls for communications, summaries and technical notes from the Secretariat, workshops, and round tables. It is noted, regrettably, that for some of the specific aforementioned agenda items of APA, the round tables (and sometimes the negotiation sessions) will only be open to the Parties and Observer States, although the Paris Agreement recognised and ratified the important roles of non-State actors in combating climate change.

Finally, the APA noted the intention of the APA co-presidents to publish a concept note to provide an overview of the outcomes of the last session in May 2017, and to suggest options for the way forward, based on the viewpoints and the ideas suggested by the Parties and expressed in their observations for this session, without prejudice to the options or suggestions that the Parties could introduce in the future.

Regarding the negotiations concerning ambition, some progress can be noted on certain agenda items of the 45th sessions of the subsidiary bodies (SB 45), the COP22, the APA, as well as the Bonn session (SBSTA46 and SBI46) in May 2017. The following paragraphs take stock of this progress, highlighting the upcoming negotiations which will be held at COP23.

- **The mechanisms of international cooperation to implement NDCs**

Some principles, as well as work methods were defined among Parties at round tables and negotiation sessions. Also note the definition of the structure and content (informal information notes containing a list of points prepared by the co-facilitators) of the modalities, procedures and directives to implement the mechanisms and the framework, referred to in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (see Section I.3 as well).

419. Decision 1/CP.21, Chapter IV, Enhanced action prior to 2020.

- **The monitoring system for implementation and “enhanced” support, or the Transparency Framework**

Significant progress has been noted, and the work of the APA in drawing up the transparency framework of the measures and support post-2020. The APA informal work group on transparency addressed the points and the information sources that the framework must include. Prior to the upcoming sessions, there will be submissions, summaries and technical notes followed by round tables and targeted subjects (see Section I.12 as well). The next round table⁴²⁰ on this subject, held under the auspices of the 4th APA session at COP23 will address: (i) the transparency of the support provided and received (4 November 2017) and the review of technical experts and the multilateral assessment of progress based on facilitation; (ii) for both of these, emphasis on the connection between the transparency of the support and the transparency of mitigation and adaptation action (this subject will be addressed by a specific point on 5 November 2017).

- **The 2018 Facilitative Dialogue**

Greater clarity was noted on the preparation for the 2018 Facilitative Dialogue, which must take stock of the progress collectively made on the Paris Agreement objective concerning long-term emissions, and inform the preparation of the NDCs. The Presidencies of COP22 and COP23 were tasked with conducting consultation on planning this dialogue and reporting on it at COP23. The target of limiting the temperature rise to well below 2 °C, and to strive to limit it to 1.5 °C, is asserted. Lastly, note that the Facilitative Dialogue will incorporate the integration of the elements of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on the impacts of limiting the temperature to 1.5°C.

- **The global stocktake from 2023**

The Parties have not yet agreed on the points to consider in the Global Stocktake, and prior to the next session, the Parties will send their submissions with targeted comments on the possible elements of an outline to identify the sources of contributions and to draw up the modalities of the Global Stocktake, mentioning the viewpoint of the Parties in the informal note of the co-facilitators, as appropriate. The points included in these submissions will be discussed in a round table prior to the negotiation session. Progress on structuring the 2018 Facilitative Dialogue could help the Parties on going forward with the agenda item.

- **Long-term climate financing**

The secretariat was asked to compile and synthesize the biennial communications of developed country Parties on their updated strategies and approaches aiming to increase climate action funding between 2014 and 2020. The Parties also decided that the in-session workshops on long-term climate finance planned for 2017 and 2018, in order to increase financing devoted to mitigation and adaptation, will deal with the experiences and lessons from formulating projects and programmes

420. FCCC/APA/2017/2.

based on the needs defined in the frameworks in the dynamic of processes in the countries, on the role of policies and conditions conducive to financing mitigation and adaptation, and on facilitating enhanced access.

- **Links between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention**

Additional discussion on this COP22 agenda item was postponed to COP24. However, recommendations were made for the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) in order to facilitate the funding of technology action plans resulting from assessments of technological needs of developing countries.

Although much technical progress was noted, for the negotiations to go forward and to comply with the goal of finalising the “Manual” of the Paris Agreement procedures in 2018, to sustain the momentum that has been observed since Paris. This momentum was particularly consolidated by the Marrakech Proclamation for Climate Action⁴²¹, adopted at COP22, which reasserts the commitment of the States Parties to continue the implementation of the set targets, because reaching the targets requires strong political will.

Sectoral approaches

The Bali Action Plan⁴²² referred to cooperative sectoral approaches and specific sectoral actions to strengthen mitigation after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This brought a lot of hope for the effective implementation of sectoral approaches in the Convention. Unfortunately, the negotiations have never resulted in consensus, due to the opposition in principle between developed countries and developing countries. Developed countries consider that the implementation of these approaches should not result in mitigation commitments for them, which thus questions the principle of common but differentiated responsibility of the Convention.

Contrary to the stipulations of the Kyoto Protocol, currently all the Parties to the Paris Agreement must submit an NDC; nearly all of these NDCs have a mitigation component. Certain NDCs have an adaptation component based on international cooperation. Furthermore, international cooperation in mitigation among the Parties to implement their NDCs is authorised, and the Paris Agreement and the decision that accompanies it recognises and encourages the efforts deployed by all non-party entities in order to confront and respond to climate change.

421. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/marrakech_action_proclamation.pdf

422. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1.

Already, since Lima, the UNFCCC tried to give more make cooperative sectoral actions more visible, particularly those of non-State actors, by inviting them to take stock of these efforts via the portal of non-State actors for climate action.⁴²³ COP21 in Paris strengthened this phenomenon by inviting non-State parties to increase their efforts⁴²⁴ and support measures meant to reduce emissions and/or strengthen the resilience and reduce vulnerability to the adverse consequences of climate change.

Currently over 220 climate change initiatives have been launched.⁴²⁵ Most of them use sectoral and sub-sectoral approaches, and involve non-State actors (see Section I.11 as well). Most of these initiatives are cooperative initiatives at the regional or global level. Furthermore, we have initiatives in all of the largest sectors, including transport, agriculture, forestry, waste, industry, energy (access to energy, renewable energy, energy efficiency) and adaptation, etc.

The main question is to determine the modalities for incorporating recorded outcomes in order to avoid double counting, beyond the potential domino effect of these results in terms of emissions reduction, improving the resilience of ecosystems and populations, and their contribution to climate finance. These provisions must be incorporated when drawing up modalities, procedures and directives relating to NDCs, market-based and non-market based mechanisms, implementation of the transparency framework and of the Global Stocktake, in particular.

Just one example is the significant progress made in one of the highest emitting sectors, civil aviation. Through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), this sector succeeded in implementing concrete measures for technological development and regulatory standards at the international level. In 2016, ICAO set up regulations including a market mechanism, CORSIA⁴²⁶, to reduce its emissions and help to reach the ambitious targets that the Organisation and its members set for themselves for 2030.

The main issue is that the Parties to the Paris Agreement work for this new mechanism – similar to the mechanisms that will be established in other sectors – to be incorporated in the systems that will be established to ensure environmental integrity and sustainable development, and avoid double counting of emissions and funding.

423. NAZCA platform [online] <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/>.

424. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 133-134.

425. 224 initiatives as at 3 October 2017 [online] <http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/>

426. Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation; for further information [online] <https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/Pages/market-based-measures.aspx>

I.7. Transfer of technologies

Context: the issue of technology in the climate negotiations

The importance of cooperation for adjusting, developing, applying and transferring, or access to environmentally sound technologies has been and remains one of the levers that the UNFCCC uses to reach its objectives.

Indeed after including specific Article in the Convention (Article 5 paras. 4 and 5) and its Kyoto Protocol (Article 10), the subsequent decisions of the sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP), after a broad consultation process, enabled the creation of the Technology Transfer Framework and the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) in 2001.

Between 2001 and 2010, the activities conducted to implement this framework include the work of the Expert Group, planning meetings and workshops, elaborating methodologies, and creating an information exchange centre on technology transfer. This framework has also developed strategies and assessed options to accelerate technology and long-term transfer⁴²⁷.

During this period, the GEF launched the Poznan Strategic Programme (PSP) to support technology needs assessments (TNAs), following Decision 4/CP.13, in which the Parties asked the fund to step up the provision of funding to prepare a strategic program to acquire environmentally sound technologies. These evaluations must enable the identification of priority technologies for mitigation and adaptation, for the analysis of obstacles and the implementation of a favourable framework, and for working out technology action plans and project ideas.

At COP16 (Cancun in 2010), the assessment of the Technology Framework and PSP outcomes resulted in the finalisation of the EGTT mandate and the implementation of the Technology Mechanism, composed of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).

The issue of technology and the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement states that “Parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”⁴²⁸.

As the Parties recalled the need for enhanced action for technology development and transfer to implement the mitigation and adaptation measures planned in the Paris Agreement, the Parties decided to strengthen the Technology Mechanism, and asked the TEC and the CTCN to provide their support in applying the Agreement.

427. FCCC/CP/2008/7/Add.1- Decision 1/CP.14.

428. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 1.

A new Technology Framework responsible for giving general directives for the Technology Mechanism work was also created.

The Paris Agreement also particularly highlighted the promotion of innovation and financial support to developing countries for technology development and transfer at different stages of the technology cycle, and notes that this aspect will be incorporated in the Global Stocktake⁴²⁹ that the same Agreement provides for.

Indeed, Decision 1/CP.21 provides for the enhancement and periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism⁴³⁰.

Within the framework of the Paris Agreement, COP21 also requested the TEC as well as the CTCN to commence new work on the following in particular⁴³¹:

- a. Technology research, development and transfer;
- b. Developing and building up of endogenous capacities and technologies.

The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) was tasked with drawing up the technology framework introduced via the application of paragraph 4 of Article 10 of the Agreement. This framework should particularly facilitate:

- a. The execution and updating of technological needs evaluations and enhanced implementation of their outcome, especially action plans and technology project ideas, by preparing projects acceptable to the funding institutions;
- b. The provision of enhanced financial and technical support in implementing the outcome of technological needs evaluations;
- c. The evaluation of technologies ready for transfer;
- d. The introduction of more favourable conditions and the elimination of obstacles to developing and transferring socially- and environmentally-sound technologies.

Continuation of work, situation since COP21 and on the run-up to COP23

At SBSTA44 in Bonn, the Parties recognised that the Technology Framework will need to be a strategic document that provides guidance for the Technology Mechanism, and that the work of the subsidiary body should consist of determining the functionalities, characteristics and content, including its objective, role and key themes.

SBSTA44 tasked the Convention Secretariat with preparing an information note on drawing up a table of the activities and initiatives for the development and transfer of climate technologies under and outside the Convention relevant to the

429. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 14.

430. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 66 and 69.

431. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 66.

implementation of the Paris Agreement, including on the status of the implementation of the framework for meaningful and effective actions to enhance the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 5 (transfer from or access to environmentally sound technologies and knowledge of developed country Parties and other Parties in Annex II, of the Convention, as adopted by decision 4/CP.7 and enhanced by decision 3/CP.13⁴³²;

SBI44 noted that the scope of the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism referred to in paragraph 69 of decision 1/CP.21 would be based on the provisions of Article 10 of the Agreement, and would highlight the following points:

- a. Effectiveness of the support provided by the Technology Mechanisms for the implementation of the Agreement on issues relating to technology development and transfer;
- b. Adequacy of the support provided by the Technology Mechanisms for the implementation of the Agreement on issues relating to technology development and transfer.

At the Marrakech conference, after intense discussions based on the information note that the Secretariat drew up on the activities and initiatives for climate transfer technologies under and outside the Convention related to the Paris Agreement⁴³³, as well as on the submissions received⁴³⁴, SBSTA45 agreed that the objective of this framework was as announced in paragraph 4 of Article 10 of the Paris Agreement.

It noted that the Technology Framework could have a major impact on enhancing the usefulness and effectiveness of the Technology Mechanism work, by incorporating the changes considered in the Paris Agreement, in compliance with paragraph 4 of Article 10, and the long-term vision for developing and transferring technologies, which is paragraph 1 of this same Article addresses.

SBSTA45 decided that the main initial themes for the technology framework would be the following⁴³⁵:

- a. Innovation;
- b. Implementation;
- c. Enabling environments and capacity-building;
- d. Collaboration and stakeholder engagement;
- e. Support.

Regarding the review of the scope and modalities of the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, no progress was noted at SBSTA45 in Marrakech.

⁴³². FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.8.

⁴³³. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/INF.9 and Corr.1.

⁴³⁴. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/MISC.4.

⁴³⁵. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/4. paras. 24-31.

At the same time, dialogue on the relationships between the TEC, CTCN and the entities tasked with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, to detail them further, was held at COP22, in accordance with Decision 13/CP.21⁴³⁶, para. 8.

It was observed that the Green Climate Fund (GCF) has made significant progress in applying this Decisions, by providing support to facilitate access to environmentally sound technologies in developing country Parties and to commence collaborative research and development work in order to enable developing country Parties to strengthen their mitigation and adaptation actions.⁴³⁷

The designated national authorities and the focal points for the GCF were invited to make good use of the assistance offered under the readiness and preparatory support programme, particularly to conduct technology needs assessments and to draw up technology action plans.

Finally, during the last subsidiary body session in May 2017 in Bonn, the SBSTA46 conclusions requested⁴³⁸ the Secretariat to prepare a technical document on the experience, lessons learned and best practices in the running of reviews of various provisions of the Convention and of the Kyoto Protocol that are relevant for the periodic assessment, including a list of these reviews.

The issues related to drawing up a scope and modalities for periodic assessment must continue, incorporating the decisions and information contained in the technical document that the Secretariat is to prepare.

Regarding the implementation of the Technology Framework, the Parties highlighted the multisectoral role of technology and of the technology framework in achieving the targets of the Paris Agreement, and the important of involving the private and public sectors⁴³⁹.

Important discussions, often with diverging views, were held on the principles and potential structure of the Technology Framework; the functions of the Technology Mechanism; flexibility for the updates of the Technology Framework; the linkages between the Framework and other processes of the Paris Agreement, as well as between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism; and the harmonisation of the Technology Framework with the periodic assessment of the Technology Framework with the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism.

In its conclusions⁴⁴⁰, SBSTA46 decided that:

- the principles of the Technology Framework, which are coherence, inclusiveness, result-oriented approach, transformational approach and transparency, should guide the Technology Mechanism in implementing the Paris Agreement;

436. Decision 13/CP.21 – *Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention*.

437. Decision B.14/02 of the Green Climate Fund Board [online] <http://www.greendclimate.fund/boardroom/board-meetings/documents>

438. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.4.

439. IISD, 2017d, p. 16.

440. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.10.

- the technology framework should strengthen the Technology Mechanism and the involvement of relevant stakeholders in accordance with their respective roles in achieving the transformative changes envisioned in the Paris Agreement, taking into account the initial key themes agreed at SBSTA45 and the technology cycle;
- the possible headings of the Technology Framework include the objective, principles and key themes, and the continuing its review of this issue at SBSTA47, incorporating the progress made at SBSTA45 and at this session.

In this context, the TEC and the CTCN were invited to provide at SBSTA47 information on activities that have been or are currently being undertaken, which are relevant for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, taking into account the key themes and their relation to the technology cycle, as well as additional activities that the TEC and the CTCN, subject to available resources, could undertake within their respective mandates and functions, individually or jointly, to implement the Paris Agreement.

We observe that the processing of the main technology development and transfer themes that the Paris Agreement had addressed is becoming very coherent. These themes are:

- Enhancing the Technology Mechanism;
- Assessment of the Technology Mechanism; and
- The establishment of MRV provisions.

This is encouraged by the fact that even if these themes are discussed by different bodies, the facilitators are more often than not the same, and most of the negotiators, which represent the different Parties, have a great deal of experiences in the discussion subjects, and many of them have already held positions in Convention bodies dealing with technology.

Given the experience acquired with previous bodies such as the EGTT, PSP and the former Technology Framework, linked to important work that is underway with the TEC, CTCN, and GCF, and making relevant provisions provided in the Paris Agreement, could make it possible to make an effective technological contribution to reach the short-, medium- and long-term targets.

I.8. Capacity building

Context: the issue of capacity-building in international climate action

In the context of the international climate action, capacity-building initiatives are based on the observation that developing countries, as well as so-called economies in transition will not be able to take ambitious mitigation or adaptation actions if the gaps and shortfalls identified as constraints to their formulation and implementation;

What is capacity building?

Combating climate change in the long run requires considerable effort. For this fight, not all countries have the capacity, knowledge, tools, public support, scientific expertise, and political know-how. In this sense, capacity building consists of improving the capacity of individuals, organisations and institutions in developing countries and in countries with economies in transition in order to identify, plan and implement mitigation measures or low greenhouse gas (GHG) emission development strategies, or strategies for climate change adaptation.

Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), capacity building is planned for at least three levels: individuals, institutional and systemic.

In the context of the climate change negotiations, the roots of capacity building are in Article 6 of the Convention⁴⁴¹, which aims to educate and raise the awareness of the public. Indeed, the provisions of this Article⁴⁴² provide for:

- in paragraph a(iv) – training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel;
- in paragraph b – using cooperation to reach the objectives referred to in the Article and in virtue of the Convention.

Since the adoption of the Convention, capacity building has been an integral part of the negotiation process. In addition to being addressed implicitly and transversally through several other subjects, it was also a negotiation topic in and of itself. Capacity building was addressed in particular with the preparation of national communications, GHG inventories, technology transfer and adaptation. The discussions throughout the many negotiation rounds resulted in the implementation of a capacity building framework which has evolved into its present form (see the below box entitled “The main capacity-building frameworks”).

Beyond these introductory points, the present section presents a brief history of the negotiations in terms of capacity building in virtue of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, scoring a point with the most recent discussion held at the 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP22 in Marrakech in November 2016) and at the 46th sessions of the subsidiary bodies (in Bonn in May 2017), followed by an overview of the COP23 stakes, held from 6 to 17 November in Bonn (in Germany).

441. Convention text – official English version [online] http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/cooperation_with_international_organizations/application/pdf/convfr.pdf

442. Based, furthermore, on the “Commitments” of the Parties in virtue of Article 4, paragraph 1 (i) of the Convention, indicating that the Parties “*promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness related to climate change and encourage the widest participation in this process, including that of non-governmental organizations*”.

Brief history of the capacity-building negotiations under the Convention.

Understand the role of “capacity building” in the context of the international climate negotiations

The very first capacity building discussions were launched at the 10th session of the subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC. The Africa Group of negotiators, China and the Philippines mentioned it, and at the end of the discussions, the Parties expressed that they would like to have a capacity building framework for developing countries implemented within an intergovernmental process, which should aim to ensure coordination among various ongoing initiatives, and also include a financial mechanism.

Throughout the years, the negotiations acknowledge the constraints that developing countries face in terms of capacity building, implementing the objectives of the Convention, and in particular, the needs of the least developed countries (LDCs), small island states (AOSIS) and African countries. Furthermore, the negotiations emphasised that the countries themselves must conduct the capacity building, to better reflect national priorities and initiatives.

T
h
e
i
s
s
u
e
s
a
n
d
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
s

With its Decision 2/CP.7 for developing countries, and Decision 3/CP.7 for so-called economies in transition, COP7 (in Marrakech in 2001) established a capacity building framework aiming to guide activities relating to the Convention, and their effective participation in the Kyoto Protocol. These decisions identified the principles that should underpin the capacity building actions piloted by the countries. In particular, these principles aim to fulfil the specific needs and conditions that prevail in developing countries, while reflecting their national sustainable development strategies, priorities and initiatives.

These decisions highlighted that capacity building activities should develop synergies between the Convention and other multilateral environmental agreements. Furthermore, the decisions highlighted that the implementation of this framework must incorporate the circumstances specific to LDCs and SIDS. With the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, the capacity building framework of the Convention becomes applicable to the Kyoto Protocol as well⁴⁴³. This framework was examine four times by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, in 2004, 2007, 2013 and 2016.

An important milestone was reached at COP17 (in Durban in 2011), when the Parties entrusted the SBI with the task of further enhancing “*the monitoring and review of the effectiveness of capacity-building by organizing an annual in-session Durban Forum for in-depth discussion on capacity-building with the participation of Parties, representatives of the relevant bodies established under the Convention [...]*”

443. Decision 29/CMP.1 and Decision 30/CMP.1.

*with a view to sharing their experiences and exchanging ideas, best practices and lessons learned regarding the implementation of capacity-building activities*⁴⁴⁴. The Durban Forum on Capacity-Building has met five times since May 2012.

Capacity-building in the context of the Paris Agreement

In 2015, COP21 concluded with the adoption of the Paris Agreement, whose Article 11 highlights the importance of strengthening the capacity of developing country Parties. The idea is to allow them to take effective climate change actions, particularly by implementing adaptation and mitigation measures, in order to facilitate technology development, dissemination and deployment, access to climate financing, relevant aspects of public awareness, education and training, and rapid, precise and transparent communication of information. Furthermore, Article 11 emphasises the cooperation that is required to do this. It thus states that all Parties must cooperate together to strengthen the capacity of developing country Parties to implement the Paris Agreement. The developed countries should enhance their support for capacity-building measures in the developing countries.

The Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) was set up to fill the current and emerging gaps and needs in the implementation of capacity building in developing country Parties and in the improvement of capacity building efforts, including the coherence and coordination in capacity building in virtue of the Convention. Decision 1/CP.21⁴⁴⁵ requested the SBI to detail the mandate of the PCCB for the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework for developing countries, in order to recommend a draft decision in this issue, for COP22 to consider and adopt.

The main capacity-building frameworks in virtue of the Convention ... up through the Paris Agreement

Various debates on capacity-building resulted in the implementation of a capacity-building framework whose current form is a result of the main steps presented afterwards.

By virtue of the Convention

In 2001, the Parties adopted two capacity-building frameworks in virtue of the Convention, which fulfil the needs, conditions and priorities of two key groups: developing countries and countries with economies in transition. These framework provide a set of fundamental principles and approaches for capacity-building: a process that involves “learning by doing”, based on existing activities. These framework also contain a list of priority areas of action in terms of capacity-building, including specific needs of LDCs, SIDS and African countries. They reaffirm that capacity-building is essential to allow these countries to implement the objective of the Convention.

The rest of the text page 112

444. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 144; see FCCC/SBI/2012/22 as well.

445. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 76.

The two frameworks offer an approach for capacity-building activities such as developing and strengthening skills and knowledge, as well as the possibility for the stakeholders and organisations to share their experiences and raise their awareness to allow them to more fully participate in the entire climate change process. These frameworks also provide advice on support from financial and technical resources that the Global Environment Facility (GEF), bilateral and multilateral bodies, and other intergovernmental organisations. According to the plan of the frameworks, developing countries and countries with economies in transition provide information on their specific priorities and needs via national communications and submissions, while encouraging the cooperation and participation of stakeholders.

Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol

In 2005, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol decided that the framework for capacity-building under the auspices of the Convention were also applicable to the implementation of the Protocol. They approved the frameworks for guiding capacity-building activities under the Kyoto Protocol framework in developing countries and countries with economies in transition.

By virtue of the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement confirms the aforementioned approaches and fundamental principles for capacity-building. It requests all Parties to cooperate in capacity-building in developing countries, to implement the Agreement and call on developed Parties countries to strengthen support for capacity-building actions in these countries. The Parties asked the SBI to supervise the work of the PCCB. It is recognised that making the Paris Agreement operational requires building capacity, especially in the most vulnerable countries. It is also recognised that capacity-building requires mobilising resources.

Decision I/CP.21 also implemented a Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT)⁴⁴⁶ in 2015 (see Section I.12 as well.). This initiative will make it possible to build institutional capacities and techniques to help developing country Parties to fulfil the heightened transparency requirements of the Paris Agreement, in virtue of its Article 13. The GEF supports the operation of the CBIT in partnership with 11 donor countries.

Continuation of negotiations, the situation since COP21 in the run-up to COP23

After the PCCB was set up in virtue of COP21, it was expected that COP22 at Marrakech would be the occasion to conduct an initial assessment of the situation, in particular to draw up its mandate. As such, the proceedings on the PCCB took place via the SBI sessions, which agreed in its conclusions that:

- The priority area for the PCCB in 2017 is capacity-building to implement nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement;
- The representatives of the following operational activities of the financial mechanism and other bodies that have been composed, in virtue of the Convention, were invited to attend the first PCCB meeting, jointly organised with the

⁴⁴⁶ Decision I/CP.21, para. 84.

46th session of subsidiary bodies (in May 2017); the Global Environment Facility (GEF); Green Climate Fund (GCF); Adaptation Committee; Least Developed Country Expert Group; Standing Committee for Finance (SCF); Technology Executive Committee (TEC);

- The representatives of other bodies created in virtue of the Convention and the operational entities of the financial mechanism were asked to identify the representatives in order to work together, as necessary, on the specific activities related to the work of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB). The SBI particularly encouraged a representative of the CTCN to attend the first PCCB meeting;
- Furthermore, the SBI recommended a decision to COP for consideration and adoption.

At the end of COP22, the mandate of the PCCB was adopted, and requested the Committee to specify and adopt its modalities and procedures for operation at its 1st meeting, which was held at the 46th subsidiary body session (in May 2017)⁴⁴⁷.

At its inaugural meeting, the PCCB, composed of twelve members, was to set the guidance of its work programme, and begin identifying capacity-building priorities for the full and successful implementation of NDCs in developing countries. The Committee also needed to encourage global dialogue amongst all actors that are currently working to build the capacities of developing countries, so that they take measures to combat climate change. The objective of this dialogue is to rationalise and coordinate these efforts, make them more effective, and to avoid duplication of actions.

Work programme of the Paris Committee on Capacity-Building (PCCB)

The PCCB is responsible for supervising a workplan covering the 2016-2020 period, which includes the below areas:

- Strengthen synergies through cooperation and avoiding duplication amongst bodies involved in capacity-building;
- Inventory the gaps, needs and opportunities to strengthen capacities;
- Disseminate capacity-building tools and methods;
- Encourage cooperation at a levels, from the international to the local level;
- Inventory best practices, difficulties, experiences and lessons;
- Examine how developing countries can create and maintain capacity throughout time and space;
- Encourage coordination, collaboration and coherence between processes, initiative and strategies for capacity-building;
- Give the secretariat directives on updating and developing the online portal.

447. Decision 9/CP.22, Decision 16/CP.22 and Decision 6/CP.12.

The report of the first PCCB meeting⁴⁴⁸, which was held in Bonn from 11 to 13 May 2017, shows the progress that the PCCB made during this meeting. The following are targeted: the adoption of its working modalities and procedures, and the initial implementation efforts of the first phase of its work programme covering 2017-2019, including in relation with the development of a web portal with the support of the secretariat; strengthen synergies with the constituted bodies; the modalities of execution, in view of a recommendation on the main theme for 2017; as well as the preparation of an annual technical progress report for consideration at COP23. In accordance with this last point, COP23 in Bonn is responsible for reviewing the annual technical progress report of the PCCB. More generally, COP23 should make it possible to continue work aiming to make the Paris Agreement objectives operational, particularly via capacity-building, which is henceforth an objective in itself, considered as essential for several reasons.

I.9. Financing questions

Climate Financing and the COP under the Fiji presidency

As for each Conference of Parties (COP), the funding devoted to combating climate change, for mitigation and adaptation, is the main stake, and is at the very core of the global system for maintaining the temperature rise well below 2 °C compared to pre-industrial levels by 2100, and for responding to the needs of an overall adaptation objective whose quantitative and qualitative outlines and limits are yet to be determined.

The needs, necessities, mobilisations, availabilities, flow and actors in climate financing are included, overall, in a rather complex and diverse structure, as the World Resources Institute (WRI) indicated in a recent publication⁴⁴⁹. This illustrates all the funds and sources of finance, and provides a more overall view of the architecture of global climate finance⁴⁵⁰.

At the twenty-third COP session (COP23), which will be held in Bonn in November 2017, under the Presidency of Fiji, climate financing is a key issue. This involves continuing the regular reporting activities for various funding and committees, and continuing the reflection on the relevant directives and recommendations that will be received from States Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to the Kyoto Protocol, and to the Paris Agreement. This also involves consolidating the preparation of rules and procedures for the implementation of the provisions of the Paris Agreement and its accompanying Decision, particularly regarding the mobilisation, provision and accounting and transparency in terms of financing.

448. PCCB/2017/1/10 [online] http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/capacity_building/application/pdf/pccb_1_meeting_report.pdf

449. WRI, 2017.

450. Global architecture of climate finance [online] http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/Funds_flowchart_v2.png

In 2017 and 2018, two activities that are important for the ambition to mobilise new and additional financial resources, via:

- the seventh replenishment of the resources of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) before the end of 2017; and
- the first constitution of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) during 2018.

At the time that this guide was drawn up, the calendar for the first GEF activity is clear and has been implemented properly. Regarding the second GEF activity, the decision on the schedule and the modalities of the first replenishment has not been made by the GEF Council. These two activities are also forums for negotiations on the UNFCCC process, and must fulfil the expectations and hopes of developing countries in effectively combating the effects and consequences of climate change.

Since COP22 in Marrakech (in Morocco) in November 2016, where major progress was made on climate financing issues (summarised in each subchapter below), it has become extremely urgent to obtain concrete, realistic and more ambitious results on financial issues, to support the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, which entered into force early.

Long-term climate financing

Since the eighteenth COP session (COP18) of the UNFCCC, the issue of long-term financing is one of the most important aspects of the negotiations on climate financing. This is mainly about negotiating a work programme that offers predictability and the mobilisation of innovative sources for climate financing in the long-term (between 2020 and 2030, for example), from developed countries and other voluntary donors to benefit developing countries – especially the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the African Countries.

At the Marrakech Conference, the Parties highlighted the below points⁴⁵¹:

- The progress made by developed countries in mobilising 100 billion US dollars (USD) per year until 2020, thus avoiding a financing gap for the pre-2020 period;
- The need to consider increasing adaptation financing from developed countries, ensuring that this is balanced with mitigation funding;
- The Secretariat was asked to compile and synthesize the biennial communications of developed country Parties on their updated strategies and approaches aiming to increase climate action funding between 2014 and 2020;
- For developing countries Parties that have not done so yet, the submission of their biennial updated reports (BURs);

451. IISD, 2016i.

- The organisation by the secretariat of workshops with balanced representation (developed countries, developing countries, public/private sectors ...) during the 2017-2018 negotiation sessions, mainly on:
 - the experiences and lessons to learned from formulating projects and programmes based on the needs specified in the country-driven processes;
 - on the role of policies and conditions to finance mitigation and adaptation;
 - on facilitating strengthened access.
- Evaluating financing needs for adaptation in developing countries which can lead to an increase in financial resources, which should consider the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the communications on adaptation, as well as the role that the private sector could play;
- Access to adaptation financing remains difficult for developing countries, especially for LDCs, SIDS and African Countries, which requires work to simplify the procedures of the concerned countries and institutions;
- The need to strengthen national public funding management systems to help countries to effectively manage, monitor and control climate financing.

This process is conducted mainly based on holding workshops on long-term financing, during the negotiation sessions. Its summaries and report that the secretariat of the UNFCCC draws up are considered and used for the negotiations.

The objectives of the workshops on Long-Term Financing

In accordance with Decision 7/CP.22, the workshop session on long-term climate financing in 2017 and 2018, to step up climate financing for mitigation and adaptation, will be on the experiences and lessons learned. The main points will be:

- to articulate and convey the needs identified in the country-driven process in projects and programmes;
- the role of policies and environments that promote mitigation and adaptation financing;
- to facilitated improved access;
- The main objective of the workshops during the long-term financing workshop in 2017 and 2018 is to facilitate technical and concrete discussions on the aforementioned questions. The conclusions will be examined by the COP. The results will also inform the deliberations of the high-level ministerial dialogue at COP24 in 2018.

In addition to reaching the broadest aforementioned objective, the secondary objectives of the workshop are to:

- obtain a better understanding to know how climate financing needs identified and assessed by developing countries can be articulated and transformed into projects and programmes, particularly through international cooperation;

- identify the stages and actions that can be taken in order to improve access to climate finance;
- have a clearer idea of the policy and the regulatory framework required to step up climate finance.

The conclusions of the workshop held at the 46th session of subsidiary bodies on consolidating climate finance needs in developing countries, and converting them into projects and programmes are recorded in a summary drawn up by the UNFCCC secretariat⁴⁵².

In Bonn, in November 2017, at the Fijian COP, developing countries will emphasise at least two points in the long-term climate financing negotiations:

- The new climate finance objective, with a minimum threshold of 100 billion US USD;
- A long-term work programme that can leverage the potential for mobilisation, innovation and the adequacy of climate finance⁴⁵³.

Developed countries will continue to want to deepen the understanding of the needs, uses, and aspects of transparency and use of this climate finance.

The Standing Committee for Finance (SCF)

One of the most important accomplishments of the SCF during 2016 was the 2016 biennial assessment⁴⁵⁴ which took stock of climate financial flows, dealing in particular with:

- Methodological aspects relating to Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV)⁴⁵⁵ of public and private climate change action funding;
- Climate financial flows during the 2013-2014 period;
- And, regarding climate financial flows, offering information concerning certain topics of central interest in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, including support for adaptation and mitigation, the levels of funding by regions, and the way in which funding is provided.

452. Available at the below address [online] https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/financial_mechanism/long-term_finance/application/pdf/ltf_2017_short_summary_note.pdf

453. As a continuation of the programme closed at COP19 in Warsaw.

454. SCF biennial assessment report [online] http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/2016_ba_technical_report.pdf

455. Measuring, Reporting and Verification.

The Standing Committee for Finance (SCF)

At COP17, the UNFCCC Party States decided that the SCF should assist the COP in performing its duties with regard to the Financial Mechanism of the Convention:

- by proposing guidelines for its bodies;
- by improving the consistency and the operational nature of the components of the Financial mechanism (funds)⁴⁵⁶;
- by offering guideline proposals to the COP for its Financial mechanism's operational bodies⁴⁵⁷.

During COP22, negotiations resulted in the following conclusions:

- Notes were taken on the 2016 biennial assessment, taking stock of climate financial flows;
- A request was made to the SCF, as part of its role regarding the MRV of support and following its 2017 working plan, to cooperate with the participating parties and qualified experts, and to take into consideration the activities currently carried out as part of the Convention and additional measures expected under the Paris Agreement;
- Notes were taken on the 2016 SCF forum and on its report on the issue of financial instruments that account for the risks of loss and damage associated with adverse effects of climate change;
- The SCF was invited to prepare its 2017 forum;
- The SCF integrated funding relating to forests into its 2017 working plan.

SCF Forum

For its annual forum, the SCF chose the following as the theme for its 2017 Forum: Mobilizing finance for climate-resilient infrastructure, during its fifteenth meeting, held in March 2017. This forum was held on 6 and 7 September 2017 in Rabat (Morocco)⁴⁵⁸. The Committee also suspended the theme of its 2018 forum during its meeting held between 18 and 21 September 2017 in Bonn (Germany).

⁴⁵⁶. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 121 subpara. (c).

⁴⁵⁷. FCCC/CP/2014/5, para. 10.

⁴⁵⁸. The information documents, presentation material and other relevant information are available on the SCF website at the following address: <http://unfccc.int/7552.php>

In preparation for the COP23 negotiations, the SCF has worked on various issues and has drafted its annual report to the Conference, outlining the main points to be negotiated⁴⁵⁹ and concluded during the Fijian COP. These are summarised as follows:

- Update guidelines for the sixth review of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including expert input, with a view to the review being finalized by COP23;
- Finalise the draft guidance to the operating entities⁴⁶⁰ of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention;
- Consider the undertaking of the SCF co-chairs on the topic of the operational framework for synergy and consistency within the Green Climate Fund (GCF);
- Finalise and present the self-assessment report⁴⁶¹ on the functions of the SCF, in order to suggest recommendations to the COP to improve its efficacy and efficiency. This topic will be considered, in the first instance, by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), which will propose draft conclusions to the COP;
- Continue to consider the MRV of the support beyond the biennial assessment and general overview of the climate finance flows. In this regard, the SCF has agreed to begin consultations with the Chairperson of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Co-chairs of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA), with the prospect of technically contributing to the ongoing work within these two bodies on the transparency of financial support provided to developing countries, in accordance with provisions made by Article 9 paragraph 7 of the Paris Agreement;
- Conclude the work plan for its 2018 biennial assessment and the technical work that the SCF must carry out by its first meeting in 2018;
- SCF report to COP23.

Green Climate Fund (GCF)

At each COP, the GCF Council is required to present its annual report and to receive guidelines for the continuation of its subsequent actions and activities. For results linked to COP22, the following is required of the GCF:

- The continuation of the implementation of its initial strategic plan, and the development of investments in ambitious climate change actions stimulated by the countries;

459. Annotated agenda from the sixteenth meeting of the SCF [online]
https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/annotated_provisional_agenda_scf_16.pdf

460. The operational entities of the Convention and its facilities are: the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility, the Least Developed Countries Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund and the Adaptation Fund.

461. SCF Self-Assessment Report: Document SCF/2017/16/7.

- The finalisation as soon as possible of work related to the COP guidelines on planned funding for the forests;
- The request to Parties that have announced contributions as part of the initial GCF resource mobilisation process but that have not yet confirmed through contribution arrangements or agreements in due form to do so as quickly as possible;
- The simplification of access processes for GCF resources for developing countries, including for preparatory actions;
- The continuation of efforts to address the absence of signed bilateral agreements on privileges and immunities for the secretariat and the council members in order for the GCF to undertake its activities;
- The increase in supply of resources by finding solutions to the difficulties that delay the implementation of projects that have been approved by the Council, including the conclusion of accreditation framework agreements and activity funding agreements;
- The development of forms of activity support, enabling effective participation of the private sector in LDCs and SIDS, and to find possibilities to involve the private sector, more specifically local participants, in adaptation measures on a national, regional and international level;
- The invitation of national authorities appointed by the GCF and national focal points of the GCF to use the facility of the Green Climate Fund Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, and to collaborate with accredited bodies to draft quality adaptation and mitigation project/programme proposals in developing countries;
- The renewal of the request addressed to the Council to approve the provisions related to the first formal GCF resource replenishment process, to take place in 2018.

The GCF in 2017

The GCF has continued its efforts to support countries in accessing its resources, particularly through its preparatory bodies, but also with regard to the approval of public and private sector projects and programmes.

This year has been defined by a session of the GCF Council, held in July 2017, specifically focused on reducing the difficulties linked to rules and procedures, in order to enable a more objective endorsement of projects, to give initiatives from countries more of a chance of succeeding and to better and further regulate issues linked to risk management, country appropriation and GCF body accreditation. On the same date, the level of funding award by the GCF was up to USD 2.2 billion for a total of 43 projects⁴⁶².

The rest of the text page 121

462. To consult the updated GCF portfolio, see [online] <http://www.greenclimate.fund/what-we-do/portfolio-dashboard>.

It also saw a large number of accreditation agreements signed by the bodies, in particular international bodies, and also the first funding agreements for activities that benefit developing countries.

Finally, it was during 2017 that the first actual disbursements for projects funded by the GCF took place. The disbursements for preparatory activities began long before. The 18th meeting of the GCF Council is planned to take place in October 2017⁴⁶³.

Furthermore, it should be noted that in 2016 and 2017, the GCF was criticized for several of its guidelines, including: (i) its choice to not support high volume projects, thus limiting access to funds for the least developed countries; (ii) partnering with funding institutes that still invest in fossil fuels; (iii) offering unrealistic expectations with regard to the state of development of projects that it seeks to finance⁴⁶⁴; (iv) internal procedural problems resulting in excessive delays⁴⁶⁵.

Main results of the 18th meeting of the GCF Council

Note lastly that the 18th meeting of the GCF Council was held on 30 September-2 October 2017 in Cairo, Egypt⁴⁶⁶. Attended by its 24 members, with a balanced representation by developing and developed countries, the Council ended by making major decisions, including:

- The approval of eleven new projects and programmes to a value of USD 392.68 million, taking the number of approved projects to 54 for a global total of USD 2.59 billion financing by GFC;
- The decision to simplify project and programme approval procedures for certain small activities through a pilot scheme allocated USD 80 million over two years;
- The adoption of the decision relating to the request for payments based on the results of proposals for REDD+, to reduce deforestation;
- The approval for additional financing of USD 50 million for some ten national adaptation plans falling within the country preparation support programme (readiness);
- The accreditation of five new entities, all with direct access, taking to 59 the number of GFC-accredited entities.

This meeting of the GFC Council also recorded the participation of observers as representatives of designated national authorities, civil society and private sector organisations, accredited entities and implementation partners.

It was then decided that the annual election of the new GFC joint Chairmen for the next financial year would be held from 1 January 2018, whilst awaiting the conclusions and the elections of new members to the GFC Council by the 23rd Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The next meeting of the GFC Council (19th meeting) is scheduled to be held in Songdo, Republic of Korea, on 27 February-1 March 2018.

463. GCF/notif/2017/06 [online] http://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24922/GCF_notif_2017_06_-_Eighteenth_Meeting_of_the_Board.pdf/9e17731e-857e-42c8-9a35-3926f49be054

464. World Finance, 2016.

465. Eckstein, 2017.

466. <http://www.greenclimate.fund/-/gcf-approves-11-projects-at-its-final-board-meeting-of-the-year>

During the Fijian COP, in Bonn in November 2017, the Party States will have to negotiate the contents of the annual report submitted by the GCF Council, and will notably have to determine:

- The COP directives and guidelines to the GCF for the continuation of development and improvement or update of GCF procedural rules;
- The process launch of the first GCF resource replenishment, with the aim of finalising it in 2018;
- The enhancement of direct access to GCF resources;
- The promotion of the most equal geographical division of GCF financial resources possible, including those that benefit LDCs, SIDS and African countries, guaranteeing a fair balance between funding mitigation and adaptation activities;
- The appeal to contributing and donor countries to disburse the rest of the amounts promised to the GCF;
- The request to accredited bodies and other GCF partnerships to work further and better to simplify procedures and to encourage the effective implementation of GCF support projects and programmes for countries, regions, territories, etc.;
- Finally, the promotion and preparatory support for the involvement of the private sector in GCF activities, in order to raise innovative and additional funds from operators and private businesses.

Global Environment Facility (GEF)

As one of the operational entities of the UNFCCC and its facilities, the GEF presents its annual report on the issues of climate funding that it has implemented under the guidelines received at the last COP. The main conclusions of COP22 are summarised as follows:

- The seventh replenishment of GEF resources must take into account the lessons from previous cycles and also from the Paris Agreement and its early entry into force;
- The commitment of developed countries and the invitation of other countries that disburse voluntary contributions to the GEF, to guarantee a seventh period of the most successful and ambitious resource replenishment possible in order to cater to an effective implementation of the Paris Agreement;
- The continuation of information supply by the GEF on the development and operation of the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT);
- Consideration by the GEF of climate risks in all its programmes and activities, as applicable, by keeping in mind the lessons learned from experience and best practices;
- Encouragement from the GEF to developing countries to align their programmes/projects submitted to the Facility on priorities identified in their NDC during the seventh resource replenishment, and to continue to promote synergies between its different areas of focus;

- The continuation of the GEF to carry out human and institutional capacity-building actions in terms of LDCs in order to develop project proposals by putting the emphasis on the identification of potential sources of funding, on a national and international level.

GEF-7

It is envisaged that the GEF will hold its assembly for the seventh replenishment of financial resources, covering the 2018-2022 period, in Addis-Abeba (Ethiopia), in October 2017. It should be noted that the GEF resources are not exclusively dedicated to the area of climate change but also cover the fight against desertification, the conservation of biological diversity, international marine waters, various kinds of pollutions, and a significant number of enabling activities. The GEF is characterised by its individual allocation system of the majority of financial resources it raises, which is for developing countries and transition economies.

With regard to the GEF, during COP23, the Party States must negotiate about:

- The need to continue with GEF support for activities that combat the effects and consequences of climate change in the developing countries;
- The state and level of support given to enabling activities: national communications, updated biennial reports, etc.;
- The seventh replenishment of GEF financial resources and the allocation system (STAR);
- The intervention of the GEF in terms of different components of the UNFCCC process, including the Poznań strategic framework on technology transfer, the Paris Committee for Capacity-building, the Climate Technology Centre and Network, the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency, etc.;
- Procedures and services that should be simplified in order to enable better access to financial resources for developing countries;

Sixth review of the financial mechanism of the Convention

The COP regularly conducts⁴⁶⁷ a review of the financial mechanism and facilities of the UNFCCC. It has done so since COP4⁴⁶⁸, on the basis of guidelines that were negotiated and decided upon by the COP.

⁴⁶⁷ Every four years.

⁴⁶⁸ Decision establishing the period review of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC [online] https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/application/pdf/3_cp.4.pdf

At COP22, the Party States agreed to continue, through negotiations, the update of guidelines⁴⁶⁹ for the sixth review of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and its facilities, organised by targets, sources of information and criteria.

The SCE, which had been appointed by the COP to prepare the project for this update, agreed, during its fifteenth⁴⁷⁰ session (March 2017), the organisation of work, including the working group, a work schedule, provision outgoings and an awareness strategy.

In Bonn, during COP23, the Party States must negotiate and agree upon the final elements of the guidelines which will serve the sixth review of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC.

Adaptation Fund

The report of the Fund Board

At COP22, the Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Kyoto Protocol Parties (CMP) examined the Report by the Adaptation Fund Board⁴⁷¹ and finalised the following, *inter alia*:

- The renewal of provisional institutional mechanisms with the GEF, which will continue act as the temporary secretariat of the Adaptation Fund Board for an additional period of three years, from 30 May 2017 to 30 May 2020;
- The alteration of rules governing the services provided by the World Bank in its capacity as acting director of the Fund, for an additional period of three years, from 30 May 2017 to 30 May 2020;
- The consideration of the mobilisation strategy of Adaptation Fund resources;
- Noting, with concern, the need to sustain and make the mobilisation of resources for the Adaptation Fund more predictable, also noting a funding deficit amounting to approximately three million USD;
- Inviting developed countries to increase their contributions and donations to the Adaptation Fund in order to carry out adaptation projects in developing countries, including LDCs, SIDS and African countries;
- Encouraging the Fund Board to explore innovative sources of funding for its activities;
- Noting information given by the Adaptation Fund Board and the additional interest it brings to the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

469. Guidelines for the 6th review of the financial mechanism of the convention adopted during COP22 [online] http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/auv_cop22_i10e_sixth_review_of_fin_mechs.pdf#page=2

470. https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/agenda_item_5_sixth_review_8march2000.pdf

471. <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cmp12/fre/08a01f.pdf>

Also, and since the Paris Agreement came into force in November 2016, the negotiations have continued so that the Adaptation Fund, just like the other operational bodies of the financial mechanism of the Convention, serves the Paris Agreement.

Third review of the Adaptation Fund

This item is listed on the CMP13 agenda and follows the conclusions from the 46th session of the SBI. The Party States recognise⁴⁷²:

- The important role that the Adaptation Fund has played and continues to play, and its unique characteristics that have enabled the Fund to contribute in a significant way to the support for developing countries through specific adaptation projects, programme development and preparation;
- That the results of the third review do not prejudice negotiations under the APA on the Adaptation Fund in the service of the Paris Agreement, but that they provide relevant information to enable the Parties to make an informed decision.

Points related to the implementation of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement

Paragraph 5: Process for information that the Parties must communicate

The review of this point by the COP enables Party States to take stock, overall, of the fulfilment and the handling of obligations of the developed countries (and other voluntary contributors) in terms of the mobilisation and supply of appropriate, sufficient and accessible financial resources for the benefit of developing countries and, more specifically, LDCs, SIDS and African countries.

In Marrakech, during COP22, the negotiations were concluded by a reminder of the mandatory status of developed countries, although voluntary for others regarding the supply of quantitative, qualitative and periodic information⁴⁷³ on the mobilisation and availability of financial resources, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, and under paragraph 5 of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. The COP also asked the Secretariat of the UNFCCC to organise a round table on this issue during the 46th session of the subsidiary bodies (May 2017), from which the conclusions will be considered by COP23.

The round table was held in Bonn on 6 May 2017 and enabled all country parties and/or groups to express their points of view and positions on this issue, in accordance with the note drafted by the Secretariat⁴⁷⁴.

472. IISD, 2017d.

473. Every two years.

474. Note and round table programme [online] http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_note_2017/in-session/application/pdf/exante_roundtable_programme_1305.pdf

The Party States will have to examine the round table report during COP23 and decide on recommendations on the transparency of financial support from developed countries for developing countries.

Paragraph 7: Modalities for measuring financial resources

Paragraph 7 of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement deals with the modalities for measuring financial resources provided and mobilised by public interventions. This is an issue that was negotiated by the SBSTA during its 46th session (May 2017). It concluded the consultations between the Chairperson of the SBSTA and the Co-chairs of the APA in order to ensure, in due course, the integration of modalities for accounting in the transparency system, as stipulated in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.

At the 47th session of the SBSTA in Bonn (November 2017), the Party States will have to continue their consultations and the deepening of definitions and understanding of modalities for accounting in order to submit them for adoption at the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA1).

Other financial issues

Provision of financial support to national communications

The process of reporting as part of the Convention never stops evolving, involving more and more important obligations for developing countries. This requires the most simple availability and access possible to financial resources and support, from developed countries for the benefit of all developing countries, and more specifically LDCs, SIDS and African countries.

The Party States continued, during the 46th session of the SBI in Bonn, the negotiations regarding the provision of financial support, in order to enable developing countries to be compliant with their reporting obligations and their obligations in terms of state communications, efforts and needs in the fight against global warming.

The review of this point is based on the GEF report concerning funding agreements and funding disbursements for the benefit of developing countries to develop their national communications and national greenhouse gas inventories. During the May 2017 session, the negotiations were not successful in view of a disagreement between developed countries and developing countries about the acknowledgement of concerns and frustrations of the latter due to difficulties accessing financial resources.

The 47th session of the subsidiary bodies will continue to review this point and will be based on the GEF report to COP23, and must produce conclusions in favour of a more appropriate access to financial resources for more reporting from developing countries and better participation in the transparency process of the Convention as with the Paris Agreement.

Other financial and budgetary issues

Under the title “administrative, financial and institutional issues”, listed on the SBI, CMP and COP agendas, various other financial and budgetary issues are regularly discussed and negotiated.

The 46th session of the SBI reviewed the programme budget plan of the secretariat for the 2018-2019 year, in particular elements concerning:

- annual Party State contributions, where delays in contributions have been noted, impacting on the activities of the secretariat;
- flexibility in the special allocation fund for additional activities;
- the budget of the international transactions publication and a methodology for collecting fees during the 2018-2019 year.

The conclusions of this session produced the results that follow for consideration by the 47th session of the SBI, CMP and COP23:

- A draft decision on the international transactions publication budget and a methodology for collecting fees during the 2018-2019 year;
- Two draft decisions on the programme budget of the secretariat for the year 2018-2019, under the COP and the CMP respectively.

Furthermore, the secretariat was invited to organise a technical workshop, on the fringe of SBI47, to review possible ways to increase the efficacy and transparency of the budgetary process, subject to the availability of financial resources.

Conclusion

Climate funding issues will continue to play a central role, not only for the fight against climate change but also and above all in the negotiations during sessions of the COP and permanent and *ad hoc* subsidiary bodies.

Besides the issues that regularly recur at each session, relating to mobilisation, adequacy, innovation, etc., COP23 will also concentrate on developing rules and procedures for the implementation of provisions of the Paris Agreement, including those related to climate financing.

In this area, it should be noted that there is a need to only make a commitment of possible mobilisations and access to financial resources that make it possible to fulfil promises on both sides of the global climate process.

I.10. Adaptation

In Marrakech, adaptation was considered as a central issue after the announcement of the entry into force of the Paris Agreement. During the 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP22, November 2016), and during the work of the 46th Session of the Subsidiary bodies of the Convention and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA, in Bonn, May 2017)), the negotiations were

seeking a new vision and approach (or approaches) to adopt in order to successfully complete the preparation of responses to provisions taken by the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 in terms of adaptation.

The main challenge in this area will be the qualitative and quantitative definition of the global objective of adaptation⁴⁷⁵ and taking it into consideration in the facilitation dialogue in 2018 and in the framework of the first Global Stocktake in 2023. The other challenge will be to effectively consider national communications on adaptation, and the elements that constitute it, whether they are part of the NDC or not. The countries, individually or in groups, have already submitted their opinions in this regard, and will be called, as and when, to advance the process of negotiations and establish rules and procedures for the Paris Agreement, to make more technical, detailed and operational submissions.

In addition to recurring issues on the agenda of the COP or subsidiary bodies, like those relating to the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP), the Adaptation Committee, adaptation scheduling and the needs and support for adaptation, the Fijian COP in Bonn will look into technical and methodological considerations on national communications, the national register, etc. and also the need for equal consideration of adaptation regarding mitigation firstly and the reassignment of the issue of vulnerability in the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, in particular for Africa on the other hand.

List of provisions of the Paris Agreement concerning Adaptation (Annex of the Submission of the Africa Group of Negotiators, 2016⁴⁷⁶)

- Article 2.1: Formulates and reiterates the links between the three global goals related to temperature increases and mitigation action, adaptation and the need for finance to enable both mitigation and adaptations.
- Article 3: Sets the context for NDCs and provides that NDCs cover all elements including mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building and transparency of action and support.
- Article 7.1: Formulates the global goal for adaptation, its assessment towards achieving it constitutes part of the global stocktake.
- Article 7.3: Provides for the recognition of adaptation efforts made by developing countries, which will also be considered at the global stocktake.
- Article 7.4: Recognises the link between mitigation (in) action, adaptation needs and costs.

The rest of the text page 129

475. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7 para. 1.

476. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/586_280_131198158733193507-AGN%20Submission%20on%20APA%20Item%204.pdf

- Article 7.10: Introduces the adaptation communications and the type of information Parties should communicate through them.
- Article 7.11: Provides flexibility for developing countries in using different vehicles to communicate adaptation communications.
- Article 7.12: Provides for all adaptation communications, e.g. regardless of the vehicle used, to be recorded in a public registry.
- Article 7.14: Provides for the adaptation-related aspects that will be considered at the global stocktake.
- Article 9.1: Provides for developed countries to provide financial resources for adaptation and mitigation to developing countries
- Article 9.5: Provides for developed countries to provide qualitative and quantitative information on indicative finance to be provided to developing countries on a biennial basis.
- Article 9.7: Provides for developed countries to provide information on support provided and mobilized for developing countries on a biennial basis.
- Article 13.5: Provides information about the type of information that will be considered in the framework for transparency of action, including adaptation.
- Article 13.6: Provides information about the type of information that will be considered in the framework for transparency of support, including adaptation.
- Article 13.8: Provides for the information Parties should provide on adaptation under the transparency framework of action and support.
- Article 13.9: Provides for developed countries to provide information on the means of implementation provided to developing countries.
- Article 13.10: Provides for the type of information developing countries should provide on the means of implementation needed and received.
- Article 13.11: Introduces the technical expert review that Parties have to undergo and the need for capacity-building for developing countries in meeting their reporting obligations.
- Article 14.1: Establishes the global stocktake and provides for its consideration of all elements, including mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation, as well as equity and science.
- Article 14.3: Provides for the outcome of the global stocktake to inform Parties in updating and enhancing their actions and support.

Adaptation Committee

Since the Paris Agreement was adopted, the adaptation committee has been tasked with important mandates and responsibilities. In this context, the COP22 asked the adaptation committee to⁴⁷⁷:

- continue to collaborate with the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change and its partner organisations;

⁴⁷⁷. IISD (2016i, 21 November).

- expedite preparations for the Technical Expert Meetings (TEM) on adaptation planned in 2017, including with regard to the choice of topics as part of the Technical Review Process (PET) of adaptation measures;
- ensure that the PET of adaptation measures achieves its goal of identifying concrete opportunities for strengthening resilience, reducing vulnerability factors, and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions, including through technical reports;
- continue to implement its revised work plan, in particular by prioritising activities carried out in support of the Paris Agreement, and searching for new ways to reinforce its progress, efficacy and operation.

COP22 also took note of and came to the, previously mentioned, conclusion regarding the budgetary implications and the Secretariat's need for additional ways to successfully complete the new tasks assigned to the Adaptation Committee. In doing so, it called upon the countries for more financial contributions.

In Bonn, in November 2017, the negotiations will touch upon the elements of the Adaptation Committee report to the COP, and the progress report on the fulfilment of tasks entrusted by the Paris Agreement and the accompanying decision.

National communication on Adaptation

The Parties to the Paris Agreement have been trying, since Marrakech, to find common ground regarding an understanding and interpretation of the nature and the impact of the communication on adaptation. The, frequently informal, consultations and negotiations during COP22, like those that followed in Bonn during the 46th session of the Subsidiary Bodies, have so far failed due to strong disagreements between developed countries and developing countries. They foresee implications for financial support that will result from the form, nature and use of such reporting. It is evident for the developing countries that any new reporting obligation would involve financial support from developed countries, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. A consequence that the developed countries would like to avoid, insisting on the voluntary nature of national communication.

Extract from the Position of the Africa Group of Negotiators on the Adaptation Communication, 2016⁴⁷⁸

The adaptation communications aimed at Article 7.10 and 7.11 of the Paris Agreement apply to all Parties, including both developed countries and developing countries. The Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) is of the opinion that in order to guarantee the progress of the global adaptation objective, adaptation communications must include the five elements/functions mentioned in Article 7.10, that is to say:

The rest of the text page 131

478. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/586_280_131198158733193507-AGN%20Submission%20on%20APA%20Item%204.pdf

- vulnerability and priorities;
- plans and actions;
- implementation and support needs;
- recognition of adaptation efforts by developing countries;
- guide levels of support provided to developing countries by developed countries.

These characteristics of the communications will therefore contribute to operationalising and pushing forward the global adaptation objective. These characteristics concern vulnerability, resilience and capacity for adaptation. Consequently, they are key to ensuring the significant progress of an appropriate response in terms of adaptation.

From COP22, the secretariat produced an informative note, which was modified by the co-facilitators at the end of the 46th session of the subsidiary bodies noting a slight increase in the convergence of opinions⁴⁷⁹. This document will be picked up for the continuation of informal consultations during COP23.

Nairobi Work Programme (NWP)

The main themes approached by the NWP during COP22 and the 46th session of the subsidiary bodies concern climate change and health on the one hand, and economic diversification on the other.

The negotiations and consultations on this point also concern:

- activities with the partner organisations of the NWP, by inviting them to implement relevant actions to face up to the impacts of, vulnerability to and adaptation to climate change;
- the improvement in the efficacy of the forum for focal points and coordinators, by strengthening, among other things, the participation of experts and expert organisations;
- taking reports into account on:
 - human health and adaptation;⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁹. IISD (2017d) – The debate, which was structured around the “draft” of a possible result proposed by the co-facilitators, comprises objectives, elements, backing, flexibility and relationships. The Parties noted that the objective and elements are clearly interconnected, which suggests that, on the one hand, the objectives direct the choice of elements but that, on the other hand, several elements contribute to multiple objectives. Regarding the elements, the Parties presented various suggestions, including: national circumstances, impacts, vulnerabilities and risk assessments; plans, priorities and actions; efforts made by the developing countries and progress made; support needs in terms of adaptation; monitoring and assessment; and support from developed countries. The Parties discussed having a single common list of items or a list filled out with optional items.

⁴⁸⁰. UNFCCC, 2017b.

- planning, implementation and evaluation concerning ecosystems and areas such as water resources;⁴⁸¹
- the progress made in the implementation of NWP activities.⁴⁸²

In Bonn (COP23), the Party States will have to take stock of the activities carried out during the current year and decide on the work programme for 2018. The fact remains that the NWP is a matter that is handled by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and therefore it is seldom subject to implementation and support from developed countries for the benefit of developing countries, – under the provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), when it comes to adaptation and vulnerability. The negotiations regarding the NWP will have to evolve, to become an effective action scheme in favour of adaptation, particularly for Least Developed Countries (LDC), Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and African countries, which need it the most.

Adaptation Communications Registry

At its 46th session, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) reviewed the issue of modalities and procedures for operation and the use of the public adaptation communications registry, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. It was a question of discussing, in informal consultations, the design of a simple and convivial registry, which is accessible to the public. The negotiations successfully concluded the following:

- to consider the relationships between this registry, that of the NDC (Article 4, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement) and the activities undertaken in terms of the Adaptation Plan compiled and summarised by the UNFCCC secretariat;
- to take into account, during its design, the need for the registry to be characterised by simplicity, conviviality, secure access and use, and accessibility;
- to invite countries, country groups and alliances, and observers to submit their opinions (before 21 September 2017) on the possible links with the issues of planning adaptation (national adaptation plan (NAP), National action programme or action (NAPA), etc.).

The Party States will continue to consider this point at COP23, with the aim of move forward as much and as positively as possible with the design and operation of the Adaptation Communications Registry.

481. UNFCCC, 2017c.

482. UNFCCC, 2017d.

National Adaptation Plan (NAP)

The latest submissions⁴⁸³ from the NAP, by developing countries, to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC shows the importance of such a process for the effective fight against the effects and consequences of climate change, particularly for the most vulnerable countries.

In Marrakech, the review of the National adaptation plans (NAP) process by COP22 finalised⁴⁸⁴ the following items:

- Appreciation for the submission by Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Sri Lanka and the Sudan of their national adaptation plans via NAP Central⁴⁸⁵;
- Encouragement for other Parties to forward relevant outputs and outcomes related to the process to formulate and implement NAP to the same platform;
- Congratulations on the successful conduct of the NAP Expo that took place from 11 to 15 July 2016 in Bonn (Germany), and the active participation therein of developing countries and other relevant stakeholders;
- Satisfaction regarding the decision of the Board of the Green Climate Fund at its 13th meeting that approved up to USD 3 million per country through the Green Climate Fund Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme to support the formulation of national adaptation plans and/or other national adaptation planning processes;
- A request to the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to continue their respective engagement with the Green Climate Fund and to continue to include information on that engagement, including on ways to enhance the process to access support for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans, in their reports for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-seventh session (November 2017) with a view to making recommendations to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session (November 2017), as appropriate;
- Congratulations for the support provided by the Global Environment Facility for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;
- Encouragement for developed country Parties to contribute to the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund and other funds under the Financial Mechanism, as appropriate, recognizing the importance of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans.

In Bonn, during COP23, this issue will be listed on the SBI agenda but, as recommended at its 46th session, the continued review of this issue will be deferred until the 49th session of the SBI, at the end of 2018, to enable the continuation of activities linked to the NAP before evaluating them.

483. National Adaptation Plan submissions portal, from developing countries to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC [online] http://www4.unfccc.int/nap/News/Pages/national_adaptation_plans.aspx

484. Decision 6/CP.22 - National adaptation plans.

485. <http://www4.unfccc.int/nap/Pages/Home.aspx>

I.11. Role of non-State actors & evaluation of commitments

Non-State actors in international climate action, a role of growing recognition with several initiatives already under way

If national governments are the main official players of international negotiations on climate, non-State actors have played a key role in environmental matters for many years as a participant and their role is growing, both in terms of recognition and importance. From 1992, Agenda 21, which was adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, has recognised that “one of the fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-making”⁴⁸⁶. In this sense, it identified nine “major groups”⁴⁸⁷ including non-government organisations (NGO), local communities and even trade and industry⁴⁸⁸.

Since then, community organisations have pushed for the adoption of more ambitious agreements on climate, at the same time as proposing and implementing an array of solutions in favour of production methods and consumption patterns that are low-carbon and more favourable for the environment.

As part of the climate negotiations, the mobilisation of non-State actors has been formally encouraged by the setting up of the *Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA)*⁴⁸⁹. This initiative has achieved great success and, to facilitate the details and the follow-up for initiatives of the LPAA, the Nazca platform⁴⁹⁰ was set up. Launched in 2014 by the Peruvian presidency of the COP20⁴⁹¹, it has the objective of identifying as far as possible the involvement of non-State actors in climate change action. The voluntarily-registered actions are gathered according to 13 sectors: reduction in emissions; resilience; transport; access to energy and energy efficiency; renewable energies; agriculture; private financing; forest; innovation; construction; carbon enhancement; short term pollutants; and others.

486. United Nations, Agenda 21, Chapter 23, preamble, para. 23.2 line 1 [online] <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf>

487. United Nations, Agenda 21, Section III. Strengthening the role of the major groups [online] <http://www.un.org/french/ga/special/sids/agenda21/action0.htm>

488. United Nations, Official text of Agenda 21 [online] <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf>

489. LPAA – Lima Paris Action Agenda.

490. “Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action”. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/>

491. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2015. “An initiative from the French and Peruvian governments, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the administration department of the UNFCCC”.

As of 3 October 2017, 12,549 actions were recorded on this platform, covering both the pre-2020 period and the period between 2020 and 2030 (which is also the period for the implementation of INDC/NDC) and the long term. On the same date, there were commitments from 2,508 towns⁴⁹², 209 regions⁴⁹³, 479 investors⁴⁹⁴, 238 civil society organisations⁴⁹⁵ and 2,138 companies⁴⁹⁶, proving that there is a growing mobilisations of all stakeholders, both in developed countries and developing countries.

On the Nazca platform, the spectrum of commitments is organised into:

- Cooperative Initiatives: commitments that are undertaken collectively by a variety of non-State actors: companies, cities, subnational regions, investors from civil society, often in partnership with countries, uniting different actors around one objective;
- Individual actions: commitments undertaken by a single actor in order to achieve a particular objective.

As at 3 October 2017, 8,093 individual actions were recorded⁴⁹⁷, apportioned as follows:

Figure 20. Number of actors engaged in individual actions by sector (NAZCA)



⁴⁹². <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/cities>

⁴⁹³. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/subnational-regions>

⁴⁹⁴. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/investors>

⁴⁹⁵. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/csos>

⁴⁹⁶. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/companies>

⁴⁹⁷. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/total-commitment-themes?themeid=0&theme=&open=yes&type=individual&Country=0>

As at 3 October 2017, 4,246 cooperative actions were recorded⁴⁹⁸, apportioned as follows:

Figure 21. Number of actors engaged in cooperative actions by sector (NAZCA)




Figure 22. Cities engaged in NAZCA⁴⁹⁹

Among the numerous initiatives, the Covenant of Mayors serves as an example: several thousand cities, mainly in Europe and, more and more frequently, elsewhere as well, have voluntarily committed to overtake objectives fixed on a national level in their lands on the subjects of climate policy. The new Covenant of Mayors for climate and energy, launched in 2015, has reaffirmed this ambition until after 2020. The Convention has gathered, as at 3 October 2017, over 7,600 signatories, representing more than 236 million inhabitants⁵⁰⁰. The Covenant is also accompanied by action and monitoring plans⁵⁰¹.

498. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/total-commitment-themes?themeid=0&theme=&open=yes&type=cooperative&Country=0>

499. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/cities>

500. Covenant of Mayors' site [online] http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html

501. See the available monitoring reports [online] http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/actions/monitoring-action-plans_en.html




Figure 23. Signatories of the Covenant of Mayors



Among other initiatives, the *Science based targets*⁵⁰² (iSBT) initiative also serves as an example, bringing large multinationals together, all committed to policies to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As part of this initiative, notably a “*Practical guide for defining carbon targets aligned with scientific knowledge*” was published in April 2017, aiming to help companies to define GHG emission reduction goals by decrypting methodologies suggest by the iSBT⁵⁰³. The aim is to invite companies to sign up to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and to commit to implementing ongoing large international programmes, such as the Sustainable development goals⁵⁰⁴.

502. Site of the Science based targets [online] <http://sciencebasedtargets.org/>

503. Accessible at the following address [online] <https://www.globalcompact-france.org/documents/guide-pratique-pour-definir-des-objectifs-carbone-alignes-sur-les-connaissances-scientifiques-76>

504. <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/en/>

These items are just a few examples, the list of actions and involvement of non-State actors being extremely varied and rich for many years already (see also Section I.14.). In respect of their contribution to climate action, COP21 was also an opportunity to legitimise once again this soon-to-be key role.

Recognition of the role of non-State actors within the Paris Agreement

Decision 1.CP/21 and the Paris Agreement have made it possible to reaffirm the major role that non-State actors hold and must continue to hold in future alongside the Party States.

Their increasingly central role is mentioned repeatedly, as early as the preamble of Decision 1/CP.21, in order to: *“mobilise stronger and more ambitious climate action by all Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities, local communities and indigenous peoples(...)”*⁵⁰⁵.

What non-State actor involvement has stemmed from the results of Paris?

In general, Decision 1/CP.21 contains various provisions that specifically request or implicitly encourage non-State actors to make a commitment through diverse aspects of the implementation of objectives from COP21:

- (i) To any “organizations in a position to do so”: Provide support for the preparation and communication of the intended nationally determined contributions (NDC) of Parties that may need such support⁵⁰⁶;
- (ii) To relevant organisations (as targeted in para. 49 of Decision 1/CP.21) and “relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Convention, by mobilising them as appropriate”: Develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimise and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change⁵⁰⁷;
- (iii) To “Parties and non-Party stakeholders”: promote the voluntary cancellation, without double counting, of units issued under the Kyoto Protocol, including certified emission reductions that are valid for the second commitment period⁵⁰⁸;
- (iv) To “non-Party stakeholders”: Register their climate actions in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform⁵⁰⁹, “NAZCA”⁵¹⁰;
- (v) To Parties: Work closely with non-Party stakeholders to catalyse efforts to strengthen mitigation and adaptation action⁵¹¹;

The rest of the text page 139

505. Decision 1/CP.21, *Preamble of the Decision to Adopt the Paris Agreement*.

506. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 15.

507. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 49.

508. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 106.

509. See below [online] <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/>

510. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 117.

511. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 118.

- (vi) To “*non-Party stakeholders*”: Increase their engagement in the technical review processes on adaptation and mitigation⁵¹²;
- (vii) To “*dignitaries of Parties, international organizations, international cooperative initiatives and non-Party stakeholders*”: Commit to the high-level event relating to the (LPAA)⁵¹³;
- (viii) Nomination of two high-level champions to facilitate the successful execution and scaling-up of voluntary initiatives of non-Party stakeholders as part of the LPAA⁵¹⁴ with support from relevant organisations and interested Parties⁵¹⁵;
- (ix) Setting up a platform for the exchange of experiences and sharing of best practices on mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner⁵¹⁶.

Decision 1/CP.21 even dedicates Chapter V “*Non party entities*”⁵¹⁷ to them. The action of non-State actors “*including those of civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities*”⁵¹⁸ is underlined and they are invited to scale up their efforts, both in order to find ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and also to build up resilience in the face of adverse effects of climate change⁵¹⁹.

Local and subnational dimensions of adaptation are also showcased⁵²⁰, clearly recognising the role of cities and local governments going forward in the strategies and actions to put in place.

International recognition of local and regional governments

From 1947, local government networks benefit from consultative status in the capacity of non-government organisations (NGO) in the eyes of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)⁵²¹. It is through ECOSOC that, for the first time, NGOs have played a role in United Nations deliberations. “*In 1945, 41 NGOs were granted consultative status by the council; by 1992 more than 700 NGOs had attained consultative status and the number has been steadily increasing ever since*”⁵²².

The rest of the text page 140

512. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 119; relying upon the provisions set out in para. 109 and para. 124.

513. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 120(d).

514. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 121(b).

515. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 123.

516. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 135.

517. Decision 1/CP.21.

518. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 134.

519. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 135.

520. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Article 7.

521. CGLU, 2016, p. 10.

522. ECOSOC, NGO Branch, Introduction – *Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status* [online] <http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=30>

In 1992, local authorities were recognised as one of the nine “major groups” of Agenda 21. Ever since, local governments have been recognised and included in the largest international meetings and those organised by the UN, such as Beijing+10, the Millennium Summit of World Leaders+5 and even the World Water Forum, etc.⁵²³ The role of local and regional governments is increasingly recognised on the international scene, demonstrating their essential participation in the sustainable development of our societies, including as part of the fight against climate change.

Local and regional governments... a demand for results in the fight against climate change

Starting from 2007, local and regional governments have published a “*Local Government Climate Roadmap*”⁵²⁴. The objective has stayed the same; participating in the implementation of an ambitious climate regime on the post-Kyoto agenda.

In 2010, local and regional governments were recognised for the first time as “government stakeholders” within the Cancun Agreements at COP16⁵²⁵. They have since been implicated as official stakeholders within the COP, without however being negotiating parties.

Beyond climate negotiations, local authorities form the essential link between the international sphere, national governments, communities and citizens. They have a crucial role to play in the new global climate partnership. Regarding this, the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, announced: “*As the world strives for a more sustainable path in the years ahead, particularly beyond 2015, local voices and local action will be crucial elements in our quest*”⁵²⁶.

From a practical point of view, local governments have fairly broad responsibilities in the areas of specific skills, which often allows them (by virtue of their expertise, decentralisation and subsidiarity principle⁵²⁷) to implement ambitious climate policies as close to local geographic, social and economic realities as possible. This also includes the mobilisation of regions, as can be seen from the Mediterranean Forum, which took place in Tangier (Morocco) on 18 and 19 July 2016 (MedCOP Climate 2016)⁵²⁸, before COP22, and event climate stakeholders in general, with the Climate Change 2017 Summit⁵²⁹, which took place ahead of COP23, from 11 to 13 September 2017 in Agadir (Morocco).

523. CGLU, 2016, p. 10.

524. To find out more: Local Government Climate Roadmap, Official site [online] <http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=1197>

525. UNFCCC, 2010, Decision 1/CP.16, para. 7 p.3.

526. *Message from the United Nations Secretary-General: Ban Ki-moon, during a meeting of the Global Task Force of local and regional governments in New York, 28 May 2013.* According to CGLU, 2016, p. 6.

527. Contributing to decisions being taken closer to the citizens.

528. For more information, see ENERGIES 2050, 2016b.

Consult the official site of MedCOP Climate 2016: <http://medcopclimat.com/fr/medcop-climat-tanger-2016>

Or the official homepage for civil society: <http://medcoptanger-sc.com/fr/index.html>

529. <http://dev.climate-chance.org/climatechance2017/>

Beyond the formal recognition within the Paris Agreement, it has henceforth become indisputable that the contribution of all stakeholders is not only a key element of climate change action but also that it proves to be vital to be able to raise the level of ambition in order to maintain the level of global warming significantly below 2°C with respect to pre-industrial level by the end of the century⁵³⁰. In the post-Paris era, the role of the non-Party stakeholders will therefore be central. This is all the more relevant than the commitments made by the Party States as part of their NDC, which are still not enough to achieve a development trajectory compatible with the goal of 2°C⁵³¹. Facing the lack of Party State ambition, the multi-stakeholder collaboration, including the contribution of non-State actors, proves to be more vital than ever, in order to reduce the gap between the goals and the actions required to reach them.

The importance of mobilising non-State actors in international climate action in the post-Paris era

The Paris Agreement, based on Decision 1/CP.20, recognised the initiatives and commitments by all actors, including those by non-State actors⁵³² launched as part of the LPAA⁵³³. Decision 1/CP.21, furthermore, reaffirms the urgent need to intensify the world response to climate change and to promote a greater ambition for governments.

In order to create a link between the Convention and the multiple voluntary initiatives, “two high-level champions”⁵³⁴ have been appointed for the period 2016-2020. These personalities are notably responsible for monitoring the execution (of the extension of the LPAA initiatives) and intensification of voluntary initiatives by non-State actors⁵³⁵. In other words, these two champions should advance the Global Climate Action Agenda through the so-called “*non-Party stakeholders*”.

Decision 1/CP.21 in this way details the tasks that fall to these high-level champions.⁵³⁶ As part of this role, they have defined a new Climate Action Agenda⁵³⁷, formed of a “*Global Climate Action Agenda*”, which was released ahead of COP22.

530. Evidenced, for example, by the reaction of certain big stakeholders in the United States of America in order to counteract and minimise the impacts of President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.

531. See UNFCCC, 2016a; or, Climate Interactive, 2017.

532. Decision 1/CP.21, *Part IV, Enhanced action prior to 2020*, paras. 106-132; and, Decision 1/CP.21, *Part V, Non-Party stakeholders*, paras. 134-137.

533. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 121.

534. Hakima El Haite (from Morocco) and Laurence Tubiana (from France).

See UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016a.

535. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 122.

536. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 122.

537. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016b.

Global Climate Action Agenda: The roadmap

*Ms Hakima El Haité and Ms Laurence Tubiana, high-level climate champions from Morocco and France, have published their roadmap for the implementation of their global agenda. The agenda has the objective of strengthening cooperative initiatives between governments, cities, businesses, investors and citizens in order to rapidly reduce emissions and to help vulnerable countries to adapt to the impact of the climate and to develop their own sustainable future using clean energy.*⁵³⁸

Presentation of the roadmap⁵³⁹

A. To involve the interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including the promotion of voluntary initiatives from the LPAA

1. To build on existing initiatives and to support new geographically-varied initiatives
2. To connect initiatives and alliances to national action plans such as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)
3. To assure more transparency, track results and establish credibility

B. To provide guidance to the secretariat on the organisation of technical meetings of specialists and to work with the Executive Secretary and the current and future presidents of the Conference of the Parties to coordinate annual events to a high-level

The two champions also invited governments and non-State actors⁵⁴⁰ to convey their points of view on this roadmap, as well as any useful input, aiming to stimulate climate action, up until 1 August 2016⁵⁴¹. During the Conference in Bonn, which took place in May 2016, the two champions reiterated their commitments, while showing their optimism⁵⁴², notably with regard to the success of COP22 in mobilising non-State actors in the continuation of the “spirit of Paris”.

Continuing implementation, review between COP22 and COP23

During COP22, it was expected that these foundations could be consolidated by once again promoting the mobilisation of multiple stakeholders, and notably the participation of non-State actors in the fulfilment of objectives set by the Paris Agreement.

538. Official site of COP22, Marrakech, *Global Climate Action Agenda: Climate champions release roadmap* [online] <http://www.cop22.ma/en/high-level-climate-champions-launch-roadmap-global-climate-action>

539. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016a.

540. <http://unfccc.int/documentation/items/9636.php>

541. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016c – To read the champions’ letter [online] <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/658506/high-level-champions-invitation-submissions.pdf>

542. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016d.

In accordance with recommendations stipulated by Decision 1/CP.21⁵⁴³, a high-level meeting aiming to expedite climate change action took place during COP22 as part of the Global Climate Action Agenda. The event took place on 17 November 2016⁵⁴⁴, following themed sessions⁵⁴⁵ held during the two weeks of negotiations, which made it possible to bring key stakeholders together in order to promote expansion and solutions research in each sector:

- 8 November 2016, forests;⁵⁴⁶
- 9 November 2016, water;⁵⁴⁷
- 9 November 2016, industry and business;⁵⁴⁸
- 10 November 2016, cities and human settlements (resilience in cities);⁵⁴⁹
- 11 November 2016, energy;⁵⁵⁰
- 12 November 2016, oceans;⁵⁵¹
- 12 November 2016, transport;⁵⁵²
- 16 November 2016, agriculture and food security.⁵⁵³

The results of these sessions were notably transcribed by reporters during the event on 17 November in order to gauge progress and identify opportunities for climate action⁵⁵⁴. One particular point also touched upon means of mobilisation in order to access finance for climate action⁵⁵⁵.

In the end, all of these session and the results achieved from them made it possibly to strengthen and enrich the paper from COP22, drafted by the “Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action”⁵⁵⁶. This sets an action programme for the 2017-2020 period in order to catalyse and support international climate action by the Parties and non-Party stakeholders⁵⁵⁷. During the closing plenary of COP22,

543. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 120.

544. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-hle/>
Or view the programme [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/media/1093/1711_hle-provisional-agenda_final_0830.pdf

545. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/>

546. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-forests/>

547. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-water/>

548. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-industry-business/>

549. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-cities-human-settlements-resilience-in-cities/>

550. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-energy/>

551. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-oceans/>

552. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-transport/>

553. <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-agriculture-and-food-security/>

554. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/media/1093/1711_hle-provisional-agenda_final_0830.pdf – See pp. 2-3

555. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/media/1093/1711_hle-provisional-agenda_final_0830.pdf – See p. 3

556. UNFCCC, 2016d.

557. To find out more about the announcements relating to events of the Global climate action programme from COP22, see UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016e.

the Conference chairperson Salaheddine Mezouar introduced the document from the “Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action”. The text was read out loud and was greeted with applause⁵⁵⁸.

Lastly, COP22 was an opportunity for the Champions, as well as for several States, regions, cities, companies and other actors, to launch a new initiative: “2050 pathways platform”⁵⁵⁹, *“aimed at supporting those seeking to devise long-term, net zero-greenhouse gas, climate-resilient and sustainable development pathways”*⁵⁶⁰. For this reason, an announcement published after COP22 states that 22 countries have launched⁵⁶¹ (or are going to launch) a process for preparing a “2050 pathway”⁵⁶². At the same time, this same document states that fifteen cities⁵⁶³, seventeen States and regions⁵⁶⁴ and 196 companies⁵⁶⁵ have joined the platform, demonstrating once again how proactive the non-Party stakeholders are in their commitment to innovate in order to contribute to international climate action⁵⁶⁶.

Following COP22, the negotiations intersession held from 8 to 17 May in Bonn⁵⁶⁷ had to ensure also that the action of non-State actors was strengthened, among other things. To that extent, the Convention Secretariat notably published two documents on the involvement of non-State actors in climate action⁵⁶⁸. The first document keeps a record of cooperative activities between United Nations bodies and intergovernmental organisations that contribute to the work of the Convention⁵⁶⁹ and the second concerns the positions and potential for improving effective involvement of non-Party stakeholders in order to strengthen the application of provisions from Decision 1/CP.21⁵⁷⁰.

558. <http://sdg.iisd.org/news/marrakech-partnership-for-global-climate-action-launched-as-cop-cmp-hold-closing-plenaries/>

559. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016f.

560. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016e.

561. See for example the platform set up in Australia [online] <http://www.2050pathways.net.au/>

562. UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016f – See Annex 1.

563. UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016f – See Annex 2.

564. UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016f – See Annex 3.

565. UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016f – See Annex 4.

566. For more information, see UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016g.

567. From 8 to 17 May 2017, the 46th sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI46) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA46) were held in Bonn, as well as the third part of the first session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA1-3) [online] <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/fr/actualite%C3%A9s/conference-climat-de-bonn-mai-2017/>

568. <http://sdg.iisd.org/news/unfccc-reports-on-engagement-with-non-state-actors-to-enhance-climate-action/>

569. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/INF.2 “Summary of cooperative activities with UN entities and intergovernmental organizations that contribute to the work under the Convention” [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/eng/inf02.pdf>

570. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.3 “Views on opportunities to further enhance the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders with a view to strengthening the implementation of the provisions of decision 1/CP.21” [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbi/eng/inf03.pdf>

On 9 May 2017, a workshop was organised on the opportunities to enhance the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders with a view to strengthening the implementation of the provisions of Decision 1/CP.21. The Secretariat wrote a report⁵⁷¹ on this workshop for the consideration of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). Beyond the methods for enhancing partnerships between Parties and non-Party stakeholders, the workshop also touched upon ways to strengthen the ambition of the NDC through climate action; the possibilities of widening the scope of non-Party stakeholder contributions on an intergovernmental level; and ways to diversify the modalities for engagement and facilitate their participation at an intergovernmental level.

Lastly, the intersessional period in Bonn was also an opportunity for non-State stakeholders to concretely join forces for research and the dissemination of solutions for climate action. This included the organisation between 8 and 12 May 2017 of technical expert meetings on mitigation, concerning cross-sectoral issues associated with the urban environment and land use⁵⁷² (another technical expert meeting on mitigation, concerning cross-sectoral issues associated with the urban environment took place on 29 June 2017 in Cotonou, Benin). In the same vein, technical expert meetings on adaptation were held in Bonn between 16 and 17 May 2017, touching specifically on ways to integrate adaptation of climate change with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction⁵⁷³.

The topic of the technical expert meetings on adaptation set for 2017 demonstrates the need for adopting an overall view of the issues, on the fight against climate change strictly speaking but also so that climate action is a way of aiming towards sustainable and resilient development. Furthermore, this expanded scope presupposes a recognition of each participant – including non-State actors – in achieving this objective.

All these elements are positive signs for international climate action based on an open-minded, multi-sector and multi-stakeholder vision, and they should be continued during the next negotiation sessions. Despite this optimism and noticeable progress in solidarity between all stakeholders concerned by the fight against climate change, these complementary, supportive actions will not be able to replace the responsibilities of the State Parties to the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in order to achieve the overall objective of mitigation.

As for COP23, it will represent an important step in continuing this work. In particular, it will constitute a crucial step towards 2018 and the preparation of facilitation dialogue. In fact, this dialogue will be an opportunity to take stock of

571. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.7 “*In-session workshop on opportunities to further enhance the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders with a view to strengthening the implementation of the provisions of decision 1/CP.21*. Report by the secretariat” [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbi/eng/inf07.pdf>.

572. http://unfccc.int/resource/climateaction2020/media/1303/TEMS_March_Agenda.pdf

573. http://unfccc.int/focus/adaptation/technical_expert_meeting/items/10144.php or <http://tep-a.org/>

global progress and to prepare the renewal of NDC and it could be enriched by reflections from the combined action of State Parties and non-State actors⁵⁷⁴. In that respect, COP23 will be a landmark for making an initial assessment of the most important aspects, in particular progress linked to the Marrakech partnership and the ways of continuing to boost international climate change as part of the multi-stakeholder cooperation.

I.12. Transparency

Transparency has been an existing issue for several years in the internal processes of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since the Cancun Agreements, dating from 2010, already set up a verification and review mechanism for the Parties. This latter therefore constitutes a solid base for defining a strengthened transparency framework, requested explicitly in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and in the accompanying Decision 1/CP.21.

In the difficult context linked to the strong ambition of the Paris Agreement and on the proactive basis of the “rising” mitigation plan⁵⁷⁵, this new strengthened transparency framework must enable us to follow the advances and progress regarding the individual and collective goals defined in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). This strengthened transparency framework must also enable us to follow the deals implemented as part of the market-based mechanisms defined in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and to avoid double counting. It will also provide key input to the Global Stocktake of Article 14 and to the Facilitation of Implementation and Compliance Committee of Article 15.

One of the major challenges is the very different nature of mitigation and adaptation commitments taken in the NDC, which makes it difficult to compare them and which will require the use of different types of data. However, transparency does not only affect the actions implemented for mitigation and adaptation, but should also enable us to monitor the support provided and received by the different Parties. The issue of balance, which will be found between the first and second mission of the transparency framework, remains open, as the definition of “*mobilised climate funding*” is still to be made and there are sensitive differences of opinion between the countries providing the funding and the countries that receive it. Furthermore, the issue of differentiation between the type of country is very important as certain Parties wish to avoid any differentiation whereas others want to reach a strong differentiation between developed countries and developing countries.

574. Moreover, a summit dedicated to the action of non-State stakeholders is planned for September 2018, in order to highlight their efforts for the purpose of facilitation dialogue planned for later that same year.

See New Climate Institute, 2017, p. 15.

575. Within which each country has an interest in asserting their mitigation initiatives but less of an interest in really implementing them due to their costs and the inherent internal political obstacles of the country.

The paragraphs below present the recent advances on the transparency of different working groups operating as part of the UNFCCC, the different initiatives put in place for transparency by governments, the barriers still to be overcome and the work programme for the 23rd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP23).

Progress of different working groups operating as part of the UNFCCC

a. Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)

The activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA), created in December 2015 during the adoption of the Paris Agreement⁵⁷⁶ are linked to the development of the new transparency framework defined as part of the Paris Agreement. In fact, the APA is notably in charge of developing the:

- New guidelines concerning the section of Decision 1/CP.21 relating to mitigation, in particular:
 - The characteristics of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC);⁵⁷⁷
 - The information to be provided by the Parties to improve the clarity, transparency and comprehension of the NDC;⁵⁷⁸
 - The measurement of the NDC of the Parties;⁵⁷⁹
- Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework on action and support, in connection with Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.

The progress of the APA since COP22 on the two mandates presented below.

2nd part of the 1st working session of the APA – APA1-2 (COP22, November 2016)

During the second part of the first session of the APA during COP22 in Marrakech in November 2017, work sessions were carried out for the two mandates mentioned previously and linked to the strengthening of the transparency framework. For each of these items, an informal working note from the co-facilitators of the APA was published.

New guidelines concerning the section of Decision 1/CP.21 relating to mitigation (item 3 on the agenda)⁵⁸⁰

576. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 7.

577. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 26.

578. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 28.

579. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 31.

580. APA, 2016b.

Concerning this point, the information note from the co-facilitators⁵⁸¹ stated that certain Parties have requested that the difference between information for the clarity, transparency and comprehension of the NDC (*ex-ante* information) and information required for the strengthened transparency framework (*ex-post* information) is well highlighted. The question arose of the need to define the common items of information and others that are specific to different aspects of the NDC. However, certain Parties have alerted to the fact that establishing common items of information would be contrary to the discretionary, optional and voluntary nature of the NDC.

In preparation for the 3rd part of the 1st session of the APA (May 2017, the APA invited the Parties to submit their opinion on several issues, including:

- How should we understand the notion of information that makes it possible to facilitate clarity, transparency and comprehension of NDC as part of this point?
- What should the main subject of the complementary guidelines concerning this information be?
- How could the work be structured and carried out?

Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework on action and support in connection with Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (item 5 on the agenda)⁵⁸²

Concerning this point, the informal note from the co-facilitators⁵⁸³ states that six informal consultations and an informal meeting took place. The Parties recognised the importance of transparency of action and support and demonstrated an urgency to begin technical work as quickly as possible and to engage in a debate on the items mentioned during the session dialogue. The Parties also supported the need to put a work plan into place, detailing the approach to organising the work, the tools to be used (submissions in advance of APA sessions, writing of a technical Article or a summary in the future, organising workshops in advance of each APA session) and the next steps (submissions of Party opinions and organisation of the workshop in advance of the next APA session).

In preparation for the 3rd part of the 1st session of the APA (May 2017), the APA notably invited the Parties to submit their opinion⁵⁸⁴:

- Before 1 April 2017, on the items concerning item 3 on the agenda of the “Guidelines in connection with the sections on mitigation of Decision 1/CP.21” mentioned above.

581. APA, 2016b.

582. APA, 2016c.

583. APA, 2016c.

584. FCCC/ /APA/2016/4.

- Before 15 February 2017, on the items concerning item 5 of the agenda on the “modalities, procedures and guidelines for transparency framework on action and received support” and notably on the following questions:
 - a) What should the exact items of modalities, procedures and guidelines be with a view to transparency of measures and support, targeted in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Article 13?
 - b) According to which modalities of provisions relating to the transparency envisaged in accordance with the Convention, should the transparency framework be based on and strengthen, while knowing that these provisions will be part of the experience leveraged for the development of the aforementioned modalities, procedures and guidelines?
 - c) As part of these modalities, procedures and guidelines, how can we effectively conserve a certain flexibility for developing country Parties that need them depending on their capacities?
 - d) What other items should be taken into consideration when developing the aforementioned modalities, procedures and guidelines?

3rd part of the 1st work session of the APA – APA1-3 (Conference in Bonn, May 2017)

New guidelines concerning the section of Decision 1/CP.21 relating to mitigation (item 3 on the agenda)

Concerning this point, the APA report on the second part of its first session⁵⁸⁵ mentions in particular the following points for reflection:

- The introduction of guidelines on information must take into account the variety of NDCs and must not negatively impact the definition/review of NDCs, nor represent a burden for the Parties. The issue arose of knowing if the guidelines should include a minimum level of information for all of the different NDCs. On the other hand, the consideration is launched for the sake of having common/differentiated guidelines according to the type of objectives set in the NDC, or depending if it concerns a developed country or a developing country (consideration of the obligatory/voluntary character of the guidelines and their awareness of national capacities and circumstances);
- The existence of a real need to understand the relationship between information on the clarity/transparency and comprehension of NDCs and that linked to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.

Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework on action and support in connection with Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (item 5 on the agenda)

585. APA, 2017a.

Concerning this point, as mentioned previously, an intersessional workshop took place ahead of the third part of the first session of the APA. The workshop took place from 16 to 18 March 2017 in Bonn, Germany, and welcomed more than 95 experts from 84 Parties and 11 regional groups. During this workshop, six technical sessions were carried out on the following themes⁵⁸⁶:

- Reports of national inventories on emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases (GHG) (Article 13 paragraph 7);
- Information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its NDC (Article 13 paragraph 7);
- Information linked to the impacts and to the adaptation to climate change (Article 7);
- Information on the financial support, technical transfer and capacity-building provided, needed and received (Article 9 paragraph 11);
- Technical Review by Experts;
- Multilateral review, oriented towards facilitation, progress made;
- Other elements considered in the development of the modalities, procedures and guidelines.

The final version of the informal note from the co-facilitators of the APA on item 5 on the agenda for the 3rd part of the first session⁵⁸⁷ includes a proposal of titles and subtitles for the modalities, procedures and guidelines. This document must serve as a basis for Party submissions, which should be presented by 30 September 2017.


b. Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)

The Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) is in charge of developing the modalities for measuring financial resources provided and mobilised by public interventions⁵⁸⁸. This work began during SBSTA44 in May 2016 in Bonn. During this first session, a presentation of the work undertaken by the SBSTA, the APA and the Standing Committee for Finance (SCF) on the subject was carried out by asking the Parties to submit their opinion on this subject. The figure below represents the progression of agreements on the transparency of support.

⁵⁸⁶. FCCC/APA/2017/INF.2.

⁵⁸⁷. APA, 2017b.

⁵⁸⁸. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 7.

Figure 24. Progression of agreements on the transparency of support⁵⁸⁹**SBSTA45 (COP 22, November 2016)**

In the conclusions of its 45th session, the SBSTA⁵⁹⁰ encourages funds, programmes and specialised UN agencies, as well as other organisations, to shape the development of modalities. It also recognises the need for the swift development of these modalities in a way that they are integrated into the strengthened transparency framework requested in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and asks the facilitator of the SBSTA to organise consultations with the co-facilitators of the APA regarding their work on the development of modalities, procedures and guidelines for transparency framework. The SBSTA is also committed to taking the recommendations of the co-facilitators into account⁵⁹¹, for example: defining what is thought of as climate funding more clearly (for what type of activities and through which mechanisms), clearly identifying the measurement of climate funding provided regarding climate funding mobilised through public interventions, exploring the options available for strengthening and facilitating the access to and provision of information, providing more clarity on the type of public interventions that the Parties use for mobilising private climate funding (for example: capacity-building, technology transfer, public policies).

589. © Guide to negotiations of COP23–Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2017, according to the UNFCCC [online] http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/8892.php

590. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/4.

591. SBSTA, 2016.

SBSTA46 (Conference in Bonn, May 2017)

In their informal note⁵⁹², the co-facilitators highlighted several points that were raised during the session discussions, including:

- Intersectoral considerations:
 - For each form of support, drafting a list of factors to take into account (year, currency, funding source, etc.);
 - Strengthening the electronic reporting that facilitates the supply of information regarding projects/activities;
 - Taking lessons learned on measuring financial resources into account, both as part of the Convention and outside of it;
 - Defining the deadline and procedures for the incorporation of this SBSTA work into APA work.
- For climate funding from bilateral sources: strengthening the clarity of what each Party thinks of as climate funding;
- For climate funding from multilateral sources: differentiation of reporting depending on channels, strengthening the clarity of criteria used by the Parties and international financial institutions to identify the specific proportion linked to the climate of contributions and disbursements;
- For climate funding mobilised through public interventions: clear differentiation between provided and mobilised funding, development of a simple, standardised/common reporting format to facilitate the consistency of quantitative reporting for Parties.

Development of initiatives supporting transparency

The importance of setting up a strengthened transparency framework under the Paris Agreement has resulted in the setting up of two different governmental initiatives described below, namely: the Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) and the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT).

a. The Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT)

Paragraph 84 of Decision 1/CP.21 records the establishment of a Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) with the object of supporting developing countries in building institutional and technical capacities before 2020 and after this date.

According to the same decision, the CBIT will aim to:

- a. Strengthen national institutions for transparency-related activities in line with national priorities;
- b. Provide relevant tools, training and assistance for meeting the provisions stipulated in Article 13 of the Agreement;
- c. Assist in the improvement of transparency over time.

⁵⁹². SBSTA, 2017d.

During COP22 in Marrakech, 11 countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Walloon region (Belgium)) committed to funding a total of 50 million dollars to the CBIT. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is in charge of supporting the implementation and tracking of the CBIT, in particular by allocating the voluntary contributions to developing country Parties. Three agencies can implement the CBIT funds: the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International Conservation.

The Global Coordination Platform (GCP) of the CBIT was launched in April 2017⁵⁹³ and has the aim of facilitating the exchange of information on CBIT projects across different countries, maximising opportunities for learning and strengthening coordination between stakeholders working on transparency through an online platform.

All developing countries are eligible for the CBIT.

As of 3 October 2017, ten national projects and two global projects had already been approved by the GEF as part of the CBIT⁵⁹⁴, of which the list below is an example:

Country	Project
South Africa	Capacity-building programme to implement the National Climate System of South Africa
Cambodia	Capacity-building in the sectors of agriculture and land use to strengthen transparency in the implementation and monitoring of the NDC of Cambodia.
Chile	Strengthening of the transparency framework of the NDC of Chile
Costa Rica	Integrated System for Reporting and Transparency of Costa Rica
Ghana	National capacity-building in Ghana for an ambitious and transparent climate reporting.
Kenya	Strengthening of National Kenyan Institutions in order to meet the Paris Agreement requisite of transparency and share good practices in the region of East Africa.
Mongolia	Capacity-building in the sectors of agriculture and land use in Mongolia to strengthen transparency in the implementation and monitoring of the NDC of Mongolia as part of the Paris Agreement.
Uganda	Capacity-building of Ugandan Institutions in order to conform with the Paris Agreement requisite of transparency.
Papua New Guinea	Capacity-building in the sectors of agriculture and land use to strengthen transparency in the implementation and monitoring of the NDC of Papua New Guinea as part of the Paris Agreement.
Uruguay	Institutional and technical capacity-building to strengthen transparency as part of the Paris Agreement.
Global level	CBIT Global Coordination Platform
Global level	Capacity-building for strengthened capacity in the Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) sector

593. GEF, 2017a.

594. Source: CBIT Projects database [online] <https://www.thegef.org/projects>

Other funding partners have highlighted their intention to dedicate resources to the CBIT for the 2018 programme⁵⁹⁵. Furthermore, the GEF is continuing consultations with the UNFCCC in order to ensure adequate awareness of the Initiative as part of the seventh GEF resource replenishment operation⁵⁹⁶.

Lastly, the evaluation of the implementation of the CBIT set out by paragraph 87 of Decision 1/CP.21 must be carried out before 2021⁵⁹⁷.

b. Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT)

A combination of governments (Germany, Italy) and NGO (Children's Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF), Climateworks Foundation) have committed up to 16 million dollars for an Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT). The aim of the initiative is to provide all policymakers with the tools and support required to measure and assess the effects of their climate actions.

ICAT provides recommendations and supports capacity-building as well as knowledge sharing. The recommendations concern different topics organised into 3 categories:

- Greenhouse gases (GHG): renewable energies, building energy efficiency, agriculture, forest sector, transport pricing;
- Evaluation of impacts: transformational change, sustainable development;
- Support: non-State and sub-national action, stakeholder participation and technical review.

The aim of ICAT is to work with 20 to 30 countries. Up until now the following countries have accepted the invitation to participate in the Initiative⁵⁹⁸: Cambodia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, India, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania.

On 26 July, the first version of the recommendations (*ICAT Guidance*) for the different topics mentioned above was opened up for public consultation⁵⁹⁹, until 24 September 2017⁶⁰⁰.

Barriers to overcome

Several barriers linked to reporting and transparency were already identified ahead of the Paris Agreement. They particularly concern the availability and clarity of information required and communicated and also the lack of reporting and classification methods for different activities related to climate change.

⁵⁹⁵. UNFCCC, 2017a.

⁵⁹⁶. GEF, 2017b.

⁵⁹⁷. UNFCCC, 2017a.

⁵⁹⁸. GEF, 2017b.

⁵⁹⁹. Initiative for Climate Action Transparency Guidance – *Public Consultation* [online] <https://collaborase.com/icat>

⁶⁰⁰. ICAT, 2017.

However, although an internal record on monitoring mitigation actions already exists within the UNFCCC, there is currently no agreement on how to monitor and assess adaptation actions. Incidentally, there is no agreement on the factors that demonstrate successful adaptation. The new transparency mechanism must therefore take these aspects into account.

Furthermore, until the Paris Agreement, the issue of estimating and calculating climate funding had only been approached a few times. Only the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and research institutions such as the Climate Policy Initiative have tried to define a methodology for calculating “mobilised climate funding” but this methodology has not been formally validated by the Parties and is openly criticised by certain developing countries. The SBSTA must therefore work on defining rules and methodologies without basing them on possible existing internal UNFCCC procedures. Moreover, in addition to the need to establish the rules and methodology for reporting climate financing, it also remains to establish a shared vision of the concepts introduced by the Paris Agreement. For example, the concepts of “*progress* in line with previous efforts” and the “provision of *scaled-up* financial resources”. Beyond financial means, efforts in terms of technical support and capacity-building must also be monitored.

As mentioned previously, different UNFCCC working groups focus on these issues, but several issues have emerged as part of these different working groups, including:

- How to guarantee sufficient detailed information is provided that allows for precise and consistent monitoring, without the transparency mechanism becoming a burden for the Parties? In fact, detailed information may be costly, even if it makes it possible to increase pressure in favour of more ambitious commitment during the next NDC review cycle. The issue of differentiation is closely linked to this matter, although it is accepted that the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and African countries should benefit from less strict regulation;
- Given the large differences between the types of commitment made in the NDC, how can we ensure information is provided that makes it possible to compare Parties?
- In principle, transparency of support may enable us to put pressure on the donor countries in order to mobilise additional resources. Transparency of mitigation measures should make it possible to put pressure on countries so that they increase their concrete measures during the NDC review. Nevertheless, this will depend on the external and internal pressure placed upon that governments, which will depend on the strength/weakness of the environmental NGOs as well as the importance the electorate places on the issue of climate change.

COP23 Standing Committee work programme

In order to prepare for the 4th part of the first session of the APA, which will take place during COP23 in Bonn from 6 to 17 November 2017, it is envisaged that the Secretariat of the Convention will organise, under the aegis of the co-facilitators of the APA, a pre-session round table on 4 and 5 November 2017⁶⁰¹. The planned agenda for these two dates is as follows⁶⁰²:

- 4 November 2017: transparency of support provided and received; technical expert review and multilateral review of progress achieved, focused on facilitation (focus on transparency of support for the two latter);
- 5 November 2017: transparency of action related to mitigation and adaptation.

The negotiations that will take place during COP23 will represent a key intermediary step since the aim is to have clear guidelines concerning the implementation of the Paris Agreement for 2018. Before then, Party submissions are expected for the following deadlines:

- APA – New guidelines concerning the section of Decision 1/CP.21 relating to mitigation (item 3 on the agenda): 15 September 2017;
- APA – Modalities, procedures and directives for the transparency framework on action and support related to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (item 5 on the agenda): 30 September 2017;
- SBSTA47: No submission. The last submissions were made in March 2017.

I.13. Facilitation dialogue

The Party States to the Convention submitted their national development plans ahead of the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21), as a voluntary contribution to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) (generally by 2025 or 2030). However, the sum of these Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) positions us on a global warming trajectory of close to 3°C by around 2100⁶⁰³.

Consequently, in order to achieve the Paris Agreement objectives, it is essential that the States reevaluate their goals as soon as possible. By 2020, the States are invited to:

- communicate a new NDC;
- communicate their NDC again; or
- update their NDC.

The 2018 facilitation dialogue has been established by Decision 1/CP.21 with the aim of providing an opportunity to present information, conditions and required political signals so that the States can scale up their goals by 2020⁶⁰⁴. This

601. UNFCCC, 2017a.

602. FCCC/APA/2017/2.

603. UNFCCC, 2016a.

604. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20.

is a key process for determining and implementing several measures that aim to progress action plans in terms of climate change, which will also contribute to the advancement of various objectives related to sustainable development and welfare.

The facilitation dialogue between Parties aims to take stock in 2018 of collective efforts made by the Parties in order to reach the long term objective announced in paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Agreement and to ensure clarity during the drafting of NDCs in accordance with paragraph 8 of Article 4 of the Agreement. It will also involve taking stock of the readiness of modalities and rules for the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement in good time.

In Marrakech, the COP has asked the COP22 chairperson, in collaboration with the chairperson of COP23, to lead open and transparent consultations with the Parties on the subject of organising the facilitation dialogue and to jointly report on the preparations of this dialogue to COP23.

These consultations began during the sessions of subsidiary bodies in May 2017, and will continue up to and including COP23⁶⁰⁵.

I.14. Ongoing Climate Initiatives

The Paris Agreement, which was been adopted by 195 nations in 2015, is both historic and universal, in the sense that it unites for the first time ever all the Party States to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Reinforcing this universal character on an intergovernmental level, it furthermore translates into efforts committed by a plethora of stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental, in favour of strengthened international climate action (see also Section I.11). Monitoring mobilisation and actions is important as they are fundamental for reaching and strengthening the goals associated with the Paris Agreement. This part of the document presents a summary of major initiatives committed on the fringe of the Paris Agreement adoption by a number of significant stakeholders: governments, businesses, cities, local authorities, regions, civil society investors and organisations, etc. This diverse range of involved stakeholders, as well as the multiple ongoing initiatives, are today considered vital in the fight against climate change on an international level.

Taking into account the lack of ambition from the Party States characterised by the low number of commitments made through their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) (see also Section I.4 or Section I.5), this array of initiatives taken by non-Party stakeholders makes it possible to reduce the gap between the objectives set by the Paris Agreement and achieving them, via multi-stakeholder cooperation. The following paragraphs also make it possible to demonstrate the fact that these initiatives are a way to respond to multiple aspects of the fight against climate change, in the short-, medium- and long-term, under a global and

605. Decision 1/CP.22, para. 16.

multi-sectoral approach (be it in the area of mitigation, adaptation, funding, resilience, etc.; through actions relating to the areas of agriculture, food, health, energy, water, oceans, etc.).

1. **Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP)⁶⁰⁶:** The Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme was launched in 2012 by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in order to improve the resilience of small agricultural producers to agricultural change. The aim being to help the producers financially so that they can access information, tools and technologies that enable them to strengthen their resilience to climate change. According to the IFAD terms, the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme offers a new source of co-funding aiming to reproduce adaptation to climate change on a larger scale, which will be integrated into new IFAD investments, of an amount of approximately one billion US dollars (USD) per year. This programme falls within the standard investment processes of IFAD, with strict supervision and quality control schemes.
2. **Adaptation of West African Coastal Areas⁶⁰⁷:** This initiative, which is also called the West African Coast Management Programme, aims to reduce the areas considered to be “hot spots” for coastal erosion by 30% by 2020 and by 70% by 2025 in West Africa. It simultaneously aims to protect 30% of the population in flood zones that are considered a priority by 2020 and 70% by 2025 in the coastal regions of West Africa⁶⁰⁸.
3. **Africa Clean Energy Corridor Initiative⁶⁰⁹:** The aim of this initiative is to meet half of the total electricity demand using renewable, clean, indigenous and cost-effective resources in East and South African regions by 2030. The initiative mobilises countries from the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) and those from the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP).
4. **African Package for Climate-Resilient Ocean Economies^{610,611}:** Through this initiative, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) announced their ambitious technical and financial assistance to support ocean economies in Africa and strengthen resilience to climate change in coastal areas. The initiative has a mobilisation goal of 3.5 billion US dollars (USD) to support, between 2016 and 2021, action for oceans and climate, as well as a vision of action on ocean and climate over the next five years for six oceans.

606. <https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/db6939a1-35f0-4bb6-87cf-377ccfc605d4>

607. <http://www.banquemonddiale.org/fr/programs/west-africa-coastal-areas-management-program>

608. <http://www.banquemonddiale.org/fr/news/infographic/2016/09/01/saving-west-africas-coastal-assets>

609. http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/ACEC_brochure_2014_FR.pdf

610. Courtesy French translation provided by this Guide.

611. <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6441e.pdf>

5. **Blue Growth Initiative**⁶¹²: Launched in 2013 by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and its partners (UNDP, NORAD⁶¹³, WWF, UNEP, ICFA⁶¹⁴, Maritime Security Committee, GEF, World Bank, the Netherlands), it aims to strengthen resilience among coastal collectives and to restore potential fishing and aquaculture productivity in order to support food safety, reduction in poverty and the sustainable development of aquatic resources in the following developing countries: Algeria, Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal and the Seychelles. Furthermore, the initiative aims to reduce CO₂ emissions by 10% in five years and 25% in 10 years and to reduce overfishing by 20% in five years and 50% in ten years in 10 countries.
6. **Bonn Challenge**⁶¹⁵: Launched by Germany and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 2011, the initiative aims to restore 150 million hectares of deforested and degraded land on an international level by 2020. In 2014, the United Nations Climate Summit brought about the objective of 350 million hectares by 2030. The 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) in 2015 gave a new drive to this initiative. Burundi, Honduras, India, three Mexican states, a province in Pakistan and the company Asia Pulp & Paper have promised to restore 18 million hectares, bringing the promised amount to 86 million hectares.
7. **Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance**⁶¹⁶: This initiative was launched in 2014 in Copenhagen and brings together cities committed to achieving long term objectives by drastically reducing CO₂, 80% by 2050. The alliance aims to provide solutions to large cities in order to make it possible to focus on ambitious levels of reduction and generate collaboration in order to reach their respective objectives in a more efficient manner.
8. **Caring For Climate**^{617,618}: Launched during COP21, Caring for Climate⁶¹⁹ is one of the largest global coalitions of businesses committed to the fight against climate change. As of 3 October 2017, the initiative included more than 450 organisations⁶²⁰. The objectives pursued aim to improve energy efficiency, reduce carbon footprints and publicly and annually report on progress made.

612. <http://www.fao.org/asiapacific/perspectives/blue-growth/fr/>

613. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, NORAD.

614. International Coalition of Fisheries Associations.

615. <http://www.bonnchallenge.org/>

616. <http://usdn.org/public/Carbon-Neutral-Cities.html>

617. Courtesy French translation provided by this Guide.

618. <http://caringforclimate.org/about/>

619. The Caring for Climate coalition is a member of the organisation Global Compact, launched by the United Nations in 2000, which has the objective of encouraging businesses from around the world to promote the key principles of the United Nations such as human rights, being socially responsible, respecting international norms and laws related to work, protecting the environment and not resorting to corruption.

620. <http://caringforclimate.org/about/list-of-signatories/>

- 9. Blue Belt Initiative⁶²¹:** On the initiative of the Kingdom of Morocco, this initiative aims to build resilience within coastal communities and to promote sustainable fishing and aquaculture, in accordance with targets set out by Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14), which specifically aims to *conserve and sustainably exploit the oceans, seas and marine resources*⁶²².
- 10. Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance⁶²³:** This initiative has the goal of catalysing and expediting the flow of additional capital in cities, optimising investments in low-carbon, climate-resistant infrastructures and bridging the investment gap in urban areas by 2030.
- 11. Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS)⁶²⁴:** The objective of this initiative is to increase the capacity to produce and communicate effective information on the risks linked to the impact of dangerous hydrometeorological and climate phenomena in Least Developed Countries (LDC) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). This initiative, founded on the results, aims to ensure that the LDCs and SIDS affected have “at least a modest” early warning and risk information system. By 2020, 100 million US dollars (USD) should be mobilised as part of the initiative to bridge the gaps in existing programmes⁶²⁵. It is also envisaged that a Trust Fund will be set up, managed by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery.
- 12. Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)⁶²⁶:** An initiative aiming to strengthen cooperation between governmental and non-governmental partners in order to undertake actions aiming to reduce short-lived climate pollutants (specifically black carbon, methane and hydrofluorocarbons) to considerably reduce global warming in the short term. The objectives of this initiative fall within those of the Paris Agreement and a large number of Sustainable Development Goals at the same time⁶²⁷.
- 13. Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy⁶²⁸:** To reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% by 2020 through the implementation of an action plan for sustainable energy adopted to the Council and to report on the progress made every two years.

621. <http://www.laceinturebleue.org/>

622. <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr/oceans/>

623. <http://www.citiesclimatefinance.org/>

624. <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa-fr/resilience/risques-climatiques-et-systemes-d-alerte-precoc/>

625. This sum is envisaged based on an estimation made by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Office for Global Disaster Prevention, stating that it is the amount needed to achieve the objectives of the initiative.

626. <http://www.ccacoalition.org/fr>

627. <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr>

628. http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html

14. **Divest-Invest Global Movement**^{629,630}: This initiative consists in ensuring that a minimum of 5% of finance investment portfolios are made up of renewable products and clean energy through divestment and asset transfer in clean energy investments.
15. **Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves**⁶³¹: A private-public initiative from the United Nations Foundation, which aims to achieve the objective “100 by 2020”. In other terms, it is about equipping 100 million homes with clean cookstoves and clean and ecoenergy fuels by 2020. These objectives aim not only to combat climate change but also to improve the livelihoods of populations and their health, or even empower women.
16. **Global Geothermal Alliance (GGA)**⁶³²: Aims to contribute to the realisation of the potential of geothermal energy in the long term to achieve a growth five times higher than the current capacity reached by the production of geothermal energy and to double the growth of geothermal heating by 2030. As for short term action, the objective is to develop and operationalise the Global Geothermal Alliance as a global platform for improved dialogue, knowledge sharing and coordinated action into order to address technical, regulatory, political and financial challenges for a higher penetration of geothermal energy in the global energy mix. The alliance includes 41 countries and 27 international partner institutions.
17. **Food Security Climate Resilience Facility (FoodSECuRe)**^{633,634}: Funds developed by the World Food Programme (WFP) to provide financial and programme support for actions developed by communities in order to strengthen climate resilience, reduce loss and damage and to improve the reinforcement of resilience during post-disaster recovery.
18. **Global Resilience Partnership**^{635,636}: Consists in identifying and expanding innovative resilience solutions in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and South and South-East Asia.
19. **Water for Africa Initiative**: Set up by the Kingdom of Morocco and supported by the African Development Bank (ADB), this initiative was launched at COP22, with the aim of bringing justice to Africa through the adoption of a specific action plan which will mobilise different political and financial partners, as well as those from international institutions. The three alliances for reservoirs, megacities and businesses, created at COP21 in Paris and strongly committed

629. Courtesy French translation provided by this Guide.

630. <http://divestinvest.org/>

631. <https://cleancookstoves.org/binary-data/RESOURCE/file/000/000/269-1.pdf>

632. <http://www.irena.org/ggal/>

633. Courtesy French translation provided by this Guide.

634. <http://www.wfp.org/climate-change/initiatives/foodsecure>

635. Courtesy French translation provided by this Guide.

636. <http://www.globalresiliencepartnership.org>

to action on water and climate (which represent more than 450 organisations around the world today), signed a shared commitment that aims to jointly mobilise their partners, identify and disseminate good practices and support the development of new projects.

20. **Initiative for the Adaptation of African Agriculture (AAA)**⁶³⁷: This initiative aims to strengthen the resilience of African farmers by promoting sustainable soil management, better water management and risk management at the same time as personalised capacity, policy and funding mechanism development. The launch of the Global framework on water shortage helps countries to integrate climate change and the sustainable use of water into policies for agricultural sectors and cross-sectoral dialogue.
21. **African Adaptation Initiative (AAI)**⁶³⁸: Launched in December 2015 during COP21, the AAI aims to improve actions relating to adaptation and loss and damage in Africa. It is based on four pillars, which are (i) to strengthen climate information services; (ii) to strengthen political and institutional frameworks; (iii) to improve measures on the ground; and (iv) to strengthen funding and investment into climate adaptation. This initiative also aims to highlight the importance of strengthened action during the pre-2020 period.
22. **4 to 1000 Initiative**⁶³⁹: Launched by France as part of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), it aims to demonstrate – by drawing on scientific documentation – that agricultural soils can play a crucial role in food safety and climate change, in particular by implementing concrete actions relating to carbon storage in soil and agricultural practices to do this.
23. **Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)**⁶⁴⁰: An initiative led by the African Union Commission, the New Partnership for African Development, the Africa Group of Negotiators, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). It aims to highlight the enormous potential of the continent in terms of renewable energies and aims to achieve a new and additional capacity of energy production from renewable sources of 10 GW by 2020 and 300 GW by 2030. This will make it possible to guarantee universal access for African populations to sufficient quantities of clean, suitable and affordable energy. Furthermore, it aims to set up a favourable framework enabling the countries to make a technological leap, which will be a crucial advantage for achieving the objectives of the initiative.
24. **International Solar Alliance**⁶⁴¹: This Alliance was jointly launched by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the President of the French Republic François Hollande in order to facilitate a “scaling up” in the deployment

637. <http://www.aaainitiative.org/fr/initiative>

638. <http://www.africaadaptationinitiative.org/iaa.html>

639. <http://4p1000.org/>

640. <http://www.arei.org/>

641. <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/renewable-energy/international-solar-alliance/>

of solar energy in countries with strong sunshine. The objective targeted by the initiative is to mobilise substantial investments by 2030 (more than a billion US dollars) for the mass deployment of affordable solar energy. The alliance currently includes 43 countries and several representatives from the private sector⁶⁴².

25. **Life Beef Carbon**⁶⁴³: The objectives of the project are to develop an action plan that aim to reduce the carbon footprint of beef production by 15% in 10 years in four producer countries in Europe, namely France, Ireland, Italy and Spain.
26. **Lima Challenge**⁶⁴⁴: This initiative is associated with the New York Declaration, is an integral part of the LPAA, includes fourteen signatory countries⁶⁴⁵ and is financed by Germany, the United Kingdom and Norway. The main objective of the initiative is to *“halve the rate of loss of natural forests globally by 2020 and strive to end natural forest loss by 2030”*.
27. **Maritime Regions in Action against Climate Change**⁶⁴⁶: Launched by the European Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), the initiative aims to reduce emissions, develop sustainable energy solutions and carry out effect adaptation in maritime regions.
28. **Promotion of Smart Agriculture towards climate change and agroecology transition in West Africa**⁶⁴⁷: The programme aims to cause 25 million homes in West Africa to adopt agro-ecological practices by 2025.
29. **RE100**⁶⁴⁸: The initiative’s acronym in English, RE100 for Renewable Energy 100%, refers to its ambitious objective, which aims to involve and support big businesses that have committed to using 100% renewable energy by 2020. Launched in 2014 at the climate summit, with 13 big businesses including IKEA and the insurer SWISS RE, the initiative brings together businesses from both developed countries and developing countries. The aim being that the first businesses to be committed will create a virtuous circle, encouraging others to join the initiative. In 2015, Chinese and Indian businesses joined this global effort. The RE100 initiative is managed by The Climate Group and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).

642. last consulted on 3 October 2017.

643. <http://idele.fr/reseaux-et-partenariats/life-beef-carbon.html>

644. <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/forest/lima-challenge-bridging-the-emissions-gap-by-forest-intervention/>

645. Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guyana, Liberia, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and the Philippines.

646. <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/resilience/maritime-regions-in-action-against-climate-change/>

647. <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/agriculture/promotion-of-smart-agriculture-towards-climate-change-and-agro-ecology-transition-in-west-africa/>

648. <https://www.theclimategroup.org/RE100>

30. **Low Carbon Technology Partnerships Initiative (LCTPi)**⁶⁴⁹: An initiative managed by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, in partnership with the International Energy Agency and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, which brings together 150 big businesses and 70 partners in order to expedite the development of low carbon technological solutions for the purposes of limiting the global average temperature increase to not more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. In total, the initiative aims to support the deployment of 1.5 TW of additional renewable energy on a global scale before 2025.
31. **R4 – Rural Resilience Initiative**⁶⁵⁰: Launched in 2011⁶⁵¹ by the World Food Programme (WFP) and Oxfam America with the support of the insurance company Swiss Re, the aim of the initiative is to integrate systems for disaster risk management, microinsurance and livelihood diversification, savings and credit in productive safety net programmes, in order to increase the resilience of 100,000 farmers by 2017. The programme has been implemented in Ethiopia, Senegal, Malawi and Zambia.
32. **Save Food Initiative (called “SAVE FOOD”)**⁶⁵²: The overall objective of this initiative is to reduce food waste globally in order to guarantee more productive, resilient and low-emission food systems. This initiative recognises that the loss of food and reduction of waste are cross-sectional problems in the context of climate action and offers a clear path to reducing emissions and stimulating resilience in food systems. The increase in the availability of food, through food loss and a reduction in waste is crucial to ensure food and nutritional safety and to contribute to strengthening adaptation measures, risk reduction and resilience in vulnerable populations and regions. Furthermore, repairing food loss and the challenge of waste through the deployment of climate technologies along the whole value chain presents an additional opportunity to improve the potential mitigation in food systems and to mobilise climate funding.
33. **SIDS Lighthouses initiative**⁶⁵³: Developed by IRENA for SIDS, this initiative plans to support the strategic deployment of renewable energy in SIDS through the mobilisation of USD 500 million, the deployment of 100 MW of extra energy produced by photovoltaic solar power and 20 MW of extra power produced by wind turbine, a significant number of small hydropower and geothermal energy projects, and the development by all SIDS of a roadmap for renewable energies. To achieve these objectives, the initiative will enable capacity building and encourage technology transfer and the development of methodologies for implementation.

649. <http://lctpi.wbcsd.org/the-solution/>

650. <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa-fr/resilience/initiative-pour-la-resilience-rurale-r4/>

651. <https://www.wfp.org/climate-change/initiatives/r4-rural-resilience-initiative>

652. <https://www.save-food.org/>

653. <http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?page=view&type=1006&nr=2716&menu=1507>

34. **30 by 30⁶⁵⁴**: Launched by the International Road Transport Union in November 2009, this initiative constitutes a voluntary commitment from the road transport sector to reduce their emissions by 30% by 2030, in comparison with 2007 as the reference year. To achieve this ambitious objective, the members of the International Road Transport Union want to promote investments in innovative engines and automotive technologies that could contribute to reducing fuel consumption and, consequently, CO₂ emissions, eco-driving and even innovative logistics approaches.
35. **The New York Declaration on Forests⁶⁵⁵**: Adopted in 2014 by more than 130 governments, private sector businesses and civil society organisations, the declaration provides for the target of reducing the loss of natural forests on a global scale by half by 2020 and end the loss of forests by 2030 including a potential annual reduction in greenhouse gas emissions between 4.5 and 8.8 billion tonnes of CO₂ by 2030.
36. **Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity producers and traders⁶⁵⁶**: This is about eliminating deforestation caused by the production of cash crops by 2020, also contributing to the set objective to end the loss of natural forests by 2030.

I.15. Equality of the sexes in the context of climate change negotiations

Context: “gender”, “gender equality” and climate

Gender reflects the analysis of the status of men and women, the qualities or characteristics that society ascribes to each sex, social relationships between women and men, and socio-cultural perceptions of gender⁶⁵⁷. Gender in the Paris Agreement is included under “gender equality”⁶⁵⁸

From a general point of view, the recognition of gender equality in the context of climate change involves recognising and taking into account the particular vulnerabilities of each gender faced with climate change, knowing that these tend to exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities. In fact, a significant number of studies have shown that women, who are generally more affected by poverty

654. https://www.iru.org/sites/default/files/2016-01/en-g100129-30-by-30-resolution-2009_0.pdf

655. <http://forestdeclaration.org/>

656. <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa-fr/forets/engagements-zero-deforestation-des-producteurs-et-courtiers-de-commodites-agricoles/>

657. United Nations Organisation for Agriculture. Why “gender”? [Online] <http://www.fao.org/gender/gender-home/gender-why/pourquoi-parler-de-genre/fr>

658. See above, box “Gender equality in the Paris Agreement”

and precariousness, are also often more vulnerable to the consequences of climate change⁶⁵⁹. At the same time, it has been proven that the daily activities of women are closely linked to the environment and the climate and, that for this reason, they have an important role to play, in particular in the conservation and transfer of traditional techniques and local expertise that is generally more respectful of natural resources. This key role is also stressed in the education of children, with whom the future of sustainable and resilient development lie. In the context of international climate negotiations, the recognition of gender equality also involves supporting the participation and representation of women at negotiations and in international climate action.

Gender and climate

The gender aspect is a cross-cutting issue that – although not always considered central in the history of negotiations – is of great importance nonetheless. In effect, taking into consideration the differentiated role of women and men would allow to better fight against climate change and better adapt to it.

In numerous countries, in particular countries said to be developing (a fortiori the most vulnerable ones), women are the first victims of the consequences of climate change. It is they who cook, fetch wood and bring water. It is therefore women who should be given priority when it comes to raising awareness of energy conservation. They are the first to benefit from the introduction of renewable energy, and also the first to suffer from scarcer water resources or environmental deterioration in general. In their central role as educators of children, they are also at the forefront of awareness and education for future generations.

Better representation of women among negotiators and inside the different organisations created as a result of the Convention would also improve recognition of their crucial role. That being said, it must be noted that, for the time being there is unanimous agreement that not enough progress has been made on advancing gender equality.

On the other hand, the question of gender has been, for now, essentially dealt with from an organisational point of view whilst many consider that only a global approach would be fit for the issue.

Recognising and taking into account issues relating to gender and gender equality in international negotiations

The topic of gender became a factor in 1992, during the international Conference in Rio, notably through the adoption of Agenda 21, which, even then, identified women as one of the “*main groups*” in civil society whose participation was deemed

659. See in particular: http://unfccc.int/files/gender_and_climate_change/application/pdf/educoposters_freight.pdf

essential to the realisation of sustainable development⁶⁶⁰. For this reason, Chapter 24 of the document “*Global action for women towards sustainable and equitable development*,”⁶⁶¹ was dedicated to them.

The issue of participation and representation of women in international negotiations also very quickly became apparent. It first came up in the Beijing Declaration at the fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, which notably states that, “*the reinforcement of power of action of women and their full participation on the basis of equality in all fields of social life, including decision making and access to power are essential conditions for equality, development and peace*”⁶⁶².

Based on the Beijing Declaration, the 7th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP7, held in Marrakech in 2001) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) put forward the need to have a more balanced representation of men and women among the elected members of the bodies created under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol⁶⁶³.

Other than the question of parity in decision instances, equality of sexes appears more generally as linked to efficiency of climate action. Thus, in the Cancún Agreements, in 2010, the COP recognised that “*equality of sexes and effective participation of [...] are of great importance to act efficiently on all aspects of climate change*”⁶⁶⁴. During COP17 in 2011, the Secretariat was asked to include the application of methods and tools that respect gender equality⁶⁶⁵ among the cross-sector issues, in the framework of the Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change.

During COP18 (held in Doha in 2012), the Parties acknowledged that women continued to be under-represented in international negotiations. To remedy this situation, the Parties adopted a decision that set the goal of achieving a gender balance within the negotiation and decision-making bodies⁶⁶⁶.

In the same decision, the COP established ways of monitoring the implementation of this objective, in particular by asking the Secretariat of the Convention⁶⁶⁷ to:

- Maintain information on the gender composition of constituted bodies established under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, including information on the representation of women from regional groups;
- Gather information on the gender composition of delegations to sessions under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol;

660. United Nations, 1992b. Agenda 21, Chapter 23.

661. United Nations, 1992b. Agenda 21, Chapter 24.

662. United Nations, 1995, Annex 1, para. 13.

663. Decision 36/CP.7.

664. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 7.

665. Decision 6/CP.17.

666. Decision 23/CP.18.

667. Decision 23/CP.18 para. 8.

- Report this information to the Conference of the Parties for its consideration on an annual basis, in order to enable the tracking of progress made towards the goal of gender balance in advancing gender-sensitive climate policy.

Ever since, each year, the secretariat produces a report on gender composition enabling us to monitor progress made⁶⁶⁸. Even so, beyond the commitments made, there is still a long way to go.

Still an uneven split between men and women in the incorporated bodies

The first report⁶⁶⁹ produced by the Secretariat was presented during COP19 (held in Warsaw in 2013). Assessing the year 2013, it confirmed that equality was only achieved in one body⁶⁷⁰ and that on average, women represented just 23% of the headcount in organisations incorporated into the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.

On the eve of COP21, held in Paris in 2015, the report on gender composition, assessing the same year, showed that equality was not achieved in any body incorporated in the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol⁶⁷¹. The highest proportion of women in 2015, as a percentage, was around 40% in the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee and the Compliance Committee facilitative branch.

During COP22 (held in Marrakech in 2016), the Secretariat's report⁶⁷² showed that in 2016, the proportion of women ranged from 52% (in the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention) to 10% (in the Executive Board of the Clean development mechanism and the enforcement branch of the Compliance committee)⁶⁷³. In comparison with 2015, the rate of representation of women increased in four incorporated bodies (up to 19% in the Consultative Group of Experts and the Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network). In all other incorporated bodies, the rate of representation remained unchanged or had decreased.

Furthermore, decision 23/CP.18, adopted in 2012, seeks to make sure that policies on climate change respond to the differing needs of men and women in national and local contexts⁶⁷⁴. Likewise, the decision aims particularly to ensure that the needs of women and men are addressed *equally* in a more effective climate change policy⁶⁷⁵.

668. In accordance with Decisions 23/CP.18 and 18/CP.20.

669. FCCC/CP/2013/4.

670. The Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention.

671. UNFCCC, 2015b, See Table 1, p. 4-5.

672. FCCC/CP/2016/4 [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cop22/fre/04f.pdf>

673. FCCC/CP/2016/4, p. 6 [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cop22/fre/04f.pdf>

674. Decision 23/CP.18.

675. Decision 23/CP.18, para. 2.

Another achievement of COP18 was the acknowledgement, in the Doha programme on Article 6 of the Convention, of the issue of gender as a cross-sector issue concerning all the items of this Article, namely:

- public awareness and education programmed on climate change and its effects;
- public access to information concerning climate change and its effects;
- public participation in the review of climate change and its effects and the development of appropriate measures for combating it;
- training of scientific, technical and management staff;
- international cooperation in terms of design and exchange of materials for public awareness and education on climate change and its effects, and educational and training programmes⁶⁷⁶.

In another sign of the growing recognition of the central importance of gender balance, COP18 planned to organise a first workshop on gender, which became a full item on the agenda. To solidify the result of Doha, the aforementioned workshop took place in November 2013 in Warsaw⁶⁷⁷.

Work generating the results of COP21 and the inclusion of gender equality in the Paris Agreement

Following the work conducted under the aegis of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) in 2014, COP20 established the Lima work programme on gender for a two-year period⁶⁷⁸. The objective was to carry out a review in 2016, during COP22⁶⁷⁹, *“with a view to taking any necessary action needed to strengthen the progress of furthering these goals”*⁶⁸⁰. The adopted Decision recommends the Parties, on the one hand *“advance gender balance”*, in particular through the representation of women in bodies created in accordance with the Convention (and the Kyoto Protocol) and, on the other hand, *“achieve gender-responsive climate policy in all relevant activities under the Convention”*⁶⁸¹.

As such, the need to expand the framework on gender in the context of climate change was highlighted by going beyond the simple participation of women in activities relating to climate action. The Conference of Lima was also an occasion to encourage various bodies created under the Convention, such as the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund, to integrate or reinforce integration of issues of gender in their activities⁶⁸².

676. Decision 15/CP.18, Annex para. 8.

677. UNFCCC, 2013c.

678. Decision 18/CP.20, Preamble.

679. *See above*, “Further work on gender and equality between men and women following the Paris results”.

680. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 16.

681. Decision 18/CP.20, Preamble.

682. Decision 8/CP.20, paras. 17 and 18.

The Lima Work Programme also asked the Secretariat to organise two workshops in order to continue actions relating to gender by highlighting mitigation⁶⁸³ and adaptation⁶⁸⁴ at the same time.

Results of the workshops set up as part of the Lima Work Programme relating to gender by the intermediary SBI

The first workshop was organised in Bonn in June 2015, during the 42nd session of the SBI. This workshop particularly focused on the policies relating to climate change that encouraged gender equality, by highlighting mitigation and the development and transfer of technology. The question of definition of terms linked to the subject of gender was also dealt with. The report on the workshop⁶⁸⁵ was considered by the SBI during its 43rd session, held simultaneously with COP21⁶⁸⁶. The SBI's main conclusions concerned the organisation of training and awareness building activities on issues related to gender and climate change, while stressing the efforts to step up existing work in the areas of adaptation, mitigation, funding, technology and capacity-building. The report also recapped the need to implement sensitive and appropriate actions on gender in these particular fields.⁶⁸⁷

The second workshop was scheduled for May 2016, adhering to the continuity of the programme mentioned above, to focus in particular on adaptation, capacity-building and training of stakeholder representatives working on gender related issues. For its part, the Secretariat prepared a technical report on the directives and other tools designed to ensure the integration of questions of gender in activities related to climate change in April 2016⁶⁸⁸ for review by the SBI at its 44th. session, during the Bonn Conference in May 2016. On Thursday 26 May, the SBI plenary session adopted these conclusions⁶⁸⁹, among which⁶⁹⁰, the SBI:

- expresses its appreciation for the two-year Lima Work Programme on Gender and the comments received in support of the programme;
- expresses its support for the continuation and strengthening of the work programme;
- asks the Parties and observers to provide information on progress towards achieving the gender balance objectives and gender-sensitive climate policy;
- agrees to continue to examine this issue [...] with a view to preparing a draft decision for review during COP22.

The result of this meeting is the culmination of a long process, for which hopes are running high, especially as a draft decision is included in the schedule for COP22.

683. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 11.

684. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 12.

685. FCCC/SBI/2015/12.

686. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 11.

687. FCCC/SBI/2015/L.31, para. 6 [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/sbi/eng/l31f.pdf>

688. UNFCCC, 2016e.

689. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.16.

690. *Report of the Bonn Climate Change Conference: 16-26 May 2016*. Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12 n° 676 pp. 16-17 [online] <http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12676f.pdf>

With the biennial Lima work programme, it has become evident that the topic of gender equality constitutes a broad consensus, both on behalf of developed countries and developing countries, as a general principle and driver. Numerous Parties, including the countries of the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), the Like Minded Group of States (LMDC), the LDC, Switzerland, Norway, Australia and Turkey, had thus made a call in September 2015 to include gender equality in the preamble of the Paris agreement⁶⁹¹. The EU and India had already made similar calls in June 2015⁶⁹². The EU, the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) and even AILAC, among others, had also requested that it appear in the objectives⁶⁹³. These proposals were included in the draft agreement⁶⁹⁴ written during the 11th part of the 2nd session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, which was held in Bonn from 19 to 23 October 2015.

In the end, in the final version of the Paris Agreement, the word “gender” was replaced by “gender equality”, to ensure recognition of the necessary equal involvement of both sexes in combating climate change, in the essential adaptation to it, and in the capacity-building topic.

Gender equality in the Paris Agreement

Decision 1/CP.21 includes the topic of gender equality and the empowerment of women, by “*Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity*”⁶⁹⁵.

This text is recalled from the preamble of the Paris Agreement, the Parties being aware that “*climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on [...] gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity*”⁶⁹⁶.

In Article 7 of the Agreement, which establishes the global goal on adaptation, “*Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socio-economic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate*”⁶⁹⁷.

The rest of the text page 172

691. IIDD 2015c, p. 4.

692. IIDD, 2015d, p. 5.

693. IIDD, 2015c, p. 5.

694. ADP, 2015.

695. Decision 1/CP.21.

696. Decision 1/CP.21, Preamble of the Paris Agreement.

697. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, *Paris Agreement, Art. 7, para. 5*.

Finally, the topic of gender equality is included in Article 11, which addresses capacity-building, and which should in particular “be guided by lessons learned, including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive”⁶⁹⁸.

Further work on gender and equality between men and women following the Paris results

With COP21, the Parties to the UNFCCC recognised once again the importance of involving women and men on an equal footing in processes related to the Convention as well as in the creation and implementation of climate policies, this time on the basis of a strict acceptance of “gender equality”. Since 2012, the issue of gender and gender equality has been a whole topic of negotiations (notably being listed on the agenda of COPs and sessions of the SBI) and numerous efforts have already been made. COP21 confirmed the importance of the issue through the treatment of gender equality across the board in the Paris Agreement.

COP22 was expected to take stock of the progress of actions carried out on this topic, notably in the review of the Lima Work Programme relating to gender⁶⁹⁹. The Conference in Marrakech was an opportunity to strengthen the position taken around gender and gender equality, which has notably been conveyed by the organisation through a day specially dedicated to the topic⁷⁰⁰.

Following COP22, the Parties decided to continue and strengthen the Lima Work Programme on gender for a period of three years, with the aim to undertake a new review of the work programme at COP25 (in 2019)⁷⁰¹. All points relating to the continuation of this work programme are contained in Decision 21/CP.22 between paragraphs 7 and 30. In a non-exhaustive manner:

- The Parties are invited to continue to assist the activities of training and awareness-raising for gender balance⁷⁰² as well as building the skills and capacity of their female delegates to participate effectively in UNFCCC meetings⁷⁰³ (with a special focus on training and capacity-building for delegates from Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change⁷⁰⁴);

698. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 11, para. 1.

699. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 16.

700. http://unfccc.int/gender_and_climate_change/items/9948.php

701. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 6.

702. Decision 21/CP.22, para. 7(a).

703. Decision 21/CP.22, para. 7(b).

704. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 8.

- It is decided that annual in-session workshops will be held in conjunction with the sessions of the subsidiary bodies in the first sessional period of 2018 and 2019⁷⁰⁵. The topics of these workshops should be elaborated during 2017 by the SBI to be reviewed during COP23⁷⁰⁶;
- It is requested that the secretariat to prepare a technical paper identifying entry points for integrating gender considerations in workstreams under the UNFCCC process for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-eighth session (April–May 2018)⁷⁰⁷;
- It is requested that the secretariat prepares a technical paper on achieving the goal of gender balance⁷⁰⁸ for consideration by COP23⁷⁰⁹;
- It is requested that the SBI develops *“a gender action plan in order to support the implementation of gender-related decisions and mandates under the UNFCCC process, which may include priority areas, key activities and indicators, timelines for implementation, the responsible and key actors and indicative resource requirements for each activity, and further elaborate its process of review and monitoring”*⁷¹⁰. A first workshop was organised by the Secretariat (in cooperation with the Parties, interested observers and other bodies) during the 46th session of the Subsidiary Bodies (May 2017) to define possible items of the aforementioned action plan, in order to be considered by the SBI at its 47th session (November 2017).

An initial session of workshops was organised on 10 and 11 May 2017⁷¹¹, in Bonn, during the 46th session of the SBI⁷¹², on the possible items on a gender action plan⁷¹³. The Parties⁷¹⁴, as well as observers and other stakeholders⁷¹⁵, were invited to submit their views. The follow-up to this workshop is planned during the 47th session of the SBI, in November 2017, at the same time as COP23.

705. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 11.

706. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 12.

707. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 13.

708. As mandated by Decisions 36/CP.7, 1/CP.16 and 23/CP.18.

709. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 20.

710. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 27.

711. http://unfccc.int/gender_and_climate_change/items/10289.php

712. FCCC/SBI/2017/1.

713. The programme of events and notes are available at this address: http://unfccc.int/files/gender_and_climate_change/application/pdf/sbi46_ws_gender_provprog_v1.pdf

714. Available at the following address: http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_parties/items/5900.php

715. Available at the following address: http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_non-party_stakeholders/items/7481.php

More generally, COP23 will be an opportunity to continue work on the topic of gender and gender equality, as there are a certain number of unresolved points. That being said, despite all the good intentions that have been declared, it should be noted that efforts to promote the realisation of set objectives in terms of gender and gender equality remain significant while from an overall point of view (beyond international negotiations on climate), awareness of the issue is taking a more and more prominent role.

Issues relating to gender and gender equality, widely recognised issues, beyond international negotiations on climate

Beyond the progress of the Paris Agreement, 2015 was a landmark year for recognition and awareness of the topic of gender equality on an international level. In fact, 2015 was also marked by the adoption by the United Nations, on 25 September, of a 2030 agenda for sustainable development (2030 Agenda), which is set out in a document with the title “*Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*”⁷¹⁶. Following on from the Millenium Development Goals, this programme rolled out 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) accompanied by 169 targets for achieving them.

Figure 25. The SDG, Goal 5: Gender equality⁷¹⁷



The rest of the text page 175

⁷¹⁶. United Nations, 2015.

⁷¹⁷. UN Women, 2015, p. 4-5.

Among these SDGs, there is a separate objective that aims to *Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls* (SDG 5) as well as a second goal based on reducing inequalities within and among countries (SDG 10). The targets set by SDG 5 on gender equality guide countries towards ending all forms of discrimination and violence, and ensuring that women, in all domains, can make their voice heard, make choices, and access opportunities and resources on an equal footing. Eleven other goals – concerning subjects as varied as ending poverty and work, health, water and sanitation, just societies and sustainable cities – provide targets which are explicitly linked to achieving gender equality.⁷¹⁸

To take just one example, the 2017 United Nations SDG Report⁷¹⁹ mentions that men still hold greater political and economic power, and insists on the fact that “*Effective policymaking to achieve gender equality demands broad political participation*”. Yet, “*women’s representation in single or lower houses of parliament in countries around the world was only 23.4 per cent in 2017, just 10 percentage points higher than in 2000*”⁷²⁰. As this includes results in terms of the representation on women in bodies created under the UNFCCC, the “*slow progress suggests that stronger political will and more ambitious measures are needed*”. As such, COP23 will be an important step for international climate action and the strengthening of provisions relating to gender and gender equality, while the United Nations have comprehensively integrated these issues as crucial targets and prerequisite for realising ongoing large international programmes.

According to the United Nations, “*Gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. Providing women and girls with equal access to education, [...] decent work, and representation in political and economic decision-making processes will fuel sustainable economies and benefit societies and humanity at large*”⁷²¹.

718. United Nations, 2017, p. 29.

719. United Nations, 2017, p. 29.

720. United Nations, 2017, p. 29.

721. See Sustainable Development Goals, Gender and *equality* [online]
<http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/>

Part II.

Understanding international climate negotiations: From the Paris Agreement to its implementation

II.A. The implementation of the Agreement... From Marrakech to Bonn

The entry into force in record time of the Paris Agreement, on 4 November 2016, was within a context of renewed enthusiasm to combat climate change internationally, although two significant initiatives preceded the entry into force of the Agreement that same year. These initiatives especially included the adoption of the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol which aimed to reduce by 80% the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbon-type (HFC) greenhouse gases (GHG) over the next 30 years. The reduction in HFCs within the framework of the Amendment should avoid a temperature increase of 0.5 C from now until the end of the century, whilst continuing to protect the ozone layer. A second important development was the adoption of the reduction and compensation programme of international aviation-derived GHG emissions adopted by the international civil aviation Organisation. The Paris Agreement does not cover the international aviation industry, an industry currently responsible for 2% of global GHG emissions although this is increasing exponentially.

Within this context, some observers determined two key issues for the COP22. Firstly, for the UNFCCC, it was an opportunity to show to the outside world that it was capable of taking up the mantle and thereby keeping this momentum alive⁷²². Then, internally the COP22 presented a significant challenge for the Parties although these had forecast numerous technical advances since the very first session of the Conference of the Parties acting as the Conference of the Parties to the Paris agreement (CMA1) which sought to rapidly adopt the methods, procedures and guidelines allowing for the implementation of the Paris Agreement⁷²³. Expectations were therefore raised that it would be possible to make some solid progress by the time the COP22 ended. Finally, the deadlines for adopting the decisions on the rules of the Paris Agreement were pushed back to 2018. Indeed, at COP23 the CMA met once again to take stock of the progress achieved by the different subsidiary bodies for the purpose of complying with the December 2018 deadline. Nevertheless,

722. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.

723. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.

in Marrakech, the less developed countries (LDC) maintained that the decisions should be adopted once they are ready rather than being adopted in block at the COP24,⁷²⁴ thereby hoping to avoid that some parts of the regulation would be subject to trade-offs.

The Parties met in Marrakech within the framework of COP22/CMA1 with the aim of resuming the discussions on developing the “Rules” of the Agreement or its “Handbook”⁷²⁵, discussions which had commenced earlier in the same year in Bonn. In this regard, numerous points were on the agenda of both the permanent subsidiary organs of the Ad Hoc working Group on the Paris agreement (APA). Therefore, at COP22, significant attention was paid to certain key aspects of the implementation of the Paris Agreement notably⁷²⁶:

- The definition of the regulation for market mechanisms which will help to reduce the costs involved in achieving the mitigation targets included in the nationally determined Contributions (NDC);
- Adaptation in terms of institutional consistency and of financing;
- Pre-2020 Agenda;
- An important effort in capacity-building;
- An emphasis on the support to developing countries and technology transfer;
- An improved access sources of financing;
- Maintaining and monitoring international cooperation, commitment, financing, technology transfer and capacity-building will also be core subjects; and
- Consideration of the work of the intergovernmental expert group on climate change (IPCC) within the framework of the Global Stocktake i.e. to find out how this work can clarify the results of the stocktake.

In Marrakech, the developing countries also reiterated the importance of combining the work of implementing the Paris Agreement, aimed at climate change action from 2020, with pre-2020 concrete actions. In relation to this, observers spoke of a certain form of deception by the developing countries⁷²⁷, although the discussions in Marrakech and Bonn specifically focused on action from 2020. Particularly, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol which aims at increasing the ambition of the pre-2020 action has not yet come into force. These same observers reiterated that the Durban mandate focused on two work plans:

- The action from 2020 which translated into the adoption of the Paris Agreement; and,
- The pre-2020 action which has not yet been clarified.

724. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.

725. IISD, 2017d, p. 22.

726. OIF/IFDD, 2016, pp. 3-4.

727. IISD, 2016i, p. 42.

At the closing of the Marrakech Conference, the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) highlighted their concern about how little progress had been made on the need to “*treat pre-2020 issues equally*”⁷²⁸ not only for the question of the pre-2020 action in itself, but also taking into account the fact that the contributions currently submitted by the Parties translated into emissions exceeding by 12 to 14 Gt of CO₂e compared to the limit required to maintain global temperature increases well below 2°C⁷²⁹ compared to pre-industrial levels. In Marrakech, some delegates also deplored that this aspect of their NDC was not tackled head on⁷³⁰.

Nevertheless the Moroccan Presidency was able to achieve the adoption of the Marrakech partnership on global climate change which seeks to strengthen the world programme on climate change adopted at COP20 in Lima, in 2014⁷³¹. This new partnership aims “to establish a road map for action between 2017 and 2020”⁷³². This undoubtedly will represent a crucial challenge for the new Fijian Presidency at COP23, critically within the framework of a potential increase in the Parties’ ambitions to limit the average global temperature increase to 1.5° C (see also Section I.4.).

Some significant progress made in Marrakech and in Bonn was in the preparations for the facilitation dialogue of 2018⁷³³. At the close of the Marrakech conference, the Moroccan and Fijian Presidencies were mandated by the COP “*to conduct discussions related to the organisation of this dialogue and to report to COP23*”⁷³⁴, a mission started in Bonn to lay the foundations to envisage the concept of the objective of this dialogue and to possibly strengthen the trust between the Parties in terms of collective efforts from 2020⁷³⁵. Also with regard to the pre-2020 action, the Paris Committee on capacity-building was able to hold its first meeting in Bonn during which the continuous working plan for 2017-2019 was adopted⁷³⁶.

Furthermore, the Parties arrived well prepared in Bonn and were ready to further the technical work of the objective adopted in Marrakech to finalise the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement at the latest by COP24 in 2018. Thus, over a hundred pre-session documents were submitted by the Parties prior to the Bonn meeting in May 2017⁷³⁷. This would have allowed also to clarify the thrust of the discussions on certain “*orphan*” issues since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, particularly⁷³⁸:

728. IISD, 2016i, p. 43.

729. UNEP, 2016, p. xvii.

730. IISD, 2016i, p. 42.

731. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.

732. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.

733. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.

734. IISD, 2016i, p. 42, on decision 1/CP.22, para. 16.

735. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.

736. IISD, 2017d, p. 24.

737. IISD, 2017d, p. 22.

738. IISD, 2016i, p. 43, on APA, 2016a.

- the common NDC calendars;
- the adjustment of the existing NDC;
- the forum on the response measures;
- the acknowledgement of the adaptation measures used by the developing countries;
- financing-related issues;
- determining the new collective objective for financing;
- the biannual financial reports by the developed countries; and
- education, training and awareness.

II.A.1. Sessions and outcomes of the permanent subsidiary organs between COP22 and COP23

Amongst the items on the agenda addressed by the subsidiary organs, included the discussions that stalled in Marrakech regarding a decision to determine if one or two public NDC registers should be set up, given the lack of consensus in relation to the nature itself of the adaptation reports themselves and regarding the NDC⁷³⁹. In this regard, the Bonn Parties focused on making progress on the less contentious technical aspects such as the functionalities of the register and user accessibility⁷⁴⁰.

However, in relation to the transparency of financial supports, the Parties were able to make progress on the discussions both in Marrakech and Bonn. In the first case, progress was made on the methods of verifying the information about this support, critically in relation to financial supports provided or given by developed countries⁷⁴¹. In the second case, the Parties were able to discuss the *ex ante* and *ex post* information which will be included within this framework of transparency on financial support⁷⁴².

Concrete progress was also made on the International Warsaw mechanism (IWM), although the COP approved the indicative framework of a rolling five year work plan by the IWM Executive Committee⁷⁴³. The Parties also discussed the procedure of periodic assessments post-IVM, at most, every five years⁷⁴⁴. Finally, the SBI received its mandate in Marrakech to address, within the framework of its work, two of the so-called “orphan” issues i.e.⁷⁴⁵:

- Common NDC calendars; and
- Article 12 of the Paris Agreement.

739. IISD, 2016i, p. 43.

740. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.

741. IISD, 2016i, p. 42.

742. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.

743. Decision 3/CP.22, para. 3.

744. Decision 4/CP.22, para. 2.

745. IISD, 2016i, p. 42.

Some discussions were postponed till later, including⁷⁴⁶:

- the scope of the application of the review of the long-term global objective (postponed until 2019);
- the review of the modalities and procedures of the Clean Development Mechanism (November 2017 or December 2018);
- the framework for capacity-building (November 2017 or December 2018);
- national adaptation plans (November 2017 or December 2018).

II.A.2. Sessions and results of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement between COP22 and COP23

In Marrakech, although the technical work of the APA was brought to a close at the end of the first week of the COP22 – even if some Parties wanted to take advantage of the two weeks available- the Parties still held informal discussions through the whole of the second week of the COP on the following issues⁷⁴⁷:

- mitigation;
- adaptation;
- transparency;
- Global Stocktake;
- the implementation and compliance with provisions;
- other issues concerning implementation.

This informal work enabled the Parties to establish a specific work programme to prepare for the APA session held in Bonn in May 2017. Amongst other things the Parties added the role of the Adaptation fund as a topic under the remit of the APA, a stalling point for the developing and developed countries which was addressed in greater depth at the Bonn session. In particular, the Parties discussed in greater detail the legal issues surrounding the inclusion of the Adaptation Fund as an organ which would serve the Paris Agreement. Some observers emphasised especially that these legal discussion shone a light on the greater degree of complexity between the body and the Agreement and the need therefore to continue with technical discussions in this sense⁷⁴⁸.

Furthermore the parties in Bonn discussed numerous informal notes from the co-presidents and co-leaders of the APA which could have potentially laid the foundations required to hold basic negotiations on the various APA issues at

746. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.

747. IISD, 2016i, p. 42.

748. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.

COP23⁷⁴⁹. In the hope of making more rapid progress on this work, the Parties extended the mandate of they co-presidents of the APA so that so they would still hold the post at COP23⁷⁵⁰.

Nevertheless there exists an important challenge that the Parties will have to tackle at COP23. These are discussions regarding the differentiation of responsibilities between the developed countries and developing countries which stalled both in Marrakech and in Bonn in May 2017 during the work carried out under the auspices of the APA. Specifically at COP 22, certain developing countries highlighted that their participation in progressing the discussions under the auspices of the APA were conditional on their inclusion in the discussion on the topics aimed at the implementing “the full scope of the NDCs,” including financing, technologies and capacity-building and not solely mitigation measures⁷⁵¹.

Finally in Bonn, the differences in opinion re-emerged, on the one hand, to the need to explicitly include the differentiation procedures into the Agreement rules or, on the other hand, considerations, whereby, the very fact of contributions to the Paris Agreement being determined nationally suffices to differentiate the efforts amongst the Parties⁷⁵². Moreover, a number of developing countries reiterated in Bonn that they considered the discussions on mitigation measures were overly represented compared to other issues, such as transparency of action and of support⁷⁵³.

Therefore, similar to COP22, it is indispensable that COP23 maintains the “spirit of Paris” and that the ambitions of the international community are more than ever embedded in trust and sustainability, even though the Parties agreed in Marrakech to push back certain final decisions until 2018 at COP24.

II.B Concise summary of the Paris Agreement⁷⁵⁴

Form and legal implications

As opposed to the Kyoto Protocol which contains legally binding commitments with figures for the Parties registered in Annex B, the Paris Agreement commits all Parties to adopt internal measures with the aim of conducting mitigation objectives that are self-determined. Several discussions brought to light the subject of the legal nature or legally binding character of the agreement that did not appear evident in the analysis of the text of the Agreement. Whilst the mitigation approach by

749. IISD, 2017d, p. 24.

750. IISD, 2017d, p. 24.

751. IISD, 2016i, p. 43.

752. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.

753. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.

754. Update and summary adapted from the Guide to negotiations, 2016 edition.

For greater detail on the analysis of the Paris Agreement, see OIF/IFDD, 2016.

nationally determined contributions (NDC) represents a more significant, almost universal participation by the Parties to the Convention, their non-legally-binding nature and lack of collective ambition raised concerns⁷⁵⁵. Numerous actors expected that the Paris Agreement would result in commitments in terms of mitigation and financing that would be legally binding. To this, they were reminded that such regulations did not necessarily guarantee implementation, regarding previous experience, but that they could, on the contrary, reduce participation, and by extension, the level of global ambition of the agreement.

Nevertheless, several elements testify to the legal force of the Paris Agreement⁷⁵⁶:

- It is an international treaty by virtue of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties of 1969, submitted for signature and national ratification processes to guarantee its effectiveness;
- As the majority of international legal texts, it contains both mandatory provisions and non-mandatory provisions;
- Several clear legal requirements appear through elements and processes that are interdependent in the architecture of the Agreement, in relation to the long-term objectives, the individual obligations of the Parties, the national reports and reviews, the processes of harmonisation of temporal horizons of the NDC towards a common calendar, the frame of transparency and accountability as well as the mechanism aimed at facilitating implementation and promoting respect of the obligations of the Parties.

The set of provisions results in a certain number of obligations for Parties to the international community.

The sophistication of the architecture of the Paris Agreement can be seen as a hybrid model reconciling the “top down” and “bottom up” efforts⁷⁵⁷. This architecture has proven to be the most efficient to reconcile the divergent viewpoints of the Parties and makes the Agreement acceptable to everyone⁷⁵⁸. However, given that the Agreement must be ratified entirely without reservations⁷⁵⁹, several analysts concluded that the legal form of the Agreement is globally binding once in force even though it contains elements that are not binding⁷⁶⁰.

755. IISD, 2015a, p. 50.

756. Bodansky, 2016.

757. See discussion by Bodansky, 2016, p. 18-20.

758. Obergassel, *et al.*, 2016.

759. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 27 providing that “No restriction can be applied to this Agreement”. It is to be highlighted that in practice, some countries bypassed this and issued restrictions when they lodged their ratification instrument.

760. See Bodle, Donat, & Duwe, 2016; and Jeyaratnam, Whitmore, Hokpin, & Mountain, 2015.

In clarity, distinction is made among the obligations of the Paris Agreement between elements that are binding and others that are not. Among the non-binding elements are financing⁷⁶¹ and emissions reduction⁷⁶² whilst binding aspects of the Agreement include the periodic communication of NDC at regular intervals of five years⁷⁶³, transparency of actions and support⁷⁶⁴.

It is important to note the subtlety by which, despite the obligation for the Parties to communicate their NDC⁷⁶⁵, it is not on the other hand legally binding to implement or realise the targets set by these⁷⁶⁶. In effect, the Agreement only required the Parties to adopt internal mitigation measures to comply with the NDC objectives. According to the analysis by Galbraith⁷⁶⁷, only the procedural aspect of the NDC⁷⁶⁸ is binding and there is no legal obligation concerning the substance of Article 4.

Summary of the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement contains 29 articles organised into three parts:

- The context, principles and objectives of the Agreement, addressing the treatment of cross-cutting issues;
- The main obligations relating to substantive issues, in particular mitigation, adaptation, financing, the development and transfer of technology, transparency of action and support, and capacity-building;
- Institutional, procedural and legal issues.

This Agreement is guided by an ascending approach (“bottom-up”) sustained by the principle of self-determination of mitigation objectives and adaptation at the national level through NDC, strengthened by binding provisions. It is accompanied by Decision 1/CP.21 aimed at giving it effect and outlining the actions to develop to facilitate entry into force and sustain implementation of its regulations.

761. See Jeyaratnam, Whitmore, Hokpin, & Mountain, 2015; and Obergassel, *et al.*, 2016.

762. Obergassel, *et al.*, 2016.

763. Obergassel, *et al.*, 2016.

764. IDDRI, 2015.


765. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 2.

766. See discussion by Bodansky, 2016, p. 13-14.

767. Galbraith, 2015.

768. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 2.

Figure 26. The structure of the Paris Agreement in a few words⁷⁶⁹



769. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

Figure 27. The principles of the Paris Agreement in a few words⁷⁷⁰



770. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.



ARTICLE 4 Mitigation <p>Peaking of emissions as soon as possible to achieve the long-term temperature goal laid down in Article 2</p> <p>Each Party must establish its NDC corresponding to its highest possible ambition level; reviewable every five years, always upwards; each Party is required to communicate long-term Strategies</p>	ARTICLE 5 Forests <p>Preserve and strengthen the GHG sinks and reservoirs, mainly the forests</p> <p>Pursuing and enhancing arrangements adopted by virtue of the Convention (REDD+); promote the adoption of non-carbon-related measures</p>	ARTICLE 6 Mechanisms <p>General framework for the cooperation activities, mitigation and adaptation activities, sustainable development and environmental integrity</p> <p>Cooperative approaches; transfer of results of mitigation; mechanisms to contribute to mitigation and support sustainable development</p>
ARTICLE 7 Adaptation <p>Enhance adaptation capacities, increase resilience, reduce vulnerability to climate change and contribute to sustainable</p> <p>Strengthening support and international cooperation, mainly in favour of developing countries; communication of national adaptation measures</p>	ARTICLE 8 Loss and damage <p>Avoid and reduce as much as possible the loss and damage from the effects of climate change and remedy it, mainly in a sustainable development framework</p> <p>Enhancing the Warsaw International Mechanism; cooperation and facilitation of action and support</p>	ARTICLE 9 Financing <p>Financial resources for mitigation and adaptation for developing countries for implementation of objectives</p> <p>Mobilisation of resources by developed countries or on voluntary basis; from a broad spectrum of sources; biennial communications on financing</p>
ARTICLE 10 Technology <p>Development and transfer of technologies to increase resilience to climate change and reduce GHG emissions</p> <p>Creation of a Technology Mechanism by virtue of the Convention; strengthening of cooperation; technical and financial support for innovation</p>	ARTICLE 11 Capacity-building <p>Contribute and improve the capacities of developing countries, mainly the most vulnerable, faced with the effects of climate change</p> <p>Cooperation; development and deployment of technologies; access to financing; communication of capacity-building activities</p>	ACRONYMS <p>CC Climate change</p> <p>NDC Nationally Determined Contributions</p> <p>SD Sustainable development</p> <p>GHG Greenhouse gases</p> <p>DC Developing countries</p>

<p>ARTICLE 12</p> <p><i>Education and awareness</i></p> <p>Contribute to the awareness of the importance of measures to combat climate change</p> <p>The Parties cooperate in taking measures to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information</p>	<p>ARTICLE 13</p> <p><i>Transparency</i></p> <p>Build up mutual trust and promote effective implementation</p> <p>Creation of an enhanced transparency framework of measures (mitigation and adaptation) and support for developing countries; technical review by experts</p>	<p>ARTICLE 14</p> <p><i>Five-year global stocktake</i></p> <p>First global stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter, to update and enhance the measures, as for international cooperation in achieving objectives.</p>
<p>ARTICLE 15</p> <p><i>Facilitation of implementation of and compliance with provisions</i></p> <p>Creation of a facilitation mechanism for implementation of the Agreement and compliance with its provisions: formed by a committee of experts, acting in a transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive manner</p>	<p>ARTICLE 18</p> <p><i>Subsidiary Bodies</i></p> <p>The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention serve, respectively, as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement</p>	<p>ARTICLE 19</p> <p><i>Directives for subsidiary bodies</i></p> <p>Subsidiary bodies or other institutional arrangements established by or under the Convention help to implement the Paris Agreement; the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) specifies their functions and may provide further guidance to these subsidiary bodies and institutional arrangements</p>
<p>ARTICLE 20</p> <p><i>Signature and ratification</i></p> <p>The Paris Agreement is open for signature from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017 and is open for accession from the day following the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with Secretary General of the United Nations, taken to be the</p>	<p>ARTICLE 21</p> <p><i>Entry into force</i></p> <p>The Paris Agreement enters into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which ratification, acceptance or accession instruments have been deposited by 55 Parties, representing 55% of the total of world greenhouse gas emissions</p>	

Article 2: Goal

The Paris Agreement is based on three main objectives indicated in its Article 2 which are inscribed in the larger context of implementing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), of sustainable development and fight against poverty:

Contain d the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels;

Increase the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production;

Make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development.

The objectives of the Agreement, thus set out, focus mainly on the three elements of mitigation, adaptation and financing. The Parties to the Paris Agreement collectively commit to conduct actions to achieve these objectives, with levels of ambition regularly evaluated and reinforced on the basis of transparency.

Mitigation

One of the main compromises reached in Paris concerns the long-term objective of limiting temperatures compared to pre-industrial levels from now until 2100. The emergence of scientific research in recent years on the risk encountered with the objective of 2°C has reinforced this position before and during the Paris Conference. The Paris Agreement ratified this long term objective requesting the Parties to pursue the actions made to limit the increase in global average temperature to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels.

Decision 1/CP.21 furthermore invited the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming at 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and on related scenarios of changes in global GHG emissions. The IPCC has meanwhile accepted this invitation (see also section I.4).

The Agreement also defines a specific world target of mitigation in very clear terms: a balance between anthropogenic emissions and absorptions by sinks must be reached during the second half of the 21st century (see also Article 4). Achieving such a balance between emissions and absorptions will require extensive deployment of negative emission technologies (e.g. Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)).

All these targets are clearly more ambitious than what was expected before COP21⁷⁷¹.

771. IISD, 2015a, p. 50.

Is the target of 2°C the safe limit which would avoid dangerous climate change?

The target of 2°C has long been presented as a safe limit identified by scientists, which would avoid dangerous climate change. According to Knutti, Rogelj, Sedláček, & Fischer⁷⁷², this perception is erroneous because no scientific evaluation has clearly justified or defended the objective of 2°C as being a safety level of the warming.

The question of the feasibility of the 1.5°C objective has been the subject of considerable academic debate. Some studies have shown that both scenarios of 1.5°C et 2°C are economically and technically feasible but that unprecedented, immediate action is required to achieve them and reach zero net emission between 2045 and 2060⁷⁷³. In the context of pursuing these two options (1.5°C/2°C), identical technologies are required with the sole difference that reaching 1.5°C would need more rapid deployment earlier by some ten years compared with that of 2°C⁷⁷⁴.

Finishing the two scenarios means introducing strong economic incentives as quickly as possible (at least \$40-80/tCO₂ in 2020 and \$50-100/tCO₂ in 2030 at global level)⁷⁷⁵. Achieving these objectives is important also for forecasting purposes: the sooner the efforts are made in implementing appropriate technology the lower the costs.

Article 3: Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)

The Paris Agreement allows the Parties to present their NDC under Articles 4 (mitigation), 7 (adaptation), 9 (finance), 10 (technology development and transfer), 11 (capacity building) and 13 (transparency). The implementation of the NDC at national level is one of the first steps to achieve in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the agreement. It requires converting the NDC into policies, strategies, programmes, projects, measures and initiatives that can contribute to the achievement of the targets related to the NDC.

Once the first NDC have been reported, strong expectations are placed on the countries to ensure implementation and the preparation of the subsequent reporting cycles for future NDC. The implementation of the NDC and the strategies of development for low carbon emissions and resilience to climate change necessitate the commitment of all Parties as well as real international cooperation.

The Paris Agreement provides for the evaluation of collective progress made in executing the purpose of the Agreement through periodic global stocktakes. The first Global Stocktake is anticipated in 2023 and should be repeated every five years after that unless the COP adopts a different decision.

772. Knutti, Rogelj, Sedláček, & Fischer, 2015.

773. Rogelj *et al.*, 2015.


774. Schleussner *et al.*, 2016.

775. Stiglitz *et al.*, 2017.

Unofficial assessments of NDC by research institutes agree unanimously that the reductions applied to day lead to warming of nearly 3°C in 2100 and are not enough to achieve 2°C⁷⁷⁶.

Figure 28. Conceptual diagram of the Global Stocktake⁷⁷⁷

This diagram shows how contributions to the Global Stocktake are related to the entire global uptake process. It emphasises the comprehensiveness, the collective nature and facilitation of the Global Stocktake.



⁷⁷⁶. Rogelj *et al.*, 2016.

⁷⁷⁷. © Guide to the negotiations of COP23-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – Based on the diagram of the UNFCCC Secretariat.

Article 4. Mitigation

With a view to achieving the long-term temperature goal laid down in Article 2, the Paris Agreement seeks to lead Parties to reach peaking of global GHG emissions as soon as possible and to make reductions rapidly thereafter, in accordance with the best scientific data available, in order to reach a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and anthropogenic removals by sinks of GHG in the course of the second half of the century, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

As previously stated, the Paris Agreement does not assign mitigation objectives with figures on the Parties, nor does it define a global level of emissions to be reached. Rather it stresses the national mitigation plans on climate change through the INDC- which must be converted into NDC. The Agreement stipulates that the efforts of all Parties will represent a progression in time, recognising the need to help developing countries so that the Agreement is efficiently applied.

The decision seeking to implement the Agreement notes with concern that efforts to reduce levels of emissions significantly greater than those associated with the INDC will be required to maintain the rise of the planet's temperature below 2°C or 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels⁷⁷⁸. Consequently, an effort must be carried out at all levels in order to transform the entire economic system into the realisation of the mitigation objectives. The role of means for implementation: financing, investments, and innovative instruments both domestic and international, capacity building and technology transfer for this, shall be determining factors to this effect.

Obligations in reducing GHG emissions

The Agreement commits the Parties to communicate their NDC at intervals of five years, and to pursue measures of mitigation at the national level in order to make their contributions which should not only always progress in comparison to previous efforts, but also adjust to take into consideration the results of the Global Stocktake which will evaluate and aggregate global progress. Decision 1/CP.21 aimed at making effective the Paris Agreement invites the Parties to communicate their first NDC no later than at the time of depositing their ratification, adherence and or approval of the Agreement. The INDC submitted by the Parties before the entry into force of the Paris Agreement are considered as being their first NDC unless said Parties decide differently.

In order to harmonise the temporal horizons of the NDC, the decision commits the Parties, whose submitted INDC/NDC comprise a calendar until 2025, to communicate a new NDC and those whose INDC/NDC comprise a calendar up to 2030, at least to adjust it and then do so every five years⁷⁷⁹. The Conference of

⁷⁷⁸. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 17.

⁷⁷⁹. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 9.

the Parties serving as a meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) was responsible for examining the common calendars for the NDC at its first session.

The Agreement gives very little detail on the elements of the NDC requesting developed countries to continue showing the way by assuming the objectives of emission reduction in absolute figures on the scale of the economy whilst the developing countries must continue to increase their efforts of mitigation and are encouraged to move progressively to objectives of reduction. The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) has the mandate of formulating other directives on the characteristics of Contributions determined at the national level for examination and adoption by the CMA at its first session⁷⁸⁰.

Low GHG emission development strategies

The Agreement also commits all the Parties to formulate and communicate between now and 2020 strategies for development of low GHG emissions in the long-term considering their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in respect of the different national situations and keeping in mind the three main objectives defined in Article 2.

Article 5. Forests

The initial goal of the REDD+ mechanism was to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. The mechanism was established by Decision 2/CP.13 in 2007 and was developed further by subsequent decisions of the Convention. By Decision 1/CP.16, the COP defines further the REDD+ activities which target reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries and includes the role of conservation, sustainable forest management and development of forest carbon reservoirs in developing countries⁷⁸¹. Decisions 9/CP.19 and 15/CP.19 set out the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, which led to more significant progress in implementation aspects of the REDD+ mechanism.

The Paris Agreement ratified the progress made under the REDD+ by inviting the Parties to take measures to apply and enhance, mainly by results-based payments, the existing framework defined in the directives and relevant decisions already adopted under the Convention⁷⁸². In the plenary session to adopt the Paris Agreement, Panama, on behalf of the Coalition of tropical Rainforest Nations, stated that the REDD+ implementation mechanism would allow the State and non-State players to participate and serve the communities which depend on ecosystem services provided by the rainforests⁷⁸³.

780. With the entry into effect of the Paris Agreement on 4 November 2016, the first session of the CMA took place in Marrakech.

781. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 70.

782. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 5, para. 2.

783. IISD, 2015b, p. 14.

To secure the financing of forest-related mechanisms, Decision 1/CP.21 recognises the importance of suitable, predictable financial resources, including results-based payments, if appropriate, to implement general approaches and positive incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, whilst encouraging the coordination of the support from, inter alia, public and private, bilateral and multilateral sources like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and other sources, in application of the relevant COP decisions.

**Article 6. Cooperation mechanisms:
market and “non-market” mechanisms**

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement provides for three international cooperation-based mechanisms: it offers countries the opportunity to cooperate voluntarily on the implementation of mitigation activities (cooperative approaches, CA)⁷⁸⁴, it establishes a “*mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development*” (often referred to as the Sustainable Development Mechanism, SDM),⁷⁸⁵ and it finally recognises non-market based approaches⁷⁸⁶. All these different mechanisms can be considered to be the successful outcome of major and un hoped for negotiations. This success is due in part to the fact that the Parties have realised the potential that market mechanisms represent as well as other cooperative methods that can contribute to realising their NDC.

Table. Number of INDC/NDC indicating respectively the use and non-use of market instruments⁷⁸⁷

Number of Parties	Reference to the market instruments within the INDC/NDC
67	Yes
7	Use not in terms of INDC/NDC, but in long-term strategies.
17	Use to be considered
53	No reference to market instruments
17+EU	Indicate that they are not going to use the market instruments in the implementation of their INDC or NDC

784. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, paras. 1-3.
785. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, paras. 4-7.
786. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 8.
787. Source: “NDC tracker” of the international Association for emission exchange rights [online] <http://www.ieta.org/> (last consulted on 3 October 2017).

From Kyoto to Paris

Market-based mechanisms are not fundamentally new in the Paris Agreement, but the international community has gained experience through market-based mechanisms which it created under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol and which allow Parties to generate and/or trade emissions reduction units, commonly called “carbon credits”. These are the international exchange of emission rights, the Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

Existing flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms include:

- International emissions trading. Countries concerned by the objectives of reduction of GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol have the possibility to sell their emission rights, if they have surpassed their objective, or to buy some, if they cannot reach it;
- The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) permits developed countries to reach some of their objectives by bringing support to mitigation projects implemented in developing countries. The CDM is a compensation mechanism where GHG reductions associated with low-carbon projects in relation to a reference scenario generates carbon credits (one credit = one tonne of equivalent CO₂ eq), once certified, they are then sold on the carbon market;
- The Joint implementation (JI) functions on the same principal as the CDM, but relates to the trading of carbon credits between two developed countries, generated by projects carried out in one of these countries (the country with the lowest marginal costs in emissions reduction is the most attractive).

Since 2012, the revision of the methods and procedures of the CDM is undertaken by the Executive Board of the CDM (EB CDM). These last years, recommendations relative to projects have put the emphasis on aspects linked to environmental integrity, to the governance of the CDM and to facilitating access to the mechanism by under-represented countries or countries that have benefited little from these mechanisms.

In addition to the existing mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, the Parties expressed their opinions on the introduction of new instruments during the Bali Conference (2007). Prior to the Paris COP21, negotiations were focussed on two instruments in parallel: The new market mechanism (NMM) which seeks to create a market system under the central governance of the UNFCCC with the aim of achieving real and net mitigation globally. It needs to be emphasised that the framework for these various approaches (FVA) enable bilateral initiatives as well as non-market-based initiatives which would follow common, established principles.

These negotiations constituted the starting point to establish Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and related mechanisms related⁷⁸⁸.

788. For further details on the history of the negotiations leading to Article 6 of the Paris agreement, OIF/IFDD, 2016.

Comparative analysis of Article 6 instruments

Paragraph 1 of Article 6 provides a general framework for cooperation activities and an umbrella for subsequent provisions. It lists activities relating to mitigation and adaptation. Sustainable development and environmental integrity are defined as targets to be promoted and pursued. Article 6 paragraph 1 imposes no restriction on market-based approaches. In accordance with the aforementioned provision, the cooperative approaches defined in paragraph 2 of Article 6 are intended to contribute to increasing the ambition in implementing national contributions. The exact definition of the relationship between the market mechanisms and the NDC will play a key role in the debate on environmental integrity and must culminate in a new definition or an improvement in additionality rules since those of the CDM.

Promoting sustainable development is given as the second general principle of activities planned within the framework of paragraph 2 of Article 6. This is also mentioned in paragraphs 4, and 8 of Article 6, which gives it broader scope in the Paris Agreement compared to the Kyoto Protocol. Operationalising this requirement without repeating the difficulties encountered in the context of the CDM will be an essential task for the forthcoming negotiations.

The major difference between the mechanisms provided for in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6 will be mainly the different degree of regulation for both mechanisms. Paragraph 4 of Article 6 provides for central governance by the United Nations by institutions and dedicated procedures, whereas paragraph 2 of Article 6 simply provides a guideline. Nevertheless, both mechanisms share the same broad principles in that they must both contribute to a greater ambition and demonstrate robust accounting as well as promoting environmental integrity and sustainable development.

Details of the Paris Agreement cooperation mechanisms

The three instruments of Article 6 broadly reflect previous discussions relating to NMM, FVA and to non-market based approaches.

Cooperative approaches (CA) – Article 6, paragraph 2

Within the framework of cooperative approaches (CA), the Parties are free to carry out mitigation activities on a bilateral or group basis and transfer the mitigation results at their convenience. CA can play a role in executing NDC, but this role has not yet been defined.

By virtue of the Paris Agreement, CA are not subject to a specific monitoring process by the UNFCCC, but the transactions take place within an accounting system which will be defined by virtue of the Agreement⁷⁸⁹. In this context, huge importance is given to the transparency of both activities and the transfer of mitigation

789. In compliance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Paris Agreement on transparency.

outcomes. With regard to core requirements for a robust accounting system, the main objectives arising from realising the provisions in paragraph 2 of Article 6 will be to ensure that the mitigation activities that the CA contribute to a higher level of ambition are transparent and promote sustainable development.

The sustainable development mechanism (SDM) – Article 6 paragraph 4

The mechanism established in paragraph 4 of Article 6 known as the “Sustainable Development Mechanism” (SDM), is placed under the supervision of the United Nations. A complete set of rules, modalities and procedures must be developed. Decision 1/CP.21 regarding this requires that “*experience and lessons [are] learnt from existing mechanisms and approaches adopted under the Convention and its related legal instruments*”⁷⁹⁰. Clearly the previous sources of experience are the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol.

Emission reductions within this mechanism must be “*real, measurable and long-term*”⁷⁹¹. In addition, the reductions must be additional⁷⁹², the activities must have a precise scope⁷⁹³ which has yet to be defined and they must be verified and certified by Designated Operational Entities (DOE)⁷⁹⁴, as is the case under the CDM framework.

The SDM goes beyond the mechanisms of classic markets. This arises from the fact that both the host Party and the purchasing Party will have defined a contribution, but also due to the fact that the SDM should “*allow for the global mitigation of world emissions*”⁷⁹⁵. Contributions to the net mitigation by the host Parties can be achieved through an explicit agreement or by a mitigation effect of an activity which does not mean the issue of negotiable certificates. The objective of overall mitigation of emissions could raise the ambition level beyond the sum total of NDCs of the Parties participating in the mechanism. Nevertheless, this question also relates to the appropriate accounting.

Non-market-based approaches – Article 6, paragraph 8

Unlike the CA or the SDM, the non-market-based approaches do not allow the transfer of mitigation results. The implications that this could have, and the way in which such approaches would affect international cooperation, remain topics for future analysis and consultation. The expectations from measuring, reporting and verification approaches (MRV) and any accounting system require clarification.

790. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(f).

791. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(b).

792. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(d).

793. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(c).

794. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(e).

795. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 6, para. 4(d).

Numerous terms introduced into the two paragraphs have no definition and no history in international negotiations. This is especially true for the term non-market-based approaches which according to the text should be “*integrated, holistic and balanced*”.

Article 7. Adaptation

The Paris Agreement establishes for the first time a global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience to climate change and reducing vulnerability to this change. The Agreement recognises the link between the mitigation ambition level and the adaptation needs⁷⁹⁶ but includes no quantitative element, mainly in terms of financing.

In terms of main guidelines, the Agreement establishes that action towards adaptation should follow an approach which is driven by the countries, sensitive to gender equality, participative and totally transparent and which takes into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems. It should also take account of and be inspired by the best scientific data available and, if appropriate, traditional knowledge, the know-how of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to incorporating adaptation into relevant socio-economic and environmental policies and measures, if necessary. In terms of planning, each Party should, as appropriate, submit and update periodically an adaptation communication which could set out its priorities, its implementation and support needs and its projects and measures without imposing an additional burden on the developing countries. The communication on adaptation can be incorporated in a national adaptation plan, an NDC and/or a national communication.

Progress of adaptation efforts towards the goal of Article 7 will be analysed during the Global Stocktake every five years. However, the overall assessment of individual efforts and needs in relation to such a qualitative long-term objective and the lack of precise indicators could prove to be difficult to achieve. Technical and methodological work will be necessary during sessions of future talks on this question.

Article 8. Loss and damage

Considering loss and damage in the Paris Agreement in a separate article from the one on adaptation is a major step taking account of residual, potentially irreversible impacts of climate change in the vulnerable developing countries.

The Agreement places the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts under the authority of the CMA. It will monitor its guidelines and may subsequently be enhanced in accordance with its decisions.

796. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7, para. 4.

The Parties should improve the understanding, action and support, especially through the Warsaw International Mechanism in the framework of cooperation and facilitation, with respect to loss and damage associated with the harmful effects of climate change. The work of the Executive Committee during the next sessions could fuel this thinking and culminate in concrete progress.

Nevertheless, Decision 1/CP 21 states that this Article dedicated to loss and damage cannot lead to or serve as a basis for any liability or compensation⁷⁹⁷.

Article 9. Financing

The provision of financial support and other implementation means is the third objective of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, to make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. This provision, helps to send a strong signal to the private sector to re-assess and redirect its investments⁷⁹⁸.

Ultimately, the Paris Agreement has not jeopardised the provisions of the Convention which restate the primary responsibility of developed countries in providing developing countries with financial resources, for both mitigation and adaptation purposes, in continuation and with an increase of their obligations under the Convention and to existing commitments (mainly the promise of 100 billion made in Copenhagen). The “other Parties” are invited to provide or continue to provide voluntary financial support.

The Agreement also calls for a balance between adaptation and mitigation in the provision of financial resources, taking into account country-driven strategies and the priorities and needs of developing countries, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the LDC and the SIDS.

The Paris Agreement offers the Parties the option of using a broad spectrum of sources, instruments and channels, through sundry actions, whilst bearing in mind the crucial role of public sources. Article 9, paragraph 4 also recognises the importance of public sources and donations in terms of adaptation. The Agreement places greater emphasis on the public sources by requesting the developed countries to communicate transparent, coherent information every two years on the support provided to the developing countries and raised by public interventions. It was planned that the methods, procedures and guidelines on communication of this information are adopted by the CMA during its first session.

Just like for the mitigation and adaptation actions, the Global Stocktake will also take into account the assessment of implementation means. In this respect, the developed countries are called on to continue to communicate every two years indicative quantitative and qualitative information, mainly on the projected amounts

⁷⁹⁷. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 52.

⁷⁹⁸. Bodle, Donat, & Duwe, 2016.

of public financial resources for the developing countries. The other Parties which provide resources on a voluntary basis are invited to communicate this information every two years, also on a voluntary basis.

Although the Paris Agreement requires individual communications of quantifiable information, it makes no mention of information quantified on the overall financing needs. Only the decision accompanying the Agreement, in paragraph 54, stipulates that the developed countries intend to continue their current collective mobilisation objective until 2025 with a view to concrete mitigation measures and transparent implementation. A new quantified collective objective based on a lowest level of 1000 billion dollars a year, is provided for before 2025.

The Convention's Financial Mechanism, including its operating entities, is called on to fulfil the functions of the Financial Mechanism of the Paris Agreement. As such, Decision 1/CP.21, in paragraph 59 considers that the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the entities responsible for operating the Financial Mechanism, along with the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Fund for Climate Change (SFCC), can combine to implement the Paris Agreement. Decision 1 CRP 11 furthermore recommends that the CMA consider how the adaptation Fund can contribute to the application of the Paris Agreement⁷⁹⁹.

Article 10. Technology development and transfer

Article 10 of the Paris Agreement notes the importance of technology in implementing mitigation and adaptation measures and recognises efforts to deploy and disseminate technology, strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer and the role of the Technology Mechanism created by virtue of the Convention in the Agreement.

It was decided in Paris to strengthen the Technology Mechanism and the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network were entrusted with supporting the application of the Agreement and undertaking new work including, *inter alia*⁸⁰⁰:

- a. Technology research, development and transfer; capacities;
- b. Developing and building up of capacities and endogenous technologies.

A technological framework was created⁸⁰¹. This is responsible for giving general guidelines to the work of the Technology Mechanism to promote and facilitate enhanced action in technology development and transfer, in support of the implementation of the Agreement and for the purposes of the long-term vision.

799. In compliance with the provisions of Decision 1/ CP 21, para. 60-61.

800. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 66.

801. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10 para. 4.

In addition, Article 13 clearly outlines in paragraphs 9 and 10 that:

- The developed country Parties must, and other Parties which provide voluntary support should, communicate information on the support provided in the form of financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building to the developing country Parties under Articles 9, 10 and 11;
- The developing country Parties should communicate information on the support they need and which they have received, in the form of financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building under Articles 9, 10 and 11.

It must therefore be emphasised that even if the Parties did not reach agreement on a global objective for technology development and transfer or in defining national and global monitoring indicators, the work to be carried out under Decision 1/CP.21⁸⁰² on preparing guidelines for the Transparency network and for the Global Stocktake⁸⁰³, will be an opportunity to use the progress made by the Technology Mechanism and the Technology Framework to succeed with the necessary evaluations and provide relevant recommendations to move the technology development and transfer agenda forward.

Article 11. Capacity building

Capacity-building should be driven by the countries, take into account and satisfy national needs and encourage the ownership by the Parties, especially for the developing countries, mainly at national, infra-national and local levels. It should be inspired by lessons learned from experience, mainly capacity-building activities performed under the Convention, and represent an effective, iterative, participative, transversal and gender-equality sensitive process. The Parties are called on to cooperate in order to increase the capacity of developing country Parties in implementing the Agreement. The developed countries should enhance their support for capacity-building measures in the developing countries.

The Paris Agreement invites all the Parties which assist developing countries with their capacity-building to communicate regularly on these capacity-building measures or initiatives. The developing countries should regularly provide information on progress made in the application of capacity-building plans, policies, initiatives or measures to implement this Agreement.

The Paris Agreement provides for appropriate institutional provisions for the capacity-building activities which, based on the pre-existing provisions under the Convention, help to bring about the application of the Agreement. At its first session, the CMA will examine and adopt a decision on the initial institutional provisions relating to capacity-building.

802. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 94-94.

803. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 99-101.

Article 12. Public education, training, awareness and participation

The Paris Agreement emphasises the cooperation of the Parties by taking measures, as appropriate, to improve public education, training, awareness and participation and access by the population to information on climate change, given the importance of such measures in enhancing the action engaged under this Agreement.

Article 13. Transparency of measures and support

Transparency and implementation of the Paris Agreement

The enhanced transparency framework is one of the key aspects of the architecture of the new global climate regime adopted in Paris in December 2015. Within the context of the “bottom-up” process, without the option of sanctions against defaulting governments, a strong framework on transparency is absolutely necessary. This framework is decisive for instilling confidence on an international scale in the implementation of effective mitigation actions and to allow them to be assessed. It informs the stakeholders who can apply pressure to strengthen these actions. The implementation of strong public policies therefore becomes more likely.

Framework established ahead of COP21

The first reporting framework established for actions to mitigate climate change initially consisted of a system differentiated between countries. Firstly, all the Parties must submit their NDC (following set deadlines) to the UNFCCC⁸⁰⁴. For industrialised countries, this document must include information on GHG emissions and reductions, national circumstances, policies and measures in place, the assessment of vulnerability, financial resources and transfer of technology, education, training and public awareness measures and any other details of the activities undertaken to implement the Convention. Developing countries must provide information on GHG inventories, measures to mitigate and to facilitate adaptation to climate change and any other information relevant to implementing the Convention. These countries do not have to comply with set deadlines, but can submit their report gradually as resources become available to them from the industrialised countries. Many countries have not updated their reports for several years. Industrialised countries are also required to submit their annual inventories of GHG emissions to the Secretariat of the Convention in addition to this National Report. Within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol there is a rigid control of the inventories of the industrialised countries by expert groups. Several countries have had to revise their inventories following these controls and were excluded from market mechanisms until their inventories were corrected.

The rest of the text page 203

804. http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1408.php.

The 2010 Cancun Agreements strengthened the existing transparency framework. The Parties agreed to share information every two years on policies and measures to combat climate change, according to their specific circumstances. This enhanced framework was implemented in 2014 and includes three main phases:

- An initial Communication phase (reporting);
- A second national technical assessment phase of the reports submitted;
- A third peer-to-peer exchange covering progress by the country.

Developed countries are required to submit Biennial Reports, while the reporting by developing countries takes the form of Biennial Updated Reports. The second and third phases in reviewing reports are also differentiated. The Biennial Reports from developing countries are submitted for International Consultation and Analysis while the technical examination of the Biennial Reports from developed countries are submitted to a process known as an International Assessment and Review process.

New, enhanced transparency framework

The biennial reporting and review process introduced in the Paris Agreements provides a solid basis to establish the enhanced transparency system explicitly called for in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement⁸⁰⁵. This new enhanced framework must:

- Monitor advances/progress towards achieving individual and collective emission reduction objectives;
- Increase understanding of how to complete NDCs. However, for some types of NDCs, such as those that do not have detailed mitigation goals, it will be more difficult to evaluate progress or expected impacts.

The new mechanism will be flexible with regard to defining the scope, frequency and level of detail in the reporting, as well as the scope of the reviews.

In relation to reports regarding the support provided to fulfil obligations and undertakings under the Paris Agreement, reporting will follow the process already established under the UNFCCC framework. The challenges of reporting and reviewing this type of information are well known. For the most part, they concern the availability and clarity of the information required and reported, as well as the lack of reporting methods and typology of activities related to climate change.

In the absence of clearly-defined rules and methodologies, reporting on financial support for measures to combat climate change poses a greater challenge, compared with reporting on GHG emissions and emission reductions (for example, reporting on climate change financing through public interventions). In this instance, it is vital for all multilateral development banks, environment funds, international organisations, the private sector and national governments to participate in the communication and information effort. Communicating the support received

805. OECD/IEA, 2016.

by developing countries will also be critical, since few countries had previously established this process. In addition, *ex-ante* communication by industrialised countries on financing provided and used is seen as crucial, since this was previously done on a voluntary basis.

Moreover, in addition to the need to establish the rules and methodology for reporting climate financing, it also remains to establish a shared vision of the concepts introduced by the Paris Agreement. For example, the concepts of “*progress* in line with previous efforts” and the “provision of *scaled-up* financial resources”.

Ending differentiation between the Parties is one of the main features of the enhanced transparency framework ushered in by the Paris Agreement. A second important difference which can be highlighted concerns the purpose of reporting. Prior to this, the transparency system was based primarily on mitigation actions. This new enhanced transparency and *support* framework must also take into account transparency regarding the resources provided to complete mitigation and adaptation actions, in other words, the financial, technical and capacity-building resources needed to achieve objectives. Transparency on adaptation actions will also be a core challenge for implementing the Paris Agreement.

Article 14. Global stocktake

The Paris Agreement provides for the evaluation of collective progress made in executing the purpose of the Agreement through periodic global stocktakes. The first Global Stocktake is anticipated in 2023 and should be repeated every five years after that unless the COP adopts a different decision. Prior to the first Global Stocktake, a facilitation Dialogue between the Parties is planned for 2018, to take stock of collective efforts by the Parties to achieve the long-term objective set out in Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Agreement and clarify the establishment of NDC.

The transparency framework and the Global Stocktake have been described by some as “the ambition mechanisms” of the Agreement. The dual obligation to report and take stock of mitigation, adaptation and support every five years creates a collective assessment of achievements and efforts required.

Article 15. Facilitation on the implementation and compliance

Apart from the Global Stocktake, the facilitation mechanism instituted by the Paris Agreement to facilitate its implementation and promote compliance with its provisions is a significant arrangement. This mechanism will comprise a Committee that is expert-based and facilitative in nature and will function in a transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive manner. It will pay particular attention to the respective national circumstances and capacities of the Parties.

The Committee will operate under the modalities and procedures to be decided by the CMA during its first session. The Committee will report annually to the CMA.

Articles 16-22. Institutional provisions and final clauses

The ordinary sessions of the CMA will coincide with the ordinary sessions of the COP. The CMA can, nevertheless, hold extraordinary sessions at any other time when it deems this necessary or if a Party so requests in writing, provided that this request is supported by at least one third of Parties within six months of it being communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat.

The permanent subsidiary bodies: the SBSTA and SBI created by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention, are operational, respectively, under the Paris Agreement.

The Paris Agreement was opened for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 22 April 2016 until 21 April 2017⁸⁰⁶. It was planned that it would come into force on the thirtieth day following the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention, representing a total of at least an estimated 55% of all global GHG emissions, deposit their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession⁸⁰⁷.

As at 5 October 2016, 191 Parties out of 197 signed the Paris Agreement, including 72 Parties, which together account for 56.75% of the total of global GHG emissions⁸⁰⁸, had deposited their instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Depositary. Thus, both thresholds in Article 21 of the Paris Agreement, have been passed, paving the way for the Paris Agreement to come into force on 4 November 2016, a few days after the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP22) in Marrakech (7-18 November 2016). This process is shown in Figure 29 below.

Given the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, the Marrakech Conference (COP22, November 2016) has since included⁸⁰⁹:

- The 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP22);
- The 12th session of the Conference of the Parties acting as the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP12);
- As well as the 1st session of the Conference of the Parties acting as the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP1).


806. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 20, para. 1.

807. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 21, para. 1.

808. http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php

809. http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567.php

Figure 29. Process for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement and ratification status⁸¹⁰



810. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – Figures updated on 1 September 2017.

Part III.

Understanding international climate negotiations:

General information

III.A. Brief history of international negotiations on climate change

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In this framework document, the UNFCCC signatory countries undertake to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Following this historic event, the question of global warming has increasingly taken centre stage on the international agenda. The UNFCCC came into effect on 21 March 1994, and since then, the Parties have been engaged in international negotiations to strengthen the global response to climate change. The 1st session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP1) was held in Berlin in 1995. Within this framework and to supplement the commitments made in Rio, the 3rd Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP3)⁸¹¹ adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. This obliges the Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC (developed countries) that have ratified the Protocol to reduce jointly the emission level of six GHGs by at least 5% compared with the 1990 level in the period 2008-2012⁸¹². This was the first binding provision, by virtue of international law, to limit countries' GHGs

Controversies over certain points of the Protocol could not, however, be settled in Kyoto and the Parties continued to negotiate on these topics in subsequent years. The Marrakech Accords, adopted in 2001, finally allowed the adoption of operationalisation modalities for the Kyoto Protocol. However, the Protocol only came into force in February 2005 and its implementation was delayed in most countries. Australia only ratified it in December 2007, for example. Canada even withdrew in 2011. And the United States, the largest GHG emitter in the world until 2004 (since overtaken by China)⁸¹³, has never ratified the Protocol.

811. The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) meets annually. Each session of the COP is therefore referred to using the acronym COP x; Paris was the 21st conference and was therefore COP21.

812. Kyoto Protocol, Art. 3, para. 1.


813. According to data from the CAIT tool of the World Resources Institute on historical emissions of countries. [online] <http://cait2.wri.org>

With the aim of continuing to combat climate change after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and formalising the contribution made by developing countries to mitigation and adaptation efforts, the Parties embarked on a dialogue about long-term cooperation in 2005. Two ad hoc working groups were set up in 2005 to facilitate the progress of negotiations. This involved an Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for the Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP -implemented in 2005 in parallel with the dialogue on long-term cooperation), which discussed the modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA- set up in 2007), which constituted a specific framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues under the Convention.

COP13 (2007) provided a two-year road map on these issues known as the Bali Action Plan. This aimed to reach an agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen on a post-2012 climate regime under the Convention. The Parties did not manage to reach a detailed agreement at the planned date. The negotiations therefore continued during the next COP (in Cancún in 2010 and in Durban in 2011), before being concluded in Doha in 2012. At the same time, the Parties, acting as a Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, agreed on an amendment to the Protocol providing for GHG reduction targets during a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. With these decisions, the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP18) to the UNFCCC and the 8th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP8) in Doha brought the mandates of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) to an end.

At the same time, a new stage had commenced with the creation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in 2011. This group has been working for more than three years on preparing an agreement that it hoped would be adopted at the COP21 in Paris, and expected to enter into force and be applied by 2020. The next Conferences of the Parties, in Doha, Warsaw and Lima, moved in this direction, whilst attempting to plug the ambition gap between the commitments taken by the Parties by 2020 and those necessary to limit global warming to less than 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. In 2015, this process resulted in the adoption of the first universal agreement on climate at COP21 in Paris. Less than one year after it was adopted, the Paris Agreement came into effect on November 4, 2016, a few days after COP22. The Marrakech Conference (COP22, 7-18 November 2016) paved the way for progress to be made for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, by setting 2018 as the target date to define the procedures to implement the said Agreement.

Figure 30. International climate negotiations, main stages 1988-2015⁸¹⁴



History of the negotiations – Main stages

Bali Action Plan (2007)

The 13th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP13), serving as the third session of the extensively-published meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP3), was held in Bali on 3-5 December, 2007, in a climate of citizen pressure. One of the key issues of this international meeting was to

814. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.

establish a multi-lateral cooperation framework for the post-2012 period which would coincide with the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The conclusions drawn after several delegate meetings and sessions were an agreement on the Convention's action plan and a roadmap over a two year period⁸¹⁵. This Bali Action Plan consists of a set of decisions emanating from the *Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention*, initiated during the Montreal Conference (2005)⁸¹⁶. The Bali Action Plan forms a coherent basis for negotiations with a view to adopting an "agreed outcome under the Convention", an essential part of a climate regime for the post-2012 period.

A change in formulation was one of the most significant developments brought by the Bali Action Plan. For the first time, the terms "developed" and "developing" countries replaced the terms "Parties included in Annex I" and "non-Annex I Parties". This innovation extended the perspective to new combinations and effort levels by the countries. Another major advance was the link established between the mitigation efforts of developing countries and the financial and technological support from developed countries.

The negotiation process opened up by the Bali Action Plan, that should have ended in 2009, only finally reached an end in 2012 in Doha. It is structured over five pillars: a shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, technology development and transfer, and financing.

Mitigation: This issue was shown as one of the most thorny issues of COP13. The United States, Canada and other Parties favoured tough language on developing countries' actions and commitments; the Group of 77 and China (G77+China) sought greater emphasis on a discourse dealing more with the commitments of Annex I Parties, therefore of developed countries⁸¹⁷. Lastly, both views were taken into account and the Parties agreed to examine the option of taking⁸¹⁸:

- For the developed countries: "*measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally-appropriate mitigation commitments or initiatives, including quantified GHG emission limitation and reduction objectives*", taking into account differences in their national circumstances;
- For the developing countries: "*nationally appropriate mitigation actions (...) in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing resources and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner*";
- **Adaptation:** It was decided to boost the action for adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change, mainly by examining international cooperation in order to achieve the urgent application of miscellaneous adaptation measures,

815. Decision 1/CP.13.

816. Decision 1/CP.11.

817. IISD, 2007.

818. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(b).

given the immediate needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries, mainly the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the African countries⁸¹⁹;

- **Technology development and transfer:** The Bali Action Plan provides for reflecting on effective mechanisms to eliminate the obstacles of access by developing country Parties of the UNFCCC to environmentally sound technologies at affordable cost and facilitate their roll-out⁸²⁰. The debates on these issues have mainly covered the financing of these technologies and the intellectual property rights. These issues are also discussed in other forums such as those of the World Trade Organisation (WTO);
- **Financing:** The mitigation measures of developing countries were linked for the first time in Bali to the financial and technological supports provided by the developed countries. Financing is also envisaged to help developing countries to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The Bali Action Plan thus sets up the bases for the financial framework to support developing countries in their mitigation and adaptation efforts⁸²¹.

Copenhagen Accord (2009)

The Copenhagen Conference (COP15) was intended to endorse the main components of a post-2012 climate regime using two negotiating processes, firstly under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and secondly under the Convention (AWG-LCA). But the Parties were unable to agree on the setting up of this regime, resulting in the failure of the Copenhagen negotiations. It is nevertheless essential to retain that only a political agreement in the form of a high-level declaration by a few States could be reached during the COP15, known as the **Copenhagen Accord**. The day following the Copenhagen Conference, a total of 114 parties declared they would become part of it⁸²². Despite not being legally binding, a positive point is that the Copenhagen Accord includes the two principal GHG emitters, namely China and the United States.

The Accord underlines the political desire of States associated with it to address climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Noted by the COP15⁸²³, the Copenhagen Accord clarifies certain aspects of the negotiations, like the long-term GHG emission reduction targets and financing. The developed countries set themselves the goal of assembling collectively 100 billion US dollars a year until 2020 to finance climate projects of developing countries. Finally this accord was the basis for negotiations leading to the Cancún Agreements but also to the Paris Agreement.

819. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(c).

820. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(d).

821. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(e).

822. <http://unfccc.int/5262>.

823. Decision 2/CP.15.

Cancún Agreements (2010)

The Cancún Conference was held between November 29 and 11 December, 2010 and allowed for the launch of the foundations of a new cycle of negotiations under the UNFCCC. Despite the far more modest expectations than at the Copenhagen Conference, or perhaps because of it, the Cancún Conference resulted in a “balanced set” of decisions which the international community greeted with enthusiasm. The Cancún Agreements assembled the progress in Copenhagen into a formal agreement and sent a political signal to continue the discussions on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties associated themselves unanimously with this, with the exception of Bolivia.

The significant progress brought by the Cancún Agreements mainly consists of the formal creation of institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Adaptation Committee and the technology Mechanism comprised of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) as well as the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). Other progress made includes creating a register to facilitate support for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) and the launch of the REDD+, which aims at Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and includes the role of conservation, durable forestry management and the development of forest carbon reservoirs in developing countries (the “+” in REDD+). The Cancún Agreements also provide for the preparation of National Adaptation Plans (NAP), mainly by the least developed countries⁸²⁴.

Durban Platform (2011)

The Durban Conference (COP17) launched the process for negotiating a unique agreement under the UNFCCC, with the creation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). This group has the mandate of implementing “*a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties*”, which should enter into force and be applied no later than 2020⁸²⁵. Also known as the Durban Platform, this process has made it possible to encourage long-term cooperation involving all the countries. It thus represents significant progress in the central question of whether the developed countries or the developing countries should make the effort. One of the goals of the Platform is “*ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties*”⁸²⁶.

This progress was not achieved without difficulty. In fact, the main greenhouse gas emitters – Canada, Russia and Japan in particular – refused to commit to a second commitment period⁸²⁷, which provoked considerable controversy. However, by

824. Decision 1/CP.16, paras. 14-16.

825. Decision 1/CP.17, paras. 2 and 4.

826. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 7.

827. Decision 1/CMP.7, Annex 1.

reaffirming the willingness of the Parties to reach agreement on a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, the outcome of the Durban Conference was ultimately to strengthen trust between the Parties. It testifies to a universal political will to combat climate change with a constructive commitment by the most vulnerable countries and emerging countries. China's initiative announcing its willingness to commit to its emission reduction from 2020 onwards under certain conditions, encouraged other emerging countries with increasingly significant GHG emissions, such as Brazil and South Africa.

Progress was also made at the Durban Conference on the topic of adaptation to climate change, with a framework and guidelines for the NAPs created the previous year in Cancún⁸²⁸. These aim to build up the capacities of developing countries, mainly the least developed and most vulnerable countries, in terms of assessing and reducing their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.

Doha Climate Gateway (2012)

In 2012, the United Nations Conference on climate change in Doha, Qatar (COP18/ CMP8) enabled delegates to consolidate the advances in international negotiations achieved over the last three years and opened up the road to raising the ambitions and doubling up efforts on all levels.

The Doha Climate Gateway, at outcome snatched at the last minute on the last evening of the 2012 conference, refers to two major elements. Firstly, the adoption of the “Doha Amendment” to the Kyoto Protocol that records the second commitment period in it. This commenced on 1 January 2013 and will end on 31 December 2020. To date, 83 Parties have ratified the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol⁸²⁹. The second element in the Doha Climate Gateway is the conclusion of negotiations under the Bali Action Plan of 2007. In Doha, the Parties finally disbanded the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA, whose mandates had been extended twice over the last three years of prolonged negotiations.

COP18 therefore allowed a certain streamlining of the UNFCCC negotiation process. The ADP, SBI and SBSTA henceforth formed the only three negotiation channels, compared with the five that existed in 2012. The Doha Decision reaffirms the ambition to adopt “*a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force*” by 2015. It also provides for a negotiation text to be available before May 2015.

828. Decision 5/CP.17.

829. To access the updated list [online] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=_in (last consulted on 3 October 2017).

Warsaw Conference (2013)

Although the Warsaw Conference (COP19) proved flawed in terms of climate urgency, it nevertheless produced a series of decisions which map out the route towards the Paris Conference. One of its advances was to clarify further the modalities for preparing the draft negotiation text for 2015 and for the submission process for the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) of the Parties to the UNFCCC⁸³⁰. The INDC indicate the voluntary efforts of countries in terms of climate change that could be included in the 2015 agreement. The term “contributions” adopted finally achieved consensus in the final minutes of the Warsaw negotiations. It nevertheless leaves major issues hanging; the legal nature of the contributions and the differentiation between the countries based on their different levels of development and emissions as well as financial support, technology transfer and capacity-building.

In addition, the Parties were invited in Warsaw to intensify their efforts to reduce the ambition gap for the pre-2020 period, by cancelling, for example, the certified emission reductions (CER)⁸³¹.

The agreement on the CTCN rules, which signals its operationalisation, and on the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage was a positive signal towards the implementation of the Cancún Agreements and the Durban and Doha decisions. REDD+ was also the subject of numerous decisions of a technical nature, which now form the “*Warsaw Framework for REDD+*”. In addition, pledges for finance amounting to almost 280 million US dollars were announced in Warsaw for the REDD+. A sum in total contrast to the sum the GCF could count on in December 2013, which was no more than USD 6.9 million. This figure greatly fuelled the loss of confidence among developed and developing countries, who deplored the 71% decrease in financing of climate-related activities in 2013⁸³². To remedy this, a high-level ministerial dialogue on climate action financing was established in Warsaw, with meetings planned every two years until 2020. Directives for the GCF were also adopted to make it more operational⁸³³.

Lima Call for Climate Action and the road to Paris (2014)

On the final straight to Paris, the Lima Conference (COP20) capitalised on the outcomes of previous COPs and managed to lay the bases for the future agreement of 2015. After extended negotiations, the Parties adopted in December 2014 “the Lima Call for Climate Action”, which contains, especially in its annex, a draft version of the future Paris agreement⁸³⁴. It also states that this should give balanced

830. Decision 1/CP.19.

831. Decision 1/CP.19, para. 5(c).

832. IISD, 2013, p. 31.

833. Decision 4/CP.19.

834. Decision 1/CP.20, Annex.

consideration to six issues: mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, capacity-building and transparency of measures and support.

The Lima Call also includes a decision about the INDC. This sets out their scope, the data they can contain, the submission methods and measures to be taken by the secretariat⁸³⁵. The Parties are invited especially to include elements on adaptation and implementation resources. Lastly, they are asked to specify the reason why they believe their efforts to be *fair and ambitious*⁸³⁶.

The Parties also adopted a group of decisions within the framework of the COP and CMP10, taking place in parallel. These contribute among other things to the operationalisation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. They establish the work programme for Lima on gender⁸³⁷, which results were due to be reviewed in 2016 at COP22. The Lima Ministerial Declaration on education and awareness-raising was also adopted during the COP20⁸³⁸. This aims to raise the awareness of children and the general public to the effects of climate change and encourage them to change their behaviour.

Progress on adaptation remained modest in Lima. Although many countries sought revised guidelines for the NAPs, the COP saw no need for the review. In addition, the COP expressed its concern in Lima over the lack of funds to meet the needs of the LDCs, and notably the deficit in the Fund for the LDCs (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), which could support the NAP formulation and implementation process⁸³⁹.

In addition, the Parties held a first annual high-level ministerial meeting aimed at reinforcing the implementation of measures identified under the work relating to the commitments for the pre-2020 period. In terms of financing, the Parties also held their first biennial ministerial meeting relating to the work programme on long term financing. Lastly, the first biennial reports and sixth national communications were evaluated under the auspices of the SBI for the first time in Lima, with the assessment of 17 developed countries.

The Paris Agreement, adoption of the first universal Climate agreement (2015)

At COP21, in Paris, the Parties adopted what would become the first so-called “universal” climate agreement, thus bringing together all Parties to the UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21, which are aimed at operationalising it, enabled real progress to be made with regard to global issues. In addition to including

835. Decision 1/CP.20, paras. 9-16.

836. Decision 1/CP.20, para. 14.

837. Decision 18/CP.20.

838. Decision 19/CP.20.

839. Decisions 3, 4 and 8/CP.20.

all the Parties to the UNFCCC, a certain number of issues were reaffirmed and/or confirmed, such as mitigation and market mechanisms, and also adaptation, loss and damage, financing, technology transfer, capacity-building, and the recognition of the role and necessary involvement of all players in combating global warming, and all this through the prism of monitoring implementation and transparency, with a view to achieving the targets.

At the end of COP21, the Parties agreed to implement a real long-term programme, which particular feature is the objective since then contained in a binding legal instrument that limits the global temperature increase to “well below 2°C”, indeed to 1.5°C, from now to the end of the century, compared to pre-industrial levels. The fundamental principles of the Convention, such as equality, shared but differentiated responsibilities and the respective capacities were reconfirmed.

The key innovation arising from Paris consists in the implementation of fixed contributions on a national level (NDC) i.e. national targets to be implemented by the States which are required to be renewed every five years and which always increase. By 2023, global progress in terms of climate action will be revised by a “Global Stocktake” which will be afterwards implemented in five year cycles.

Marrakech...the “Action Conference”

COP22 was held in Marrakech on 7-18 November 2016. Announced as the “Action Conference” following the adoption of the Paris Agreement in the previous year, it allowed to track the road towards the operationalisation of the targets set in Paris. The keen interest around the event was reinforced by the speed in which the agreement was enforced on November 4, 2016 only a few days after the beginning of COP23. In compliance with this, the Marrakech Conference also included the first session of the Conference of the Parties as a meeting between the Paris Agreement Parties (CMA1).

Following the Conference, the Parties adopted over 30 decisions⁸⁴⁰, particularly in relation to the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement. In a non-exhaustive way, we note that the Adaptation Fund should benefit the Agreement⁸⁴¹, the definition of the mandate of the Paris Committee on capacity-building (PCCB) or again the launch of the process to identify the information to be provided by the developed countries within the framework of their bi-annual financial reports⁸⁴². It was also determined that 2018⁸⁴³ would be a target date to define the methods to implement the Paris Agreement. Other transversal topics aimed at implementing the Agreement

840. Access all the decisions adopted during COP22 [online] http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567/php/view/decisions.php#c

841. Decision 1/CP.22, para. 14-15.

842. In compliance with Article 9, para.5 of the Paris Agreement.

843. Decision 1/CP.22 para. 10; in compliance with Decision 1/CMA.1 para 5-7.

were defined, for example the preparation of the facilitation Dialogue of 2018⁸⁴⁴, or again the strengthening of the pre-2020 actions⁸⁴⁵.

COP22 was also the occasion to reinforce internationally the visibility of climate governance and of environmental multilateralism, with the adoption of two policy decisions: the “Marrakech Proclamation”⁸⁴⁶ stating the engagement of the Party States to pursue the implementation of the targets set and a “Marrakech Partnership”⁸⁴⁷ which establishes a programme of action between 2017-2020 recognizing the indispensable role the non-state actors should also play in international climate action and sustainable development.

Nevertheless, the conference did not provide concrete results on a number of key elements relating to the implementation of the Paris agreement, but it helps to better understand the parties points of view on a multiplicity of questions (see Section I.). It is worthwhile noting that a shadow fell over COP22 with the announcement of Donald Trump’s election to the American presidency during the Conference. He had clearly indicated during his campaign that he would withdraw from the Paris Agreement if elected. For a certain number of observers, legitimate fears on international climate action ambition were raised regarding the impact on financing, or again, amongst other things, the achievement of the mitigation objectives in line with the challenges of the pre-2020 period.

III.B. Structure of the Convention and description of the role and mandate of its main bodies and ad hoc groups

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is composed of several bodies. Some have a decision-making role, others have consultative roles and many are allocated to specific issues. The organisation chart below lists the various bodies. The following table gives a brief description of each ones.

844. Decision 1/CP.22 para 16.

845. Decision 1/CP.22, para. 17-22.

846. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/marrakech_action_proclamation.pdf

847. http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/marrakech_partnership_for_global_climate_action.pdf

III.B.1. Structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Figure 31. Conceptual figure of the UNFCCC structure⁸⁴⁸



848. © Guide to the COP23 negotiations-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2017, author translation – According to the UNFCCC [online] <http://unfccc.int/bodies/items/6241.php>

Table. Bodies and entities formed under the Convention

Institution	Responsibilities
<i>Decision-making bodies</i>	
Conference of the Parties (COP)	The COP is the Convention's supreme decision-making body. It is the association of all the country Parties to the Convention. The COP reviews the implementation of the Convention and assesses the Parties' commitments in light of the Convention's objective, new scientific discoveries and experience acquired in implementing climate change policies. The COP is held every year, unless the Parties decide otherwise
Conference of Parties acting as a meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).	The CMP is the supreme decision-making body of the Kyoto Protocol. It also meets every year since its inception. Here the Parties discuss the implementation of the protocol, its achievements and its efficacy.
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA);	The CMA is the Paris Agreement's supreme decision-making body. It held its first meeting in November 2016
<i>Subsidiary bodies common to the COP, CMP and CMA</i>	
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)	Advises the COP, CMP and CMA on scientific and technical issues which are specific to or shared by them.
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)	Advises the COP, CMP and CMA to improve the effective application of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
<i>Specialist bodies created by virtue of the COP</i>	
Technological mechanism composed of the two elements below:	
Technology Executive Committee	Seeks to carry out the application of the framework for implementing meaningful and effective actions to enhance the transfer of or access to technology.
Climate Technology Centre and Network	Facilitates the establishment of a network of organisations, initiatives and national, regional, sectoral and international technology networks.
Permanent finance committee	Helps the COP to carry out its functions relating to the Convention's financial mechanism.
Adaptation Committee	Promotes the implementation of enhanced action for adaptation.
Executive Committee of the Warsaw international mechanism on loss and damage	Addresses loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, in particular extreme weather events and phenomena that are gradual, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
Paris Committee on Capacity-building	Provided by the Paris Agreement to address gaps and needs, both current and emerging, in implementing capacity-building in developing country Parties and further enhancing capacity-building efforts, including with regard to coherence and coordination in capacity-building activities. The Committee mandate was adopted at COP22 in Marrakech. The Committee held its first meeting in May 2017.

Institution	Responsibilities
Forum on the impact of response measures ⁸⁴⁹	Helps the countries concerned to deal with the impacts of response measures that have been implemented.
<i>Ad hoc working groups created by virtue of the COP</i>	
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)	To prepare the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement through the development of decision projects that the COP would recommend to the CMA for assessment and adoption at its first session.
<i>Specialist ad hoc groups created by virtue of the COP</i>	
Consultative Group of Experts on national communications of non-Annex I Parties (CGE)	Assists the non-Annex I Parties in preparing their national communications.
Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LDCEG)	Advises the least developed countries on preparing and implementing NAPs among other things.
<i>Specialist bodies of the CMP</i>	
Executive Board of the CDM	Ensures the effective implementation and correct operation of the CDM.
Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee	Spearheads the implementation and verification of the JI projects in the countries referred to in Annex I.
Compliance Committee	Responsible for guaranteeing compliance with commitments and supports the Parties finding it difficult to comply with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. This committee includes a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.
<i>Specialist body of the CMA</i>	
Committee to facilitate the implementation and to promote the compliance of the Paris Agreement provisions.	Must be made up of twelve experts and focus on facilitation. It should function in a transparent, non-accusatory and non-punitive manner. Committee procedures must be submitted to the CMA at the latest at COP24, in 2018, through the APA.
<i>Coordination body</i>	
Secretariat of the UNFCCC	It assists and supports the application of the Convention. It coordinates and organises the meetings of the various bodies and provides technical expertise.

849. Work programme overseen by subsidiary bodies.

III.B.2. Description of the role and mandate of the main decision-making bodies

The **Conference of the Parties (COP)**, the highest authority of the Convention, brings together those countries which, by signing and ratifying the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), have become Parties to this Convention. As such, the COP aims to implement the ultimate Convention objective.

The **Conference of the Parties as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP)**⁸⁵⁰ is a totally separate legal entity from the COP and is the supreme decision-making body of the Kyoto Protocol. The CMP includes the sub-group of Parties to the Convention which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties to the Protocol alone have the right to participate in decisions made by the CMP.

The **Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Parties of the Paris Agreement (CMA)** is the highest authority of the Paris Agreement. It brings together the countries that have signed and ratified the Paris Agreement and have become Parties to this Agreement.

The **Bureau of the COP** and the **Bureau of the CMP** administer the inter-governmental process for the COP and for the CMP. The UNFCCC Secretariat coordinates and organises the meetings of the various bodies and provides technical expertise.

The **Global Environment Facility (GEF)** and the **Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)** are two partner organisations of the UNFCCC and play a key role in the process. The GEF has been in existence since 1991 and was named as the entity responsible for administering UNFCCC funds earmarked to help developing countries. The IPCC helps establish the scientific base by publishing climate change assessment reports every seven years and specialist studies on specific topics. The IPCC is currently discussing the review reviewing the frequency of its assessment reports to potentially XXX them based on the five year Paris Agreement cycle critically in relation to the Global Stocktake⁸⁵¹.

III.B.3. Description of the role and mandate of the main ad hoc working groups

The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) is mandated to advise the COP, CMP and CMA on improving the effective application of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.

The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) which advises the COP, CMP and CMA on scientific and technical issues specific to or shared by these bodies.

850. See Gagnon-Lebrun *et al.* 2005 for further information on how the CMP operates.

851. Decision of the GIEC IPCC/XLIII-7, para 8. [online] https://www.ipcc.ch/meetings/session43/p43_decisions.pdf

The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) prepares for the entry into force and the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement by preparing draft decisions to be recommended through the Conference of Parties to the Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first session⁸⁵². Since 2016 it holds its sessions in parallel with the sessions of the Convention's subsidiary bodies.

It is worth noting that the SBI and SBSTA are permanent bodies whereas the APA is an *ad hoc* group.

Description of the role and mandate of the special closed working groups

With the aim of continuing to combat climate change after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and formalising the contribution made by developing countries to mitigation and adaptation efforts, the Parties embarked on a dialogue about long-term cooperation in 2005. Two ad hoc working groups were set up in 2005 to facilitate the progress of negotiations. This involved an Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for the Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP -implemented in 2005 in parallel with the dialogue on long-term cooperation), which discussed the modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA- set up in 2007), which constituted a specific framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues under the Convention.

Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)⁸⁵³. This group was established in 2005 to facilitate the negotiations on the commitments of developed countries (Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC) for the second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. These negotiations covered new GHG emission reduction targets and how to achieve them, for example market mechanisms⁸⁵⁴.

Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). The Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention was initiated in 2005 during the Montreal Conference (COP11). It aimed to enhance the implementation of the Convention, mainly by making it easier to analyse cooperation approaches in respect of sustainable development, adaptation and technological potential. At the end of this two-year dialogue uniting all the Parties to the Convention a new subsidiary body, the AWG-LCA, was created in Bali in December 2007⁸⁵⁵. Its mandate was to complete successfully, in two years, a process to enable the effective application of the Convention through long-term cooperation action.

The rest of the text page 223

852. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 11.

853. By virtue of Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol, following Decision 1/CMP.1, Study of paragraph 9 of Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol on the commitments of the Annex I Parties for the following periods.

854. The Kyoto Protocol's Annex B is a list of Parties which have made quantified commitments to reducing or limiting GHG emissions.

855. Decision 1/CP.13.

The mandate of both these working groups, scheduled to end in Copenhagen in 2009, was extended until the Doha Conference (2012).

A new working group then took up the reins:

• **Ad Hoc Working Group of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)**⁸⁵⁶. Set up in Durban in 2011, the ADP started its work in 2012. Its mandate is to develop for 2015 a protocol, another legal instrument or a commonly agreed text with legal value by virtue of the Convention and which would apply to all the Parties. This should come into force and be applied from 2020 onwards. It was also tasked with studying measures to compensate for the lack of pre-2020 ambition level in terms of the 2°C objective.

The decision to create the Durban Platform marked the start of a new and significant chapter in the collective effort by Parties to combat climate change. In fact, after difficult discussions since Copenhagen in 2009, the Durban Platform opened a more inclusive climate regime transcending the traditional lines separating until then the group of so-called “developed” and “developing” countries. Its work ended at the end of the first week of the Paris COP, when the ad hoc/working group submitted to the COP Presidency a draft of the Paris Agreement.

III.C. Presentation and positions of the various negotiation groups

III.C.1. Presentation of the main negotiating groups

Introduction to the main negotiating groups⁸⁵⁷

Each Party State to the United Nations Framework Agreement on Climate Change (UNFCCC)⁸⁵⁸, to the Kyoto Protocol⁸⁵⁹ and to the Paris Agreement⁸⁶⁰, is represented in the sessions organised through the Convention, the treaties which rely on it and their constituent bodies, by a national delegation made up of several civil servants and experts skilled in representing and negotiating on behalf of their government.

The climate change negotiation process revolves around regional groups and negotiation coalitions. The regional groups are defined by the official United Nations classification system, according to their geographical situation, whilst the negotiation coalitions are political alliances formed on the basis of common interests.

856. Decision 1/CP.17.

857. http://unfccc.int/portal_francoophone/essential_background/convention/convention_bodies/party_groupings/items/3273.php

858. 197 Parties as at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php.

859. 192 Parties as at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php

860. 166 Parties as at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/9444.php

United Nations Regional Groups

According to the organisational procedure set up within the United Nations system, the various Parties to the negotiation are organised into five regional groups included in the list below, which mainly come into play during the elections of the⁸⁶¹ governing representative bodies:⁸⁶²

- Africa;
- Latin America and the Caribbean;
- Asia and the Pacific region;
- Eastern Europe;
- Western Europe and “Others”⁸⁶³.

Except for the African countries, often within the group which serves also as the negotiation coalition group (see below, the Africa Group), the member states of the other regional groups negotiate from within the strategic alliances through formal and less formal (*ad hoc*) coalitions to present their positions and to serve their interests in the negotiations. As previously announced, the negotiation coalitions are by nature political and strategic alliances, established on the basis of common interests.

Negotiation coalitions

During the negotiations, the voices or positions of the countries are ideally presented on behalf of a negotiation coalition (common group position) or by default on behalf of their government (national position.). The following paragraphs distinguish between the formal and less formal coalitions among the most important and most strategic within the current organisational process of climate change negotiations

The formal negotiating groups

The Africa Group of negotiators (AGN) or Africa Group

The Africa Group is the only regional group to function as a genuine negotiation coalition. It has 54 member countries who share a variety of causes for concern, such as desertification, the lack of water resources, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and the fight against poverty. The Group frequently makes common declarations, mainly on topics related to adaptation, technology transfer, capacity building and financing, key to the implementation of ambitious climate change actions for the countries represented by the AGN.

861. The officers of the bodies are elected from representatives of the various regional groups and from Small Island Developing States (SIDS) – see also OIF/IFDD 2016.

862. <http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml>

863. These “Other” States include Australia, Canada, Iceland, New-Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States of America.

Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)

The AOSIS is a coalition of 44 island states particularly vulnerable to the risk of rising sea levels, due to their geographical characteristic and location. They form a pressure group which acts as a mouthpiece for the majority of small developing island states (AOSIS) during negotiations. They are active as a coalition in the negotiations at the United Nations as well as within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Most AOSIS countries⁸⁶⁴ also belong to the large group of developing countries (Group of 77 and China) and nine are among the Least Developed Countries (LDC)⁸⁶⁵. Bahrain is the only small member island state of the United Nations which is not part of AOSIS. Inversely, the Cook Islands and Nioué are Small Island Developing States, (SIDS) which are AOSIS members but not full members of the United Nations⁸⁶⁶.

Group of 77 and China (G-77 + China)⁸⁶⁷

This is a free and heterogeneous alliance of developing countries, set up in 1964 within the framework of the first United Nations Conference on trade and development. The developing countries generally work through the G-77 and China to establish common negotiation positions. The G-77 and China is today active across the whole United Nations System. It is currently made up of 134 members, and good governance is ensured by the country holding the presidency in New York based on an annual rotation system⁸⁶⁸. China is an associate member of the G-77 rather than a full member. The group seeks to develop a common position on the main negotiation topics. A majority group in the negotiations, representing approximately 85% of the world population, the G-77 and China especially supports the economic interests of its members across several issues at the United Nations. Nevertheless given that G-77 and China constitutes a diversified group with different strategic interests and socio-economic development priorities, its members can intervene in the debates individually, or in other coalitions or regional groups (AGN, AOSIS, the LDC group, etc., for example) within the G-77 and China, and sometimes they adopt divergent positions. Maintaining the unity of the group represents a major challenge.

Least Developed Countries (LDC)

The LDC are low income countries facing serious structural obstacles which affect their legitimate ambition to pursue and achieve sustainable development. They have a poor level of human resources and are very vulnerable to economic and environmental risks impacts. Currently 47 countries⁸⁶⁹ are classified in the LDC

864. <http://aosis.org/members>

865. <http://unohrrls.org/about-sids/country-profiles>

866. <http://www.un.org/en/member-states/>

867. <http://www.g77.org>

868. Since January 13, 2017 the government of Ecuador has held the presidency, *pro temporis*, of the G77+China Group.

869. 33 in Africa, 13 in Asia and 1 in the Caribbean.

list since it was updated in 2017 by the United Nations⁸⁷⁰ following the graduation of Equatorial Guinea (2017) three years after Samoa in 2014. Equally active in terms of a negotiation coalition at the United Nations in New York, the LDCs are very involved in international negotiations on climate change, working together to defend their interests regarding recognising their specific vulnerability as well as their need for support to plan their adaptation. Therefore, the UNFCCC recognises in its Article 4 paragraph 9⁸⁷¹ the “*particular needs*” and the “*special situation*” of the LDCs due to their having the weakest capacity to tackle the impacts of climate change.

European Union (EU)

The EU is a political and economic union of 28 member countries⁸⁷². Its member states are represented by the EU. As an organisation of regional economic integration, the EU itself is a party both to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol⁸⁷³ and the Paris Agreement without however benefiting from a distinctive voting right of its individual member countries. Despite certain internal differences, the EU member states manage to coordinate and adopt a common position and speak as a single voice during the negotiations on climate change. To achieve this, the 28 member states of the European Union meet in a closed-door meeting to agree on the common negotiation positions. The country holding the EU presidency⁸⁷⁴ – a post which rotates every six months – speaks on behalf of the European Union and its 28 member states.

Umbrella Group

The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not belong to the European Union. Formed after the Kyoto protocol negotiation, it emerged from the JUSSCANNZ⁸⁷⁵ group and is active in all the United Nations’ fora, including international climate change negotiations within the UNFCCC. The composition of the group is not necessarily always the same. The standard list comprises Australia, Canada, United States, Russia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Ukraine. Other countries join from time to time as they deem fit, based on the topics addressed.

870. Official LDC list [online] https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/lcdc_list.pdf

871. Convention text – official English version [online] http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/cooperation_with_international_organizations/application/pdf/convfr.pdf

872. Despite Brexit, the United Kingdom is still a full member of the European Union and the resulting rights and obligations continue to be fully applied to this State and on its territory.

873. Initially as the European Economic Community.

874. From July to December 2017, Estonia holds the presidency of the EU Council.

875. JUSSCANNZ is an English acronym for Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Norway and New Zealand”.

Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)

The EIG was formed in 2002 by members of the Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD) which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group. It includes Switzerland, Mexico and South Korea, joined later on by Monaco and Liechtenstein. Mexico and South Korea are rare OECD members not included in Annex I of the UNFCCC. Member countries are frequently known to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences in their national contexts⁸⁷⁶. Otherwise, the group is normally coordinated by Switzerland. Given the complexity and the issues of the negotiations, other strategic coalitions were formed based on issues of common concern.

The ad hoc groups or most recently formed climate negotiation groups

*Coalition for Rainforest Nations*⁸⁷⁷

The origin of this coalition stems back to 2005 through an initiative by Papua New Guinea. The ultimate goal of this coalition is for recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. The composition of this coalition has varied over time. It includes approximately 52 countries from Africa, Central America, South America, the Caribbean, Asia and Oceania. Its members do not always speak with the same voice sometimes making a statement on behalf of only some of its members.

BASIC

BASIC is a group made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China⁸⁷⁸. It was founded at a meeting held in November 2009 to define a common stance for the Copenhagen Conference (COP15). After the meeting, BASIC published a series of positions considered to be non-negotiable by its members, in particular a second commitment period by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol for developed countries and scaled-up financing for the mitigation and adaptation of developing countries⁸⁷⁹. Since then, the group regularly meets in order to coordinate its positions and to develop a shared strategy. As BASIC is made up of the most important emerging countries including the large emitters, it now stands out as an indispensable actor in international climate negotiations.

The Group of countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM)

CACAM includes countries from Eastern and Central Europe, Central Asia, including Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There are also observers, such as Azerbaijan. These countries

876. Yamin, F., & Depledge, J., 2004.

877. <http://www.rainforestcoalition.org>

878. SEI, 2010.

879. SEI, 2010.

have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-Annex I countries with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol⁸⁸⁰. Given that these countries are not included in Annex I of the Convention and given that there is a lack of clarity within the UNFCCC on the definition of “*developing countries*”, CAC AM countries distinguish themselves by this coalition in which they do not consider themselves as developing countries⁸⁸¹. The CACAM countries rarely take a common stance on other issues.

Bolivian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)

ALBA was originally a political, social and economic organisation of socialist countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to promote cooperation in these areas and to offer an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas advocated by the United States⁸⁸². ALBA thus became a negotiation coalition in 2010, representing a hub of six countries i.e. Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. This coalition bases its positions on the principle that developed countries must demonstrate ambitious action in world efforts to combat climate change⁸⁸³.

Like Minded Group of States (LMDC)

The LMDC is a spontaneous coalition of countries created during the Bonn Conference on climate change in May 2012. It is part of the G-77 and China whose aim is to strengthen and unify⁸⁸⁴. The LMDC is made up of several countries from the Arab world, India, China, several emerging Asian economies and certain active South American Parties, especially Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba and Africa (Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, etc.). Also called “Developing countries with similar views”, this coalition is also found in other international forums, especially the World Trade Organisation. It is a group of States uniting around a very strong central position on major questions for developing countries, mainly equity and respect for the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities⁸⁸⁵.

Arab Group

The Arab Group is made up of 22 member States from the League of Arab States, namely Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Algeria, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Mauritania, Somalia, Palestinian Authority, Djibouti and the Comoros. The contours

880. http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/213_149_130855981051940810-CfRN_AD2-10_opening_statement.pdf; et, www.rainforestcoalition.org

881. <https://unfccc.int/1031.php>

882. www.alianzabolivariana.org; and www.americasquarterly.org/hirst/Article.

883. www.portalalba.org/index.php/2014-03-29-22-04-24/documentos/1299-2010-06-25-x-cumbre-otavalo-ecuador-declaracion-especial-sobre-cambio-climatico

884. www.twinside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2012/climate20121005.htm

885. www.twinside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2013/climate130301.htm

of this coalition are well defined inasmuch as its members have been accustomed to working together since 1945 as a pressure group towards international institutions under the name of the League of Arab States (commonly called presented the Arab League). The Arab Group countries are linked together by a certain shared culture, the Arabic language and the Muslim religion. Nevertheless, the Middle-East conflicts cause tension between them.

Several other groups or coalitions whether formal or informal, collaborate together to defend their common interests within the framework of the International Court negotiations on climate change under the UNFCCC These include: countries from the petroleum exporting Organisation (OPEC), the Cartagena Dialogue, the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) to mention just some of the most active members.

III.C.2. Positions of the main negotiating groups

As outlined in the previous section introducing the main negotiation groups, several countries participate in climate negotiations in groups or in coalitions which, in most cases, constitute strategic alliances. These groups thus bring together countries which have common interests that need to be promoted within the framework of these negotiations.

This section explores some of the topics of common interest around which the most active and main coalitions are organised in the negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The Africa Group: Africa is a particular case in that it defends a common position⁸⁸⁶ tabled by the Africa Group of Negotiators. The specific nature of this group needs to be highlighted because generally the geographical spread of the groups does not imply a common position, given that the Parties are free to belong to one or several groups representing a common position This group emphasises the flexibility to be given to Africa due to the fact of it being recognised as the continent most vulnerable to climate change⁸⁸⁷; the historical responsibility and the leadership of the developed countries; the importance of making support available to developing countries in terms of adaptation⁸⁸⁸, financing, technology transfer and capacity-building. To ensure that the working programme of the Paris Agreement is achieved, the group requests a discussion on a new objective for long-term financing for 2025 and on the procedures regarding biannual reporting on the APA agenda items. The group also requests that developed countries provide support to developing countries for the formulation, implementation and update

886. Decided and adopted by, respectively, the Ministries of the Environment of countries in question during African Environmental Ministerial Conferences of African Heads of States and Governments on climate change.

887. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/211_230_131079795353246469-Opening%20statement_AGN.pdf

888. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/586_334_131387098169936631-AGN%20opening%20statement%20on%20SBI46%20submitted.pdf

of adaptation communications, as a component part of the nationally determined contributions, so that the information on the needs of developing countries and related costs, including support required to implement adaptation measures through subventions, are taken into account. The Africa group insists on the fact that the facilitation dialogue should also tackle the question of pre-2020 emissions, calling on developed countries to find the resources to fill the gap, mainly the financial gaps to achieve a reduction of 8 gigatonnes of emissions, through, amongst other things, initiatives and programmes, so that the burden is not placed at the door of the developing countries after 2020.

Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): Since its inception in 1990, this group defends the specific nature of its extreme vulnerability to rising sea levels. This vulnerability, even greater due to climate change, which impacts are increasingly dangerous, has, in recent years, exacerbated the positions of the Island States, the spearhead of this coalition during climate negotiations⁸⁸⁹. A major objective particularly consists in finalising a binding agreement for the implementation of an indemnity mechanism for damage linked to climate warming, in addition to the set, but binding objective, of a target to limit climate warming to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial baseline from now until the end of the century. The objective is to limit the already predictable and catastrophic impacts of climate change.

G-77 and China: The name G-77 and China tends to underline the special position of the latter in relation to the whole group, specifically its position as an industrialised developing country. The divergent interests within the group often make consensus impossible and further push the Parties to express their positions and submissions through sub-groups. The position of the G-77 and China is articulated through a call on the developed countries to be front-line in the efforts to combat climate change and its negative impacts. The G-77 + China especially encourages the Parties signatories to the Kyoto Protocol to ratify the Doha amendment from the viewpoint of a strengthened pre-2020 ambition. More broadly, the group in effect proposes increasing the pre-2020 ambition. Taking into account its level of socio-economic development and priorities for the eradication of poverty, the group emphasises the importance of financial support and of its transparency. Within this framework, the objective to clarify the mechanisms to achieve the financial goals of USD 100 billion now until 2020 is key, particularly, in relation to adaptation targets. It also insists on the question of technology transfer. Finally G-77 and China want the developed countries to increase their objective to raise 100 billion US dollars every year from 2020 onwards to achieve a new more ambitious objective at the latest by 2025 (100 billion being the threshold for this new target)⁸⁹⁰, as approved in the chapter on finance of the operationalisation decision of the Paris Agreement⁸⁹¹.

889. http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/53_152_130937948115158180-AOSIS%20closing%20statement%20SBSTA%2043.pdf

890. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/653_289_131230119632936322-G77%20and%20China%20APA%201-2%20opening%20statement.pdf

891. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 53.

Least Developed Countries (LDC): These include 47 Parties to the Convention which include the most economically deprived countries but also the most vulnerable countries in terms of climate and environmental issues. Since 2001, these countries have been working together through the LDC group in negotiations within the framework of the UNFCCC. Within the negotiation process leading to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the group strongly sustained the route towards limiting temperatures to 1.5° C and the need to agree binding provisions. Although contributing little to greenhouse gas emissions (GGH), this group has always shown its willingness to ensure that all the Parties contribute in an ambitious manner to limit emissions and to implement decisions in terms of climate change⁸⁹².

European Union (EU): The 28 members of the European Union have adopted a common position during negotiations, defending the position whereby emerging developing countries should commit to reducing emissions in compliance with the Paris Agreement, and thereby contribute in a substantial manner to the reduction of emissions in the pre-2020 period⁸⁹³. They insist also on capacity-building in terms of adaptation.

The Umbrella Group: A heterogeneous group comprised of developed countries. The position of the group is that the reduction of GGH emissions to help achieve the target of maintaining temperatures below 2°C should be the result of the efforts of all the Parties, including the contribution by developing countries. By the same token, the group posits that demands in terms of communication and accounting of GGH should be the same for all countries. In this sense, according to it, historic levels of emissions should not be taken into account to determine the level of ambition for emission reduction, rather the level of ambition should be based on the current level of accumulative emissions. It is to be reiterated that the position of the group has been weakened by the United States' recently expressed intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, even if numerous observers hope that a solution to the crisis will be found.

Environmental Integrity Group: Made up of Switzerland, Mexico, South Korea, Liechtenstein and the principality of Monaco. The only group representing both developed countries and developing countries, it aims to facilitate the rapprochement between the negotiation Parties by building bridges with other groups. Its positions are often close to the EU position. For COP21, this group was favourable towards a binding agreement equitable for the developing countries. In relation to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly the methods of its implementation, the position of the group is more nuanced particularly Switzerland's reservation on allocating additional financial resources to developing countries. The decision of the group is also mitigated in terms of the ambition of nationally determined contributions (NDC)⁸⁹⁴.

892. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/cop21cmp11_hls_speech_ldcs_angola.pdf

893. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/slovakrepublic_cop22cmp12cma1_hls.pdf

894. https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/cop21cmp11_hls_speech_eig_liechtenstein.pdf

ALBA: The analyses and positions of the group are based on the vision by which climate change is a result of a capitalist economic model part of a development model predatory of natural and environmental resources. ALBA's position is based on the theory that developed countries are historically responsible for climate change and therefore must drastically reduce their emissions and acquit their climate debt towards the developing countries. The efforts of the Parties to Annex 1 should allow for the average temperature increase to be limited to approximately 1.5°C indeed to 1°C. In addition, the developed countries should provide financial and technical resources to the developing countries to sustain their adaptation and mitigation efforts as well forestry restoration and conservation. For this group it is fundamental that any action in terms of combating climate change is based on the vision of the peoples and global organisations and not based on a capitalist vision of private and multinational companies.

Independent Association of Latin America and Caribbean (IALAC): uniting eight States⁸⁹⁵, it was formed during the COP18 in Doha in 2012. Its vision is progressive, expecting that the developed countries make a prior commitment to the emission reduction and a financial support that should be conditional on the implementation of a low-carbon development strategy⁸⁹⁶.

Like Minded Group of States (LMDC): This coalition created in 2012 by circa 25 or more states, all members of G77 and China, is unified in its perception of climate change and international measures undertaken to tackle it, as impediments to the socio-economic development of its group's members. The demographic weight of this group is important because it includes more than half the world's population. The position of the group centres on the fact that developing countries must act as role models and play a pioneering role in relation to mitigation, based on the principles of shared, but differentiated responsibilities and as such, must also support adaptation efforts providing finances and technology transfer solutions so as to not impede the development of the countries that make up the group.

Arab Group: On the strength of its 22 member countries of which the majority belong to the LMDC – which explains why positions of both groups are often similar – the Arab Group insists on the negative impacts of the measures to combat climate change on their economies. For the latter, the developing countries must also contribute financially to the collective effort.

895. Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Peru.

896. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSUBMISSIONUpload/53_151_13093526347653856-AILAC%20SBSTA%20Opening%20Statement.pdf

BASIC: The acronym for Brazil, South Africa, India and China, this group was established in November 2009 just before COP15. The objective was to coordinate their efforts and streamline their positions prior to the negotiations which led to the Copenhagen agreement. BASIC insists on the fact of being a coalition within the G77 + China group and not a negotiating group. The group tends to defend the position of the emerging bloc countries within the G77 + China Group. The position of the group is that any flexibility within the context of the negotiations must be extended to all the developing countries without distinction. The group campaigned to limit the temperature increases to 2°C, in contrast to the developing countries who want a more ambitious limit set below 1.5°C. The group insists on the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities, the differentiation between the developed countries and developing countries and the pioneering role that industrialised countries should play.

General conclusion

The reality of climate change is acknowledged unanimously. The efforts made by the international community in terms of multilateral cooperation in combating climate change are made concrete by gradually introducing a complex, dynamic process under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). However, and in spite of international negotiations, it has to be recognised that the progress made over recent decades has been too modest with regard to the many challenges posed and the urgent need to take action.

After twenty years of international climate negotiations, the Agreement adopted during the session of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC in 2015 united all State Parties to UNFCCC for the first time. In this sense, it becomes the first so-called “universal climate agreement and, as such, has therefore already entered the history books. The quantified aim, which is now included in the Paris Agreement, is to limit the increase in the global average temperature to *well below* 2°C and to pursue efforts to maintain it at 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels, from now until the end of the century.

In addition to the universal character of this agreement, a certain number of issues were reaffirmed and/or confirmed, with reference to mitigation and cooperation mechanisms, and also adaptation, loss and damage, financing, transfer of technology, capacity-building, or the recognition of the role and necessary multi-stakeholder involvement in combating global warming. The monitoring of implementation and transparency in order to achieve the goals were also reaffirmed. The next stage, which is essential for realising all these major advances, is the implementation of the commitments.

Adding these individual contributions fixed by the nationally-determined contributions (NDC) implies collectively achieving the objectives set by the Paris Agreement. As at 3 October 2017, 166 Parties have ratified the Paris Agreement⁸⁹⁷ and 160 CND have been included within the interim registry⁸⁹⁸. However, the current pledges, even if they were fully met, would not be sufficient to keep the temperature increase below 2°C (at 1.5°C) by the end of the century, which is the target set in the Paris Agreement.

Paragraph 19 of Decision 1/CP.21 asked the Secretariat to prepare an assessment report on the national contributions for combating climate change⁸⁹⁹. According to this document published prior to COP22, entitled “*Updated synthesis report on the aggregate effect of intended nationally determined contributions*”⁹⁰⁰, a surplus of global

897. http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php

898. <http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx>

899. This report, which was released in 2016, takes into account all of the INDC submitted by 4 April 2016.

900. UNFCCC, 2016a.

GHG emissions, averaging 8.7 GtCO₂e and 15.2 GtCO₂ is expected in 2025 and 2030 respectively, compared with a scenario that is compatible with a 2°C pathway. Other studies since then have confirmed this outcome of a shortfall in collective ambition to achieve the objective of maintaining temperatures⁹⁰¹.

Under the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, the commitments by States that have ratified the Agreement have become NDC⁹⁰². Nevertheless, for a vast majority of them, they have just been “copied” from *intended* nationally-determined contributions (INDC), declarations of intent by States Parties to UNFCCC communicated prior to COP21. A Party’s acceptance⁹⁰³ of the Paris Agreement makes the submission of an NDC mandatory, if not already done through an INDC, or that they wish to modify them⁹⁰⁴. For all Parties that have simply transformed their INDC into an NDC, an opportunity to increase the collective goal has already been lost. Beyond issues of implementing the commitments, raising the ambition therefore remains an essential corollary to the achievement of the goals set.

At COP22 (Marrakech, November 2016), the Parties decided to finalise items relating to the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement by COP24, in 2018, at the latest. COP22 concluded with the adoption of more than thirty decisions⁹⁰⁵, but a number of points remain unresolved. A certain number of discussions were continued in May 2017, during the intersessional negotiations in Bonn, where the 46th session of the permanent Subsidiary Bodies (SBI46 and SBSTA46), as well as the third part of the first session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA1-3), were held. COP23 will be key for continuing the ongoing work.

By achieving the adoption of the Paris Agreement (December 2015) and by ensuring that it takes effect through its entry into force in less than a year (November 2016), the international community has met two of the first major challenges. These are also two historic milestones. The first step is therefore, more than ever, the realisation of elements relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, by pursuing the realisation of these objectives during COP23.

Out of all of the points under negotiations, it is vital that the “Spirit of Paris” that has been present since the adoption of the Agreement is maintained in Bonn. The objective being that the aims of the international community are in line with trust and duration, while the Parties were heard in Marrakech to reject certain final decisions concerning the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement until December 2018, during COP24.

901. See in particular UNEP, 2016; or, Climate Interactive, 2017.

902. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.

903. Ratification or equivalent process according to national laws.

904. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.

905. Access all the decisions adopted during COP22 [online] http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567/php/view/decisions.php#

Appendices

A.1. Themed Sheets

Sheet 1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

Date of entry into force: 21 March 1994

Ratification status: 197 Parties⁹⁰⁶, including 196 countries and the European Union (EU)⁹⁰⁷

Supreme decision-making body: Conference of the Parties (COP)

Main objective [Article 2]: “[...] *stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.*”⁹⁰⁸

UNFCCC Annexes:

Annex I – List of 41 Parties, including the EEC⁹⁰⁸: developed countries and countries with economies in transition⁹⁰⁹;

Annex II – List of 24 Parties, including the EEC⁹¹⁰: wealthiest developed countries⁹¹¹.

Commitment of the Parties:

All Parties: for example, prepare a national greenhouse gas emission inventory, implement mitigation programmes and adaptation actions, offer cooperative support in technological research and dissemination and facilitate the education and awareness of the general public (Article 4.1).

Annex I Parties: mainly, implement national policies to mitigate climate change and weaken emissions in the long term (Article 4.2).

906. As at 3 October 2017 [online] <http://unfccc.int/2631>.

907. The European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).

908. EU Today.

909. <http://unfccc.int/2774>.

910. EU Today.

911. Originally 25, but Turkey was deleted from Annex II by an amendment that entered into force on 28 June 2002, in accordance with Decision 26/CP.7.

Annex II Parties: support developing countries financially and technically, mainly by helping to prepare their national communications, to ease their adaptation to climate change and encourage access to technologies (Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5).

Link to the Convention site: www.unfccc.int

Link to the Convention text: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf

Sheet 2. Kyoto Protocol

Date of entry into force: 16 February 2005.

Ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol: 192 Parties⁹¹², including the EU⁹¹³; five Parties to the Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.

Ratification status of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: 83 Parties⁹¹⁴.

Supreme decision-making body: Conference of Parties acting as a meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).

Main objective: instigate quantified and legally-binding targets for limiting and reducing greenhouse gas emissions to boost the UNFCCC.

Protocol Annexes:

Annex A: List of the six greenhouse gases targeted by the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), dinitrogen oxide (N₂O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆).

Annex B: List of 39 Parties, included the EEC⁹¹⁵; developed countries and countries with economies in transition which have made quantified commitments to reducing or limiting greenhouse gas emissions.

Commitment of the Parties:

Annex B Parties

Limit or reduce by 5.2% the quantity of GHG emissions compared with 1990 emissions, except countries with economies in transition, which can choose a reference year other than 1990⁹¹⁶;

Implement national or regional policies and measures to fulfil compliance with quantified commitments to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (Articles 2 and 4). The Parties can fulfil their commitments through domestic measures and flexibility mechanisms;

Publish an initial report giving the information required to implement the commitments, especially for the accounting of assigned amounts (Article 7);

912. As at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php

913. The European Union (EU) signed the Protocol whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).

914. As at 3 October 2017 [online] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=_en

915. EU Today.

916. Article 3 para. 5 of the Kyoto Protocol.

Publish a report demonstrating the progress made in achieving commitments (Articles 3 and 7); and

Set up a national emissions inventory system based on methodologies approved by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Article 5);

All Parties

Prepare programmes to establish the national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, to mitigate and facilitate the adaptation to climate change, cooperate to support technology transfer, research and education and present in their national communications information on the actions undertaken to combat climate change (Article 10);

Parties included in Annex II of the UNFCCC

Finance developing countries, mainly to help them set in place their national emissions inventory and encourage technology transfer (Article 11).

Doha amendment:

The second period of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at CMP8⁹¹⁷ under the title “Doha Amendment” It commenced on 1 January 2013 and will end on 31 December 2020⁹¹⁸. Thus this period will last eight years and not five years as for the first period. Regarding its effective date, although the Doha Decision encourages countries to implement the second commitment period before the countries ratify it, the countries are free to choose from what date they will enforce it.

Link to the Protocol text: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpfrench.pdf.

Link to the text of the Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol according to paragraph 9 article 3 (Doha amendment) for the second period of commitment: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/fre/13a01f.pdf>.

917. Eighth Conference of Parties acting as a Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

918. Decision 1/CMP.8.

Sheet 3. List of Parties to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement and ratification status

List of Parties to the UNFCCC and ratification status
<p>Ratification status of the UNFCCC: 197 Parties⁹¹⁹, including the European Union (EU)⁹²⁰</p> <p>Access the detailed list of Parties to the UNFCCC here: http://unfccc.int/2631</p>

List of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and ratification status
<p>Ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol: 192 Parties⁹²¹, including the EU⁹²²; five Parties to the Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.</p> <p>Access the detailed list of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol here: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php</p>
<p>Ratification status of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: 83 Parties⁹²³.</p> <p>Access the detailed list of Parties to the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol here: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=_en</p>

List of Parties to the Paris Agreement and ratification status
<p>Ratification status of the Paris Agreement: 166 Parties⁹²⁴, including the EU.</p> <p>Access the detailed list of Parties to the Paris Agreement here: http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php</p>

s
 e
 i
 c
 e
 s
 a
 p
 p
 e
 n
 d
 i
 c
 e
 s

919. As at 3 October 2017 [online] <http://unfccc.int/2631>
 920. The European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).
 921. As at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php
 922. The European Union (EU) signed the Protocol whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC).
 923. As at 3 October 2017 [online] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=_en
 924. As at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php

A.2. List of the documents from the negotiations

Name	Description
Decision x/CP.x	COP decision
Decision x/CMP.x	CMP decision
Decision x/CMA.x	CRA decision
FCCC/CP/x	COP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/KP/CMP/x	CMP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/KP/AWG/x	AWG-KP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SBI/x	SBI preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SBSTA/x	SBSTA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SB/x	Preparatory document or provisional or current agenda of the two subsidiary bodies
FCCC/APA/x	APA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
GCF/x	Preparatory document of the Green Climate Fund
/ARR/x	Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory (from 2005)
/TRR.x/x	Report of the technical review of the biennial report
/WEB/IRI/x	Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory/Document published on the Web only (listing used until 2004 inclusive)
/ASR/x	GHG inventory annual status report
/WEB/SAI/x	GHG inventory summary and assessment report/Document published on the Web only
/COM/x	National communication
/DPR/x	Demonstrable Progress Report (<i>Demonstrable Progress Report</i>)
/IDR.x	In-depth Review (<i>In-Depth Review</i>)
CDM EB-x	CDM Executive Board Report
SMSN/IGO/x	Document submitted by intergovernmental organisations
SMSN/NGO/x	Document submitted by non-governmental organisations
/TP/x	Technical document
/Add.x	Text added to a document presented previously (Addendum)
/Amend.x	Amendment to a text
/Corr.x	Correction of a text
/CRP.x	Conference Room Paper
/INF.x	Information series containing general information
/L.x	Limited distribution document: Draft report or text (Limited document)
/MISC.x	Miscellaneous documents: Points of view of Parties and observers; list of participants
/Rev.x	Text revision which supersedes the text published previously
Non paper	Internal, unofficial document to facilitate the negotiations

Note:

- x indicates a serial number or a year.
- For the Green Climate Fund documents (GCF/x), see: www.gcfund.org/documents/in-session-documents.html

Source: <http://unfccc.int/2644>

A.3. Abbreviations and acronyms (French – English)

French		English	
ABPA	Alliance bolivarienne pour les Peuples de notre Amérique (ALBA en espagnol)	<i>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA in spanish)</i>	BAPA
AILAC	Alliance indépendante de l'Amérique latine et des Caraïbes	<i>Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean</i>	AILAC
ALBA	Alliance bolivarienne pour les peuples de notre Amérique	<i>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America</i>	BAPOA
AND	Autorités nationales désignées	<i>Designated National Authorities</i>	DNA
APEI	Alliance des petits États insulaires (www.sidsnet.org/aosis)	<i>Alliance of Small Island States</i>	AOSIS
ADP	Groupe de travail spécial de la plateforme de Durban pour une action renforcée	<i>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action</i>	ADP
AEI	Analyses et Examens internationaux	<i>International Analysis and Review</i>	IAR
CAI	Consultations et Analyses internationales	<i>International Consultations and Analysis</i>	ICA
CCNUCC	Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques	<i>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</i>	UNFCCC
CDD	Cadre pour les Diverses Démarches	<i>Framework for Various Approaches</i>	FVA
CDN	Contribution déterminée au niveau national	<i>Nationally Determined Contributions</i>	NDC
CdP	Conférence des Parties à la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques	<i>Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</i>	COP
CE	Comité exécutif	<i>Executive Board</i>	EB
CESNU	Conseil économique et social des Nations Unies	<i>United Nations Economic and Social Council</i>	ECOSOC
CET	Comité exécutif de la technologie	<i>Technology Executive Committee</i>	TEC
CPDN	Contribution prévue déterminée au niveau national	<i>Intended Nationally Determined Contribution</i>	CPDN
CPF	Comité permanent des Finances	<i>Standing Committee for Finance</i>	SCF
CRA	Conférence des Parties servant en tant que Réunion des Parties de l'Accord de Paris	<i>Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement</i>	CMA
CRP	Conférence des Parties agissant en tant que Réunion des Parties au Protocole de Kyoto	<i>Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol</i>	CMP
CRTC	Centre et Réseau des Technologies du Climat	<i>Climate Technology Center and Network</i>	CTCN
CSF	Conseil de Stabilité financière	<i>Financial Stability Board</i>	FSB
DC	Démarches concertées	<i>Cooperative Approaches</i>	CA
DSE	Dialogue structuré entre experts	<i>Structured Expert Dialogue</i>	SED
EET	Équipe d'experts techniques	<i>Team of Technical Experts</i>	TTE

French		English	
EOD	Entités opérationnelles désignées	<i>Designated Operational Entities</i>	DOE
FA	Fonds pour l'adaptation	<i>Adaptation Fund</i>	AF
FEM	Fonds pour l'Environnement mondial	<i>Global Environment Facility</i>	GEF
FPMA	Fonds des pays les moins avancés	<i>Least Developed Countries Fund</i>	LDCF
FPP	Fonds de Préparation de Projets	<i>Project Preparation Facility</i>	PPF
FSCC	Fonds spécial des Changements climatiques	<i>Special Climate Change Fund</i>	SCCF
FVC	Fonds vert pour le climat	<i>Green Climate Fund</i>	GCF
GEMO (ou PDVS)	Groupe d'États ayant la même optique (ou Pays en développement aux vues similaires)	<i>Like Minded Developing Countries (Like Minded Group)</i>	LMDC (ou LMG)
GEPMA	Groupe d'Experts sur les pays les moins avancés	<i>Least Developed Country Expert Group</i>	LEG
GES	Gaz à Effet de Serre	<i>Greenhouse Gas</i>	GHG
GETT	Groupe d'Experts pour le Transfert de la Technologie	<i>Expert Group on Technology Transfer</i>	EGTT
GIEC	Groupe intergouvernemental d'Experts sur l'évolution du Climat	<i>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</i>	IPCC
GtCO ₂ e	Gigatonne de CO ₂ équivalent	<i>Gigaton of CO₂ equivalent</i>	GtCO ₂ e
GTS-AP	Groupe de Travail spécial pour l'Accord de Paris	<i>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement</i>	APA
G77 + Chine	Groupe des 77 et Chine (www.G77.org)	<i>Group of 77 and China</i>	G77 + China
EI	Évaluation et Révision internationale	<i>International Assessment and Review</i>	IAR
AIEDE	Association internationale pour l'échange de droits d'émission	<i>International Emissions Trading Association</i>	IETA
MCC	Mécanisme de Crédit conjoint	<i>Joint Crediting Mechanism</i>	JCM
PALP	Plan d'action Lima-Paris	<i>Lima-Paris Action Agenda</i>	LPAA
MAAN	Mesures d'Atténuation appropriées au niveau national	<i>Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions</i>	NAMA
MDD	Mécanisme pour un Développement durable	<i>Sustainable Development Mechanism</i>	SDM
MDP	Mécanisme de Développement propre	<i>Clean Development Mechanism</i>	CDM
MNV	Mesure, Notification, Vérification	<i>Measuring, Rapportage, Verification</i>	MRV
MOC	Mise en œuvre conjointe	<i>Joint Implementation</i>	JI
M&P	Modalités et Procédures	<i>Modalities and Procedures</i>	M&P
NMM	Nouveau Mécanisme de Marché	<i>New Market Mechanism</i>	NMM
NR	Niveaux de référence	<i>Reference Levels</i>	RL
NRE	Niveaux de référence des émissions	<i>Reference Emission Levels</i>	REL
OACI	Organisation de l'aviation civile internationale	<i>International Civil Aviation Organization</i>	ICAO
ODD	Objectifs de Développement durable	<i>Sustainable Development Goals</i>	SDGs
OCDE	Organisation de Coopération et de Développement économiques	<i>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</i>	OECD
OMM	Organisation météorologique mondiale	<i>World Meteorological Organization</i>	WMO

French		English	
ONG	Organisation non gouvernementale	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ONU	Organisation des Nations unies	United Nations	UN
OS	Organe subsidiaire	Subsidiary Body	SB
OSCST	Organe subsidiaire de Conseil scientifique et technologique	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advise	SBSTA
OSMOE	Organe subsidiaire de Mise en Œuvre	Subsidiary Body for Implementation	SBI
PANA	Plan d'Action national d'Adaptation	National Adaptation Programme or Action	NAPA
PED	Pays en développement	Developing country	DC
PEID	Petits États insulaires en développement	Small Island Developing States	SIDS
PET	Processus d'examen technique	Technical examination process	TEP
PIB	Produit intérieur brut	Gross Domestic Product	GDP
PK	Protocole de Kyoto	Kyoto Protocol	KP
PMA	Pays les moins avancés	Least Developed Countries	LDC
PNA	Plan National d'Adaptation	National Adaptation Plan	NAP
PNUE	Programme des Nations Unies pour l'Environnement	United Nations Environment Programme	UNEP
PTN	Programme de Travail de Nairobi sur les incidences des changements climatiques et la vulnérabilité et l'adaptation à ces changements	Nairobi Work Program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change	NWP
RB	Rapport biennal	Biennial Report	BR
RBA	Rapport biennal actualisé	Biennial Updated Report	BUR
RCMD	Responsabilités communes mais différenciées	Common but differentiated responsibilities	CBDR
RCMD-CR	Responsabilités communes mais différenciées et capacités respectives	Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities	CBDR-RC
REDD	Réduction des émissions issues de la déforestation et de la dégradation forestière	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation	REDD
RET	Réunion d'experts techniques	Technical Expert Meeting	TEM
RIT	Relevé international des transactions	International Transaction Log	ITL
SA	Secteur d'activité	Workstream	WS
SA1	Secteur d'activité 1	Workstream 1	WS1
SA2	Secteur d'activité 2	Workstream 2	WS2
UE	Union européenne	European Union	EU
UQA	Unité de quantité attribuée	Assigned Amount Unit	AAU
URCE	Unité de Réduction certifiée	Certified Emission Reduction	CER
UTCATF	Utilisation des terres, changement d'affectation des terres et foresterie	Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry	LULUCF

A.4. Abbreviations and acronyms (English – French)

English		French	
AAU	Assigned Amount Unit	<i>Unité de quantité attribuée</i>	UQA
ADP	Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action	<i>Groupe de travail spécial de la plateforme de Durban pour une action renforcée</i>	ADP
AF	Adaptation Fund	<i>Fonds pour l'adaptation</i>	FA
AILAC	Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean	<i>Alliance indépendante de l'Amérique latine et des Caraïbes</i>	AILAC
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States	<i>Alliance des petits États insulaires (www.sidsnet.org/aosis)</i>	APEI
APA	Ad hoc working group on the Paris Agreement	<i>Groupe de travail spécial de l'Accord de Paris</i>	GTS-AP
BAPA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA in spanish)	<i>Alliance bolivarienne pour les Peuples de notre Amérique (ALBA en espagnol)</i>	ABPA
BAPOA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America	<i>Alliance bolivarienne pour les peuples de notre Amérique</i>	ALBA
BR	Biennial Report	<i>Rapport biennal</i>	RB
BUR	Biennial Updated Report	<i>Rapport biennal actualisé</i>	RBA
CA	Cooperative Approaches	<i>Démarches concertées</i>	DC
CBDR	Common but differentiated responsibilities	<i>Responsabilités communes mais différenciées</i>	RCMD
CBDR–RC	Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities	<i>Responsabilités communes mais différenciées et capacités respectives</i>	RCMD-CR
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism	<i>Mécanisme de Développement propre</i>	MDP
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions	<i>Contribution déterminée au niveau national</i>	CDN
CER	Certified Emission Reduction	<i>Unité de Réduction certifiée</i>	URCE
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement	<i>Conférence des Parties servant en tant que Réunion des Parties de l'Accord de Paris</i>	CRA
CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol	<i>Conférence des Parties agissant en tant que Réunion des Parties au Protocole de Kyoto</i>	CRP
COP	Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	<i>Conférence des Parties à la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</i>	CdP
CPDN	Intended Nationally Determined Contribution	<i>Contribution prévue déterminée au niveau national</i>	CPDN
CTCN	Climate Technology Center and Network	<i>Centre et Réseau des Technologies du Climat</i>	CRTC
DC	Developing country	<i>Pays en développement</i>	PED
DNA	Designated National Authorities	<i>Autorités nationales désignées</i>	AND

English		French	
DOE	Designated Operational Entities	Entités opérationnelles désignées	EOD
EB	Executive Board	Comité exécutif	CE
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council	Conseil économique et social des Nations Unies	CESNU
EGTT	Expert Group on Technology Transfer	Groupe d'Experts pour le Transfert de la Technologie	GETT
EU	European Union	Union européenne	UE
FSB	Financial Stability Board	Conseil de Stabilité financière	CSF
FVA	Framework for Various Approaches	Cadre pour les Diverses Démarches	CDD
G77 + China	Group of 77 and China	Groupe des 77 et Chine (www.G77.org)	G77 + Chine
GCF	Green Climate Fund	Fonds vert pour le climat	FVC
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	Produit intérieur brut	PIB
GEF	Global Environment Facility	Fonds pour l'Environnement mondial	FEM
GHG	Greenhouse Gas	Gaz à Effet de Serre	GES
GtCO ₂ e	Gigaton of CO ₂ equivalent	Gigatonne de CO ₂ équivalent	GtCO ₂ e
IAR	International Analysis and Review	Analyses et Examens internationaux	AEI
IAR	International Assessment and Review	Évaluation et Révision internationale	EEI
ICA	International Consultations and Analysis	Consultations et Analyses internationales	CAI
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization	Organisation de l'aviation civile internationale	OACI
IETA	International Emissions Trading Association	Association internationale pour l'échange de droits d'émission	AIEDE
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change	Groupe intergouvernemental d'Experts sur l'évolution du Climat	GIEC
ITL	International Transaction Log	Relevé international des transactions	RIT
JCM	Joint Crediting Mechanism	Mécanisme de Crédit conjoint	MCC
JI	Joint Implementation	Mise en œuvre conjointe	MOC
KP	Kyoto Protocol	Protocole de Kyoto	PK
LDC	Least Developed Countries	Pays les moins avancés	PMA
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund	Fonds des Pays les moins avancés	FPMA
LEG	Least Developed Country Expert Group	Groupe d'Experts sur les Pays les moins avancés	GEPMA
LMDC (ou LMG)	Like Minded Developing Countries (Like Minded Group)	Groupe d'États ayant la même optique (ou Pays en développement aux vues similaires)	GEMO (ou PDVS)
LPAA	Lima-Paris Action Agenda	Plan d'action Lima-Paris	PALP
LULUCF	Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry	Utilisation des terres, changement d'affectation des terres et foresterie	UTCATF
M&P	Modalities and Procedures	Modalités et Procédures	M&P
MRV	Measuring, Rapportage, Verification	Mesure, Notification, Vérification	MNV
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions	Mesures d'Atténuation appropriées au niveau national	MAAN
NAP	National Adaptation Plan	Plan national d'Adaptation	PNA

English		French	
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme or Action	<i>Plan d'Action national d'Adaptation</i>	PANA
NMM	New Market Mechanism	<i>Nouveau Mécanisme de Marché</i>	NMM
Non-Governmental Organization	NGO	<i>Organisations non gouvernementale</i>	ONG
NWP	Nairobi Work Program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change	<i>Programme de Travail de Nairobi sur les incidences des changements climatiques et la vulnérabilité et l'adaptation à ces changements</i>	PTN
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	<i>Organisation de Coopération et de Développement économiques</i>	OCDE
PPF	Project Preparation Facility	<i>Fonds de Préparation de Projets</i>	FPP
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation	<i>Réduction des émissions issues de la déforestation et de la dégradation forestière</i>	REDD
REL	Reference Emission Levels	<i>Niveaux de référence des émissions</i>	NRE
RL	Reference Levels	<i>Niveaux de référence</i>	NR
SB	Subsidiary Body	<i>Organe subsidiaire</i>	OS
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation	<i>Organe subsidiaire de Mise en Œuvre</i>	OSMOE
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advise	<i>Organe subsidiaire de Conseil scientifique et technologique</i>	OSCST
SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund	<i>Fonds spécial des changements climatiques</i>	FSCC
SCF	Standing Committee for Finance	<i>Comité permanent des Finances</i>	CPF
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals	<i>Objectifs de Développement durable</i>	ODD
SDM	Sustainable Development Mechanism	<i>Mécanisme pour un Développement durable</i>	MDD
SED	Structured Expert Dialogue	<i>Dialogue structuré entre experts</i>	DSE
SIDS	Small Island Developing States	<i>Petits États insulaires en développement</i>	PEID
TEC	Technology Executive Committee	<i>Comité exécutif de la technologie</i>	CET
TEM	Technical Expert Meeting	<i>Réunion d'experts techniques</i>	RET
TEP	Technical examination process	<i>Processus d'examen technique</i>	PET
TTE	Team of Technical Experts	<i>Équipe d'experts techniques</i>	EET
UN	United Nations	<i>Organisation des Nations unies</i>	ONU
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme	<i>Programme des Nations Unies pour l'Environnement</i>	PNUE
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	<i>Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</i>	CCNUCC
WMO	World Meteorological Organization	<i>Organisation météorologique mondiale</i>	OMM
WS	Workstream	<i>Secteur d'activité</i>	SA
WS1	Workstream 1	<i>Secteur d'activité 1</i>	SA1
WS2	Workstream 2	<i>Secteur d'activité 2</i>	SA2

A.5. Thematic glossary

Additionality	Characterises the GHG emission reductions generated by the compensatory projects must be greater than the emissions which would have occurred without these projects. The goal of environmental additionality is to demonstrate that a project produces actual, measurable, additional and long-term GHG reductions.
Adaptation	Ability of a system to adjust its mechanisms, processes and structure to climate change. Adaptation can be spontaneous or planned; it can occur in response to or in advance of a change in conditions.
Hot air “Hot Air”	Due to their industrial recession in the 1990s, certain Annex B countries to the Kyoto Protocol (like Russia and Ukraine) received higher emission limitation targets than their total amount of emissions without taking any measures for domestic reduction. This quota surplus (hot air) could potentially be sold to other countries via flexibility mechanisms.
Improvement in greenhouse gas removals	Calculated improvement of greenhouse gas removals between a baseline scenario and a project. The removal designates the penetration of greenhouse gases in a living organism that assimilates these gases, thereby allowing the disappearance of the removed greenhouse gases.
Annex I	Annex I is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. It quotes forty developed countries and countries with economies in transition that have made commitments to stabilise the greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels.
Annex II	Annex II is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. It identifies 24 developed countries (including in Annex I) that have agreed to provide financial and technological aid to developing countries to combat climate change.
Annex B	Annex B is attached to the Kyoto Protocol. It identifies 38 developed countries and countries with economies in transition that have made commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the period 2008-2012.
Anthropogenic	Greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities are called anthropogenic when they do not come from natural emissions. These are additional emissions which can be considered as pollution.
Mitigation	Human intervention to reduce the sources of greenhouse gases or reinforce the sinks of greenhouse gases, either by extending the surface area or by improving their removal capacity.
Afforestation	Action of planting trees on land that has had no forest cover for a certain number of years.
Bioenergy with Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage	The combination of Carbon dioxide capture and storage with bioenergy causing CO ₂ to be absorbed by the atmosphere (BECCS). According to IPCC scenarios corresponding to the objectives of 1.5 to 2 °C, several GtCO ₂ per year must be removed from the atmosphere in the second half of the 21st century.
Carbon dioxide capture and storage	The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon reservoir other than the atmosphere (CCS). This process designates the separation of CO ₂ from flue gases or from processing fossil fuels to produce CO ₂ -rich fractions and storage in underground geological formations or in seabeds.

Carbon neutrality	Can mean two different things: Either, the objective of releasing a minimal quantity of GHG emissions, which corresponds to the quantity that is physically removed by the atmosphere in the same time or the aim of releasing zero GHG. Also it is often about the action of investing in one or more projects that will avoid producing an equivalent quantity of GHG than generated by the entity seeking carbon neutrality.
Climate change	Climate variations that are attributed directly or indirectly to human activities, altering the composition of the atmosphere, and which are added to the natural variability of the climate note during comparable periods.
Fossil fuel	Natural gas, petroleum, coal or any solid, liquid or gaseous fuel derived from these materials.
Supplementarity	In the context of the UNFCCC, supplementarity refers to the option available to the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to introduce, in addition to the Kyoto mechanisms, suitable domestic policies, energy-related or otherwise, to fulfil the GHG emission reduction objectives in the long term.
Compliance	Obligation whereby the emitter is required to comply with his objectives of GHG emission reductions. The verification of compliance with the commitments and mandatory objectives is an essential factor in a mandatory emission reduction system. Compliance includes the verification modalities, the organisation responsible for verifying the compliance and the possible sanctions. <i>Synonym: obligation compliance</i>
Business as usual	Greenhouse gases resulting from general trends in an economy with no emission control policy. This reference is used to estimate the effectiveness of policies and measures undertaken to combat greenhouse gas emissions.
Compensatory credits	Emission rights representing a tonne of sequestered or removed equivalent CO ₂ , given to the promoter of a compensatory credit project to reduce GHG emissions.
Woodland clearance	Conversion of forest to non-forest. <i>Synonym: Deforestation</i>
Emission right	Any emission right symbolises the reduction of GHG emissions by one metric tonne of equivalent carbon dioxide, i.e. an emission unit, an emission quota or a compensatory credit. These rights can be traded inside international or national carbon trading systems.
Greenhouse gas emission	Total mass of a GHG which is released into the atmosphere during a given period.
CO₂ equivalent	The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO ₂) that would cause the same amount of radiative forcing as a given mixture of CO ₂ and other greenhouse gases. <i>NOTE 1:</i> The CO ₂ equivalent is calculated using the mass of a given GHG multiplied by its global warming potential. <i>NOTE 2:</i> Annex B lists global warming potentials established by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Greenhouse gas emission or removal factor	Factor reporting the activity data on the GHG emissions or absorption. <i>NOTE:</i> A greenhouse gas emission or removal factor can include an oxidation factor.
Fungibility	Quality of what is consumed through use and which can be replaced by other similar products. In the context of the carbon market, fungibility makes no distinction between the categories of units and considers them all identical (one AAU would therefore be equivalent to a JI project unit and also to a unit resulting from an internal measurement of energy efficiency).

Carbon leakage	Part of GHG emission reductions in Annex B countries that may be offset by an increase in emissions in non-constrained countries above their baseline levels. This can occur through (i) relocation of energy-intensive production units in non-constrained regions; (ii) increased consumption of fossil fuels in these regions through decline in the international price of oil and gas triggered by lower demand for these energies; and (iii) changes in revenues (thus in energy demand) due to improved economic conditions. NOTE: The term also refers to the situation in which a carbon capture activity (tree planting, for example) on one piece of land inadvertently, directly or indirectly, triggers an activity, which in whole or part, counteracts the carbon effects of the initial activity.
Greenhouse gases (GHG)	Gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that remove and re-emit the infrared radiation. They help maintain the heat in the Earth's atmosphere. These gases are produced by both natural and anthropogenic processes. The main gases are water vapour, carbon dioxide (CO ₂), methane (CH ₄), dinitrogen oxide (N ₂ O), the chlorofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), nitrogen trifluoride (NF ₃), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF ₆).
Energy intensity	Ratio of energy consumption to economic or physical output. At the national level, energy intensity is the ratio of total domestic consumption or final energy consumption to Gross Domestic Product or physical output.
GHG inventory	Assessment that measures the GHG emissions from activities of an entity (country, business, municipality, etc.). This assessment is calculated in relation to a reference year.
Carbon market	Name for a group of greenhouse gas emissions trading and transaction mechanisms. The carbon market designates both the voluntary market for the voluntary compensation of GHG emissions and the regulated markets that make the regulated emitters compliant.
Voluntary market	Carbon credits trading mechanism not linked to national or international regulations.
Materiality	An item of information, an error or an inaccuracy are normally considered as material if they can influence people building on them. This concept comes into play when verifying project data and embodies the idea that there is a threshold beyond which the search for other potential errors is not longer justified in terms of time, money or the efforts required. Thus, if the error found generates a difference in the emission reductions of the project which is below the set threshold, this error is viewed as negligible or, in other words, immaterial.
Clean development mechanism (CDM)	Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 12). It assumes the implementation of emission reduction or avoidance projects in the developing countries. The CDM projects or activity programmes require at least three partners to be realised: developing countries (host countries represented by the Designated National Authorities, or DNA), a project leader in the host country and a buyer of Certified Emission Reduction units, or CER.
Joint implementation (JI)	Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol. This mechanism is used by the governments of developed countries and countries with economies in transition, and their companies, to finance greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in the other developed countries and countries with economies in transition (mainly the Eastern European countries and Russia). In return, these States receive emission credits that they can sell or deduct from their own national efforts.

Baseline	This is a historical level used to calculate subsequent changes in greenhouse gas emissions. This level is determined micro-economically or macro-economically. It is of crucial importance in determining the additionality level of reductions resulting from joint initiative projects or those implemented under the Clean Development Mechanism or the Joint Implementation.
Carbon black	Carbon black, also known as furnace black or lamp black, is an amorphous form of the carbon produced by industrial activity. It is a climate forcer (has a warming effect on the climate) that has only been of interest to the scientific community for a few years.
Global warming potential (GWP) or planet warming potential (PWP)	Index describing the radiation characteristics of greenhouse gases. The GWP or PWP represents the combined effect of the time these gases remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in absorbing outgoing infrared radiation. This index approximates the time-integrated warming effect of a unit mass of a given greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, relative to that of CO ₂ . NOTE: The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change contain planet warming potential tables.
Greenhouse gas programme	Voluntary or mandatory, international, national or sub-national system or plan which records, counts or manages the emissions, removals, greenhouse gas emission reductions or improvements in greenhouse gas removals.
Carbon sink	Any process, activity or mechanism, natural or artificial, that removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere (for example, trees, plants and oceans).
Reforestation	Planting of forests on lands that had previously contained forests but have been converted to other uses.
Additional reductions	See Additionality
Greenhouse gas emission reduction	Calculated drop in GHG emissions between the baseline scenario emissions and the actual emissions avoided by a project.
Reduction in emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+)	International issue of the post-2012 climate regime on the financial provisions and the transfer of technology under the reduction plan for emissions caused by deforestation and forest degradation. This issue also includes the protection and sustainable management of forests and the promotion of forest carbon stocks in the developing countries resulting, for example, from adapted silvicultural practices or plantings.
Greenhouse gas reservoir	Physical unit or biosphere, geosphere or hydrosphere component capable of storing or accumulating a GHG removed from the atmosphere by a greenhouse gas sink or a GHG captured at its source. NOTE 1: The total mass of carbon contained in a GHG reservoir at a given moment can be called reservoir carbon stock. NOTE 2: A GHG reservoir can transfer GHG to another reservoir. NOTE 3: Collecting a GHG at its source before it enters the atmosphere and storing the GHG collected in a GHG reservoir can be called GHG capture and storage.
Baseline scenario	Hypothetical reference case that represents in the best possible way the conditions that would be the most likely in the absence of the greenhouse gas project. NOTE: The baseline scenario coincides with the GHG project chronology.
Sequestration	Action of removing the carbon from the atmosphere. CO ₂ sequestration projects can participate in two distinct and sometimes complementary ways to carbon sequestration: (i) by extracting the carbonic gas from the atmosphere and storing it as over- and underground biomass; (ii) by producing additional renewable biomass where the waste-to-energy conversion can avoid the recourse to fossil fuels.

Greenhouse gas source	Physical unit or process releasing a GHG into the atmosphere.
Affected greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir	GHG source, sink or reservoir influenced by the activity of a project through modifications to the supply and demand of the market regarding its associated products or service or through physical movement.NOTE 1: Unlike the <i>associated</i> GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs which are linked physically to a GHG project, the <i>affected</i> GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are linked to a GHG project by changes caused by market supply and demand.NOTE 2: An affected GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found off the project site.NOTE 3: The reductions in emissions or the increases in GHG removals attributable to the affected GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are commonly called “leaks”.
Controlled greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir	A GHG source, sink or reservoir that operates under the guidance or influence of an author of a greenhouse gas project proposal through financial, political, management or other instruments.NOTE: A controlled GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found on the project site.
Associated greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir	A GHG source, sink or reservoir with material or energy flows entering or exiting the project or which are contained within it.NOTE 1: An associated GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found upstream or downstream of the project and can be located on or off the project site.NOTE 2: An associated GHG source, sink or reservoir can also include activities relating to the design, construction or declassification of a project.
Standard of performance	Simplified approach of additionality and the baseline scenario. Rather than seeking to prove the additionality and to determine the baseline scenario for each project, the standard of performance is an approximate evaluation that establishes a generic baseline scenario as a quantitative standard of performance. Any project where the emissions are below this predefined standard is considered as additional.
Monitoring	Continuous or periodic assessment of emissions and removals of GHG or other GHG-related data.
Emission cap-and-trade system	System that assigns rights to companies for their greenhouse gas emissions based on governmental environmental objectives. Compensatory credits issued thanks to a GHG reduction project can also be traded in this system.
Tonne of carbon equivalent	See equivalent CO ₂
Removal unit	Unit issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and which covers the net removal by carbon sinks of GHG from Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) activities.
Emission unit	Under the cap-and-trade system, an emission unit designates a right of emission generated by the government according to the declared GHG emissions verified by the companies. A right of emission relates to the authorisation to emit 1 tCO ₂ eq.
Assigned amount units (AAU)	Units issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in their national register. The amount assigned is calculated according to emissions of the base year and quantified emission reduction commitments. This quantity is expressed as a percentage.
Certified emission reduction (CER)	Certified emission reductions (CER) are emission credits obtained through CDM projects. These credits can be applied directly to fulfil the quantified commitments of Annex B countries.Note: the acronym UCRE for Certified units of emissions reduction is also used.

Emission reduction units (ERU)

These are units converted from an assigned amount unit (AAU) or a removal unit and handed to the project participant under joint implementation activities.

Target user

Person or organisation identified by those in charge declaring information relating to greenhouse gases and which relies on this information to take decisions. NOTE 1: The target user can be the customer, the responsible party, the administrators of the GHG programme, regulators, the financial community or other stakeholders involved such as local authorities, ministerial departments or non-governmental organisations. NOTE 2: The level of assurance is used to determine the accuracy a validator or verifier gives to his validation or verification plan to detect any errors, omissions or false declarations. NOTE 3: There are two assurance levels (reasonable or limited) that result in validation or verification reports that are formulated differently. See ISO 14064-3: 2006 A.2.3.2 for sample validation and verification reports.

Land Use, Land Use changes and Forestry (LULUCF)

Land use and their changes (forest, agriculture, natural areas, etc.) have a significant influence on carbon storage (sink) and methane (CH₄) releases and therefore on climate change. They contribute to the anthropogenic emissions taken into account by the Kyoto Protocol. The problem of land and forest use goes hand in hand with the concerns of two other conventions: biodiversity and desertification.

Vulnerability

Vulnerability defines to what extent a system can be degraded or damaged by climate change. It depends not just on the sensitivity but also on the adaptability of the system to new climatic conditions.

A.6. Meeting agendas during COP23

COP23 – 6-17 November 2017⁹²⁵

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
 - a. Election of the President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session;
 - b. Adoption of rules of procedure;
 - c. Adoption of the agenda;
 - d. Election of officers other than the President;
 - e. Admission of organizations as observers;
 - f. Organization of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies;
 - g. Dates and venues of future sessions;
 - h. Adoption of the report on credentials.
3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies:
 - a. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice;
 - b. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation;
 - c. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement.
4. Preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
5. Consideration of proposals by Parties for amendments to the Convention under Article 15:
 - a. Proposal from the Russian Federation to amend Article 4, paragraph 2(f), of the Convention;
 - b. Proposal from Papua New Guinea and Mexico to amend Articles 7 and 18 of the Convention.
6. Report of the Adaptation Committee.
7. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts.

⁹²⁵. Available in English [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/cop23/eng/01.pdf>

8. Development and transfer of technologies and implementation of the Technology Mechanism:
 - a. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;
 - b. Review of the effective implementation of the Climate Technology Centre and Network.
9. Second review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the Convention.
10. Matters relating to finance:
 - a. Long-term climate finance;
 - b. Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance;
 - c. Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund;
 - d. Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Global Environment Facility;
 - e. Sixth review of the Financial Mechanism;
 - f. Process to identify the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement.
11. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention.
12. Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention.
13. Capacity-building under the Convention.
14. Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention:
 - a. Implementation of the Buenos Aires programme of work on adaptation and response measures (decision 1/CP.10);
 - b. Matters relating to the least developed countries.
15. Assessment of the technical examination processes on mitigation and adaptation.
16. Gender and climate change.
17. Other matters referred to the Conference of the Parties by the subsidiary bodies.
18. Administrative, financial and institutional matters:
 - a. Audit report and financial statements for 2016;
 - b. Budget performance for the biennium 2016–2017;
 - c. Programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019;
 - d. Decision-making in the UNFCCC process;
 - e. Review of the process established by decision 14/CP.1 relating to the selection and nomination of the Executive Secretary (at the level of Under-Secretary-General) and the Deputy Executive Secretary (at the level of Assistant Secretary-General).

19. High-level segment:
 - a. Statements by Parties;
 - b. Statements by observer organizations.
20. Other matters.
21. Conclusion of the session:
 - a. Adoption of the draft report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-third session;
 - b. Closure of the session.

CMP13 – 6-15 November 2017⁹²⁶

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
 - a. Adoption of the agenda;
 - b. Election of additional officers;
 - c. Organization of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies;
 - d. Approval of the report on credentials;
 - e. Status of ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.
3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies:
 - a. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice;
 - b. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation.
4. Matters relating to the clean development mechanism.
5. Matters relating to joint implementation.
6. Report of the Compliance Committee.
7. Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund:
 - a. Report of the Adaptation Fund Board;
 - b. Third review of the Adaptation Fund.
8. Report on the high-level ministerial round table on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments.
9. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I:
 - a. National communications;
 - b. Annual compilation and accounting report for the second commitment period for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol.

⁹²⁶. Available in English [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/cmp13/eng/01.pdf>

10. Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol.
11. Matters relating to:
 - a. Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Kyoto Protocol;
 - b. Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol.
12. Other matters referred to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol by the subsidiary bodies.
13. Administrative, financial and institutional matters:
 - a. Audit report and financial statements for 2016;
 - b. Budget performance for the biennium 2016-2017;
 - c. Programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019.
14. High-level segment:
 - a. Statements by Parties;
 - b. Statements by observer organizations.
15. Other matters.
16. Conclusion of the session:
 - a. Adoption of the draft report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its thirteenth session;
 - b. Closure of the session.

CMA – 6-17 November 2017⁹²⁷

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
 - a. Adoption of the agenda;
 - b. Application of the rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties;
 - c. Election of additional officers;
 - d. Organization of work;
 - e. Status of ratification of the Paris Agreement;
 - f. Approval of the report on credentials.
3. Matters relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
4. High-level segment.
5. Other matters.

927. Available in English [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/cma/eng/01.pdf>

6. Conclusion of the session:
 - a. Adoption of the report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
 - b. Closure of the session.

SBI47 – 6-15 November 2017⁹²⁸

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
 - a. Adoption of the agenda;
 - b. Organization of the work of the session;
 - c. Multilateral assessment working group session under the international assessment and review process;
 - d. Facilitative sharing of views under the international consultation and analysis process;
 - e. Other mandated events;
 - f. Election of officers other than the Chair.
3. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention:
 - a. Status of submission and review of second biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
 - b. Compilation and synthesis of second biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
 - c. Report on national greenhouse gas inventory data from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention for the period 1990–2015.
4. Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention:
 - a. Information contained in national communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;
 - b. Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;
 - c. Provision of financial and technical support;
 - d. Summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports of Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention.
5. Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement.
6. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement.

⁹²⁸. Available in English [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbi/eng/08.pdf>

7. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement.
8. Matters relating to the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol:
 - a. Review of the modalities and procedures for the clean development mechanism;
 - b. Report of the administrator of the international transaction log under the Kyoto Protocol.
9. Coordination of support for the implementation of activities in relation to mitigation actions in the forest sector by developing countries, including institutional arrangements.
10. Matters relating to the least developed countries.
11. National adaptation plans.
12. Report of the Adaptation Committee.
13. Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts.
14. Development and transfer of technologies:
 - a. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;
 - b. Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer.
15. Matters relating to climate finance:
 - a. Review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance;
 - b. Third review of the Adaptation Fund.
16. Matters relating to capacity-building:
 - a. Capacity-building under the Convention;
 - b. Annual technical progress report of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building;
 - c. Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol.
17. Impact of the implementation of response measures:
 - a. Improved forum and work programme;
 - b. Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures;
 - c. Matters relating to Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol;
 - d. Progress on the implementation of decision 1/CP.10.
18. Ways of enhancing the implementation of training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information so as to enhance actions under the Paris Agreement.

19. Report on activities related to Action for Climate Empowerment.
20. Gender and climate change.
21. Administrative, financial and institutional matters:
 - a. Budget performance for the biennium 2016–2017;
 - b. Audit report and financial statements for 2016;
 - c. Other budgetary and financial matters.
22. Other matters.
23. Closure of and report on the session.

SBSTA47 – 6-15 November⁹²⁹

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
 - a. Adoption of the agenda;
 - b. Organization of the work of the session;
 - c. Election of officers other than the Chair.
3. Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change.
4. Report of the Adaptation Committee.
5. Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts.
6. Development and transfer of technologies:
 - a. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network;
 - b. Technology framework under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement.
7. Issues relating to agriculture.
8. Research and systematic observation.
9. Impact of the implementation of response measures:
 - a. Improved forum and work programme;
 - b. Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures;
 - c. Matters relating to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Kyoto Protocol.

⁹²⁹. Available in English [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/eng/05.pdf>

10. Methodological issues under the Convention:
 - a. Common metrics to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of greenhouse gases;
 - b. Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport.
11. Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement:
 - a. Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement;
 - b. Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement;
 - c. Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement.
12. Modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement.
13. Local communities and indigenous peoples platform.
14. Reports on other activities:
 - a. Annual report on the technical review of information reported under the Convention by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention in their biennial reports and national communications;
 - b. Annual report on the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
 - c. Annual report on the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories and other information reported by Parties included in Annex I, as defined in Article 1, paragraph 7, of the Kyoto Protocol.
15. Other matters.
16. Closure of and report on the session.

APA1-4 – 7-15 November⁹³⁰

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
 - a. Election of officers;
 - b. Adoption of the agenda;
 - c. Organization of the work of the session.

930. Available in English [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/apa/eng/03.pdf>

3. Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21 on:
 - a. Features of nationally determined contributions, as specified in paragraph 26;
 - b. Information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of nationally determined contributions, as specified in paragraph 28;
 - c. Accounting for Parties' nationally determined contributions, as specified in paragraph 31.
4. Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement.
5. Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.
6. Matters relating to the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement:
 - a. Identification of the sources of input for the global stocktake;
 - b. Development of the modalities of the global stocktake.
7. Modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement.
8. Further matters related to implementation of the Paris Agreement:
 - a. Preparing for the convening of the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
 - b. Taking stock of progress made by the subsidiary and constituted bodies in relation to their mandated work under the Paris Agreement and section III of decision 1/CP.21, in order to promote and facilitate coordination and coherence in the implementation of the work programme, and, if appropriate, take action, which may include recommendations.
9. Other matters.
10. Closure of and report on the session.

Bibliography

South Africa (2017a). *Submission by South Africa on guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/219_317_131376670117911730-Submission%20by%20South%20Africa%20on%20Article%206.2%20April%202017.pdf

South Africa (2017b). *Submission by South Africa on rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/219_318_131376670779667972-Submission%20by%20South%20Africa%20on%20Article%206.4.pdf

South Africa (2017c). *Submission by South Africa on the work programme under the framework for nonmarket approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/219_319_131376671224426823-South%20Africa%20submission%20on%20Non%20Market%20Approaches%20April%202017.pdf

South Africa (2017d). *Submission by South Africa on the Scope and Modalities for the Periodic Assessment of the Technology Mechanism in Relation to the Implementation of the Paris Agreement*.

[http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/219_258_131360272149181955-DRAFT%20SUBMISSION%20PERIODIC%20ASSESSMENT%20OF%20the%20efficiency%20of%20the%20TECHNOLOGY%20MECHANISM%20\(2\).pdf](http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/219_258_131360272149181955-DRAFT%20SUBMISSION%20PERIODIC%20ASSESSMENT%20OF%20the%20efficiency%20of%20the%20TECHNOLOGY%20MECHANISM%20(2).pdf)

ADP (2015). *Draft agreement and draft decision on workstreams 1 and 2 of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Version of 23 October 2015@23:30hrs*

<http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/application/pdf/ws1and2@2330.pdf>

ALBA (2015). *Intervención de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela en nombre de miembros de la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) en la plenaria de apertura del Grupo de Trabajo Ad Hoc sobre la Plataforma de Durban para una acción mejorada (ADP) de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climático*.

http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/211_128_130776296388127605-Discurso%20ALBA%20Apertura%20ADP%20Bonn.pdf

IALAC (2017). *Principles and structure of the technology framework and scope and modalities for the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism.*

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/233_258_131363287669809632-170410%20AILAC%20Submission%20on%20Technology%20Framework%20and%20Technology%20Mechanism%202017.pdf

Anderson, K., & Peters, G. (2016). *The trouble with negative emissions.* Science, 354(6309), 182-183.

<http://smartstones.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Kevin-Anderson-2016.10.13-the-Trouble-with-Negative-Emissions-Science-2016.pdf>

AOSIS (2015). *Statement by Maldives on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States at the Opening of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action Bonn, Germany.*

http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/167_149_130855072315160574-AOSIS%20ADP%20Opening%20Statement.pdf

AOSIS (2016). *Modalities, work programs functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of Response Measures.*

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/167_255_131182660087674273-AOSIS_Submission_RM%20modalities%20and%20work%20programme.pdf

Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (2017) *Scope and modalities for the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism.*

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/243_258_131320948274131657-Argentina,%20Brazil%20and%20Uruguay%20-%20Evaluation%20of%20Technology%20Mechanism.pdf

Saudi Arabia and United States (2016). *Joint Submission on the Forum on Response Measures.*

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/39_255_131190009980716097-September%202016%20RM-KSA-USA.pdf

National Assembly of the French Republic (2016). *Draft bill authorising the ratification of the Paris Agreement adopted on 12 December 2015*

<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/projets/pl3719.pdf>

Australia, Canada, Japan and Norway (2017). *Submission on the Scope and Modalities of the Periodic Assessment of the Technology Mechanism in Relation to Supporting the Implementation of the Paris Agreement.*

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/175_258_131305334662773021-Submission%20-%20Periodic%20Assessment%20of%20the%20Technology%20Mechanism_%20Final.pdf

Bodansky, D. (2016). *The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A new hope?* Arizona State University. Draft: March, 2016

<https://conferences.asucollegeoflaw.com/workshoponparis/files/2012/08/AJIL-Paris-Agreement-Draft-2016-03-26.pdf>

Bodle, R., Donat, L., & Duwe, M. (2016). *The Paris Agreement: Analysis, Assessment and Outlook*
http://ecologic.eu/sites/files/event/2016/ecologic_institute_2016_paris_agreement_assessment.pdf

Boysen, L. R., Lucht, W., & Gerten, D. (2017). *Trade-offs for food production, nature conservation and climate limit the terrestrial carbon dioxide removal potential*. Global Change Biology.

Brazil (2013) *Enhancing ambition through CDM credits voluntary cancellation, views of Brazil on the implementation of all the elements of decision 1/cp.17, matters related to paragraphs 7 and 8 (work stream 2), on the work of the ad hoc working group on the Durban platform for enhanced action*.
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_brazil_workstream_2_cdm_voluntary_cancellation_20130918.pdf

Brazil (2017a). *Views of Brazil on the Guidance referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC,
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/525_317_131354419477778493-BRAZIL%20-%20Article%206.2.%20SBSTA46%20May%202017.%20FINAL.pdf

Brazil (2017b). *Views of Brazil on the Process related to the Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/525_318_131354420270499165-BRAZIL%20-%20Article%206.4.%20SBSTA46%20May%202017.%20FINAL.pdf

Canada (2017). *Canada's submission on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement March 2017*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/175_317_131345842042315582-Submission%20from%20Canada%20on%20Article%206.%20March%202017.pdf

Climate Action Tracker (2016). *Paris Agreement in force, but no increase in climate action*.
http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefing_papers/CAT_temperature_update_November_2016.pdf

Climate Interactive (2017). *Climate Scoreboard*.
<https://www.climateinteractive.org/programs/scoreboard/>

Coalition for Rainforest Nations (2015). *ADP 2–10 opening plenary: Statement*.
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/213_149_130855981051940810-CfRN_AD2-10_opening_statement.pdf

UNFCCC (2001). *Report to the Conference of the Parties on the work of its seventh session, held in Marrakech on 29 October-10 November 2001: Decision 4/CP.7*.
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/french/cop7/cp713a01f.pdf#page=23>

UNFCCC (2010). Decision 1/CP.16, *The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention*
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf>

UNFCCC (2011a). *Views on the elaboration of market-based mechanisms, Submissions by Parties, FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/MISC.2*
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/awglca14/eng/misc02a04.pdf>

UNFCCC (2011b). *Benefits of the Clean Development Mechanism 2011*
https://cdm.unfccc.int/about/dev_ben/ABC_2011.pdf

UNFCCC (2013a). *Report on the workshop on the revision of review guidelines for developed country Parties, Note by the Secretariat, FCCC/SBSTA/2013/INF.14*.
http://unfccc.int/files/methods/other_methodological_issues/application/pdf/workshop_report.pdf

UNFCCC (2013b). *Technical synthesis on the framework for various approaches – Technical Paper, FCCC/TP/2013/5, FCCC/SBSTA/2013/INF.14*
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/tp/05.pdf>

UNFCCC (2013c). *Subsidiary Body for Implementation 39th session, Warsaw, 11-6 November 2013, Agenda item 19, Gender equality in the context of climate change*
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/sbi/fre/l16f.pdf>

UNFCCC (2014a). *Framework for various approaches, Technical paper, FCCC/TP/2014/9*.
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/tp/09.pdf>

UNFCCC (2015a). *List of draft negotiating texts*
http://unfccc.int/documentation/document_lists/items/2960.php

UNFCCC (2015b). *Report on the breakdown by gender 2015*.
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/fre/06f.pdf>

UNFCCC (2016a). *Updated Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of INDCs*.
http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/9240

UNFCCC (2016b). *Turning the Paris Agreement into Reality: Post-Paris work on mitigation*.
http://www.unclearn.org/sites/default/files/inventory/unfccc30062016_mitigation_and_transparency.pdf

UNFCCC. (2016c) *Progress Tracker Methodology*
http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/progress_tracker_methodology_050716_1530.pdf

UNFCCC (2016d). *Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action – Full text*
http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/marrakech_partnership_for_global_climate_action.pdf

UNFCCC (2016e). *Guidelines or other tools for integrating gender considerations into climate change related activities under the Convention*
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/tp/02.pdf>

UNFCCC (2016f). *Reflections note by the President of the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and the incoming President of the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties*
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/reflections_note.pdf

UNFCCC (2016g). *Report by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on its forty-fifth session, held in Marrakech on 7-15 November 2016; FCCC/SBSTA/2016/4*
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/sbsta/fre/04f.pdf>

UNFCCC (2017a). *Progress tracker, Work programme resulting from the relevant requests contained in Decision 1/CP.21* Latest version available, published on 20 June 2017.
http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/pa_progress_tracker_200617.pdf

UNFCCC (2017b). *Human health and adaptation: review of the effects of climate on health and possibilities for action*. March 2017. Summary report by the Secretariat.
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/fre/02f.pdf>

UNFCCC (2017c). *Planning, implementation and evaluation of measures concerning ecosystems and areas such as water resources* March 2017. Summary report by the Secretariat.
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/fre/03f.pdf>

UNFCCC (2017d). *Progress made in implementing NWP on the impact, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change*. April 2017. Note by the Secretariat.
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/eng/inf01.pdf>

UNFCCC (2017e). Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, *Agenda item 4 — Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement*. 17 May 2017.
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/apa_4_informal_note_final.pdf

UNFCCC (2017f). Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, *Agenda item 5 — Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement*. 17 May 2017.
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/apa2017_i5_informal_note_by_the_co-facilitators.pdf

UNFCCC (2017g). Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, *Agenda item 7 — Modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance referred to in Article 15.2 of the Paris Agreement*. 17 May 2017.

http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/application/pdf/apa_item7_informalnote_provisional_17may2017@1100_final.pdf

UNFCCC (2017h). *Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement. Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair*, FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.15

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/eng/l15.pdf>

UNFCCC (2017i). *Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement*. Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair, FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.16

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/eng/l16.pdf>

UNFCCC (2017j). *Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement*. Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair, FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.17

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/eng/l17.pdf>

UNFCCC (2017k). *Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on its forty-sixth session, held in Bonn from 8 to 18 May 2017*, Advance Version, FCCC/SBSTA/2017/4

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/eng/04.pdf>

UNFCCC, Newsroom (2015). *The Lima-Paris Action Plan becomes an essential driver for climate action*

<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa-fr/lpaa/mobilisation-massive-des-acteurs-non-etatiques-a-la-cop21>

UNFCCC, Newsroom (2016a). *Global climate action plan, the climate champions publish a detailed road map*

<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/fr/action-climatique/plan-mondial-action-climatique/#Events>

UNFCCC, Newsroom (2016b). *Road Map for Global Climate Action*

<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/658505/high-level-champions-climate-action-roadmap.pdf>

UNFCCC, Newsroom (2016c). *Submit your viewpoints to the climate champions*
<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/fr/actualit%C3%A9s/date-butoir-de-participation-a-la-consultation-mondiale-des-championnes-climat/>

UNFCCC, Newsroom (2016d). *The Paris Spirit continues whilst the governments commence implementation of the new emblematic agreement, Positive results of the latest UN climate conference in support of an early entry into force*

<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/fr/actualit%C3%A9s/communiqu%C3%A9-de-presse-de-cloture-de-la-conference-de-bonn-mai-2016/>

UNFCCC, Newsroom (2016e). *Official COP22 closing press release*.
<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/fr/actualite/C3%A9s/cop22-communique-presse-de-cloture/>

UNFCCC, Newsroom (2016f). *2050 pathways platform announcement*
<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/791675/2050-pathway-announcement-finalclean-3.pdf>

UNFCCC, Newsroom, (2016g). *High-Level Climate Champions Launch 2050 Pathways Platform*
<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/high-level-climate-champions-launch-2050-pathways-platform/>

CEPS (2016). *Centre for European Policy Studies Carbon Market Provisions in the Paris Agreement (Article 6) Andrei Marcu*.
<http://www.ceps-ech.eu/sites/default/files/SR%20No%20128%20ACM%20Post%20COP21%20Analysis%20of%20Article%206.pdf>

ECOSOC, NGO Branch, *Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status*
<http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=132>

UCLG (2016). *Global Taskforce of local and regional governments, Local and regional governments, an organised community that is ready to contribute*
https://www.uclg.org/sites/default/files/gtf-habitat_iii-un_collectif_organise_et_pret_a_contribuer.pdf

Climatechangenews (2016a). *Hungary becomes first in EU to approve Paris climate deal*
<http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/05/24/hungary-becomes-first-in-eu-to-approve-paris-climate-deal/>

Climatechangenews (2016b). *President Hollande ratifies Paris climate deal for France*
<http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/06/15/president-hollande-ratifies-paris-climate-deal-for-france/>

Climate Interactive (2017). *Climate Scoreboard*.
<https://www.climateinteractive.org/programs/scoreboard/>

CRED (2016). *CRED Crunch*.
<http://cred.be/sites/default/files/CredCrunch45.pdf>

Gagnon-Lebrun, Frédéric, Helena Olivas and Christiana Figueres (2005). *Directed at the COP/CMP*.
http://www.centrehelios.org/downloads/studies_changement_climatique/guidecopmop_french.pdf

Eckstein, D. (2017). *Green Climate Fund (GCF): Much progress, but many open questions remain in 2017*; published on the German Climate Finance website.
<http://www.germanclimatefinance.de/2017/03/31/green-climate-fund-gcf-much-progress-many-open-questions-remain-2017/>

ENERGIES 2050 (2016a). *Sustainable Development Goals: A citizens' guide*. 110 p. "Guides for Action" Collection, ENERGIES 2050. No. 3.
<http://energies2050.org/les-guides-pour-agir-3-les-objectifs-de-developpement-durable/>

ENERGIES 2050 (2016b). *The challenges of climate change in the Mediterranean, transforming constraints into opportunities for action*. 140 p. ENERGIES 2050, in partnership with Plan Bleu, FEMISE and IME. "Guides for Action" Collection, ENERGIES 2050. No. 1.
<http://energies2050.org/les-guides-pour-agir-1-les-defis-du-changement-climatique-en-mediterranee/>

Ethiopia (2017a). *Submission by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group on the Operationalisation of Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/786_317_131356565779926468-LDC%20Group%20submission%20on%20operationalization%20of%20Art%206.2.pdf

Ethiopia (2017b). *Submission by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group on the Operationalisation of Article 6, paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/786_318_131371561949441465-LDC%20Group%20submission%20on%20operationalization%20of%20Art%206.4.pdf

Ethiopia (2017c). *Submission by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group on the Operationalisation of Article 6, paragraph 8 and paragraph 9 of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/786_319_131371562963291964-LDC%20Group%20submission%20on%20operationalization%20of%20Art%206.8-6.9.pdf

Russian Federation (2016). *Submission by the Russian Federation on the modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures*.
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/433_255_131220449856360159-Russian%20Federation_Submission_RM_ENG.pdf

GEF (2017a). *New coordination platform for transparency will help implement Paris Climate Agreement*.
<https://www.thegef.org/news/new-coordination-platform-transparency-will-help-implement-paris-climate-agreement>

GEF (2017b). *GEF-7 Replenishment: 1st Meeting*.
<https://www.thegef.org/events/gef-7-replenishment-1st-meeting>

France and Peru (2015). *Aide-mémoire: Second informal ministerial consultations to prepare COP21*, Paris, 2-7 September 2015.
<http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/fr/>

Galbraith, J. (2015). *The Legal Structure of the Paris Agreement*.
<http://www.regblog.org/2015/12/21/galbraith-legal-structure-paris-agreement/>

Ghana (2016). *Ghana's submission on views on the further elaboration of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures and the modalities for its implementation under the Paris Agreement*.
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/39_255_131230766294414973-Ghana%20AGN%20Response%20measures%20Final%201.pdf

Africa Group (2013). *Submission by Swaziland on behalf of the Africa Group—In respect of Workstream 1: 2015 Agreement under the ADP, General aggregate commitments*.
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp_2_african_group_29042013.pdf

Africa Group (2015). *Statement on behalf of the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) By the Republic of the Sudan, at the Opening Plenary of Ninth Part of the Second Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2.9)*.
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/211_128_130776266564236543-AGN%20Opening%20statement%20to%20the%20ADP%202-9.pdf

Africa Group (2016). *Africa's views on the further elaboration of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures and the modalities for its implementation under the Paris Agreement*.
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/39_255_131190008260994145-African%20Group%20Submission%20on%20RM%20APA%20%20August%202016.pdf

APA (2016a). *Agenda item 8 – Informal Note by the Co-Chairs, 14 November 2016@19:00hours*.
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/in-session/application/pdf/apa_item_8_informal_note_by_co-chairs_v02.pdf

APA (2016b) *Informal Note by the Co-Facilitators on Agenda item 3. Second part of the first session*.
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/in-session/application/pdf/informal_note_item3_v2.pdf

APA (2016c) *Informal Note by the Co-Facilitators on Agenda item 5. Second part of the first session*.
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/in-session/application/pdf/apa_item_5_informal_note_v2.pdf

APA (2017a). *Informal Note by the Co-Facilitators on Agenda item 3. Third part of the first session*.
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/informal_note_apa_3_for_publication_final.pdf

APA (2017b) Informal Note by the Co-Facilitators on Agenda item 5. Third part of the first session.
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/apa2017_i5_informal_note_by_the_co-facilitators_.pdf

APA (2017c) *Conclusions proposed by the Co-Chairs, adopted by APA1.3 at its closing plenary on 18 May 2017 as orally amended. Advance unedited version.*
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/apa2017_l2_amended_unedited.pdf

Government of Brazil (2014) *Standing Committee on Finance COP draft guidance for the operating entities of the financial mechanism of the Convention Submission by Brazil*
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/application/pdf/cop_operating_entities_brazil_02092013.pdf

G77+China (2016). *Submission by the G77 and China: Views on the modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement on the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures.*
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/39_255_131194497776279987-RM%20submission%20SB%2044_G77%20China_Final.pdf

IPCC (2007). *Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*. Climate Change 2007. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press.
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf

IPCC (2012). *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation*. Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press.
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/SREX_Full_Report.pdf

IPCC (2013). Climate change 2013, the physical science basis. *Summary for policymakers Report of the IPCC working group I Technical summary Report agreed by the IPCC working group I but not approved in detail and frequently asked questions*
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_SummaryVolume_FINAL.pdf

IPCC (2014a) *Summary for Policy Makers (AR5—mitigation)*. Climate Change 2014, Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press.
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers.pdf

IPCC (2014b). *Chapter 14—Adaptation Needs and Options et Chapter 19—Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities*. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press.
<https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/>

IPCC (2016). *44th Session of the IPCC: Decisions adopted by the Panel*.
http://www.ipcc.ch/meetings/session44/p44_decisions.pdf

Group of Least Developed Countries (2014) *Submission by the Nepal on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group: Views and proposals on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)*.
https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/submission_by_nepal_on_behalf_of_ldc_group_on_views_and_proposals_on_the_work_of_the_adp.pdf

Guatemala (2017). *Submission by Guatemala on behalf of the IALAC Group of Countries on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/233_318_131354732820248158-170331%20AILAC%20Submission%20Article%206%202017.pdf

Horton, J.; Keith, D.; Honegger, M. (2016): *Implications of the Paris Agreement for Carbon Dioxide Removal and Solar Geoengineering*; Harvard Project on Climate Agreements Viewpoints, July 2016, Cambridge, MA, US.

IDDRI (2015). *Paris agreement: history! What now?*
<http://www.blog-iddri.org/2015/12/14/laccord-de-paris-un-moment-historique-et-maintenant/>

IISD (2013). *Report of the Warsaw Climate Change Conference: 11-23 November 2013*, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 594
<http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12594f.html>

IISD (2015a). *Report on Paris conference on climate change Tuesday, 15 December 2015*, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 663.
<http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12663f.html>

IISD (2015b). *Summary of the Geneva Climate Change Conference: 8-13 February 2015*. Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 626.
<http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12626f.pdf>

IISD (2015c). *Report on the Bonn conference on climate change April 31 August-4 September 2015*, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 644.
<http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12644f.pdf>

IISD (2015d). *Report of the Bonn Climate Change Conference 1-11 June 2015*. Technical Experts meetings, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12, no. 638.
<http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12638f.pdf>

IISD (2016a, 17 May). *Highlights of the Bonn conference: Monday, 16 May*
<http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12667f.pdf>

IISD (2016b, 18 May). *Highlights of the Bonn conference: Tuesday, 17 May.*
<http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12668f.pdf>

IISD (2016c, 20 May). *Highlights of the Bonn Climate Change Conference: Thursday, 19 May 2016.*
<http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12670f.pdf>

IISD (2016d, 21 May). *Highlights of the Bonn conference, Germany: Friday, 20 May 2016.*
<http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12671f.pdf>

IISD (2016e, 23 May). *Highlights of the Bonn conference, Germany: 21 May 2016.*
<http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12672f.pdf>

IISD (2016f, 8 November). *Highlights of Marrakech: Monday, 7 November 2016.*
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12679f.pdf>

IISD (2016g, 10 November). *Highlights of Marrakech: Thursday, 10 November 2016.*
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12681f.pdf>

IISD (2016h, 12 November). *Highlights of Marrakech: 12 November 2016.*
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12683f.pdf>

IISD (2016i, 21 November). *Report of the Marrakech Climate Change Conference: 7-19 November 2016.* Earth Negotiations Bulletin. Vol. 12, No. 689.
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12689f.pdf>

IISD (2017a, 9 May). *Highlights of the Bonn conference: Monday, 8 May 2017.*
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12692f.pdf>

IISD (2017b, 11 May). *Highlights of the Bonn conference: Wednesday, 10 May 2017.*
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12694f.pdf>

IISD (2017c, 16 May). *Highlights of the Bonn conference: Tuesday, 16 May 2017.*
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12698f.pdf>

IISD (2017d, 22 May). *Report of the Bonn Climate Change Conference: 8-18 May 2017.* Earth Negotiations Bulletin. Vol. 12 No. 701
<http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12701f.pdf>

Indonesia (2017). *Submission by the Government of Indonesia.*
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/453_258_131317304102873576-Indonesia%20Submission%20on%20Technology%20Mechanism%20-%20SBI44-11.pdf

ICAT (2017) *ICAT Guidance Public Consultation.*
<http://www.climateactiontransparency.org/icat-guidance-public-consultation/>

Jeyaratnam, E., Whitmore, J., Hokpin, M., & Mountain, W. (2015). *The Paris climate agreement at a glance*

<http://theconversation.com/the-paris-climate-agreement-at-a-glance-50465>

Knutti, R., Rogelj, J., Sedláček, J., & Fischer, E. M. (2015). *A scientific critique of the two-degree climate change target*. *Nature Geoscience*

<https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/usys/iac/iac-dam/documents/group/climphys/knutti/knutti15natgeo.pdf>

United Nations (1992a). UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf>

United Nations (1992b) *Official text of Agenda 21*

<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf>

United Nations (1995). *Declaration and Programme of action of Beijing*

<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20F.pdf>

United Nations (2015). *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E

United Nations (2016a). *Paris Agreement – Entry into Force*. Reference:

C.N.735.2016.TREATIES-XXVII.7.d – Depositary Notification

<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.735.2016-Eng.pdf>

United Nations (2016b) UNFCCC, Ad hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, First session Bonn, 16-26 May 2016, *Provisional agenda item 2b): Organizational matters Adoption of the agenda*

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/apa/eng/l01.pdf>

United Nations (2017). *The Sustainable Development Goals report*

<https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/report/2017/TheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsReport2017.pdf>

Nature Climate Change (2016a). *Science to inform climate policy targets*.

<http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v6/n8/full/nclimate3101.html>

Nature Climate Change (2016b). Volume 6, September 2016, *Science and policy characteristics of the Paris Agreement temperature goal*

<http://www.nature.com/Articles/nclimate3096.epdf>

Nature Climate Change (2017). *Less than 2°C warming by 2100 unlikely*

Adrian E. Raftery, Alec Zimmer, Dargan M. W. Frierson, Richard Startz and Peiran Li.

<https://www.nature.com/Articles/nclimate3352.epdf>

NewClimate Institute (2017). *NDC Update Report – Ambition to Action*

<http://www.ambitiontoaction.net/NDC-Update-Report-May-2017.pdf>

New Zealand (2017). *Submission to SBSTA on the guidance referred to in Article 6(2) of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/55_317_131350636474742143-New%20Zealand%20Submission%20to%20SBSTA%20Article%206.2%20of%20the%20Paris%20Agreement%2027%2003%202017.pdf

Obergassel (Wolfgang), Christof Arens, Lukas Hermwille, Nico Kreibich, Florian Mersmann, Hermann E. Ott, and Hanna Wang-Helmreich (2016). *An Analysis of the Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*
https://wupperinst.org/fa/redaktion/downloads/publications/Paris_Results.pdf

Obergassel, W., Arens, C., Hermwille, L., Kreibich, N., Mersmann, F., Ott, H.E., Wang-Helmreich, H. (2017). *Setting Sails for Troubled Waters. An Assessment of the Marrakech Climate Conference*. Wuppertal Institute Conference Report, March 2017.
<https://wupperinst.org/fa/redaktion/downloads/publications/COP22-report.pdf>

European Parliament (2014). Committee on Budgetary Control *Working document “European Union Climate Finance in the context of External Aid”*
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/cont/dt/1030/1030361/1030361en.pdf

LDC (2017) *Submission by Ethiopia on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group on the scope and modalities of the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism in relation to supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement*.
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/60_258_131320836506107412-ethiopia.pdf

UNEP (2016). *Emissions Gap Report*.
http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/10016/emission_gap_report_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

OECD/IEA (2016). *Unpacking Provisions Related to Transparency of Mitigation and Support in the Paris Agreement*. Climate Change Expert Group Paper No. 2016(2). COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2016)2.
<http://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/Unpacking-transparency-provisions-Paris-Agreement-CCXG-May2016.pdf>

OIF/IFDD (2016). Guide to the Negotiations – COP22, Marrakech, November 2016 OIF/IFDD “Guide to the Negotiations” collection. Guide to the negotiations no. 18.
<http://www.ifdd.francophonie.org/ressources/ressources-pub-desc.php?id=696>

UN Women (2015). *UN Women annual report 2015-2016*
<http://annualreport.unwomen.org/-/media/annual%20report/attachments/sections/library/un-women-annual-report-2015-2016-fr.pdf>

SBSTA (2014). *Submission by Italy and the European Commission on behalf of the European Commission and its member States*
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/75_89_130565446286309205-IT-09-29-NMM%20EU%20submission.pdf

SBSTA (2016). *Reflections Note by the Co-chairs on SBSTA item 13. SBSTA45*.
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_13_reflection_note_by_the_co-chairs.pdf

SBSTA (2017a). *Informal Note by the Co-Facilitators. SBSTA46 agenda item 10(a) – Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement*, Non-paper
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_10a_informal_note_final.pdf

SBSTA (2017b). *Informal Note by the Co-Facilitators. SBSTA46 agenda item 10(b)- Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement*, Non-paper
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_10b_informal_note_final.pdf

SBSTA (2017c). *Informal Note by the Co-Facilitators. SBSTA46 agenda item 10(c) – Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement*, Non-paper
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_10c_informal_note_final.pdf

SBSTA (2017d). *Informal note by the co-chairs on SBSTA item 11*.
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_11_informal_note.pdf

SBSTA and SBI (2017). *Summary of discussions of ad hoc technical expert group on the impact of the implementation of response measures (TEG)*.
http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/response_measures/application/pdf/summary_teg.pdf

SBI (2016). *First workshop for the facilitative sharing of views under the international consultation and analysis process*.
http://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/facilitative_sharing_of_views/application/pdf/20160318_template_fsv_advance_written_questions.pdf

Peters, G. P. (2016). *The 'best available science' to inform 1.5 [deg] C policy choices*. *Nature Climate Change*, 6(7), 646-649.
<http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v6/n7/abs/nclimate3000.html>

Democratic Republic of Congo (2017a). *Submission of Views by the Democratic Republic of Congo on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations on Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement. Views on guidance on cooperative approaches*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/588_317_131355625593706613-CfRN%20SOVs%20art.%206.2-UNFCCC%20SUBMISSION%20COPY.pdf

Democratic Republic of Congo (2017b). *Submission of Views by the Democratic Republic of Congo on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations on Article 6, paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement. Views on rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established under 6.4*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/588_318_131355627122242505-CfRN%20SOVs%20art.%206.4--UNFCCC%20SUBMISSION%20COPY.pdf

Republic of Korea (2017) *The Republic of Korea's Submission on the Scope and Modalities for the Periodic Assessment of the Technology Mechanism*.
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/649_258_131299949176531164-ROK_Submission-Periodic%20Assesment_TM_final.pdf

Republic of Malta (2017) *Submission by the Republic of Malta and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and its Member States*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/783_317_131345685428746919-MT-03-21-EU%20SBSTA%2012a%20b%20and%20c%20EU%20Submission%20Article%206.pdf

Republic of Maldives (2017a) *Submission to the Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement by the Republic of the Maldives on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/167_317_131382181838031501-AOSIS_Submission_Art%206%202%20and%206%204%20of%2020PA.27.04.2017.FINAL.pdf

Republic of Maldives (2017b) *Submission on Non-Market Approaches under Article 6.9 of the Paris Agreement by the Republic of the Maldives on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/69_319_131365551896517845-AOSIS_Submission_Non%20Market_Approaches.pdf

Republic of Mali (2017a) *Submission by the Republic of Mali in behalf of the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) on Guidance on Cooperative Approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement (Agenda sub-item 10 (a))*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/586_317_131350320609564622-Submission%20by%20the%20Republic%20of%20Mali%20on%20behalf%20of%20the%20AGN_SBSTA%2046_Art.%206.2%20March%202017.pdf

Republic of Mali (2017b) *Submission by the Republic of Mali in behalf of the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) on Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement (Agenda sub-item 10 (b))*, Submission to the UNFCCC
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/586_318_131350323555397454-Submission%20by%20the%20Republic%20of%20Mali%20on%20behalf%20of%20the%20AGN_SBSTA%2046_Art.%206.4%20March%202017.pdf

Republic of Mali (2017c) *Submission by the Republic of Mali in behalf of the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) on The Work Programme under the Framework for Non-market Approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement (Agenda sub-item 10 (c))*, Submission to the UNFCCC

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/586_319_131350323960310101-Submission%20by%20the%20Republic%20of%20Mali%20on%20behalf%20of%20the%20AGN_SBSTA%2046_Art.%206.8%20_March%202017.pdf

Republic of Rwanda (2017) *Submission of Views by the Republic of Rwanda on behalf of the Member States of the Central African Forestry Commission (COMIFAC) on Article 6*, Submission to the UNFCCC

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/475_317_131359465186663936-Article%206%20-%20SUBMISSION%20of%20COMIFAC%20countries-%2022%20March%202017_Rwanda.pdf

Robiou du Pont, Y., Jeffery, M. L., Gütschow, J., Rogelj, J., Christoff, P., & Meinshausen, M. (2017). Equitable mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement goals. *Nature Climate Change*, 7(1), 38-43.

Rogelj, J., Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R. C., Kriegler, E., Schaeffer, M., Krey, V., & Riahi, K. (2015). Energy system transformations for limiting end-of-century warming to below 1.5°C. *Nature Climate Change*, 5(6), 519-527.

Rogelj, J., Den Elzen, M., Höhne, N., Fransen, T., Fekete, H., Winkler, H., Schaeffer, R., Sha, F., Riahi, K. & Meinshausen, M. (2016). *Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2 C*. *Nature*, 534 (7609), 631-639.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2017) *Saudi Arabia's Submission on Behalf of the Arab Group on Articles 6.2 and 6.4*, Submission to the UNFCCC

[http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/102_317_131375779687492508-Arab%20Group%20Submission%20on%20Articles%206.2%20%206.4%20\(Revised%20Version\)%20\(002\).pdf](http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/102_317_131375779687492508-Arab%20Group%20Submission%20on%20Articles%206.2%20%206.4%20(Revised%20Version)%20(002).pdf)

Schleussner, C. F., Rogelj, J., Schaeffer, M., Lissner, T., Licker, R., Fischer, E. M., ... & Hare, W. (2016). Science and policy characteristics of the Paris Agreement temperature goal. *Nature Climate Change*, 6(9), 827-835

<http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate3096.html>

SEI (2010). *Together Alone? Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC) and the Climate Change Conundrum*.

<https://www.sei-international.org/publications?pid=1643>.

Sethi N. (2016). *Developed Countries Fight Continuation of Climate Adaptation Fund at Marrakech*; The Wire, published online on 15/11/2016.

<https://thewire.in/80171/climate-adaptation-fund/>

Switzerland (2017) *Submission on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement by Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco, Switzerland*, Submission to the UNFCCC

http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/201_317_131345583000206330-170321_Market_FINAL.pdf

Stiglitz, Joseph E., Stern, N. et al. (2017). *Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices*. Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition. 29 May 2017.

TWN (2016a, 17 May). *Battle of interpretation over Paris Agreement begins*. http://twn.my/title2/climate/news/Bonn18/TWN_update1.pdf

EU (2017) *Scope and modalities for the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism in relation to supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement*. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/783_258_131292290946463493-MT-01-18-EU%20Submission%20Periodic%20Assessment%20TECH%20for%20WPIEI.pdf

EU (2016) *Views on the modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement on the forum on the impacts of the implementation of response measures*. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/75_255_131182350371806620-SK-09-13-EU%20RM%20impact%20implementation.pdf

Venezuela (2017). *Submission by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Views on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement*, Submission to the UNFCCC http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/53_317_131344865972446736-Art6-Venezuela.pdf

Voigt, J. (2016). *Carbon Market Watch*, fourteen lessons from MVR for the future sustainable development and climate finance mechanism. <http://carbonmarketwatch.org/fr/watch-this-ngo-newsletter-14-enseignements-dumdp-pour-le-futur-mecanisme-de-developpement-durable-et-la-finance-climatique/>

World Finance (2016). *The UN's climate fund is failing to invest in those most in need*; published online on 23 September 2016. <https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/the-uns-climate-fund-is-failing-to-invest-in-those-most-in-need>

Yamin, F., & Depledge, J. (2004). *The International Climate Change Regime A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures*. (C. U. Press, Ed.) Cambridge, United Kingdom: Press syndicate of the University of Cambridge. http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/40897/frontmatter/9780521840897_frontmatter.pdf

ENERGIES 2050 was born of the certainty that the development trajectories of our societies are not inevitable. As an informal network since 2007, and as a French non-profit and non-governmental organisation working exclusively in the general interest since 2011, ENERGIES 2050 contributes relentlessly to the transformation of our societies for a more humane, plural and united future.



Gathering members and partners from more than sixty nationalities, ENERGIES 2050 works internationally to set up a new, positive and inclusive development model and to convert constraints into action possibilities. As a collective adventure in the quest for better ways of living together, ENERGIES 2050 has committed to the *Great Transition*, including combating climate change, implementing sustainable development, the energy transition, sustainable cities and regions and the shift towards a more humane, plural and united society, bringing peace and respecting the common goods of humanity.

ENERGIES 2050 breaks its activities down into five complementary areas:

- Executing demonstrative and repeatable projects accompany by technical studies and research actions to show the possibilities.
- Organising or attending meetings and conferences in order to expand the opportunities for exchanges and discussions.
- Publishing research results to pool and share knowledge.
- Educating, training and building the capacities so that each individual can understand, know and act.
- Communicating to the greatest number to inform, mobilise and unit the desire to act.

ENERGIES implements projects in more than thirty countries. ENERGIES 2050 is active in the following topics: eco-development and sustainable development, climate, environmental and energy policies, sustainable cities, challenges and opportunities for action in rural and urban territories, energy transition, development of renewable energy sources, responsible and sustainable tourism, buildings and the construction sector, natural resources and the common goods of humanity, ecological and environmental economics, responsible business dynamics and corporate performance, low-carbon development strategies, gender, environmental education, social dynamics, behaviour change and citizen action and the social solidarity economy.

ENERGIES 2050 is a recognised player in climate change negotiations and in preparing and setting up national and international low-carbon strategies and action programmes. ENERGIES 2050 is also known for successfully introducing concrete mitigation and adaptation projects with huge innovation potential and for deploying essential capacity-building programmes to support country ownership and boost national excellence and that of players involved. ENERGIES 2050 has especially been privileged to support several African countries in preparing their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) and in producing briefing files for submission to the Green Climate Fund. The association also launch *ethiCarbon Afrique** in 2012. This strong, solidarity-based and innovative tool is designed to contribute to a real African energy revolution.

ENERGIES 2050

8 avenue du Docteur Julien Lefebvre – 06270 Villeneuve Loubet – France
info@energies2050.org – www.energies2050.org
+33 (0)6 80 31 91 89

The *Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD – Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development)* is a subsidiary body of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF – International Organisation of the Francophonie) and its headquarters are in Quebec City.

Under its original name of *Institut de l'Énergie des Pays ayant en commun l'usage du Français* (IEPF – Energy Institute for Countries with French as a common language), the IFDD came into being in 1988 following the 11th Summit of the Francophonie held in Quebec in 1987. It was created in the wake of the global energy crises and from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative action to develop the energy sector in member countries. In 1996, the Institute took the resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit 1992 as the major guide for its action and became the *Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie* (Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking World) And in 2013, following the Rio+20 Conference, it was renamed *Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable* (IFDD – Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development).

Its mission is to contribute to:

- training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
- support for development players in initiatives to prepare and implement sustainable development programmes;
- the promotion of the sustainable development approach in French-speaking countries;
- the development of partnerships in the various economic and social development sectors, mainly environment and energy, for sustainable development.

IFDD action falls under the Strategic Framework of the Francophonie, within mission D “Sustainable development, economy and solidarity” and Strategic Objective 7 “Contribute to the preparation and implementation of the post-2015 development programme and sustainable development goals”.

The Institute is in particular lead partner in the following two programmes under the OIF 2015-2018 schedule, implemented in partnership with other OIF units:

- Increase the capacities of target countries to develop and implement national, regional and local sustainable development strategies which are inclusive, participative and results-based;
- Build up the capacities of French-speaking players to allow active participation in international negotiations and decisions on the economic, environment and sustainable development, and their implementation.

The International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) is an institution founded on sharing a language – French – and common values. It currently groups 84 States and governments, including 58 members and 26 observers. The 2014 Report on the French language worldwide sets the number of French speakers at 274 million.

The OIF carries out political and cooperation actions on all five continents in the following priority areas: French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; peace, democracy and human rights; education and training; sustainable development and solidarity. OIF pays special attention in all its actions to young people and women and to access to information and communication technologies.

The Secretary General runs the political action of the Francophonie as its international spokesman and official representative. Mrs Michaëlle Jean has been the Secretary General of the Francophonie since January 2015.

58 member States and governments:

Albania • Principality of Andorra • Armenia • Kingdom of Belgium • Benin • Bulgaria • Burkina Faso • Burundi • Cabo Verde • Cambodia • Cameroon • Canada • Canada-New Brunswick • Canada-Quebec • Central African Republic • Chad • Comoros • Congo • Côte d'Ivoire • Cyprus • Democratic Republic of Congo • Djibouti • Dominica • Egypt • Equatorial Guinea • Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia • France • Gabon • Ghana • Greece • Guinea • Guinea-Bissau • Haiti • Laos • Lebanon • Luxembourg • Madagascar • Mali • Mauritania • Mauritius • Moldavia • Principality of Monaco • Morocco • New Caledonia • Niger • Qatar • Romania • Rwanda • Saint Lucia • São Tomé and Príncipe • Senegal • Seychelles • Switzerland • Togo • Tunisia • Vanuatu • Vietnam • Wallonia-Brussels Federation.

26 observers:

Argentina • Austria • Bosnia Herzegovina • Canada-Ontario • Costa Rica • Croatia • Czech Republic • Dominican Republic • Estonia • Georgia • Hungary • Kosovo • Latvia • Lithuania • Mexico • Montenegro • Mozambique • Poland • Serbia • Slovakia • Slovenia • South Korea • Thailand • Ukraine • United Arab Emirates • Uruguay.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF LA FRANCOPHONIE

19-21 avenue Bosquet, 75007 Paris, France

Tel.: +33 (0)1 44 37 33 00

www.francophonie.org

Guide to the Negotiations assessment form

To assist us in improving the next versions of the *Guide to the negotiations*, we should be grateful if you would assess this version on a scale of 1 to 4, adding your comments below.

1 = **highly satisfactory** 2 = **satisfactory** 3 = **rather unsatisfactory** 4 = **highly unsatisfactory**

Clarity of issues	1 2 3 4
Presentation of main progress from COP21:	1 2 3 4
Presentation of main expectations of COP23 and in achieving objectives:	1 2 3 4
Relevance of the level of detail:	1 2 3 4
Comments on the format:	
Other comments:	

Please forward the form to the following address:

Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD)

56 rue Saint-Pierre, 3rd floor
Quebec City (Quebec) G1K 4A1, Canada
Fax: +1 418 692-5644
E-mail: ifdd@francophonie.org

The reality of climate change is acknowledged unanimously. However, and in spite of international negotiations, it has to be recognised that the progress made over recent decades has been too modest with regard to the many challenges posed and the urgent need to take action. The agreement reached in Paris, in December 2015, at the end of the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is of critical importance in the climate negotiation process. While emphasising different national circumstances and the UNFCCC's founding principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the Agreement reaffirms the necessary raising of ambition and measures to take in order for our societies to develop on low-carbon, resilient and united pathways. However, the challenge of implementation still remains and the next steps are crucial in transforming the collective vision and ambition into reality on the ground.

Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, huge progress has been made in Marrakech (COP 22, Marrakech, November 2016) and Bonn (under the auspices of the 46th session of permanent subsidiary bodies, May 2017) and the contribution of the COP 23 will be central in continuing with the work in progress. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015 and then its entry into force less than a year later in November 2016, the international community has met two of the first major challenges. The goals now need to be made workable, by dealing with the challenges of implementation. Out of all of the points under negotiations, it is vital that the "Spirit of Paris" that has been present since the adoption of the Agreement is maintained in Bonn. The objective being that the aims of the international community are in line with trust and duration, while the Parties were heard in Marrakech to reject certain final decisions concerning the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement until December 2018, during COP 24.

Aimed at helping negotiators to understand better the challenges of the COP 23, this *Guide* the major issues being debated (Part I). Part II proposes a concise summary of the Paris Agreement and the challenges related to achieving the objectives from it, focusing upon the work carried out by the permanent subsidiary bodies and the special Paris Agreement Ad Hoc working group. The major issues at stake are then presented in Part III. Lastly, Part III gives a brief history of the negotiations and presents the UNFCCC structure and the main negotiation groups and their positions. Boxes supplemented by information diagrams and themed sheets provide the reader with all the keys to understand the negotiations.

Although this publication is intended especially for negotiators from Francophone countries, it should also be a useful tool for any other interested stakeholder. The negotiations, which remain the competence of the State Parties to the UNFCCC, will not succeed without the mobilisation of each and everyone of them, especially in terms of achieving the challenge of realising the resulting objectives.



INSTITUT DE LA FRANCOPHONIE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE (IFDD)
56, RUE SAINT-PIERRE, 3^E ÉTAGE, QUÉBEC (QUÉBEC) G1K 4A1 CANADA

The IFDD is a subsidiary body of the International Organisation of the Francophonie.

www.ifdd.francophonie.org